

WWNU (Ger.)

5169

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff Operations Division

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
ARCHIVE
RECEIVED

100-31-200

Copy number 1 of 1

PART A

VOLUME 46

DECLASSIFIED BY DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

June 1943

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

二

二



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DIARY OF THE GEFMAN NAVAL STAFF
(Operations Division)

UNCLASSIFIED

Part A
June 1943

Chief, Naval Staff:
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:

Grand Admiral Doenitz
Vice Admiral Meisel
Rear Admiral Wagner

Volume 46

begun: 1 June 1943
closed: 30 June 1943

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 46 is the twelfth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the micro-film library of Naval Records and Library.

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

Washington, D. C.
1948

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

De Gaulle and Giraud have founded an executive committee in Algiers headed by the two Generals. Algiers was proclaimed the provisional capital of France.

According to a Reuter report, the French squadron at Alexandria is said to be on its way to Algiers in full agreement with Giraud.

It is to be assumed that the ships, which are not in proper condition due to mechanical defects or due to lack of personnel, will sail around South Africa to West Africa, as announced by Admiral Godefroy.

Egypt entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This step is of special importance in view of a forthcoming Allied conference in Cairo.

Admiral Robert wired the Vichy Government that the internal situation on the Antilles is gradually improving. Admiral Robert renewed his assurances to the Government concerning the attitude to be adopted in case of an attack by a foreign power. In reply to this telegram, Laval repeated the order to sink ships and destroy planes immediately. (1/Skl 16563/43 geh.)

For the minutes of the conference of Commander in Chief, Navy with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on 31 May, see 1/Skl 1614/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume VII.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Operations Division reports with regard to the assistance to be rendered to a submarine, which was bombed outside the Bay of Biscay, that at present only three torpedo boats are ready for action on the west coast. Their radius of action, however, will not suffice to reach the scene. Of the destroyers available only one is ready for action. This destroyer cannot put out until tomorrow morning owing to the water level and the closing of navigation on the Gironde at night. Chief, Naval Staff issues instructions that the destroyer be sent out in any case, but no torpedo boats. Furthermore he orders that in the future destroyers, ready for action, be anchored in harbors where there are no channel restrictions. This is not the case with regard to the Gironde.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group West receives an order to this effect from Naval Staff as per l/Skl I a 15914/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II b.

In this connection the Group reports that in the morning of 2 June a destroyer and a large torpedo boat will leave the west coast to render assistance. The 3rd Air Force on its own initiative sent out a crash boat to the scene at noon on 1 June. In the future it is intended to have at least two suitable boats always in Brest ready to give assistance to submarines. The increased danger from the air in this port will be accepted. (l/Skl 15941/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II b). In the harbors the boats should lie far apart from one other.- (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, Tr.N.)

II. Quartermaster General. Naval Staff reports that the PT boats lying in Travemuende with Organization Todt are three Navy boats lent to Organisation Todt and are now to be handed back to the Navy.

III. Chief, Bureau of Naval Administration submits a leaflet dropped by British planes, the second part of which contains instructions for feigning sickness in order to evade duty.

IV. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports that the Food Conference in the United States was concluded without any special result. Certain recommendations were submitted to the Governments.

Sinkings in May 1943, after careful checking, amount to altogether 695,000 BRT. At present enemy tonnage is to be estimated at 31 million BRT. Since the beginning of the war, 27.4 million BRT have been sunk and 15.3 million BRT newly constructed.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Chief, Naval Staff states that the Fuehrer was not particularly receptive to the proposed sabotage operation along the North African Coast. The Fuehrer does not believe that this will greatly disturb the British, as they will not use their own, but French troops for guard and defense purposes.- Nevertheless, the matter will be pursued further; a request to this effect has been made to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. Tr.N.)

The Fuehrer approved the proposal to carry out minelaying off Port Said and Alexandria. At present, however, no planes are available for this task. For details concerning yesterday's discussion at the Berghof, see page 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

I. Naval Ordnance Division, Torpedo Branch reports to Commander in Chief, Navy on the state of development and planning of the anti-destroyer torpedo (code name - "Zaunkoenig"). An immediate increase of personnel - 300 engineers and 1,200 workmen - is requested by the Torpedo Branch as a substantial help. (1/Skl 16063/43 Gkdos.)

Quartermaster Division, Submarine Branch states that for the purpose of making more extended trials with the new torpedo possible, 400 torpedoes will be put at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Submarines. (1/Skl 15929/43 Gkdos.)

II. Naval Intelligence Division submits, in connection with the situation on the eastern front, a report on the organization of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet and brief intelligence report No. 1/43 on the situation. (1/Skl 16225/43 and 16560/43 geh. in War Diary, Annex "Information on the Enemy Situation").

Situation 1 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Ship "28" is requested by Radiogram 1603 to report on the following:

"Shortly before leaving Jokjokarta report via Naval Attaché in Tokio on:

1. Fuel stock.
2. Maximum speed ascertained on passage from Japan to the southern area.
3. Consumption of fuel at cruising speed and maximum speed.
4. Alterations in armaments.
5. Equipment as to planes.
6. Strength of crew, as to officers, petty officers and ratings.
7. Ammunition stock of all weapons.
8. All important changes of interest to Naval Staff as compared with the first trip.
9. Bottlenecks and weak points".

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Air reconnaissance sighted 25 - 30 merchantmen southeast of Harwich, no course mentioned, and 1 destroyer and 2 small naval vessels on the Thames.

In the Bay of Biscay 27 planes were out on operations. In the eastern part of the north Atlantic 3 Russian vessels were located.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla was transferred from Nantes to Donges in immediate readiness for the sea-rescue operation.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Off the North Sea Islands eight ground mines were swept.

A group of minesweepers on the Ems and patrol boats off Terschelling were attacked from the air with machine-guns. Only slight damage.

Boats of the Rhine Flotilla were attacked by British fighters off Flushing and Walcheren. One plane was shot down.

Convoy traffic in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North without incident.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance in the area west of the Faroes and Jan Mayen was without special results. On the north coast of Iceland two merchantmen were sighted on northeasterly course.

In Eina and Motka Bays three merchantmen were sighted.

One submarine was sighted in Kislava Bay and one off Motovski Bay.

A British vessel was located west of Kirkenes.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In the North Sea two planes were out on operation, but the Iceland squadrons sent out no planes.

One of our convoys was shelled by Russian batteries with 320 rounds. One steamer was hit, but was only slightly damaged. Our batteries returned the fire.

Own Situation:

On the morning of 1 June the hospital ship BIRKA, escorted by a patrol boat, sank at the western entrance of the Alta Fjord, after striking a mine which had been cut by the escort vessel.

The air attack on a submarine escort southeast of Eggeroey was unsuccessful.

The floating dock convoy passed Roervik on 1 June.

A submarine-chase carried out near Vesterneset can be considered a success, since repeated air bubbles were observed; engine noises, which had been detected, ceased.

Thirty three steamers were escorted north and 34 south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

On the morning of 1 June, 28 small vessels on easterly course were sighted between Schepel and Seiskari. In the afternoon there were four PT boats west of Lavansaari. There was considerable traffic consisting of towed convoys and motor cutters between Leningrad, Kronstadt and Oranienbaum.

During the night of 31 May Battery "Koenigsberg" was heavily attacked by gunfire. One gun was put out of action.

2. Own Situation:

Five steamers, two transports and two submarines were escorted in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Twenty three vessels and one minesweeping plane cleared channels.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In the future fixed positions will be occupied on the mine-free routes in the area of the Coastal Defense Commanders; they will be reinforced at night.

Submarine control behind net barrages proceeded according to plan.

Sweeping operations on barrage "Wartburg II" were continued.

On the morning of 1 June, a plane sighted an enemy submarine near Porkalla. The submarine was pursued by two minesweepers. Oil traces and air bubbles were observed.

On 1 June Battery "Koenigsberg" sank a large guardboat. Near Tyters an attack by five Russian PT boats was repulsed.

V. Merchant Shipping.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping informs Naval Staff of the disposition of tonnage for May and reports that shipping was opened from Lulea on 3 May. (1/Skl 13574/43).

VI. Submarine Warfare.

Enemy Situation:

No special reports.

Concerning the torpedoing of an unknown ship west of Iceland, reported yesterday, investigation has shown that it is not considered possible that mines remain active after expiry of the time set. At best it is possible that the time setting was not switched on.

Own Situation:

Group "Trutz" did not find the expected convoys. The search by 21 Ju 88's for survivors of the submarine which was sunk by bombs yesterday was without success. Therefore preparations for a search by surface vessels were called off.

Special Items:

In connection with the search for the submarine lost in the Bay of Biscay, Naval Staff, Submarine Division orders that in cases of submarine distress in the coastal waters up to and including the eastern third of grid square BE, Group West is to be informed without delay. (see telegram 1400).

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Of the 3rd Air Force 179 planes were out on operations in the west and 8 in the Mediterranean.

In the course of the search over the Bay of Biscay, four enemy planes were shot down. During the day there were some enemy flights over the west area, but none at night. Mines were probably laid off the Atlantic coast. Our fighter-bombers attacked small places on the south coast of England.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 1 June, 18 of our planes were sent out to bomb Sousse.

3. Eastern Front:

On 1 June, 21 enemy planes were shot down; we lost 2. On 31 May 10 boats were again destroyed in the Sea of Asov.

Special Items:

1. At the request of Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, all demands for fighter cover for convoys in the North Sea area are in the future to be directed to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff via Naval Staff, since Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area cannot decide such matters alone. (1/Skl I L 15827/43 Gkdos.)

2. Naval Staff requests from Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, two helicopters, type F A 223, for trial purposes of the Torpedo Inspectorate, since this plane is specially suitable for sighting and observing torpedo tracks. (1/Skl 15430/43 Gkdos.)

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the evening of 1 June a large convoy consisting of 61 freighters, escorted by 1 auxiliary cruiser, 5 destroyers and 7 minesweepers left Gibraltar, bound for the Mediterranean.

During the night of 1 June Tangiers reports a convoy consisting of 71 ships with probably one aircraft carrier on easterly course.

There are no reports from Task Force "H". Photographic reconnaissance of the harbors in the western Mediterranean during the period 29 May - 31 May revealed an increase of landing craft, especially in the

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Tunisian area. On 29 May there were 20 enemy submarines in Malta and Oran. (1/Skl 15944/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV).

Considerable shipping - including 18 landing craft on easterly course - was reported off Jijelli.

On the Turkish coast destroyers and landing transports were sighted. In the afternoon there were two merchantmen and one destroyer near Beirut.

Submarines at sea are reported near Cape Bon, Messina, on the east coast of Sardinia, south of Corfu and near Palermo.

According to a report from Intelligence Center, Portugal, it is said that in the last week of May Indian troops passed Port Said on their way to Jaffa and Beirut. At the beginning of June further reinforcements of Indian troops are expected in Port Said.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

West of Gibraltar a submarine bound for the Mediterranean was recognized by the enemy. The submarines ordered into the Mediterranean, have therefore received instructions to wait for 48 hours and then to attempt the break-through again.

During the night of 31 May the 7th PT Boat Flotilla carried out minelaying as planned and made numerous locations southwest of Empedocle, probably PT boats on the same course. Pursuit was unsuccessful.

Near Messina a submarine-chaser was out on operation.

Near Cape Ferato (east coast of Sardinia) a moored mine was observed. It is intended to send out auxiliary minesweepers.

In the course of an attack on the sea plane base of Marsala, two planes were destroyed and ten damaged. Three enemy planes were shot down. During the night of 1 June a nuisance raid was carried out on Naples.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Convoy traffic to the islands was carried out as planned. On the way from Taranto to Palermo, the steamer PESKARA (1,047 BRT) temporarily ran aground 65 miles south of Taranto.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

1. The first group of Italian repatriation ships proceeded on to Port Elizabeth after a stop at St. Vincent on the Cape Verde Islands. On 30 May the second group was south of the Canary Islands.

2. The transport staff of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South requests the immediate construction of at least 200 Siebel ferries for use in the Italian area. Engines should be available in sufficient numbers. (see telegram 2210).

The Naval Attaché in Rome was informed of the Naval Staff's request for torpedo supplies needed by the PT Boat Flotilla taken over by the Italians in the Black Sea; he was invited to make a further report on the matter. (see telegram 1706).

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 31 May eight enemy planes flew into the Nish - Belgrade area without attacking.

During the day single planes flew over the west coast of Greece and near Crete. An auxiliary sailing vessel was bombed.

Own Situation:

The minelayers DRACHE and BALETTA arrived at Piraeus from Salonika with mines aboard.

The steamer RIEGEL, which ran aground, has been pillaged. The cargo was not aboard. The possibility of salvaging is being investigated. Escort duties were carried out without incident.

Special Items:

Regarding the reinforcement of coastal batteries on the west coast of Greece, Group South submits a proposal concerning the details. (1/Skl 16047/43 Gkdos.)

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed only slight shipping along the Caucasian coast.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

According to radio intelligence, there were one destroyer and about ten submarines at sea, four of the latter probably in the sea area of the Crimea.

West of Eupatoria a convoy was attacked by a submarine firing four torpedoes; all missed their targets. Submarine-chase is in progress.

Own Situation:

Because of the weather, operations by PT boats had to be cancelled. Naval artillery lighters MAL "1", "2" and "3" are in Temriuk, MAL "8" to "11" are in Constanta and, because of the shortage of escort vessels, MAL "4" is still in Kerch.

The northern supply route in the Strait of Kerch is closed owing to the possible existence of mines there. Traffic is being directed over a circuitous route.

On the Danube between Galatz and Sulina, minesweeping planes have had no success up to now.

Ferry traffic proceeded as planned.

IX. Situation East Asia.

No reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.I. Comments on invasion rumors:

It is reported from Buenos Aires that Roosevelt and Churchill have decided on a large-scale attack against Norway. Sweden and Finland will be occupied later with the aid of Soviet Russia.

The American intention to intensify the war against Japan contradicts this plan, which would also entail for the British and Americans an undesirably close connection with Soviet Russia, if the intention is not thereby to remove Scandinavia from the grip of Russia.

Intelligence Center, China quotes a Russian source which says that Moscow is disappointed about the delay in the Allied offensive. It is said that in the course of a discussion about an offensive against the Balkan States, Stalin expressed the wish that the Dardanelles be opened by Turkey. As a condition of his participation at an Allied conference, Stalin demanded the recognition of Russian claims to the western border, to the Black Sea border and in Iran.

This report is to be regarded with caution.

An agent from Turkey reports the view of the American Military Attaché in Turkey that the Allies are not strong enough to carry out simultaneously a large-scale attack in Europe and in the Far East. The British recommend an attack on the Balkans while, under pressure of public opinion, the Americans in turn demand an attack against Japan. In America it is feared that the considerable progress recently made by the Japanese in China could bring about her total defeat. Therefore it is important to win back the Burma Road, the route to China, as soon as possible. All attempts to arrive at a common strategy with the Soviet Union have failed so far.

II. The Military Attaché wired from Tangiers that the Spanish General Staff in Morocco has no indications that the Allies intend to exert military pressure on Spanish Morocco.

III. Comments from the occupied territories.

1. Admiral Denmark reports:

The attitude of the population has stiffened; they refuse to cooperate. The overwhelming majority of the Danish population declines acts of sabotage.

2. Admiral, Baltic States reports:

The attitude of parts of the population is strongly opposed to cooperation. In consequence of the conscription, escapes from Finland are increasing. Of 7,000 draftees, 2,000 failed to report for duty.

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The conference on the situation was held in the presence of all Chiefs of Divisions and Offices of High Command, Navy. After the report on the daily situation, Chief, Naval Staff made an address. The main problem at present lies in alleviation of the armament crisis, which must enable submarines to operate again with success. (For copy of address see War Diary, Part C, Volume a).

Report on situation by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

The monthly chart, showing positions of enemy submarines in the Mediterranean indicates a strong concentration of submarines around southern Italy and Sicily and an increase in numbers in the Gulf of Genoa.

According to the monthly chart, shipping losses through ground mines, especially in the Baltic Sea, have increased compared with the previous months. (1/Skl I E 16270/43 in War Diary, Part C, Volume XI.)

Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division gives a comprehensive report on the general situation in all theaters of war.

Army Liaison and Land Warfare Section, Operations Division reports on the situation on the eastern front, in the Balkans and described the course of the fighting in Tunisia.

II. Quartermaster General reports that four motor minesweepers and ten naval landing craft have up to now been transferred to Marseilles and that two motor minesweepers and four naval landing craft are on their way.

The Navy has taken over from the Air Force 200 soldiers experienced in handling Siebel ferries and will return a corresponding number of men of Branch 14 (Coast Artillery. Tr.N.) to the Air Force.

The cruiser KOELN was put into service at Kiel as an accommodation ship. At the same time the fleet tender HELA was put at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

III. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports that Churchill is to visit Africa.

The United States are said to have sunk a Japanese battleship entirely with the aid of radio location. This must be a battleship which the

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Japanese admit to have lost in the South Sea.

The harvest in Spain is regarded as below normal because of the great drought. This fact has special political significance since Spain will become even more dependent on imports from overseas.

Other sources regard the harvest prospects generally as very good. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. Tr.N.)

IV. Chief, Underwater Obstacles Branch, Naval Ordnance Division reports that the development of mines has reached a stage where great dangers can be foreseen because the new firing devices no longer permit sweeping of the mines. A number of ships will probably have to use their hulls as a means for sweeping.

V. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament suggests that the main points of to-day's discussion on the situation be made known to a wide circle, for instance to inspectors, etc. Chief, Naval Staff is in complete agreement with such an arrangement. It is intended to call all the Chiefs of the offices concerned to Berlin.

VI. In a Highly Restricted Circle:

Commander, Submarines, Italy suggests that the Mediterranean submarines be used not only in the western, but also in the eastern part of the Mediterranean.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff agrees to the proposal, since a direct participation of the boats in the defense against a landing operation does not promise particular success. For combatting enemy attacks the PT boat is still the best weapon in the Mediterranean, apart from the planes. Chief, Naval Staff is of the same opinion and agrees with the proposal of Commander, Submarines. The attempt to bring submarines through the Straits of Gibraltar, which failed just recently, will be renewed. This is only possible if the boats are not detected beforehand. Naval Staff issues orders to this effect to Commander, Submarines, Italy. (1/Skl Iu 1589/43 Gkdos. Chfs.)

VII. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports that he explained to Ambassador Schnurre of the Foreign Office, in reply to his inquiry, the reasons for the present absence of submarine successes. Ambassador Ritter was also informed. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. Tr.N.)

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items:

I. Bureau of Naval Armament transmits to all offices of the High Command, Navy, the Fuehrer order, dated 31 May. According to this order the submarine construction program is to be stepped up quickly to at least 40 submarines monthly. In proportion to the increase in the number of the submarines the construction of light naval vessels needed for escort and convoy duties must be increased. The Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition received orders to make available the necessary facilities for construction and repair.

Commander in Chief, Navy orders that the necessary inquiries concerning the measures to be taken, be made immediately. Further instructions will be issued with regard to carrying out the program. (1/Skl 16058/43 Gkdos.)

II. General Naval Administration Bureau, Recruitment Division has issued an order that every man suited for the officers' branch be recommended for the officer candidate schools, since the shortage of officers has become acute. (1/Skl 16785/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.)

III. On 2 June there was a discussion between Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Naval Ordnance Division and Quartermaster Division, concerning the new destroyer and torpedo boat constructions. This was for the purpose of attaining agreement on the proposals for new constructions to be reported to Commander in Chief, Navy. (1/Skl 16140/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.)

IV. Naval Intelligence Division submitted a report on the disposition of the British Fleet as at the end of May 1943. (1/Skl 16154/43 Gkdos. in Annex "Foreign Navies.")

V. In the report on "Foreign Merchant Shipping" No. 6/43, Naval Intelligence Division deals with the controlled Swedish shipping overseas. (1/Skl 16807/43 geh. in Annex "Foreign Merchant Shipping").

VI. Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch submitted a summary of planes shot down during the month of April 1943 by naval anti-aircraft guns. Eight planes were definitely shot down; the other 83 reported require confirmation. (1/Skl 16666/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume X).

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Situation 2 June 1943.

I. War in Foreign Waters:

1. Enemy Situation:

It is reported from Buenos Aires that on 26 May 3 large steamers escorted by 1 U.S. cruiser and 2 destroyers left Montevideo.

On 22 May an unknown command station passed the following message to the British Admiralty with reference to previous messages not intercepted here:

"American Army Command ordered that the American army transport SIBONEY (6,938 tons), and GOETHALS (unknown) proceed direct from Capetown to America instead of via Casablanca. The SIBONEY is to refuel in South American ports. In view of the fact that these ships are to take on prisoners of war in Capetown, passengers are not to embark at present, should they intend to do so. The other American ships of convoy WS 30 and (one group missing) will leave (two groups missing) for Capetown and then for Casablanca to take on prisoners of war in the latter port. Ships have the necessary range to reach Freetown.

No American escort vessels."

This decoded message gives proof for the first time of the use of enemy ships for the transportation of prisoners.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio reports that the following agreement was arrived at with the Japanese Navy regarding operations by the MICHEL:

1. Operational area east of 160° W., south of 20° N.
2. Approach route south of Australia; in view of Japanese submarines remain 300 miles away from Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand.
3. Appearance for a short time in the Indian Ocean approved.

The Naval Attaché adds that the MICHEL has been informed.

By shifting the western boundary of the operational area in the Pacific Ocean to 160° W., Ship "28" has been granted a substantial and very favorable extension of the operational area.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

The Naval Attaché in Tokio was informed of the voyage of the submarine MARKO POLO to Japan.

1. On 28 May the MARKO POLO was halfway between Monrovia and Natal (Brazil). Probable arrival at Penang 21 July. Will require 230 cbm of Diesel oil there.

2. Submarine will proceed surfaced. Attacks permitted up to 90° E. Will proceed from approximately 42° S, 20° E direct to the position 0° and 89° E given by the Japanese Navy. Procedure as far as this point as in enemy waters, that is submerging if the enemy is sighted, especially in case of planes which are the chief danger.

3. On passage from point of destination to point of rendezvous 6° 10' N., 94° 50' E, the submarine will submerge when sighting planes, with the exception of the single-engined carrier-borne monoplane, which will meet the submarine on "X" day, one hour after sunrise. Only proceed surfaced if the Japanese Navy guarantees that there are no enemy planes in the area.

4. Agreement with Yokoi has been reached that on passage through the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean no submarines must be attacked unless recognized without doubt as enemy vessels.

5. From the point of destination, recognition markings agreed as this is on the border of the operational area.

6. Further orders concerning recognition markings will follow. Dependent on reply to 3.

(1/Skl 1594/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume I).

By Radiogram 0110, the Naval Attaché in Tokio received the names for reference points for motor ship BOGOTA, which will act as supply vessel.

"Ship 28" arrived at Jokjokarta (Batavia) on 30 May and will probably leave for the operational area on 3 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

A northbound convoy consisting of 22 merchantmen was sighted northwest of Cape Ortegal and a single merchantman northeast-bound 500 miles west of Cape Villano.

Thirty eight planes were out on operation over the Bay of Biscay.

One enemy vessel each was located near Iceland, west of Gibraltar and west of Cape Villano.

According to an agent report from London, about 70 ships of one type are being assembled in all small ports along the west coast of Cornwall for purposes of transporting troops and tanks.

2. Own Situation:

Off Lorient and Brest three mines were swept.

Destroyer Z "24" has transferred to Brest.

Because of the weather, patrol positions were not taken up. In the harbor of Alderney, a floating crane was torn loose and driven off by the storm.

Special Items:

Group West intends to close a gap through our mine barrages, used by enemy PT boats, with UMB mines with snag line. Naval Staff agrees with this plan. (Codeword "Leuchtkaefer") (1/Skl 1590/43 Gkdos. Chfs. and 1/Skl I E 16073/43 Gkdos.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

The tug MEMMERT has been towed into Borkum after being damaged by a mine north of Schiermonnikoog.

One mine was swept north of Ameland.

Convoy traffic in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North without special incident.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence established four Russian submarines on operations.

On 2 June a minesweeper was ordered to Gorodetzki.

Five enemy planes were on operations over the North Sea. No planes of the Iceland squadrons were sent out.

According to a reliable agent, two cruisers left Hval Fjord on 29 May.

In the evening of 31 May and in the morning of 1 June enemy planes attacked a fishing smack and a battery; only slight damage was caused.

In the afternoon of 1 June a Spitfire appeared east of Kafjord and one east of Langfjord. It is certain that the enemy located anchorages

Own Situation:

At the place where the hospital ship BIRKA sank two additional anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut on 2 June. One hundred and fifteen men of the hospital ship are missing.

It is stated that north of Aalesund a cutter landed six men. This is being investigated.

The floating dock convoy bound for Narvik passed Sandnesjoen on 2 June.

Thirty two ships were escorted north and 23 south.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic 4 transports, 3 steamers, 1 tanker and 2 submarines were escorted. Twenty eight vessels were engaged in sweeping channels. Behind the net barrages in the Gulf of Finland, submarine and barrage patrol was carried out without special events. An attack by a Russian flying boat was repulsed.

The sweeping of "Wartburg" Barrage 2 is in progress. About ten to fourteen more days will be necessary.

The declared area off Windau was swept and is open for shipping.

During the night of 1 June Finnish patrol boats attacked Russian patrol boats south of Saivasto and set one on fire. An engagement took place between Finnish PT boats and guard boats and Russian guard boats north of Schepel in the evening of 30 May when the Finnish PT boats attacked a convoy. No special success was observed.

V. Merchant Shipping.

Naval Intelligence Division submits confirmed enemy merchant shipping losses for May. Altogether 151 ships totalling 687,423 BRT were sunk. (1/Skl 16749/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XI.)

VI. Submarine Warfare:

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

West of Iceland a submarine had an engagement lasting 80 minutes with a Catalina flying boat without sustaining particular damage.

Off Freetown a submarine sank a tanker of 11,000 BRT out of a convoy. Near Capetown a steamer of 5,000 BRT was sunk.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Eighty five planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operations in the west area and 6 in the Mediterranean sector.

Three hundred miles northwest of Brest and 300 miles southwest of Brest a Mosquito and a Sunderland were shot down. In the course of the day there was only slight enemy air activity; machine-gun attacks were directed against trains. Two planes were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns. During the night of 2 June there was no air activity.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Concerning the attack against Sousse during the night of 1 June, remarkably heavy anti-aircraft defense is reported. Five of our planes failed to return.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The convoy reported from Tangiers during the night of 1 June and the one which left Gibraltar on easterly course in the evening of 2 June, have not been detected again.

On 2 June the mine-cruiser ADVENTURE called at Gibraltar for several hours. Slight merchant shipping in Gibraltar. In the morning of 2 June, 22 landing craft put out for the Mediterranean.

No reports received regarding Task Force "H".

Photographic reconnaissance of Bone and Arzeu at noon of 2 June gave no confirmation of the departure of convoys. Northeast of Bone there were 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers and about 10 small ships.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Photographic reconnaissance of Benghazi showed that there were only 4 freighters and 6 landing craft in the harbor.

During the night of 2 June Pantelleria was again shelled from the sea by four enemy vessels.

According to a photograph, the following boats were in the harbor of Sousse in the evening of 2 June:

- 1 landing boat transport,
- 19 landing boats,
- 1 freighter,
- 11 landing craft, leaving harbor,
- 3 landing boats, apparently sunk.

During the night of 2 June a ship, probably a destroyer, was reported southwest of Favignna (west of Trapani).

On 1 June enemy submarines were northwest of Messina and on 2 June west of Messina and off Valona.

During reconnaissance between Rhodes and Crete and along the Nile Delta no enemy ships were sighted.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Two Italian submarines were in the operational area.

Because of the weather, the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla had to call off a thrust against the Tunisian coast during the night of 1 June.

Two Aegean boats entered a small harbor near Nettunia on 1 June.

In the course of the morning, Cagliari was attacked by fighters; slight damage was caused.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

During the night of 1 June a convoy, on passage from Taranto to Messina, was attacked near Cape Spartivento by surface forces. The steamer POSTUNIA (595 BRT) was beached and the steamer VRAGNIZZA (1,541 BRT) was damaged and put into Messina. There are no reports from the escorting torpedo boat CASTORE.

Transport traffic to the islands proceeded without special incidents.

The minelayers BRANDENBURG and POMMERN left Marseilles for transfer to German Naval Command, Italy.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Five tank-barges left Marseilles eastbound.

Special Items:

Group West suggests using the large tankers CHAMPAGNE and ROSILLON, designed for the transport of tanks, for the transport of lighters, cranes and launches and requests German Naval Command, Italy to dispatch the two tankers at once. (Telegram 1750).

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Single planes bombed various islands in the Aegean Sea.

An auxiliary sailing vessel and one of our Q-ships were attacked from the air without sustaining particular damage.

Own Situation:

The central barrage in Suda Bay has been completed.

Transport duties as planned.

I. Special Items:

Naval Staff instructs Group South to select and prepare for future use bases and operational harbors for PT boats and motor minesweepers in the Aegean Sea. (1/Skl I a 16087/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.)

II. The Foreign Office has been asked by the Fuehrer Headquarters for its views concerning the attitude of Turkey on a possible shifting of the supply traffic to Greece to the eastern route. Naval Staff clearly stated to the Foreign Office its opinion that traffic through the Dardanelles so far has proceeded without friction and that Naval Staff foresees no change even if traffic is increased. The Foreign Office is of the same opinion. (1/Skl 16007/43 Gkdos.)

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance established only slight shipping along the Caucasian coast. One motor minesweeper was sighted near Tuapse.

CONFIDENTIAL

2 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

During the night of 1 June 4 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla and two motor minesweepers laid mines in the sea area northwest of Gelendzhik without being observed. Afterwards the landing place at Myschako was attacked with two torpedoes. Results were not observed.

Four PT boats, newly assigned, arrived at Sevastopol

On 1 June an enemy submarine which had attacked a convoy near Eupatoria on 1 June was attacked with depth-charges and gunfire. The boat showed slight traces of oil.

On 2 June a convoy was attacked several times by enemy planes near Eupatoria. A steamer sprang a leak as a result of bomb hits and was temporarily beached. The ship has been in tow since the morning of 3 June.

An air attack on Mariupol caused no damage. Moderate damage was caused by an air attack on Anapa. Ferry traffic proceeded according to plan.

Special Items:

Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division has ordered that the icebreakers WIDDER and DELPHIN be used as harbor tugs. Group South reports that the tugs - after several weeks of rebuilding - were converted into remote minesweepers and requests that they be left at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea as naval vessels. Shipping and Transport Branch, Quartermaster Division complies with the request of the Group. (Telegram 2100 and 1/Skl 1688/43 geh.)

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

The First Lord of the Admiralty stated in the House of Commons that the past month has been the best of the war with respect to ships sunk by submarines. The more favorable situation in the Battle of the Atlantic is due to the increase in escort forces, in respect to ships as well as planes, and also to the ever increasing quantity of new weapons and apparatus.

The Foreign Office reports that additional information on the discussions in Washington confirms that Churchill's opinion prevailed. Consequently it was decided to defeat Germany first and then to attack Japan.

The Military Attaché in Rome reports that some parts of the Italian population and Armed Forces are suffering from defeatism. On the one hand there is the desire to become independent of Germany's leadership as much as possible, on the other hand there is the necessity to ask for German assistance. If this assistance is insufficient the Italian will lose the willpower to defend his country. Future co-operation must take into account the special mentality of the Italians who wish to keep the leadership in Italian hands, at least to all outward appearances.

Between Germany and Turkey economic agreements have been reached which have had a satisfactory result and justify the conviction that Turkey is determined to remain neutral now and in the near future. (1/Skl 16458/43 Gkdos.)

Report of Recruitment Division, General Naval Administration Bureau on personnel requirements of the Navy to be presented in connection with the intensified Construction Program.

Recruitment Division has carried out a thorough investigation into the personnel situation and the demands in connection with the new construction program and has come to the conclusion that by fall 1944 272,000 more men will be required. (For particulars see 1/Skl 16137/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Volume V).

Chief, General Naval Administration Bureau reports that the main reason for the shortage in Navy personnel is because the Navy has up to now withdrawn its demands in favor of the eastern front. In spite of this, the view still prevails - according to a report by Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division - in many non-naval circles that the Navy is extremely well supplied with

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

personnel. An inspection of the offices in Germany, carried out by General von Unruh, showed that a certain number of personnel can still be withdrawn. This number, however, has already been taken into consideration in the statement of the Recruitment Division.

Chief, Naval Staff states that it is impossible to carry out the construction program without a basic solution of the question of manpower. If naval warfare, previously neglected, is to be carried out to the extent planned, there must be a fundamental, strategic change in the attitude of the Fuehrer and concentration must also be shifted to matters of personnel. Chief, Naval Staff requests, apart from personnel demands, a report as to the consequences which will arise should these not be fulfilled, not only as far as it affects the military, but also the manpower situation.

Bureau of Naval Armament is ordered to state similar demands for workers as Recruitment Division has done in respect to military personnel.

In this connection Bureau of Naval Armament has requested Chief, Naval Staff to effect an immediate exemption for workers employed in the torpedo and communications industry. Chief, Naval Staff will personally settle this question with Minister Speer.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that classification has been effected of work in the various branches of radar research.

A report is made regarding the so-called "Rotterdam" gear of the enemy, in which reflective location gear is coupled in an ingenious manner with television. This development is new to us and will be followed up.

Special Items.

I. Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division has issued an order for preparation and withdrawal of batteries and personnel for special tasks of coastal defense. (1/Skl. Qu A II 1583/43 Gkdos. Chfs.)

II. Chief, Radio Monitoring Reports, Naval Communications Division submits results of radio intelligence and monitoring in Special Radio Monitoring Report No. 22/43.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Situation 3 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Ship "28" received the following instructions in answer to request for supplies:

"Assignment of a ship to supply "Ship 28" will probably be impossible in September, since the BRAKE and SCHLIEMANN are required for submarine operations. Arrange to leave the operational area about the end of September, and subsequently take on supplies in the area of Southern Japan. " (1/Skl 1607/43, Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.)

2. It was confirmed to Ship "28" that the Japanese Navy has agreed to the appearance of Ship "28" in the Indian Ocean and has extended the operational area in the Pacific to the west up to 160° W. (1/Skl 1591/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.)

3. The Naval Attaché in Tokio suggests that the thanks of Commander in Chief, Navy be expressed to the Japanese Navy for meeting the two raiders Ship "10" and Ship "28". The Naval Attaché in Tokio has been instructed to express these thanks personally in the name of the Commander in Chief, Navy. (1/Skl 15860/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.)

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty eight planes were on operations over the Bay of Biscay. British vessels were located west of Brest and west of Porcupine Bank.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Stormy weather prevented minesweeping and escort activity.

Destroyer Z "32" has been ready for operations again since 3 June.

Channel Coast:

On account of stormy weather no patrol, minesweeping or escort duties.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The floating crane, which broke loose in the harbor of Alderney, was sighted east of Barfleur. Salvaging is not possible at present because of the weather.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

One ground mine was swept north of Norderney. Because of the weather, escort and minesweeping operations were restricted. Patrol positions were taken up.

Near Beverland one tanker and one ferry were attacked with machine-guns by enemy planes.

Special Items:

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North submits the monthly report on activities in his area during the month of May. (1/Sk1 16182/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume IIa).

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance near the Faroes, Jan Mayen and in the Strait of Denmark was without results.

Seven planes were detected over the North Sea and five in the Iceland area.

A Russian battery on the Ribachi Peninsula shelled the entrance to Petsamo, firing several rounds.

Air reconnaissance detected an enemy-occupied radio installation on Hope Island (Southeast of Spitsbergen).

Own Situation:

Near the position where the hospital ship BIRKA sank, another anti-submarine inertia-contact mine was cut. An air attack on Kyberg caused only slight damage. One plane was shot down.

The floating dock convoy bound for Narvik passed Rotvaer at noon on 3 June.

Twenty one ships were escorted north and 24 south.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

During the night there were many towed convoys in Kronstadt Bay. When fired at they laid dense smoke screens and returned the fire.

In the Voronka sector an enemy assault company was repelled.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic one steamer, one tanker and one submarine were escorted. Nineteen vessels were engaged in sweeping channels.

Patrol behind the "Nashorn" and "Seeigel" barrages was carried out according to plan. Work on barrage "Wartburg II" is being continued.

On 3 June a submarine was attacked near Vaindlo. There were large bubbles of air and oil.

Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reports details about the destruction of three submarines recently effected by naval landing craft. He requests that these sinkings should not be announced for the time being because the present season is very favorably for submarine-chasing and the Russians, becoming aware of this, might stop sending out further submarines.

On 2 June a Finnish steamer was unsuccessfully attacked with aerial torpedoes near Leosund.

Special Items:

Naval Staff points out to Naval Station Baltic and Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic that Russian submarines possibly have their training area in Kronstadt Bay west of 29° 30' E, and requests proposals for laying LMB mines. (1/Skl I E 16138/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume III.)

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

On 30 May a Spanish steamer sighted a convoy consisting of 37 vessels on northerly course 90 miles west of the Straits of

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Gibraltar. On 31 May the same ship sighted 16 large PT boats 150 miles west of Casablanca on northerly course. Presumably these were landing craft.

2. Own Situation:

A minelaying submarine laid mines off Halifax. According to a radio monitoring report seven mines were already sighted shortly after laying.

In the Bay of Biscay or on return passage from the North Atlantic four submarines were lost again. As far as these losses occurred in the Bay of Biscay, they can only be attributed to surprise attacks by planes. It is likely that new means of defense are being used by the enemy, in particular he seems to have developed a very heavy depth-charge.

Special Items.

Of the nine Italian submarines provided for transport purposes, three were lost, two as **operational** boats and one on outward passage as the first transport boat in the Bay of Biscay.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Sixty one planes were on operations in the west area and four in the Mediterranean.

Over the Bay of Biscay three enemy planes were shot down.

There were only a few flights into the west area during the day and none during the night.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our fighter-bombers were sent out against shipping targets near Cape Bon and reported two hits on two vessels.

3. Eastern Front:

On 2 June 83 Soviet planes were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft guns, especially in the area of Kursk.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items:

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff informed Naval Staff about intentions to strengthen the forces of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast. The intended measures will entail a noticeable improvement for reconnaissance and long-range bombers, but not yet for clearing the Bay of Biscay. (1/Skl 15896/43 Gkdos.)

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the evening of 2 June Tres Forcas reported 20 - 25 tank landing craft on easterly course, probably the vessels that left Gibraltar in the morning of 2 June.

According to photographs, Task Force "H" is neither in Oran nor in Mers el Kebir.

Air reconnaissance reports 80 - 90 ships and 20 - 30 patrol boats northeast of Cape Serat, most of them with LCT's and LCA's aboard and equipped with anti-torpedo nets. Off Oran a convoy is reported putting in, presumably the large convoy which passed Gibraltar on 1 June.

Near Cape Bon small shipping was observed.

Enemy submarines are reported near Bari and Cape Carbonata (south of Sardinia).

Reconnaissance of coastal waters between Alexandria and Sollum on 3 June sighted nothing.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

PT boats could not be sent out on account of the weather.

Nine auxiliary motor minesweepers were sent out off the southeast coast to check-sweep a sea area.

No reports received up to now.

The minelayers POMMERN and BRANDENBURG, together with an Italian destroyer, carried out minelaying off the south coast of Sardinia on 3 June.

Anti-aircraft corvette SG "11" arrived at Genoa on 3 June from Marseilles.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

No special air attacks on Italy are reported. In the evening of 3 June single planes dropped bombs on Reggio.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The steamers POSTUMIA and VRAGNIZA, which were attacked near Cape Spartivento, have anchored at the Messina roads. The fire on the VRAGNIZA has been extinguished. The torpedo boat CASTORE covered both steamers in an all-out operation and was sunk in the course of the engagement.

The tanker DESPREZ (9,802 BRT) bound for the Aegean Sea, was torpedoed by a submarine 70 miles north of Messina. The ship lies helpless and is listing. Tugs and a submarine-chaser are on the way to assist her.

Other convoy service to the islands was carried out as planned.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 2 June an enemy submarine unsuccessfully attacked a steamer lying in the harbor of Carlovasi (Samos) with a torpedo.

On 2 June one submarine each was reported near Naxos, east of Piraeus and northeast of Athens. The latter sank 2 auxiliary sailing vessels.

Enemy flights over the Aegean Sea and Greece have increased. Four enemy planes attacked the harbor of Porto Naussa on Paros.

Convoy service was carried out as planned.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 2 June Anapa was shelled from the sea. The enemy vessels could not be recognized. During an air attack on Berdjansk one harbor defense vessel was damaged. Slight damage was caused in Anapa and none in Feodosiya.

Own Situation:

On 3 June at noon the 1st PT Boat Flotilla put out into the sea area of Sotschi for operations.

Minesweeping in the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch achieved no success.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The steamer HEINBURG, which ran aground temporarily yesterday, was unsuccessfully bombed near Ak Mechet. She entered the harbor. A towed convoy was attacked between Mariupol and Taganrog with bombs and machine-guns. Only slight damage was sustained. The convoy entered Taganrog.

Ferry traffic was carried out as planned.

Shipping on the Danube is again open to German vessels between Galatz and Sulina.

Shipping of supplies by the Navy to the Gotenkopf and to the Mius front amounted in May to 54,223 tons of goods, apart from soldiers, vehicles and guns.

Special Items:

Group South reports about a discussion between Commanding Admiral, Black Sea and Commander in Chief, 4th Air Force according to which fighter cover cannot be provided for the convoys to the Crimea, Anapa and Asov; the anti-aircraft defense of Sevastopol and Feodosiya cannot be increased. The Group proposes that anti-aircraft in these ports, which are vital for supplies to the Army, be reinforced by withdrawing anti-aircraft units from the land front. (see telegram 1350).

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

With regard to the negotiations in Algiers, a joint Anglo-American declaration has been published containing three aims of common policy. These are:

1. Maintenance of the favorable conditions which are necessary for using North Africa as a base for further attacks against the Axis.
2. Every assistance to local authorities towards solving economic problems.
3. Support of efforts by the French to attain unity and form a Government which will represent the interests of France until the Motherland has been liberated.

The Parliamentary Secretary of the British Ministry of War Transport stated that the supply center for the Middle East has made possible a drastic reduction of tonnage for civilian consumer goods. This was achieved by restricting imports to the minimum and by better exploitation of local resources.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Quartermaster General reports that the barges destined for Norway will be transferred by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to Italy as far as they are suitable for transportation.

II. Chief, Policy Branch, Naval Personnel Division reports that it was possible to meet a request by the Torpedo Branch, Naval Ordnance Division for specialized personnel by providing 300 torpedo mechanics. Attempts must be made to meet the request for skilled workers by drawing them from the front.

III. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division states that a committee has been formed in Algiers representing the French central authority. The presidents are De Gaulle and Giraud. In the U.S.A. 500,000 miners are at present on strike. According to official data available, 47,000 civilians have been killed in England and 17,000 in Germany by air raids.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division stated the operational area in the Pacific Ocean granted to ship "28" by the Japanese Navy.

V. The question of the designation of ships carrying prisoners of war on board is still open.

No measures can yet be taken on the part of Naval Staff.

Special Items:

I. An agent reports from Portugal that the highest degree of alarm has been ordered for the American and British intelligence service in Lisbon from 15 June to 7 July. According to statements of the American Naval Attaché, the main assault is to be carried out against Norway with simultaneous actions against Italy and Greece. (see Telegram 1712).

II. Naval Staff, Operations Division informs Quartermaster, Fleet Branch that a decision on the dockyard periods of the Task Force cannot be made until the summer. Plans for the LUETZOW can be set for the period 1 Oct. 42 - 1 Feb. 1943. (Obviously meant to read 1 Oct. 1943 - 1 Feb. 1944. Tr.N.) (1/Skl I op 16155/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume d).

III. The German armistice commission, Naval Group, submits, in agreement with Group West, reprisal demands for the withdrawal of the forces in Alexandria. (see Telegram 2220).

Situation 4 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Over the Bay of Biscay 23 enemy planes were detected. One British vessel each was located by radio intelligence 360 miles west of

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Brest, 290 miles southwest of Reykjanaes and 450 miles south of Cape Farvell.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Three ground mines were swept off the Gironde and near La Pallice. Destroyers Z "24" and Z "32" put into Brest.

Owing to the weather only five patrol positions were taken up in the southern part of the Bay of Biscay.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 3 June the floating crane, which broke loose at Alderney, was lost from sight. Owing to the weather no patrol positions were taken up.

The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla laid barrage "Birke" (G VII) northwest of Cherbourg.

Special Items:

Concerning the situation in the Bay of Biscay:

Chief, Naval Staff reports to the Fuehrer that three submarines have again been lost through enemy planes in the Bay of Biscay, and that the Navy's own measures are exhausted.

Therefore Chief, Naval Staff requests that the situation in the Bay of Biscay be cleared up by immediate, concentrated operations on a large-scale by fighter-bombers and that, in addition, a continuous and more effective patrol than before of the submarine routes be assured.

Chief, Naval Staff points out that continuation of submarine warfare is being decidedly jeopardized by the effect of the enemy air force. (1/Skl 16241/43 Gkdos. in files I L 2 Vol. V).

Chief of the Air Force General Staff and Air Commander, Atlantic Coast were informed of this telegram at the same time.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has issued orders to the 3rd Air Force, in connection with submarine losses, to ensure the rescue of crews of submarines which have been sunk or put out of

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

control within the range of the Air Force. The 3rd Air Force is to work in closest co-operation with Commanding Admiral Submarines. A BV 222 is to be equipped for air-sea rescue and provided for this purpose at once, at the expense of reconnaissance tasks. (1/Skl 16300/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume V).

One submarine was specially equipped for detection of enemy location planes in the Bay of Biscay, but was bombed soon after leaving the harbor and had to return. At the moment no other boats are ready for this purpose. For night patrol against enemy location planes, the Air Force had, in co-operation with Chief, Naval Communications Division and Group West, started to install the proper equipment in a FW 200 and two He 111's. However, since all means must be made available, radio control is also necessary in the Bay of Biscay during the day. For this Group West had proposed planes, type Do 217. However, according to the opinion of the senior communication officer of Commander in Chief, Air Force, these planes are not very suitable for this area. Consequently Naval Staff requests Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff to investigate use of types of plane which will meet requirements as to area and are able to evade enemy planes in the central part of the Bay of Biscay. Planes of type Ju 188 are proposed. (1/Skl 16089/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume V and 16268/43 Gkdos. in files I L 2 Volume V.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Off Helder a minesweeping group was attacked by six British fighters. Only slight casualties were sustained. The boats were damaged by machine-guns. One plane was shot down and another one was set afire.

Escort service in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North was carried out without special events.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

In the morning of 4 June air reconnaissance sighted: northwest of Svatoj Noss 4 steamers and 2 patrol boats lying at anchor; in Orlovski Bay 1 steamer and 1 motor minesweeper; southeast of Orlovski Bay 2 steamers and in Yokonga 7 steamers.

Fourteen planes over the North Sea and four of the Iceland squadrons were detected.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Enemy flights are reported in the area of Banak, Vardoe and Kyberg. One plane was shot down by Battery "Kyberg".

Own Situation:

Eight mines have now been cut at the point where the hospital ship BIRKA went down. One mine was swept south of Arnoey.

The floating dock convoy bound for Narvik put in there in the afternoon of 3 June.

In the evening of 4 June the steamer ALTENFELS (8,132 BRT) was sunk in Kors Fjord by two torpedoes fired from enemy PT boats.

Thirty four ships were escorted north and 27 south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Many towed convoys were observed during the night of 3 June between Kronstadt and Oranienbaum and Kronstadt and Leningrad. There was lively enemy air reconnaissance.

One of our minesweeping units was bombed near Tyters. No damage was sustained.

2. Own Situation:

In the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, 2 transports, 2 steamers and 1 submarine were escorted. One mine was swept off Grenaa. Danish minesweepers swept two mines in the Schulzgrund.

Operations Staff, Baltic reports that from eight mine-exploding vessels available in the entire Baltic area only three are ready for action and five are lying in dry dock.

Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic has confirmed the destruction of two additional submarines which were attacked by the 31st Minesweeping Flotilla. Thus it can be assumed for certain that so far six boats have been destroyed.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

East of Hogland Finnish planes attacked one submarine with depth-charges. In view of hydrophone detections the Finns presume one enemy submarine to be near Ruskaeri.

Work is being continued on Barrage "Wartburg II". Patrol behind the "Seeigel" and "Nashorn" barrages was carried out by 34 vessels according to plan.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

It is reported from Las Palmas that a convoy was assembled in Pernambuco on 15 May and is said to comprise three large cargo steamers and three large passenger ships. Nine naval vessels are said to be acting as escort. The ships are carrying war materiel and allegedly 25,000 American soldiers.

2. Own Situation:

In the Atlantic three submarines were successful in warding off air attacks.

Between Pernambuco and Freetown a submarine sank the Greek steamer BORRIS (5,166 BRT). The boat reports routine reconnaissance near Ascension.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Seventy six planes were on operation in the west area and six in the Mediterranean.

At noon 15 FW 190's attacked Eastbourne. During the night single harrassing attacks were carried out against Bristol and Birmingham by one Ju 88 each.

Slight enemy air activity was reported in the course of the day and none at night.

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the evening of 4 June 19 bombers attacked Algiers. The target was covered by a smoke screen. Two planes are missing.

3. Eastern Front:

Twelve hundred and fifty seven enemy planes were destroyed in the month of May as compared with 143 losses on our part.

Altogether 80 vessels were observed on 4 June in the lagoons of the Sea of Asov. Eight vessels were sunk.

4. Northern Waters:

Two patrol boats were sunk and one destroyer damaged in a fighter-bomber attack in the Bay of Motovski on 3 June.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Twenty landing boats left Gibraltar in the afternoon of 4 June bound for the Mediterranean.

According to radio intelligence Task Force "H" is at sea.

Photographic reconnaissance of La Valetta showed that not even one of the submarines sighted there on 29 May is still lying in port. A decrease in the numbers of cruisers and destroyers was established in Bone. In the period from 1 to 4 June the landing craft in Bizerta have increased from 3 to 27. In addition there is an increase of LCT's, LCI's and LCA's.

A large convoy is reported north of Algiers. Because of fighter cover details could not be ascertained.

Five patrol boats each were sighted on westerly course near Cape Tenes and near Algiers. Off Bizerta there was a convoy of about 20 freighters. Destroyers and small vessels are reported in the area of Bizerta, Pantelleria and Malta. In La Valetta on 4 June there were: 3 light cruisers, 5 destroyers, 2 LST's, 5 patrol boats and 5 freighters. Eighty miles west of Alexandria there was a westbound destroyer.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Minelayers POMMERN and BRANDENBURG coming from Sardinia¹ put into Naples.

PT boats were not out on operation. North of the Messina Strait one German and one Italian submarine chaser carried out submarine-chase without success.

The enemy attacked an auxiliary airfield north of Foggia. Barracks and the workshop sustained heavy damage. Eleven of our planes were destroyed, four damaged and one shot down. In the course of an attack on the airfield at Trapani the Italian workshop was damaged; five of our planes were destroyed, one damaged and three shot down. An attack on Catania caused no special damage.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Escort service to the islands without special events.

The tanker DESPREZ, torpedoed north of Messina, sank.

Special Items:

1. On the basis of enemy strength as regards landing craft, the 2nd Air Force gives an estimate of the possible landing operations in the Mediterranean. D-day 3 June.

With the landing facilities available at the beginning of June in the Mediterranean between Gibraltar and Tripoli, eight American task forces, or six British task forces, or five American and three British task forces can be carried in one wave. As main area of departure the ports of Mers el Kebir, Oran, Arzeu, Jijelli, Bizerta and Sousse are named. Naval reconnaissance in the Gulf of Gabes could not be carried out because of heavy defense, so that no data are available on the landing forces in this area.

The 2nd Air Force reports that owing to the lack of necessary facilities, reconnaissance of the eastern part of the Mediterranean cannot be carried out to the extent necessary. At present, data on the concentrations of forces which could be sent out against the Peloponnesos are incomplete. (1/Skl 16308/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol XIV).

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. The Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean reports that no further acceleration in the procurement and passing of barges through the locks can be effected now that all military offices have given their fullest support; everything is being done to prepare the barges. A speed-up can only be effected in the repair sector. Therefore the Deputy requests that the barges be given highest degree of priority. (See Telegram 2125.)

Group West reports the actual situation regarding barges. According to this report 82 barges are on French canals on their way to Marseilles and 152 are lying in river shipyards for rebuilding. Thirty freight-barges are expected to leave Marseilles by the end of the month. In July a considerably larger number can be expected, but only a part of them will be converted and reinforced. (See Telegram 1745.)

Twenty tons of iron per vessel will be required for conversion into seaworthy barges. With regard to the good summer weather in the Mediterranean, Group West intends to put into operation as soon as possible the largest possible number of ships and to use all vessels, the engines of which are in order. Reinforcement is to be installed only in the case of those barges on which lengthy engine repairs are anyway required. (See Telegram 1540.)

3. Group West reports that on 2 June a Red Cross ship did not take the ordered course to Spain, and is therefore in danger of running into our own minefields. Naval Staff informs the Group that on 21 May directions as to course were given to the Red Cross, but that no confirmation has yet been received that all ships have properly been informed. Therefore, the laying of barrages H 3 and H 4 will have to be delayed for the time being. Other barrages may be laid. The attention of the Red Cross will again be drawn to course instructions. (see Telegram 1756 and 1/Skl I E 16247/43 Gkdos. in files I E).

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the evening of 3 June a submarine was sighted off the south coast of Crete.

During the night enemy planes were over the Greek area.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

One steamer and one tanker loaded with mines are on the way from Salonika to Piraeus, escorted by a torpedo boat and three German submarine chasers.

On 2 June a German submarine chaser was commissioned at Trieste.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On 4 June air reconnaissance established off the Caucasian coast only slight shipping and sighted a destroyer west of Suchum.

During the night of 3 June the Anapa Battery was fired on from the sea. No damage was caused.

During the night of 3 June vessels were observed from land on the south coast of Taman. A minelaying operation was possibly carried out. Sweeping of the shipping route was without result. On 5 June FZ mine check by a mine-exploding vessel is intended.

A bombing attack on Yalta caused some damage.

Own Situation:

The PT boats which were sent out on operation during the night of 3 June observed nothing. In the morning, on their way back, the boats were attacked by enemy planes. Several men were wounded. The PT boats picked up a Russian corporal who had voluntarily parachuted from a Russian plane.

On 4 June at noon an Anapa transport was attacked by seven enemy planes, but sustained no special damage.

Ferry traffic as planned.

VIII. Situation Far East.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio was informed that at a conference between Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Admiral Abe on 25 May details about the war in the Mediterranean and in the Atlantic were discussed. (1/Skl I opa 1615/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol XV).

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

No special reports.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Quartermaster General reports that orders have been given to increase the Estonian slate oil output to one million tons annually.

II. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division, Bureau of Naval Armament reports that according to a decree by the Fuehrer, classes 1919 to 1923 cannot be deferred from draft. However, complete deferment must be demanded for special naval factories. Minister Speer is to give Commander in Chief, Navy his views on the subject; it will not be possible for the Navy to do anything until then.

III. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports that a revolution has taken place in Argentina. President Castillo has been overthrown and left Argentina aboard a minesweeper bound for Uruguay. The revolution was led by the Minister of War.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Group North recommends that submarines with mines and torpedoes be sent out on operations in the Kara Sea. However, an increase in the number of boats would be necessary. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff supports the proposal.

Chief, Naval Staff is very sceptical as to the success of such an undertaking. Simultaneously a fresh operation "Wunderland" (Operation by cruisers in the Kara Sea) is intended. Commanding Admiral, Task Force proposes in this connection appearance off Kola Bay. Before making a decision, Chief, Naval Staff wants a report on the traffic situation in this sea area and an investigation of the fuel question.

V. Naval Staff has approached Air Force, Operations Staff regarding the use of new mine firing mechanisms. Several types of firing mechanism have been developed; it is recommended that they be used on a large scale in August as at that time conditions in respect to weather and forces will be favorable for the Navy and Air Force. (1/Skl I E 1597/43 Gkdos. Chefs., in files I E).

VI. Quartermaster General reports that a change has been requested in the organization of Group North and Naval Command, Norway; Naval Command, Norway is to be put on an equal status with the Station Commands. Chief, Naval Staff refuses any change in organization for the time being.

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items:

I. Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division has issued instructions for the transfer of the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to the Mediterranean. (1/Skl 16227/43 Gkdos. in files of I op.)

II. Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reports on the reasons for delays regarding armed trawlers which are to be constructed in the southeast area. The possibilities of constructing engines in the southeast area have been largely overestimated and considerable delays have occurred in deliveries of construction materiel. In order to span the existing gaps, the transfer of ten armed trawlers to the Black Sea has been ordered.

Situation 5 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

On request, "Ship 28" received a detailed review on the general situation. (See Telegram 2219).

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Four vessels were located in the eastern part of the North Atlantic. Thirty four enemy planes were on operations over the Bay of Biscay. Two Spitfires attacked searchlight positions near Brest.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Four ground mines were swept off the Atlantic coast.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 5 June the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla carried out minelaying operation "ULME" and the 2nd and 5th PT Boat Flotillas laid mines in Lyme Bay according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Twelve enemy planes attacked patrol boats off the Hook of Holland. Several casualties. One ground mine was swept near Norderney. Escort service in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North was carried out according to plan. A number of balloons, apparently carrying incendiary charges, flew into the inner Heligoland Bight.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance reported four merchantmen and one escort vessel near the Faroe Islands. Two PT boats on westerly course were sighted during the night of 5 June, 80 miles west of Bergen.

There were two enemy submarines off the Arctic coast.

Two planes were out on operations over the North Sea; no flights were made by the Iceland squadrons.

Own Situation:

Concerning the sinking of the steamer ALTENFELS it has now been reported that the attack was carried out by two PT boats around midnight. The guns of one PT boat were silenced by fire from an escort vessel. Battery "Korsnaes" participated for a short time in this engagement. Taking cover behind a smoke screen, the PT boats turned off and during the pursuit they were again fired on by a minesweeper off Marstein. A search of the skerries area was without result.

Eight ships were escorted north and six south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

The railway battery at Kronstadt fired at the Finnish coast.

2. Own Situation:

Three steamers, two tankers and one hospital ship were

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

escorted in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Eleven vessels and two minesweeping planes were engaged in check-sweeping.

North of Seelandsrev two balloons were observed descending. It is assumed that mines were dropped.

The 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla has begun its voyage to the west.

No damage was caused in an air attack on the patrol behind the "Seeigel" barrage. One enemy plane was shot down by our boats near Tyters.

Minesweeping on barrage "Wartburg II" was carried out according to plan.

Due to extensive barrel damage, Battery "Streljna" is out of action. Three 13 cm guns of Battery "Korkuli" are out of action owing to direct hits.

Special Items:

In connection with the damage to Battery "Streljna", Station Baltic requests allocation of four 15 cm rapid-fire guns as replacement. (see Telegram 1623).

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing special to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 53 planes out on operations in the west area and nine in the Mediterranean.

There were only a few enemy flights during the day; none during the night.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

No attacks on enemy ports.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty six enemy planes were shot down on 4 June. We lost four. On 5 June three boats were destroyed in the Sea of Asov and two damaged.

4. Northern Waters:

In the early hours of 4 June fighter-bombers sank two merchantmen in Kola Bay. Escort forces shot down 22 Russian planes.

Special Items:

Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy informs Naval Staff of an application filed with Operations Staff to organize the existing shipborne formations into one shipborne group.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Task Force "H", comprising two battleships and one aircraft-carrier, has been spotted in Mers el Kebir.

Photographic reconnaissance shows that the number of transport ships for landing craft in the area of Arzeu has doubled, that shipping at Oran has increased by 60,000 tons and that a considerable increase in LCI's is to be seen at Jijelli.

In the early hours of 5 June Pantelleria was shelled by a cruiser and a destroyer.

Aerial reconnaissance sighted eight merchantmen near Bizerta and reported movements of small boats, PT boats and destroyers between Bizerta and Kelibia.

The Italian Embassy is said to have learned from Morocco that on 17 June landing operations will be carried out against Corsica, Sicily, the South of France and Salonika.

The Military Attaché in Madrid reports that, according to circles close to the Spanish General Staff, there are some 200 tank landing craft and 164 landing **boats** in enemy Mediterranean ports.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

PT boats were forced to remain in port on account of the weather.

One of our motor minesweepers cut a mine 5 miles south of Leghorn. This may have been an Italian mine. Motor minesweepers were sent out to check-sweep the coastal route to Leghorn.

Sixty Fortresses attacked the port of La Spezia around noon. The submarine base sustained no damage; an Italian battleship received two light hits and one plane was shot down.

Two airfields were attacked on Sardinia. One hangar was destroyed; three of our planes were damaged and three enemy ones shot down.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Transport to the islands was carried out without special incident.

In a summary on the supply situation to the Italian islands covering the period 29 May to 3 June, German Naval Command, Italy reports that supplies to Sardinia are not quite adequate because of slow movement.

Since barges have been put into operation, the traffic to Sicily has improved. On the whole, however, the amount of supplies is still far too small. It is urgently necessary that further small ships be made available for the Straits of Bonifacio and Messina and for unloading at the ports. One tanker and one Italian torpedo boat were total losses and two steamers sustained damage from the air; railway ferry service has not yet been opened. In Sicily the general supply situation has improved due to the new grain harvest. (See Telegram 1700.)

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division informs offices concerned that the Fuehrer has confirmed directions that all large ships which can be of use for traffic in the central Mediterranean are to be placed at the disposal of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South; only those vessels not suited for operations or which will not be used at once are to be transferred to the Aegean Sea or the Black Sea. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South will be responsible for transferring vessels not required to the Aegean Sea. Detailed orders for certain ships will be issued and speedy assignment of specialized shipyard workers and construction detachments approved. (See Telegram 1300.)

Special Items:

Naval Staff informs Group West, German Naval Command, Italy and

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group South of agents' reports available at present on plans concerning enemy landings and relevant dispositions of forces. (See Telegram 1811.)

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Submarine chase carried out by planes was unsuccessful up to now. Escort service was provided as planned.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 4 June small units shelled the coast approximately 15 miles northwest of Anapa. No damage was caused.

During the night of 4 June a harbor defense vessel reported suspicious vessels in Temriuk Bay which later shelled harbor defense vessels and the mouth of the Kuban. Our naval artillery lighters and naval landing craft were too far north to participate in the engagement.

Own Situation:

It is now reported that in the course of the air attack on an Anapa transport on 4 June, naval landing craft shot down one plane for certain and another one probably. In the afternoon of 5 June ten bombers and eight ground-attack planes attacked an Anapa transport. One naval landing craft received a hit. South of the Taman coast an enemy submarine was engaged by a mine-exploding vessel escorting an Anapa transport. The mine-exploding vessel assumes that the submarine was destroyed.

A towed convoy was attacked by two bombers between Taganrog and Marinpol. No damage was caused. Slight damage was caused in an air attack on Ivanbaba.

The convoy HEIMBURG was attacked by five enemy planes about 15 miles north of Ak Mechet. No damage was reported.

In the evening of 5 June PT boats put out for the Taman coast and for submarine chase south of the Strait of Kerch.

A minesweeping plane swept a mine in the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Work has been completed on the net barrage in Kamish Burun.

Ferry traffic was carried out according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

The U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Knox, stated on 4 June that the data published in London on the decrease in ships sunk by submarines could lead to the assumption that the battle against submarines is over. Nothing could be further from the truth. "Any assumption that the submarine has been defeated or can be considered an insignificant factor from now on, is a false assumption by no means justified by the facts."

According to Reuter, Mr. Churchill has returned to London.

The Spanish State Department, in a comprehensive note to the press, has made proposals to humanize aerial warfare. The belligerents should designate which zones contain military targets and which zones do not. A permanent neutral commission should verify these statements.

The new right-winged government of Argentina has established itself firmly and intends to pursue the previous policy of neutrality as far as it is compatible with the general policy of South America. President Castillo has announced his resignation and is at liberty in Argentina.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Group West intends to keep destroyers and torpedo boats in readiness at Brest, La Pallice and Le Verdon for submarines in distress. Chief, Naval Staff agrees for the time being but raises objections against the close anchorages in La Pallice and the danger from aerial torpedoes on the roads of Brest. Group West is to be requested to give its views on these questions.

II. The increasing anxiety regarding the continuation of the war against merchant shipping and consequently regarding the entire further development in the situation has caused Chief, Naval Staff to draw up a short memorandum on naval warfare pointing out the necessity for using, besides the submarine, all other weapons, especially the Air Force. In this memorandum the main points of the conference with the Fuehrer on 31 May are once more brought out.

III. Quartermaster General reports that barges will be manned by personnel of the Siebel ferries.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Captain Moessel, Naval Liaison Officer with the Air Force, Operations Staff informs Chief, Naval Staff regarding aerial warfare, the Air Force and its equipment.

Special Items:

Naval Intelligence Division submits brief report No. 9/43 on Foreign Merchant Shipping and brief intelligence on the enemy situation No. 9/43.

Attention is drawn to intelligence on a new enemy location device and new depth-charges. (1/Skl 16923/43 geh. in War Diary, Appendix "Foreign Merchant Shipping", and 1/Skl 16924/43 geh. in War Diary, Appendix "Data on the Enemy Situation".)

Situation 6 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters:

Nothing special to report.

II. Situation West Area:

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty four planes were detected on operation over the Bay of Biscay.

2. Own Situation:

Area Atlantic Coast:

Three ground mines were swept off La Pallice and in the Gironde.

During the night of 6 June a minesweeping flotilla was bombed four times off Abbeville. Details have not yet been reported.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Channel Coast:

In the morning of 6 June a patrol boat was attacked with bombs and machine-guns by four Spitfires and three Whirlwinds in a pincer attack. Casualties resulted from machine-gun fire. One enemy plane was shot down.

The floating crane which was swept away on 2 June was brought into Fécamp on 6 June.

The 4th and 6th PT Boat Flotillas carried out their minelaying according to plan.

The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla put into Cherbourg.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Eleven ground mines were swept off the North Sea islands and off the Hook of Holland, three of them by minesweeping planes.

Convoy traffic in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North was carried out according to plan.

British barrage balloons carrying propaganda material and explosive charges were captured at Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbuettel.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted twelve merchantmen and two escort vessels on the northwest coast of Iceland.

Seventy miles northwest of Svatoi Noss the following were sighted: a group consisting of 1 steamer and 6 escort vessels and another group consisting of 3 steamers, 2 destroyers and 2 PT boats on westerly course. One of the steamers was sunk by fighter-bombers.

On 6 June two Russian submarines were detected proceeding to Yokonga.

Fifteen planes were on operations over the North Sea; of the Iceland squadrons no planes were out on operations.

On 4 June Russian batteries shelled our vessels in the fjord entrance of Petsamo, causing no damage.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

Two Russian inertia-contact mines were cut on 6 June in Kwaenangen Fjord.

The search of Kors Fjord, carried out by four minesweepers, was without result.

Twenty three ships were escorted north and 18 south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Fifteen towed convoys were sighted in Kronstadt Bay during the night.

2. Own Situation:

Three tankers, two steamers and one hospital ship were escorted in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Eighteen vessels were engaged on check-sweeping.

Ten miles northwest of Domesnes, the steamer HEINRICH VON PLAUEN (1,744 BRT) was sunk in the night of 5 June, probably by an air attack.

On account of heavy seas and fog, work on barrage "Wartburg II" was partially interrupted.

Nine Estonians, using two motorboats, escaped from the island of Odensholm to Sweden or Finland.

Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic reports the great tendency of echo-ranging sets on armed trawlers to become faulty due to the bad wood in their hulls, through which extensible units become leaky.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

On 5 June an agent reported by radio from London the following personal observation:

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

A convoy consisting of 80 ships of various tonnages left the Clyde on 1 June, bound for Charleston and other ports on the south coast of the United States. The escort consists of numerous corvettes and destroyers. The ships are to load special equipment for North Africa in the United States.

According to definite data from radio intelligence, American submarines are operating at times against German submarines in the North Atlantic. If their positions were ascertained promptly they could be transmitted to our boats.

2. Own Situation:

Up to 15 June neither the expected eastbound nor the westbound convoy had been sighted by Group "Trutz". It is assumed that the convoy evaded the patrol line or passed it during the night after enemy planes had detected some submarines. The group is being dispersed.

A submarine reports having carried out minelaying near Cape Verde.

Southeast of Iceland a submarine was attacked with bombs and machine-guns and sustained several casualties, including the commanding officer. There is an oil leak due to the damage of the main ballast tanks. The submarine has received orders to return to western France. Other submarines have been sent to render assistance.

Between Lourenco Marques and Durban a submarine sank two steamers totalling 9,100 BRT.

Near Capetown another submarine tried to attack a convoy in foggy weather, but when the visibility improved it was driven off by planes and gunfire.

Special Items:

The Radio Monitoring Service has ascertained use of a new British anti-submarine weapon, the "Hedgehog", by surface vessels. Apparently this is a new kind of a depth-charge, which is caused to detonate magnetically or acoustically by a certain type of firing mechanism, only in the vicinity of the submarine.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 90 planes on operations in the west area and eight in the Mediterranean. Sixteen fighter-bombers attacked Eastbourne at noon.

Fighter planes shot down one enemy plane near Land's End.

Only a few enemy planes flew in during the day and none at night.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

No missions were flown in the Mediterranean.

3. Eastern Front:

Forty enemy planes were shot down on 3 June; four of ours were lost. During the night of 5 June an attack was carried out on war industries of Gorki. Details have yet to be reported.

An enemy submarine chaser was damaged in the Sea of Asov.

Fighter-bombers sank two PT boats and one submarine chaser near Gelendzhik.

4. Northern Waters:

In addition to the steamer sunk near Svatci Noss, a steamer of 2,000 BRT was sunk on 5 June by fighter-bombers near Einá Guba.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Four loaded tankers and two destroyers passed the Straits of Gibraltar from east to west. Coming from the Mediterranean seven destroyers put into Gibraltar. Five landing craft left Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.

Task Force "H" is still lying at Mers el Kebir.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Air reconnaissance revealed that landing vessels in the ports of Mers el Kebir, Oran and Arzeu have increased by about 40%. At present four to five Anglo-American landing forces, each in the strength of a division, can be shipped from this area.

Thirty steamers and 14 escorts were sighted northeast of Cape Bon on southerly course.

One cruiser and several destroyers were observed near Pantelleria.

One enemy submarine is reported south of Genoa.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

In the evening of 6 June, nine PT boats were sent out from Empedocle against the enemy convoy sighted off Cape Bon. Reports on results have not yet been received.

South of Leghorn two motor minesweepers cut two mines of an unknown type. Four motor minesweepers coming from the Fhone entered Port de Bouc.

According to a report by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the battleships VITTORIO-VENETO and ROMA received two bomb hits each in the bow during the air attack on La Spezia. One submarine was sunk and a cruiser under construction, a torpedo boat and a submarine damaged.

Five enemy planes were shot down in a heavy attack on Pantelleria. The majority of the bombs dropped in an attack on Messina fell into the sea.

High explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on Feggio and Giovanni.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

In the evening of 5 June an enemy submarine attacked two boats near the stranded steamer RIEGEL. Both boats were sunk. Submarine chase has been started.

CONFIDENTIAL

6 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

During the night of 5 June a coastal patrol boat reported a suspicious vessel near Keos, probably a submarine, which did not reply to recognition signals.

Planes sank two auxiliary sailing vessels on 4 June. Escort service was carried out without special incidents.

Black Sea:

The destruction of a submarine reported by a mine-exploding vessel on the south Taman coast has not yet been confirmed.

During the night of 5 June Anapa was attacked without any special damage.

Nothing was sighted during the night of 5 June by PT boats on the south Taman coast.

In the evening of 6 June four PT boats were sent out off Cape Idokopas. The boats are returning as they did not contact the enemy.

Submarine chase carried out by Italian PT boats near Feodosiya was without result.

On 5 June submarine U "24" left Constanta for operations. Ferry traffic was carried out as planned. Anapa transports and Crimea convoys were cancelled on account of the weather.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

According to a British radio report, a new naval command is being trained in England at present for the special task of landing materiel in case of an invasion.

The British press is very much occupied with the question of a large-scale invasion of the Continent. One newspaper writes that it is probable that Russian plans are closely related to those of the Allies and that the invasion from the west, south or southwest will be co-ordinated with a Russian offensive.

According to Reuter, Churchill and the Allied military leaders at Algiers have, as an extension to the conference in Washington, worked out details for the next and heaviest blow. Besides Allied army leaders, Anthony Eden also participated in the discussions. Washington circles believe that important military operations are imminent and that extremely important matters were discussed at Algiers.

According to the views of a Swedish newspaper, it can be concluded from Churchill's visit to North Africa that, in connection with the decisions reached in Washington, certain adjustments of earlier plans proved necessary.

The New York Times thinks that Churchill's visit to North Africa indicates that the Mediterranean will be the theater of the next large Allied offensive.

Conference on the Situation with Commander in Chief, Navy:

In a conference with Naval Staff, Naval (Ship) Construction Division and the Ordnance Divisions, Commander in Chief, Navy has decided upon the fleet construction program for the next five years.

A decision was to be made as to the selection of types, the question of high pressure superheated steam or engines and the extent of the program.

Concerning destroyers, type 42 was selected. (Six engines, speed 35 knots, displacement about 2,500 tons, four 12.7 cm single-mounting guns, radius of action 5,500 miles.)

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Concerning torpedo boats, fleet torpedo boat type 43 of 1,750 tons was selected. For the time being, construction of type 41 with high pressure superheated steam will be continued.

The extent of the program proposed by Naval Staff has been approved by Commander in Chief, Navy. This will include annually:

- 8 destroyers,
- 12 torpedo boats,
- 108 PT boats,
- 100 minesweepers,
- 96 motor minesweepers,
- 35 mine-exploding vessels,
- 400 small patrol and escort vessels (Multi-purpose boats),
- 900 naval landing craft,
- 96 naval artillery lighters,
- 15 torpedo recovery boats.

The extent of this program corresponds to the ordered increase in submarine constructions to 40 boats monthly.

Notes concerning this significant decision, 1/Skl III a 16545/43, Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

This program is necessitated by higher demands regarding escort operations for carrying out the increased submarine program. The increase in torpedo-carrying craft, especially PT boats, moreover takes into account the requirements of the war against merchant shipping which is to be intensified by all possible means. The increased activity on the part of the enemy directed against our supply traffic in all theaters of war, makes it imperative - on the basis of experiences in the Mediterranean and the Channel - that the numbers of escort forces be substantially increased. The increasing demands of defensive and offensive mine warfare also had to be taken into consideration.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Naval Staff orders that the question of German influence upon the control of Italian ship construction be brought up and discussed with Admiral Bertoldi. Chief, Naval Staff contemplates carrying on talks in Rome to settle this question as soon as a basis has been arrived at.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Quartermaster Division reports on the objections which have been raised by Commanding Admiral, Group West regarding the weakness of the defense sector of Cherbourg. The sequence, according to which the fortifications were to be expanded, was established at the time on the principle that the submarine bases would be given preference. As a result, these bases have advanced beyond the extent originally planned. It has now been agreed with Organization Todt that outstanding work in the Cherbourg sector will be brought up to schedule quickly.

III. From a trip to France with foreign Naval Attachés, the Naval Attaché reports that they seemed very much impressed by the extent and the strength of the coastal fortifications. The Swedish Naval Attaché stated that the stereoscopic range-finding process is obsolete in Sweden. In Sweden firing is controlled solely by radar which, in respect to range as well as line of bearing, gives much better data than the stereoscopic process.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the recommendation of the German Naval Attaché in Madrid that thanks be expressed to the Spanish Navy for sending out a destroyer to render assistance to the submarine U "755".

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

VI. Quartermaster Division, Anti-Aircraft Guns Section concluded his report on naval anti-aircraft guns. Demands have been received from all theaters of war that anti-aircraft equipment be strengthened. The fulfilment of these demands, which are almost all justified, cannot be met by transfers. Therefore, increases in personnel have been provided for in the new program. The sectors of Toulon and Marseilles cause special anxiety. Chief, Naval Staff orders that the permanent representative at the Fuehrer Headquarters again make a report to the Fuehrer.

Since smoke-laying for Hamburg has proved insufficient, the Air Force has requested additional personnel. In an emergency, the Navy could withdraw a smoke-laying detachment from the Aasen Fjord. Chief, Naval Staff also agrees that the necessary steps be taken for a new assignment of Italian personnel for smoke-laying.

V. Chief, Operations Division submits the memorandum, ordered on 6 June, to Naval Staff. Copy as per 1/Skl 1629/43 Gkdos., Chfs. in War Diary, Part C a.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items:

I. Armed Forces High Command states that the Fuehrer has agreed to the reported intentions of Naval Staff for Alarich and Constantin and has decided that the four medium batteries available for Constantin are to be sent immediately - in co-operation with Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas - to the southeast area. They will be set up in agreement between Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and Naval Group South to reinforce coastal defense of the Peloponnesos. According to data available at Armed Forces High Command, the two batteries lying in Piraeus are already entrained. High Command, Navy is to report continually on batteries becoming available in June and July.

II. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, in accordance with the request by Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, has designated the Winschoten - Island of Tottumeroog line as the dividing line between Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands and Naval Station, North Sea, beginning 10 June 1943. Otherwise the boundary line remains unchanged. The forces of all branches in the strip to be handed over will remain there and will be placed under the command of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands as regards area and operations, in accordance with Directive No. 40.

Quartermaster Division has informed the parties concerned accordingly.

Situation 7 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

According to an announcement of the British Commission for Economic Warfare, British naval forces sank eleven German blockade runners from December 1942 to the middle of May 1943, four en route to Japan and seven en route from Japan.

The figures given unfortunately correspond to the facts.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Otherwise no special events.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, a merchantman with four destroyers was proceeding at 2212 in BF 5157 on course 20° at moderate speed. Radio intelligence established moderate activity of the 19th Group with 18 planes. An Allied vessel was detected at 2045 about 110 miles southwest of Madeira and a British vessel at 1627 420 miles northwest of Cape Finisterre.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Altogether four ELM/J mines were swept off the Atlantic coast. Patrol positions were taken up and coastal routes swept according to plan.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast intends to carry out reconnaissance on 8 June for the purpose of contacting a southbound convoy in the sea area between 43° 30' and 45° 30' N.

On 6 June a French trawler was attacked several times 110 miles west of La Pallice by four British planes, and suffered casualties.

Channel Coast:

As regards escort operations, eight vessels were escorted in four convoys with nine escorts; one ore steamer was escorted by five vessels. Six vessels were taken through the Channel in two convoys with four escorts. It is intended to carry out minelaying operation "Leuchtkaefer" in the night of 7 June. About 0100 the 44th Minesweeper Flotilla was bombed four times in BF 3383. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla coming from Cherbourg entered St. Malo at 0400. PT boats carried out minelaying as planned.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out without special incident. One ELM mine was swept off Walcheren.

Special Items:

In accordance with the order issued by Armed Forces High Command concerning the new dividing line between Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands and Naval Station, North Sea, Operations Staff, North has put the appropriate changes of command into force. For copy of order to this effect see Telegram 1655.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

There was lively reconnaissance over the central and northern part of the North Sea. Twenty planes were detected by direction-finding.

Own Situation:

On 4 June two Russian anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut in Stjerusund. The same number of mines of the same type was cut on 5 June in Kwaenangen Fjord. In the evening of 3 June enemy planes attacked a Norwegian cutter near Kyberg and on 6 June one near Gamvik.

Other enemy planes flew into the areas of North Varanger and Banak. In the afternoon of 6 June, a Mosquito was observed in the area of Bergen. The search for balloon-like objects dropped by the enemy has so far been unsuccessful. During the night of 6 June three Hampdens flew into the area of Stavanger - Egersund.

Concerning the sinking of the steamer ALTENFELS, it is reported that the vessel sustained two torpedo hits and sank within one minute. The anti-aircraft guns on board were still firing as the steamer sank. Thirty four men are missing and 19 were rescued. Accurate hits were observed on one of the attacking PT boats. Both PT boats withdrew at high speed under cover of a smoke screen.

Seventeen ships were escorted north and 23 south.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group North/Fleet informs Naval Staff of the instructions concerning transfer to the north of destroyers "27" and "30", which are to go to Aarhus on 15 June and proceed from there together with a group of minelayers to Kristiansand South on 18 June in order to participate in a minelaying operation there. Their release to Commanding Admiral, Task Force will be effected by a special order, probably on 26 June. (See Telegram 1225.)

On 1 April Naval Command, Norway submitted to Group North a request made by Admiral, North Norwegian Coast asking for approval of a number of mine barrages which would increase security and coastal defenses.

In all, 389 EMC mines would be required. Group North/Fleet reported on 7 April that it did not see the necessity thereof and that an investigation was necessary to establish whether or not the large number of mines could be utilized more effectively at other points. Group North, too, considers only a part of the mining project necessary, since the areas in question are merely skerries where only small vessels can pass, against which the EMC mine is anyhow ineffective and, due to its large charge, is too valuable. Naval Staff is of the same opinion as Group North and approved only part of the plan submitted on 23 April, allocating 273 EMC mines, Mark Northwest 41 - 44.

Under date 5 May, Naval Command, Norway raised objection to this decision, pointing out that the barrages, not approved, were intended for the approaches to the skerries route, that can be used at any time by submarines and destroyers under the guidance of Norwegians well acquainted with these parts, to penetrate into this route. Naval Command draws attention to the penetration of an enemy submarine into Bjaerangs Fjord in September 1942 and considers a barrage necessary to make up for the lack of patrol vessels, which does not permit surveillance of the numerous gaps.

Naval Command, Norway takes this opportunity to point out that the decision of Naval Staff was largely guided by the views of Group North/Fleet, and objects to the participation of the Group in this case, since it is exclusively a question of close coastal defense and not one of operations by our naval forces. Naval Command, Norway has taken this opportunity to request a fundamental clarification regarding the party responsible for barrage plans in the Norwegian coastal area; it requests that the settlement of this issue be in favor of Naval Command, Norway and that Naval Command, Norway should carry the same authority as has been given to Naval Commands, North and Baltic.

The basic settlement of the question of responsibility will be specially dealt with by Quartermaster Division, Organization and Mobilization Branch.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Concerning the matter itself, Naval Staff considered the rejection of the mining projects advisable, quite apart from the views of Group North/Fleet and Group North, since Naval Staff regards penetration of submarines and destroyers into the skerries there improbable. Naval Command, Norway, with copy to Group North/Fleet, has been informed accordingly, with a supplementary note that, should the experimental use of UMB or EMC mines with snag-line against small craft in the Mediterranean and Channel be favorable, an allocation of mines will be made, which will then be effective against all vessels. Correspondence relating to this matter, 1/Sk1 I E 13734/43 Gkdos., and previous data will be found in files I E 17.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Fourteen enemy patrol boats, 4 minesweepers, 10 small vessels, 3 PT boats and 7 motor guardboats were sighted in the evening near Lavansaari on various courses. In addition, one submarine was observed. In AO 3663, south of Great Tyters, a Russian aerial mine was sighted, apparently a surface mine.

2. Own Situation:

A mine detonation was observed in the Baltic Sea entrances near Apenrade. Three mines, apparently ELM/J, were swept near Middelgrund. One mine, apparently type III with upper antenna, was shot up near Skagen. Twenty six vessels were engaged in sweeping channels. Four steamers were escorted.

In the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea submarine net and barrage patrol was carried out as planned. While sweeping barrage "Wartburg II", another EMC mine and six explosive floats were swept. The operations were hampered by weather conditions.

In the area of Admiral, Baltic States the entire Estonian personnel of the telephone exchange on the island of Worms escaped to Sweden during the night of 6 June.

Southwest of Vaindlo an enemy submarine was attacked with depth charges by naval landing craft. Eight TMB mines were laid off Lavansaari in an operation by coastal minelayers. Engagements

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

at close range ensued with an armored Russian gunboat of 30 to 40 tons, which was attacked with hand grenades and explosive charges and heavily damaged. Because of the heavy sea, it was not possible to board the boat.

In the evening of 6 June, Battery "Dubnia" was attacked by enemy planes, but no damage was caused. One plane was shot down. In the Voronka sector forest fires were caused by incendiary bombs before positions on both sides.

According to a report of Admiral, Baltic States, Army Command 18 gives the following account of the enemy situation and probable intentions:

It is expected that the enemy will attempt to capture the railway line in order to improve supplies to the area of Leningrad; further, a thrust is expected along the October railway. In case the enemy increases transports to the Oranienbaum pocket, an attack is also to be expected on the southeast corner of the pocket and in the area of Puschkin towards the southwest in order to cut off the Peterhof area. According to a report by the Naval Liaison Officer with the 1st Air Force, the Finnish operational control is of the opinion that, during their many transport operations in the last few weeks, the Russians have also brought troops to Lavansaari, including crews for 18 cm guns. The Finns believe that offensive operations against the south coast of the Gulf of Finland or the islands are not out of the question.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic a submarine which had been hit by a bomb southeast of Iceland was so badly damaged in a fresh attack that a submarine in the vicinity had to be sent to its assistance.

In the South Atlantic a single submarine detected a west-northwest bound convoy south of Freetown but was driven off by destroyers in spite of the dark night.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

A submarine operating to the east of the Florida Strait reports heavy air patrols by shore-based planes and flying boats. Its attack on a large convoy was repulsed by destroyers.

The tanker JOHANNES SCHLIEMANN provided to supply submarines operating in the area of the Cape, left the Sunda Strait on 6 June and is expected to arrive in the supply area according to plan by 20 June.

According to data available, it seems that the British steamer ALVA (1,584 BRT) has become the victim of the minefield laid off Halifax.

VI. Aerial Warfare:

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Around noon the enemy carried out attacks with machine-guns against freight trains and a railway station in the area of Morlaix, damaging six locomotives.

Otherwise no events worth mentioning.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the early morning, 32 of our fighter-bombers attacked an enemy airfield near Kelibia, scoring good hits. During the day and at night the enemy carried out continuous attacks against Pantelleria, losing three planes according to reports up to now.

In the evening 15 Liberators attacked the city and port of Messina. One ferry burnt out. It is reported that six planes flew in over Greece to Serbia and back, and that there were two nuisance flights in the area of Crete - Milos.

3. Eastern Front:

Eighty five enemy planes were shot down on 5 and 6 June. During the nights of 4, 5 and 6 June, the industrial town of Gorki was attacked by strong formations, with accurate effect, only eight of our planes being lost. For details see Daily Situation.

During the night of 6 June the attack was once more repeated by smaller forces; no planes were lost.

The 5th Air Force reports operations carried out by altogether 38 planes.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

According to an Italian report - not confirmed by Intelligence Center, Spain - unidentified ships, among them probably eight steamers, passed the Straits of Gibraltar at midnight of 6 June, westbound.

At 0038 there were 2 unidentified vessels 13 miles north of Pantelleria; at 0710 3 destroyers on southeasterly course 30 miles west of Linosa; at 0845 2 further destroyers 18 miles northeast of Linosa, on course east-northeast.

According to an Italian report, a British party landed during the night of 6 June on Lampedusa. Part of the force was captured. Mopping-up of the remainder is in progress.

According to radio intelligence, the British formation leader reported at 0215 an unsuccessful landing due to strong resistance in the area of Cape Ponente (west coast) and his intention to return to the base at about 0900.

Another Italian report, according to which a large enemy formation of ships was approaching Pantelleria at 1410, has not yet been confirmed.

In the early morning there were submarines north of Maddalena, along the southwest coast of Corsica and south of Cagliari.

According to an intelligence report from Syria, via Sofia, dated 4 June, the French fleet at Alexandria will join Allied units in Tripoli or Sousse.

In a survey of the number and distribution of landing vessels detected in the Mediterranean on 7 June, issued by Naval Intelligence Division, a great increase in LST's and LCT's in the Oran - Algiers area is noticeable. Apparently this has been effected at the cost of the vessels hitherto in the area of Jijelli. The survey by Naval Intelligence Division dated 7 June is in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

According to an intelligence report from Tangiers dated 6 June, one freighter after another is being feverishly loaded in Oran. Fifty freighters are lying off Oran and Mers el Kebir and, in addition, since 30 May some 80 loaded vessels including 30 tank landing craft.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

On 2 June, according to the same intelligence report, it was observed from Cape Tres Forcas, near Melilla that between 1400 and 2100 four convoys consisting of altogether 248 vessels passed to the east. The convoys, including 4 battleships, 18 destroyers, 10 gunboats, 60 transports, 136 freighters and 9 tankers, obviously came from Gibraltar as they had not been detected from Tangiers in spite of good visibility.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

On 6 June altogether eleven enemy air attacks were carried out on Pantelleria by 40 twin-engined planes, 104 Lightnings and 44 Spitfires. Three planes were shot down by fighters. At noon, 27 Liberators attacked Messina and Reggio in two waves, causing no military damage.

No contact was made with the enemy during the operation by the 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas with altogether seven boats off the east coast of Tunisia during the night of 6 June.

Motor minesweepers R "1", "6", "7" and "8" were transferred from Port de Bouc to Marseilles.

The 6th Coast Patrol Flotilla carried out minelaying from Toulon according to plan.

Up to 5 June 66 tank-barges, 8 tank-lighters and 4 freight-barges arrived at Marseilles. Of these, 38 tank-barges and 4 tank-lighters left for Genoa and 5 tank-barges for Toulon for repair.

Group West reports detailed plans concerning the use of barges. For copy see Telegram 2105. The matter will be dealt with by Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

No special events have been reported concerning convoy traffic to Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily. For details see Telegram 1805.

Two steamers are reported at sea between the south of France and Italy. It is now reported that on 29 May a steamer entered Genoa.

CONFIDENTIAL

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report of 3 June, six minelayers entered Polis (Cyprus); they are to lay barrages between Cape Arnautri and Kuklia, 29 miles west of Cape Aspro. On 27 May five steamers totalling 24,000 BRT entered the same port, which are said to have brought military supplies, including 1,600 mines.

Own Situation:

At 1420 on 6 June an enemy submarine sank an auxiliary sailing vessel five miles west of Mytilene.

Three steamers carrying troops and weapons, and escorted by a destroyer, a torpedo boat and two submarine chasers, left Piraeus for Rhodes via Leros.

The steamer THISBE, which ran aground near Prevesa on 27 May, was towed off and put into Prevesa.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

There was no contact with the enemy during the operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 6 June near Cape Idokopas. Because of weather conditions the patrol line in Temriuk Bay was not taken up.

At 0738 and 0802 enemy planes attacked one of our towed convoys between Feodosiya and Yalta.

Investigation at the point south of the Strait of Kerch where an enemy submarine was probably sunk was unsuccessful.

At 1920 on 6 June two tug-barges sank due to an explosion and two others were damaged on the lower part of the Danube near milestone 48. The Rumanians suspect magnetic mines. Shipping is closed. Investigation by a minesweeping plane is in progress.

7 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Transports to Anapa, Kerch, Temriuk and Feodosiya - Taman were interrupted on account of the weather. Convoy traffic between Constanta and the Bosphorus or Sevastopol was carried out without any special happenings.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The U.S. Navy Department announces that occupation of the island of Attu has been completed. Japanese installations on Kiska were attacked by bomber formations in five waves.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

In Argentina, General Ramirez, the former Minister for War, has formed a new government. Ramirez has declared that the Argentine Republic reaffirms her traditional policy of friendship and loyal co-operation with the nations of America in accordance with the existing treaties. With regard to the rest of the world, her present policy is one of neutrality.

Apparently the Government is making it clear that it still wishes to avoid an immediate break with the Axis powers.

The newly-formed French National Committee has set up a War Committee, which is charged with the general continuation of the war. Giraud and De Gaulle are joint presidents of the National Committee.

Conference of the Commanding Admirals with Commander in Chief, Navy:

The following took part in the joint conference of the Commanding Admirals with Commander in Chief, Navy, which was set for 8 and 9 June: Commanding Admiral, Group North/Commanding Admiral, Fleet; Commanding Admirals, Groups West and South, North Sea, Baltic Sea, Norway and German Naval Command, Italy; in addition: Chiefs, General Naval Administration Bureau, Naval Ordnance Division, Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Officer Personnel Department, Quartermaster Division, Chief of Staff, Commander in Chief, Navy, Chiefs, Operations Division, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Communications Division, Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, Vice Admiral Weichold, Chief and Deputy to Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division and Chief, War Diary Unit.

The conferences were opened with reports on the Army and Air Force situations made by members of Operations Division. Quartermaster Division then gave a report on anti-aircraft, oil, personnel and the new construction program, explaining how a solution is intended of the questions of personnel and materiel needed for carrying out the new construction plan for submarines and other vessels. The particulars of the new construction program correspond to the statements in War Diary of 7 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The furnace oil situation, which is most critical at the moment, was explained. Subsequently, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff made a comprehensive report on the political and strategic situation. Copy of report as per 1/Skl 1673/43 Gkdos. Chfs., in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

Commander in Chief, Navy then made statements on naval warfare and spoke of the crisis which has arisen in submarine warfare at present, as given in statements of 2 June to the Chiefs. Copy of address to the Commanding Admirals, dated 8 June, in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

The statements of Commander in Chief, Navy gave rise to another short debate in which the possibilities were discussed which might exist on the part of our enemies to wish to end the war. Supplementing his statements, Commander in Chief, Navy in this connection took the occasion to emphasize the special importance of the supply question; he described the achievements of our escort forces as excellent.

After resumption of the discussion in the afternoon, reports were given by Commanding Admirals, Baltic Sea, North Sea, Norway and Group North/Fleet. Copy of the main points of these reports in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

The questions discussed have nearly all been dealt with in some form in the War Diary of Naval Staff. No decisions had to be made on the part of Commander in Chief, Navy, since there was no need to do so. It should be mentioned that all Commanding Admirals emphasized the good morale of the troops under their command. The discussions will be continued on 9 June.

Special Items:

As an annex to the Situation Report of Armed Forces High Command on 8 June there is a summary of the escort and operational achievements of the escort forces in all theaters of war for the month of May. Copy in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Situation 8 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

The forces reported by air reconnaissance in BF 5157 on 7 June proved to be our own vessels. According to our air reconnaissance, there was a convoy consisting of 7 merchantmen with 11 escorts and 1 destroyer, 240 miles west of Cape Ortegal on southerly course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Five boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla entered Brest. The ore steamer SCHARLACHBERGER (2,876 BRT) ran aground in the Gironde near buoy 40 F and is obstructing traffic into Bordeaux.

Until further notice, torpedo boats T "22" and "23" and two boats of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla are lying in Brest at three hours' notice for assistance to submarines in the northern part of the Bay of Biscay.

During the night of 8 June it is intended to transfer destroyers Z "24" and Z "32" from Brest to the Gironde.

Channel Coast:

From 0025 enemy targets were continually located off the north coast of Brittany, west of Les Sept Iles. At the same time, our own torpedo and patrol boats were operating in this area. From 0217 enemy locations were made northwest of Guernsey.

Four boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla, which were sent out, did not contact the enemy. Between 0208 and 0237 Batteries "Mirus" and "Steinbruch" opened fire on shipping targets located northeast of Guernsey. In the harbor entrance of Dieppe a tug sank at 0334 after colliding with a minesweeper.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The torpedo operation by the 2nd and 5th PT Boat Flotillas was cancelled as air reconnaissance had not sighted any target.

Escort service was carried out according to plan and without special incidents. A French fishing cutter blew up off Le Touquet, apparently after striking a mine.

While carrying out operation "Leuchtkaefer", the 2nd and 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotillas had an engagement with light enemy naval forces. Commander, 2nd Coast Patrol Force, who for this operation was on the command boat of the 4th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, has given a detailed report on the execution of the operation and on the engagements which were carried out with excellent navigation by the large and awkward formation of 17 motor minesweepers. The last part of the operation could no longer be carried out according to plan. Our forces suffered only slight damage and casualties. For brief report by Commander, 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and report of the 2nd Coast Patrol Force, see Telegrams 1315 and 1345.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Minesweeping planes swept five ELM/J mines north of the East Frisian Islands. Two boats of the 34th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla sustained slight damage in an enemy low-level attack off the Hook of Holland. Escort and patrol service was carried out according to plan and without special incident.

2. Norway, Northern Waters.

Enemy Situation:

Off the north coast of Iceland, air reconnaissance detected twelve merchantmen from 1,000 to 2,000 BRT and two escort vessels on course 120° and in the vicinity a torpedo boat, a corvette and two steamers on westerly course. At the eastern entrance to the Strait

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

of Denmark a steamer of 3,500 BRT was sighted on course 90°. No shipping movements were observed during reconnaissance over the Vopna and Seydis Fjords. North of the Faroes a British submarine of the "C" class was sighted submerging at the approach of the plane.

Own Situation:

On 6 June Russian batteries opened fire on the gun positions at Romanov and Petsamo. On 7 June moderate enemy air activity was reported in the area of Admiral, Arctic Coast and very little air activity in the area of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast.

Nineteen steamers were escorted north and 25 south.

Group North informs Naval Staff of the instructions to Admiral, Northern Waters that transfer of the 8th PT Boat Flotilla with the KARL PETERS to home waters may be carried out immediately. (see Telegram 1149).

Naval Command, Norway reports to Group North/Fleet, with copy to Naval Staff, plan to use the minelayers OSTMARK and BRUMMER, besides the SKAGERPAK and ROLAND, in July for laying of the UMB mine barrages NW 30 - 35, provided that the delivery of the 1690 UMB mines allocated is possible in time. Otherwise Naval Command, Norway will not require the OSTMARK and BRUMMER. (see Telegram 1140)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

No special events are reported from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

In the area of Admiral, Baltic States and Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic enemy air attacks were carried out during the night of 7 June against barrage patrol "Seeigel". Enemy PT boats were sighted near Vigrund. It is assumed that a submarine broke through at the same time. There was the usual activity in the Kronstadt area.

Sweeping of the "Wartburg" barrage was continued by the 25th Minesweeper Flotilla. On 9 June it is intended that the 1st Motor Minesweeper Flotilla shall carry out operation "Tiger I a" and that mines be laid off Lavansaari by coastal minelayers.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

V. War against Merchant Shipping.

According to information from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, the tonnage at present in the North Area, Mediterranean and Black Sea is as follows:

a. North Area:

1. Neutral tonnage	
26 tankers totalling	148,844 BRT
93 motor freighters or passenger ships over 400 BRT totalling	273,374 BRT
689 freighters over 400 BRT totalling	1,163,378 BRT

The majority of the motor freighters is laid up because of oil shortage.

2. German tonnage of Reich Commissicner of Maritime Shipping	
504 ships totalling	1,002,178 BRT
Under repair	
87 ships totalling	204,157 BRT

3. German tonnage of High Command, Navy	
477 ships totalling	2,064,025 BRT

b. Mediterranean Theater: (as of 1 May 1943)

1. Italian tonnage	
363 ships totalling	1,387,000 BRT
2. German tonnage	
66 ships totalling	208,746 BRT
3. French tonnage	
16 ships totalling	45,518 BRT

c. Black Sea:

German tonnage	
17 ships totalling	39,073 BRT

For particulars, see report of Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch as per 1/Skl 17348/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XI.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In the afternoon of 8 June a submarine sighted west of the Canary Islands one destroyer and two steamers on easterly course. Subsequently the submarine was attacked for two hours by eight carrier-borne planes and reported at first heavy damage and sinking. However, a message received later stated that the boat, which was equipped with a quadruple gun, was able to ward off all attacks, shooting down one of the planes and damaging four others. The submarine, which was damaged, withdrew for repairs. Thus, the value of a quadruple gun for defense purposes has proved itself. Despite successful defense against the enemy air attack, the submarine was so heavily damaged that for the present it will not be available for further operations. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. Tr.N.) The submarine damaged on 6 June southeast of Iceland has reported being ready for action again and is continuing to the southwest at slow speed.

Special Items:

According to a statement by Quartermaster Division, Submarine Branch, the situation regarding submarines as of 1 June 1943 is as follows (compared with 1 May 1943):

Operational boats	218	(239)
Submarine Acceptance Command, submarines	23	(23)
In operational training	115	(109)
Training and experimental submarines	64	(61)
	<u>420</u>	<u>(432)</u>
	Total	
Number of submarines on operation in May	16	
Number of submarines missing	<u>38</u>	

i.e. 17.4 % of the total number of submarines on operation as of the end of May.

The rapid increase in submarine losses in the month (38 as compared to 14 in April) proves the crisis which has arisen in submarine warfare.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

After the great successes in sinking ships during March (140 ships totalling 875,000 BRT) less success was necessarily to be expected in April through return of a great number of boats which had participated in convoy operations in the previous month. Ships sunk amounted to 62 = 422,000 BRT. Our losses amounted to 14 submarines each in March and April.

In May the number of submarines in the North Atlantic was again more favorable and gave hope of greater successes. On the average, 120 submarines were at sea, of which 44 were in the operational area and 76 on outward or return passage. However, this hope did not materialize at all. Besides still smaller successes (57 ships totalling 344,000 BRT) may brought very heavy losses on our part, which are unbearable for any length of time.

The convoy operation during the first days of the month, in which a very large group of submarines was engaged, brought about the loss of five; only 16 ships totalling 90,000 BRT and one corvette were sunk. No air cover was observed during this operation. On the other hand, especially from the second day on, naval escort was very strong and extraordinarily favored by poor visibility. Owing probably to good location at close range, the submarines were taken unaware so that submerging or deviation to great depths was no longer possible. Apart from the total number of losses sustained, practically all submarines were depth-charged or shelled so that a number of them had to break off the operation and return. This means that for the time being, attacks on convoys are no longer possible in poor visibility and in future must be broken off immediately if such conditions arise, as long as we have no effective counter-measures.

During another convoy operation, carried out by a group of 25 submarines, 16 contacted the enemy. Of these, only one boat managed to attack, sinking two ships totalling 9,000 BRT. This convoy had a very heavy naval and air escort which kept on driving off the submarines or frustrated their offensive efforts.

Other small convoy operations showed the same results. Especially the very strong air cover everywhere with excellent location devices gave only a small number of boats the chance to approach. The frequent reports by submarines this month of carrier-borne planes prove the presence of auxiliary aircraft-carriers in the area of the North Atlantic, particularly on convoy routes. According to a report of an agent in America, 40 auxiliary aircraft-carriers are ready for action there.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Our heavy submarine losses for this month - amounting to altogether 38 - did not occur, however, in convoy operations. They were mostly suffered in the Bay of Biscay, on passage into the operational area, as well as in the operational area itself and in the waiting positions. A survey in War Diary, Part C, Volume IV, as per l/Skl 1640/43 Gkdos. Chfs., gives indications as to the probable causes of the losses and evidence of the high percentage of losses through the enemy air force.

It is certain that the enemy has considerably reinforced his patrol of the whole Atlantic and, besides direct escort for his convoys, has initiated additional control of the whole convoy route by air and naval forces. The excellent location devices developed by the enemy, which have special effect when used by enemy planes, have no counter-measure on our part and are greatly jeopardizing our submarines. These heavy losses at present can only be reduced by special precautions on passage and in the waiting positions; resultant disadvantages must be accepted. The losses compel us to change our previous operational methods of submarine warfare and to leave the North Atlantic, the most successful and main operational area for submarines. Our submarines will operate in other areas, until promising countermeasures or new offensive weapons are brought into use (elimination as far as possible or jamming of enemy location, stronger anti-aircraft armament for the submarines, as well as a torpedo against destroyers.) This is on the assumption that enemy defense measures are not yet so effective in other areas. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. Tr.N.) This step is necessary in order to spare losses and gather forces with which to reopen action in the Atlantic when new weapons are in use. Just what effect the countermeasures developed by us will have is still uncertain but they are promising.

It is, therefore, intended to send out the majority of submarines elsewhere - in the Central Atlantic, in the Caribbean Sea, along the south and west coasts of America, as well as in the area of the Cape of Good Hope - and to continue operations against convoys in the North Atlantic with one group of submarines only when favorable operational conditions (new moon period) exist. It must be anticipated, therefore, that the previous low number of sinkings will probably not increase in the coming months.

Besides the particularly great losses of nine boats in the Bay of Biscay during the month of May, several other submarines sustained such heavy bomb damage in this area that most of them returned in a condition unable to submerge. Owing to our limited air forces,

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

it cannot be expected that enemy planes in this area can be combatted effectively within the near future. As a counter-measure - apart from the already planned increase of anti-aircraft armament on all submarines - altogether ten boats of type VII C will be prepared as anti-aircraft submarines and put into operation in the Bay of Biscay. The first boat of this type was put into operation this month but following its first success (one Sunderland shot down) was so heavily damaged by bombs that it had to put in again. The armament of the anti-aircraft submarines consists of two 2 cm quadruple guns, one 3.7 cm and two machine-guns C-38. The greatest safety for submarines lies in proceeding submerged. However, it must not be overlooked that sojourn in the dangerous Bay of Biscay is considerably prolonged by the slow speed of advance and that the submarines must proceed surfaced for at least 4 - 5 hours a day to charge their batteries. Furthermore, at the beginning of June the attempt will be made to assemble the outgoing submarines in groups of two or three and have them proceed through the Bay of Biscay together, thus guaranteeing stronger defense when attacked. The order issued to the submarines no longer to submerge at the sudden appearance of enemy planes but ward off the attack, has proved to be very effective and has brought about the shooting down of several enemy planes. This procedure will probably prove even more successful after equipment with quadruple guns has been completed.

Owing to excellent data from radio intelligence, detection of convoys was very much facilitated during the month of May. Again in this month it was noticeable that the enemy, as appears from his estimate of the submarine situation, often recognized our dispositions and evaded them. In several cases it was possible only by repeatedly good data from radio intelligence to detect the enemy on his new convoy route. Besides radio intelligence, very good indications were given by the schedule of the convoys. When leaving the North Atlantic it must be expected that these data will scarcely be available in other operational areas, so that detection of the enemy will be very much more difficult.

The ships sunk in more distant operational areas were mostly vessels proceeding alone; on the whole, however, these will be found everywhere on rare occasions only.

In nearly all areas the enemy has adopted traffic in convoys. If such a convoy is detected by a submarine outside the main convoy routes, a commander eager to attack has good prospects of success in view of the little experience in defense which the enemy has had

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

in these waters. For example, a submarine operating in the area of the east coast of Africa in March sank seven ships out of a convoy consisting of ten. At present six large submarines are operating in the area of the Cape of Good Hope, but so far have detected on the average only slight traffic. Their success amounts to between one and four steamers during a stay in the operational area of three to four weeks. Here, too, better results can only be expected when we are successful in detecting convoys.

From deciphering, the Radio Monitoring Service has established a new anti-submarine process called "Hedgehog". According to this, very heavy depth charges apparently of a new type are dropped in a mass or in close succession. There is also a possibility that self-steering torpedoes or mines are being used. (The last sentence added by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. Tr.N.) Besides the heavy explosive charge, there must also be a new type of firing mechanism working on the magnetic or acoustic principle. Thus the firing of the depth-charges takes place in the magnetic or acoustic field of the submarine being attacked. This procedure constitutes a considerable increase of danger. Countermeasures are being tested. Even though the submarines are being degaussed against ground mines, which is an advantage against the magnetic firing, it must not be overlooked that the magnetic conditions arising from the working of the electric engines have not yet been fully ascertained.

In order to counter the enemy's superior location methods, the Radar Research Group of the Navy has established close contact with the Reich Research Council. The attention of all persons engaged in research, science and industry was drawn, in a meeting called by Commander in Chief, Navy and by Chief, Naval Communications Division, to the urgent necessity of catching-up with the achievements of the enemy in this sphere. The Speer Ministry has offered its support in the pursuance of matters of location.

Since, in future, submarines will first have to break up the escort of the convoys more than before, in order to approach the main objective, the anti-destroyer torpedo assumes more importance. This is a new torpedo against escort forces which will be put into use at the end of summer. It will be possible to decrease the danger from the air considerably by equipping the submarines with quadruple guns. However, great efforts are necessary to manufacture these two new submarine weapons, which have been ordered.

Fully convinced that even in the future the submarine will be the chief means of offense in naval warfare, the Fuehrer has ordered the production of submarines to be increased to 40 a month. The industrial

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

and economic leaders were personally informed by Commander in Chief, Navy of the questions and tasks of the Navy, in order to increase their understanding for the necessity of co-operation.

The present crisis, a crisis in the development of arms, must and will be overcome. However, should even then the submarine successes not increase to an extent fatal to the enemy, submarine warfare will retain its value as a defensive part of naval warfare since, through the Battle of the Atlantic, enormous enemy forces are tied down, which would be quite free for an attack against Europe should submarine warfare be discontinued.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Fifty planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operations in the west area and seven in the Mediterranean.

Enemy air activity during the day was slight.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

By day altogether 34 fighter-bombers were out on operations against shipping targets in the Pantelleria area without success. The enemy attacked Pantelleria around noon with 107 planes, of which five were shot down.

In the evening an enemy air attack was carried out on an airfield in Sardinia. During the night of 7 June our bombers also attacked Jijelli and shipping targets in the Pantelleria area.

3. Eastern Front:

Fifty planes were out on operations in the area of the 5th Air Force. Nothing special to report.

Special Items:

1. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff informs Naval Staff for information, of a request to Quartermaster General to re-equip the next three Ju 188's which are delivered, for use against enemy search planes and to assign them to the 3rd Air Force (Air Commander, Atlantic Coast) for operations in the Bay of Biscay.

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. The 3rd Air Force Command reports to Commander in Chief, Air Force, with copy to Naval Staff, Operations Division, that operations by the BV 222 as a rescue plane are only possible as an additional measure, since these flying boats are only seaworthy at seaway 2 at most.

3. Naval Staff requests Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, in agreement with the Aerial Mine Inspectorate, that the 5th Minesweeping Squadron, previously provided, be set up in the area of Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area and made available to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic for operations in the Baltic Sea. Copenhagen is suggested as its base.

4. A short outline of the practical possibilities for using parts of the Air Force in the war against merchant shipping, by Operations Division, Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section, is found in War Diary, Part C, Volume (no figure given. Tr.N.) under date 8 June. This matter will be dealt with in a discussion on 10 June with Commander in Chief, Navy.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Three freighters and three escort vessels from the Atlantic entered Gibraltar. A convoy of about 35 ships and 6 escort vessels from the Mediterranean passed the Straits of Gibraltar in the afternoon bound for the Atlantic. Eleven freighters branched off to enter the harbor of Gibraltar while two tankers and three freighters from this port joined the convoy.

Two other steamers followed several hours later.

According to photographic reconnaissance on 7 June, there were in La Valetta: 4 light cruisers, 6 destroyers, 3 submarines, 6 steamers, 9 LCT's and 3 LCI's as well as other auxiliary naval ships. The ships of the heavy task force were still detected in Mers el Kebir on 7 June. For further details of the ships in Mers el Kebir and Oran, see Telegram 1835.

According to radio intelligence, four cruisers and twelve destroyers have been in the area between Cape Bon and Pantelleria since 1100. Sixteen miles southeast of Kelibia 14 ships, two or three of which were large ones, were sighted at 0855 on northerly course.

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Beginning at 1115 the naval forces reported made a concentrated attack on Pantelleria supported by air planes. During the attack pamphlets were dropped containing an ultimatum which demanded the surrender of the island within 6 hours starting at 1300. According to a report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, no reply came from the commanding officer of the island. The large-scale attack threatened in case of refusal at 1900, was also not carried out.

In the afternoon our air reconnaissance detected southwest of Pantelleria and north of Lampedusa three cruisers and six destroyers on easterly courses. These vessels apparently entered La Valetta at 2000. The Italians reported at 1400 and 2300 one enemy submarine each south of Lampedusa and south of Ajaccio.

In the course of the morning submarines were detected north-northwest of Corfu, north of Bari, and south-southwest of La Spezia.

No enemy vessels were reported in the eastern Mediterranean.

Photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria at noon on 6 June revealed that the French vessels, including the submarines, were lying at their old anchorages.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

In the evening of 8 June the 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas, in co-operation with Italian PT boats, were lying in wait east of Pantelleria to ward off expected enemy attacks. No contact with the enemy was reported. Sweeping operations by motor minesweepers were carried out according to plan without special events.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

A number of tank-barges left Marseilles for Toulon escorted by a submarine chaser. Transport traffic to Sicily as well as to Corsica and Sardinia was carried out according to plan.

Regarding the request made by Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy for barges see Telegram 1855. He requests as soon as possible allocation of at least 100 seaworthy freight-barges having a minimum speed of six knots and seaworthy up to wind strength 4 and seaway 3, with a minimum capacity of 10,000 tons for transports to the islands; also 50 more barges with a minimum capacity of 5,000 tons for the Straits, roads and harbor of Messina.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

According to statements of survivors, the two sailing vessels sunk in the vicinity of the steamer RIEGEL were destroyed by gunfire from an enemy submarine. The submarine submerged for a short time upon the approach of a German plane, then surfaced again and opened fire on the crews of the sailing vessels which had taken to the life boats; five men were killed and four wounded. Otherwise, no special events.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 8 June four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla were out on an operation against the landing point near Myschakow. Three boats of the 11th PT Boat Flotilla were out on submarine chase east of Feodosiya.

Submarine U "9" has left the operational area between Tuapse and Idokopas and is expected to enter Feodosiya on 9 June. Submarine U "19" will probably be ready for action on 10 June in Constanta.

In the evening of 8 June naval artillery lighters MAL "1" and "2", one naval landing craft and four coast patrol boats left Temriuk for coastal patrol.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch and supply traffic to Anapa and Temriuk have been resumed owing to better weather conditions. The 106th Anapa transport was attacked at noon by six enemy planes without success. All the planes were shot down by the fighter cover of the naval landing craft group.

CONFIDENTIAL

8 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Transports in the Black Sea were carried out according to plan and without special events.

IX. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, the Canadian Prime Minister has announced the establishment of a special military and civil defense system against submarine danger in the area of the St. Lawrence River. All inhabitants of the places in question will receive a special training in order to enable them to spot submarines and identify planes.

According to another Reuter report, it is believed in Washington that a full-scale invasion will be carried out simultaneously on several fronts; undoubtedly, however, the Italian islands in the Mediterranean would be one of the first targets. From Melbourne Reuter reproduces a statement by Vice Air Marshal Trevor Cole, who declared that a landing on the French coast was not only possible, but probable in the near future.

The controversy within the United States War Department on the organization of the Air Force is said to have been decided by Roosevelt and Marshall to the effect that the present organization, which permits the Army as well as the Navy to control their own air forces, will be maintained.

After his return from America and Morocco, Churchill made a remarkably optimistic statement in the House of Commons on 8 June. An excerpt is contained in the foreign press report of 9 June. Among other things Churchill stated: "It is obvious that 'amphibious operations', with their particular complications and risks are imminent on a large scale."

Churchill gave the total casualties of the 1st and 8th British Armies in Tunisia as amounting to 35,000 men and the number of prisoners as 248,000; the total losses of the Axis in Tunisia as about 300,000 men of which more than half are said to be Germans. The Axis suffered losses in the crossing, at sea as well as in the air, which cannot be determined. Only 638 persons in all eluded the British blockade, primarily on the air route. According to statements made by captured Generals, there seems to be no doubt that Hitler expected Tunis to be held until August. Furthermore, Mr. Churchill stated: "We British must still give the war against submarines priority, as we can only live and carry on if we defeat the submarines. In every respect the month of May was the best one we ever had in the fight against submarines since the United States were attacked by Japan, Germany and Italy. From this moment we acquired much greater resources, but also offered much more extensive targets. We therefore set up a budget of ships sunk and

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

of new ships, on the basis of which we knew that we could hold out for a long time to come. The sinkings were much lower than we had expected and the new ships have more than fulfilled the extensive tasks undertaken by the Americans. The month of May was one of the best for imports, which were brought safely to our islands, since the year 1941.

Our combined new constructions surpassed our losses at a ratio of more than 3 to 1.

Perhaps one should not take the first week of June as a test, but in reality it is the best one we have had for many months. In the last months the enemy carried out very heavy attacks against our convoys. This gave us the opportunity of dealing him severe blows in open battle.

There are so many enemy submarines now on operations that it is almost impossible not to encounter one or the other of these large submarine areas which are spread everywhere. One is therefore obliged to force one's way through, but there is no cause to regret this. On the contrary, submarines can best be destroyed around the convoys.

New weapons and new methods of close co-ordination between surface escorts and air forces have allowed us to inflict losses on the enemy which surpass all previous records. Some time ago the First Lord of the Admiralty issued a very encouraging statement regarding this. I can only repeat that in May our destructions of submarines for the first time substantially exceeded submarine production in numbers. This can be the decisive turning point. The Germans appear to base their hopes on submarine warfare. We can deduce this from the appeals made by German leaders. The German people are encouraged to endure the sufferings - the terror, as they term it - of aerial bombardments, in the knowledge that the submarines are taking revenge on the seas. If it is revealed to the Germans that this hope has failed, then grave disillusionment will set in, for the Germans are a race which, when seriously disillusioned, does not find the strength to face approaching disaster once its intellect tells it that disaster is inevitable.

I may say that I am confident that the submarine war will not keep the United Nations from gaining final victory, while, on the other hand, aerial warfare will constantly gain in strength and severity."

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In the course of the conferences between Commander in Chief, Navy and the Commanding Admirals, reports were given by Commanding Admirals, Groups West and South and Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy.

The most essential points of these three reports are found in War Diary, Part B, Volume V of 9 June 1943.

The renewed reference by Commanding Admiral, Group South to the necessity of transferring large ships from the western Mediterranean into the Aegean and Black Sea and the shifting of seaborne supplies to the Aegean Sea area from the Adriatic Sea to the route via the Dardanelles, should again be emphatically urged by Naval Staff to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

Commander in Chief, Navy closed the conference with a short resume stressing the usefulness of such talks, which allowed everyone to realize the needs of the others, and proposed that such meetings be held at certain intervals.

Special Items.

I. Quartermaster Division informs Operations Division of the directions to Groups West and South and Naval Station, North Sea concerning shipment of coastal batteries to be provided for the area of Group South. Twelve 15 cm torpedo boat guns type C/76 and three 15.5 cm Navy guns (French type 32) are to be loaded immediately. Group West and Naval Station, North Sea will provide personnel for two batteries each. Group South reports that Salonika is the destination of the transports.

II. Brief intelligence on the enemy situation No. 10/43 of Naval Intelligence Division contains remarkable statements on new enemy weapons. Here the "Hedgehog" is described as a remote-controlled missile against submarines while the description given in the War Diary of 8 June is that of another new type of depth-charge. However, it has yet to be ascertained whether these are really two separate weapons, or if the statements, coming from different sources, were not sufficient to give a uniform picture.

Other statements in the report concern radar gear for U.S. ships' guns, warship construction of the United States, use of auxiliary aircraft carriers and the change in command of Iceland. Copy as per

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

1/Skl 17479/43 geh. in War Diary, file "Material on the Enemy Situation".

III. Group West has transmitted a report by Commander, PT Boats pointing out the weaknesses of our present moored mines with non-contact firing mechanism (low sensitiveness of response, easy to sweep with deep-set mechanical gear), and reports that minelaying operations with the mines now on hand have no prospect of success and, even after conversion, will have only slight effect in proportion to the number laid. The Group requests a mine which remains invisible after being laid until it is overrun and which will entail great danger to minesweepers. The Group will submit a proposal to the effect.

The weaknesses reported are known. New firing mechanisms are being developed with greater range of sensitiveness and releasing device (for instance: after acoustic insertion the deep-set mine will be released from the mooring rope by echo-sounding effect, rise and detonate only when close beneath the target.)

Conversion of the UMB mine (removal of the tie-rod interlock), ordered for Commander, PT Boats, is already under way and will be completed within a few days.

The proposal of Group West is to be awaited.

Situation 9 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our vessels.

With Radiogram 1827 all vessels in foreign waters were informed of enemy shipping movements.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

At 2040 our air reconnaissance reported about ten medium-sized ships off the west coast of the Isle of Wight. No course was stated.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The Gironde channel is open again now that the steamer SCHARLACHBERGER has been towed off.

In the morning, destroyers Z "24" and Z "32" anchored in Royan roads.

Channel Coast:

Two of the 30.5 cm guns of Battery "Wirus" are temporarily out of action as the catches on the horn ring have broken off.

It is now reported under date of 8 June that the 8th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and the 2nd Gun-carrier Flotilla with a convoy en route from Dunkirk to Calais had a short engagement during the night of 7 June with enemy PT boats, without special results.

Guidance of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, while proceeding from St. Malo to Brest on the same night, to enemy vessels which were located, was not successful.

Escort and patrol service by forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West was carried out without special events. The 24th Minesweeper Flotilla established an extension of the enemy mine barrage west of Sark. For further details see Telegram 1955 and Daily Situation.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Between 0107 and 0354 during the night of 8 June unidentified targets were located in AN 8579; at 0300 PT boat noises were located east of M 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Escort and patrol service of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North was carried out according to plan and without special event.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there were three destroyers at 1050 240 miles northeast of Iceland, on course 60°.

Photographic reconnaissance revealed on 8 June 3 submarines, 1 special service vessel, 4 steamers and 5 coastal vessels in Archangel and in the morning of 9 June 7 steamers totalling 9,000 BRT in Yokonga.

Radio intelligence detected moderate reconnaissance activity over the North Sea without noticeable concentration. Nine planes were detected. Apparently the Iceland squadrons did not go out on operation.

Own Situation:

Between 2100 and 2139 on 7 June enemy batteries opened fire on the gun positions of Liinahamari and Pomanov with 45 rounds, causing some damage and casualties. Fire was returned with 21 rounds.

At 0500 on 8 June enemy batteries fired 105 rounds on one of our westbound convoys without success.

Admiral, North Norwegian Coast reports special mission NN 12 and cable search broken off on account of bad weather.

Slight enemy air activity was reported on 8 June from the area of Admiral, West Norwegian Coast.

Twenty one steamers were escorted north and 21 south.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

Convoys in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic were carried out according to plan. Twenty three vessels were engaged in check-sweeping. Three ELM mines were swept.

The channel from the naval base of Hela to Heisternest was broadened to the west from the 10 m line without any mines being swept.

CONFIDENTIAL.

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

At 0400 the Armed Forces barracks near the railway station at Memel were destroyed by fire. Investigation is under way.

Search-sweeping of barrage "Wartburg II" was continued.

There was lively enemy gunfire in the Voronka sector. Two accommodations bunkers received direct hits, but there were no casualties. Thirty four vessels carried out submarine net and barrage patrol according to plan. In the submarine chase area behind the "Seeigel" barrage it was observed that aerial mines were dropped south of 59° 51'N.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

According to radio decoding, the steamer HIGHLAND COURT (tonnage unknown) sank off Halifax on 5 June. It is assumed that the steamer ran into the minefield laid there by a submarine.

The submarine attacked and damaged by eight carrier-borne planes is able to submerge again to a depth of 40 m. A submarine with a doctor aboard is standing by.

At the third attempt submarine U "409" succeeded in breaking through the Straits of Gibraltar. However, as she has only 30 potash cartridges left, she is returning to Toulon. She warded off two air attacks on 6 June.

Submarine U "621" is being converted into the third anti-aircraft submarine and will be ready for action on 7 July.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 38 planes out on operations in the west area and nine in the Mediterranean. Otherwise no special events.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Mediterranean Theater:

No missions were carried out in the central and western Mediterranean. West of Keos a submerging enemy submarine was attacked by an Arado 196 with two bombs, but no effects were observed. From 0900 to 2000 the enemy continued his uninterrupted bomber and fighter operations against Pantelleria, losing five planes which were shot down by our own fighters. The attacks were resumed at 2125 and lasted until 2330.

In addition, around noon Liberator formations attacked the airfield at Gerbini near Catania and Catania itself, causing considerable damage to installations and planes. One Liberator was shot down by anti-aircraft guns. For details as to damage see Daily Situation.

3. Eastern Front:

On 8 June 141 enemy planes were shot down; we lost three.

On 8 June 47 enemy boats were destroyed in the Sea of Asov by machine-gun fire and bombs. At Yeisk and Primorsko on 9 June there were 95 boats and seven others, apparently minesweepers.

The 5th Air Force reports 35 planes out on reconnaissance and patrol, without special events.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Photographic reconnaissance detected an auxiliary aircraft-carrier at Gibraltar on 8 June.

At 0345 on 9 June our air reconnaissance detected 13 ships on southerly course 19 miles north of Bizerta, and at 0700 two PT boats on westerly course 18 miles northeast of Cape Bon.

It was reported at 2030 that unidentified vessels from the north and northwest were approaching Pantelleria.

According to photographic reconnaissance on 9 June, an increase of 25 LCT's was detected at Jijelli. The number of ships at Port Said apparently has not changed. The vessels reported on 21 May are now thought to be 16 LCM's, LCF's and LCA's. If this is the case, the presence of landing craft in the eastern Mediterranean is noteworthy.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area. No reports on successes have been received from our submarines.

Operations by altogether 13 boats of the 3rd and the 7th PT Boat Flotillas east and west of Pantelleria during the night of 8 June were without success. During the night of 9 June both flotillas were again operating in the same area, and acting at the same time as flank escort for convoys to and from Pantelleria.

According to a report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the air attacks and bombardments of Pantelleria on 8 June caused heavy destruction to fortifications and communications installations but casualties were slight.

Minesweeping and submarine chase were carried out without special events.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

No special events.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Twenty miles north of the Doro Channel "Q" ship GA "41" had an engagement at 0619 with an enemy submarine at a range of 6,000 m. A hit was observed. Intensified submarine chase operations are under way with additional vessels and planes.

At noon on 8 June four enemy planes carried out an attack on Naxos. One auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk. Eight drifting mines were sighted near Grabusa (on the northwest point of Crete). The steamer TANAIIS (1,545 BRT) ran aground off Salonika. Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 8 June Anapa was ineffectively shelled at long range from the sea.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Mediterranean Theater:

No missions were carried out in the central and western Mediterranean. West of Keos a submerging enemy submarine was attacked by an Arado 196 with two bombs, but no effects were observed. From 0900 to 2000 the enemy continued his uninterrupted bomber and fighter operations against Pantelleria, losing five planes which were shot down by our own fighters. The attacks were resumed at 2125 and lasted until 2330.

In addition, around noon Liberator formations attacked the airfield at Gerbini near Catania and Catania itself, causing considerable damage to installations and planes. One Liberator was shot down by anti-aircraft guns. For details as to damage see Daily Situation.

3. Eastern Front:

On 8 June 141 enemy planes were shot down; we lost three.

On 8 June 47 enemy boats were destroyed in the Sea of Asov by machine-gun fire and bombs. At Yeisk and Primorsko on 9 June there were 95 boats and seven others, apparently minesweepers.

The 5th Air Force reports 35 planes out on reconnaissance and patrol, without special events.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Photographic reconnaissance detected an auxiliary aircraft-carrier at Gibraltar on 8 June.

At 0345 on 9 June our air reconnaissance detected 13 ships on southerly course 19 miles north of Bizerta, and at 0700 two PT boats on westerly course 18 miles northeast of Cape Bon.

It was reported at 2030 that unidentified vessels from the north and northwest were approaching Pantelleria.

According to photographic reconnaissance on 9 June, an increase of 25 LCT's was detected at Jijelli. The number of ships at Port Said apparently has not changed. The vessels reported on 21 May are now thought to be 16 LCM's, LCF's and LCA's. If this is the case, the presence of landing craft in the eastern Mediterranean is noteworthy.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area. No reports on successes have been received from our submarines.

Operations by altogether 13 boats of the 3rd and the 7th PT Boat Flotillas east and west of Pantelleria during the night of 8 June were without success. During the night of 9 June both flotillas were again operating in the same area, and acting at the same time as flank escort for convoys to and from Pantelleria.

According to a report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the air attacks and bombardments of Pantelleria on 8 June caused heavy destruction to fortifications and communications installations but casualties were slight.

Minesweeping and submarine chase were carried out without special events.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

No special events.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Twenty miles north of the Doro Channel "Q" ship GA "41" had an engagement at 0619 with an enemy submarine at a range of 6,000 m. A hit was observed. Intensified submarine chase operations are under way with additional vessels and planes.

At noon on 8 June four enemy planes carried out an attack on Naxos. One auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk. Eight drifting mines were sighted near Grabusa (on the northwest point of Crete). The steamer TANAIIS (1,545 BRT) ran aground off Salonika. Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 8 June Anapa was ineffectively shelled at long range from the sea.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

During the same night the 1st PT Boat Flotilla sank one coastal vessel of 500 BFT and one lighter of 300 BFT by torpedo off the landing point of Myschako; the boats then operated without success against naval forces bombarding Anapa. A new operation was started by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla off Myschako during the night of 9 June.

Submarine chase east of Feodosiya by three boats of the 11th PT Boat Flotilla was without success.

After entering Feodosiya, submarine U "9" reported strong air and anti-submarine patrols in the operational areas northwest and southeast of Tuapse; shipping was only slight. There was no opportunity for attack.

It is probable that one plane was shot down during the enemy attack on an Anapa transport at noon on 8 June. At 1440 on 9 June the convoy of the steamers CHARKOW and VARNA was attacked off Fupatoria by an enemy submarine firing three torpedoes which missed. Other transport and ferry traffic was carried out without special events.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

1. Future attacks directed by the British and Americans against Burma must be expected for the following reasons:

The Americans see a possibility of defeating Japan mainly by launching air attacks on the main Japanese islands. Another island operation of the kind of Guadalecanal appears to be too lengthy and costly for them. Since the attitude of Russia on the question of granting American air fleets the use of Siberian air bases will remain negative or uncertain, the best possibility of reaching Japan will be from air bases in China. This requires a revival of the Chinese fighting strength in order to regain airfields, from which Japan can be reached, by an offensive in the direction of the coast of the China Sea. This strengthening of China is only possible by way of the Burma Road.

Thus it is to be assumed that the British and Americans will in the coming months send supplies to their Burma front in such amounts that they will be able to launch an offensive in the direction of the Burma Road as soon as the monsoon period is over.

CONFIDENTIAL

9 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The Burma front is the heaviest burden on the Japanese transport system because of the great distance of 4,000 miles (Tokio - Fangoon). Already in winter 1942/43 the lack of shipping made it impossible to increase contingents of troops and supplies in order to utilize the existing supremacy to a greater extent. A serious disruption of Japanese supplies would result if the British and Americans were to succeed in recapturing the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in a surprise move. From the airfields of these islands it would be possible to wage mine warfare - the type that is waged in European coastal waters - in the mouth of the Irawadi (Fangoon) and also in the inner Straits of Malacca, in view of the water depths there. It is to be feared that at the beginning the Japanese will not be sufficiently prepared to cope with the situation.

Should this supposition prove correct, the submarines operating in the Indian Ocean would have more prospects of success but at the same time would face greater dangers on their passage to the base at Penang.

2. In order to gain a clearer picture of the situation in this area - even if only with regard to questions under dispute as to the procedure of submarines upon approaching the Japanese sphere of influence (proceeding surfaced, recognition signals) - it is imperative that submarine commanders making for the supply base report on Japanese reconnaissance activity, patrol and escort measures and other observations, which may give further information, as well as on enemy activity in this area.

3. The blockade runner situation and that of the Aquilas render supplies of torpedoes and spare parts to the base more and more difficult.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has been informed to this effect. The attention of the Liaison Officer with the Japanese Navy was drawn to the mine danger mentioned above.

Otherwise nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

The Anglo-American press comments on the warning issued by Roosevelt on the use of poison gas, and stresses that the warning would not have been given if there were not serious indications that Germany is intending to use it.

Speaking to officer candidates, the Secretary of the Navy, Knox, stated that the United States will never again break up its Fleet after the war. Rather, it will be used after the war for the maintenance of world order. In addition, Knox announced that the number of men in the Navy will be doubled by the end of the year and that in this same period the Navy's tonnage will be increased by a third. The United States, he continued, are not building millions of tons of landing vessels for nothing.

The British press stresses the sober and careful optimism contained in Churchill's statement of 8 June. A Swedish newspaper describes this statement as a new thrust in the war of nerves, which has probably thereby reached its climax. This statement at the same time leads to the conclusion that at least a limited offensive is probably planned within a relatively short time.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

No special conferences and decisions.

Special Items.

I. On 17 May Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, Enemy Situation Branch forwarded data relative to minelaying by the Royal Air Force. According to this, it is possible, for instance, to lay in a single night from 2,000 to 2,400 mines in the Baltic Sea, from the Kiel Bay to the Danzig Bay.

Naval Staff reckons, therefore, with similar possibilities off the submarine bases in the west area, on convoy routes in the North Sea and in the Channel. The situation will become particularly

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

difficult if the enemy starts to lay ground mines in deep water against submerged submarines in the practice and diving areas of our submarines according to plan; our sweeping gear has only a restricted effect at greater depths. Furthermore, it will be impossible to keep large practice areas (surfaces) clear with the vessels and gear at our disposal, since they are barely adequate to keep clear narrow, straight channels. This possibility also makes it necessary that in all suspected areas submerged submarines shall keep at a corresponding distance from the bottom and not be permitted to ground.

It has repeatedly been established that the Russians are using moored mines dropped by planes in the Arctic Sea and in the Baltic and Black Seas; the British and Americans have so far only used the American MARK VI mine in North African coastal waters. However, it must be expected at any time that British or American moored mines will be laid on a large scale in all sea areas within the reach of the enemy Air Force.

Accordingly, Naval Staff issues to all operational headquarters, to the Underwater Obstacles Branch and Quartermaster Division instructions that, with regard to vessels and gear, defense against mines must be adapted to the possibilities mentioned above. High Command, Navy is doing its utmost to increase the means for defense within the scope of the total forces available. Copy as per l/Skl I E 16508/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume VI.

II. According to information from an apparently very reliable source, the Hungarian General Staff reports that the Allied attack is to be launched during the night of 12 June in the Mediterranean area. Landings are to be made on the Iberian coast, with Portugal as focal point, and at the same time on the Flemish, Dutch and Norwegian coasts. It is said that Portugal will only feign resistance. At the same time the eastern front will see action. (see Telegrams 1800 and 1803)

The value of the above should not be rated higher or lower than the many reports so far received concerning enemy plans in the course of the so-called war of nerves.

III. A summary of enemy intelligence obtained from radio decoding and intelligence from 31 May to 6 June is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 23/43 of Chief, Naval Communications Division. Attention is drawn to annex 4 which contains the

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

disposition of British trawlers and auxiliary ships for May 1943. In home waters 1167 auxiliary ships were detected and counted; 197 auxiliary ships are overseas.

Situation 10 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our vessels in foreign waters. With Radiogram 2349, Ship "28" received the following directions:

"Expect enemy warships and planes with long-range radar location. Frequencies cannot be picked up by our own radar. Reflection location is probably coupled with television. Counterdevices still in a stage of development, as the underlying principles have only recently been ascertained."

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity in the Bay of Biscay was normal. Between 1200 and 1800 it was concentrated on up to 16° W. One British vessel was located in BE 9360, one in 9980 and one in AL 3890.

According to aerial reconnaissance, there was a convoy of 27 transports with 28 escorts, 2 light cruisers and 6 destroyers in BE 9240 at noon on southerly course; speed seven to ten knots.. The strength of the escort force is worthy of note.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Destroyer Z "37" left Bordeaux in the morning to carry out anti-aircraft gunnery practice and will subsequently be transferred to Verdon roads. Three ELM/J mines were swept. Eight patrol positions were taken up.

Channel Coast:

According to a statement by a fisherman, a fishing boat struck a mine north of Herm on 9 June and sank. Owing to fog, only two patrol positions were occupied.

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla has been transferred from Peter Port to Cherbourg, and the 6th PT Boat Flotilla will transfer from Cherbourg to Le Havre during the night of 10 June. A coastal sailing vessel sank at the entrance to Cherbourg after a collision.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol service was carried out according to plan. At 1444 boats of the 34th Minesweeper Flotilla off the Hook warded off an attack by two Spitfires. Five ELM/J mines were swept off the East Frisian Islands. Four Danish mine cutters in the North Sea fishing territory blew up 31 drifting mines and three explosive floats in the period from 10 May to 5 June.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, there was moderate reconnaissance activity in the North Sea area north of Scotland and on the part of the Iceland squadrons.

Air reconnaissance reported at 0735 in AE 1960 (north of Iceland) the apparent assembly of a convoy of 16 merchantmen of 2,000 to 3,000 BRT and five escort vessels. In the vicinity a cruiser and

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

a merchantman were sighted which opened heavy fire. A later report identified this formation as being a fishing flotilla, consisting of 13 vessels, each of 800 BRT flying the Icelandic flag.

The gunfire reported probably came from fishing boat escort forces or from a patrol.

Evaluation of photographic reconnaissance reveals that there were on 8 June 4 freighters in Archangel and 5 freighters, 1 special service vessel and 3 submarines in the harbor of Bakariza. Because of the too small scale of the photographs it was not possible to evaluate the number of ships in the dockyard here. Seven merchantmen and one patrol boat were identified at Yokonga.

Own Situation:

Two more anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut on 8 June in the Kwaenangen Fjord. On 10 June four enemy planes flew into the Vardoe area. Twenty one ships were escorted north and 26 south.

Six boats of the 8th PT Boat Flotilla and the CARL PETERS are on passage from Bodoe to Trondheim.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

During the night of 8 June a considerable amount of towed traffic was reported in the Kronstadt Bay. In the evening there were four submarines east of Laavansaari and 47 vessels north of Peninsaari and Schepel. On 10 June there was very lively air activity and shipping in the Seiskari area and in the evening lively air activity in the Tyters area. Minesweeping was presumably carried out east of Seiskari. After being shelled by our coastal guns, eight minesweepers put up a smoke-screen and withdrew to the northwest at high speed. There was lively mortar activity in the Voronka sector. As a result of forest fires, numerous detonations, probably of ammunition and mines, were observed in the enemy positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Twenty three vessels were sent out on check-sweeping in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. A Danish fishing boat struck a mine north of Brandsoe and sank. Escort service was carried out according to plan.

One ELM/J mine each was swept near Samsøe and south of Bornholm. One EMC mine and 16 explosive floats were swept from the "Wartburg" barrage.

In the evening of 8 June the Batteries "Koenigsberg" and "Ischorka" in the Gulf of Finland each shelled an enemy gun-carrier in the Kronstadt sea channel. During the evening of the same day, when fire was opened on enemy tugs, the Kronstadt area was put under a complete smoke-screen up to the Karelian coast and Leningrad.

In the mornings of 9 and 10 June a submerged enemy submarine was attacked in AO 3614 with depth-charges by vessels of the 24th Landing Flotilla.

It is possible that the attack was successful. In the afternoon of 10 June a submerged enemy submarine in AO 3612 was attacked by our planes with depth-charges. Armed vessels were led to the spot. In the afternoon an enemy gun-carrier had to be beached on the south coast of Karelia as the result of the machine-gun fire of two of our fighters. While firing on 14 vessels leaving Seiskari eastbound in the evening, Battery "Bismarck" in turn was shelled from Seiskari.

Barrage "Nashorn 13 a" was laid according to plan.

The net barrage south of Nargoen was laid in two rows. Thus barrages in the Gulf of Finland have been carried out as planned.

Transport service was carried out without special events.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

A tanker of 1,000 BRT was sunk off Lourenco Marques. No further reports of importance.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 56 planes out on operations in the west area and 23 in the Mediterranean.

During the day a strong enemy formation with fighter cover flew into the Ghent area. At 1245 and at 1820 twelve enemy fighters attacked our PT boats and a tug in the Vlieland area. One plane was shot down. It is reported that minelaying was apparently carried out during the night of 10 June off the Atlantic coast in the area of Rochelle. Other smaller forces flew into the areas of Tours and Lille without attacking. One plane was shot down by night fighters.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Up to 1800 on 9 June 1351 enemy planes, among them 650 four-engined planes, were counted in the course of the attack on Pantelleria. Leaflets were dropped, demanding capitulation. The attacks against the island were continued on 10 June until 1812 and during the same night up to 0300 with about 1,000 planes of all types.

On 10 June further enemy air attacks on a smaller scale were directed against airfields in Sicily during the day and on Reggio during the evening.

Thirty nine of our bombers carried out an attack against enemy shipping targets in the harbor of Sousse. Results of this attack have not yet been reported. An enemy submarine, which sank the war transport KT "12" at noon off Tortoli, was unsuccessfully engaged by fighter-bombers.

According to a report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, German bombers sank an enemy submarine north of Bizerta on 9 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

During fighter thrusts in the direction of Pantelleria and escort duties altogether eight enemy planes, including seven fighters, were shot down.

3. Eastern Front:

Twenty one enemy planes were shot down over the Army fronts in the east on 9 June.

One hundred and thirty two of our planes participated in an attack on the rubber works at Jaroslawe and reported nine large fires.

Special Items:

Upon enquiry, the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy stated that owing to technical difficulties which have arisen, there would be a considerable delay in delivery of planes, type BV 222 A, for Air Commander, Atlantic Coast.

Since, on the one hand, such incidents may occur again at any time and since, on the other hand, it is an absolute necessity, for operational plans, to have a conception of the possibilities open to Air Commander, Atlantic Coast for co-operation with submarines, Naval Staff directs a request to Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff that the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy be given authority which will enable him to exercise influence on the progress of making these long-range reconnaissance planes ready for operations and to inform Naval Staff of the situation regarding planes.

VI. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Eleven LCT's and one corvette coming from the Atlantic put into Gibraltar on 10 June. A convoy consisting of eleven freighters left the harbor at 1800 westbound.

No sighting reports have been received from the western Mediterranean. According to radio intelligence, the Commanding Admiral of the Task Force was at sea in the evening in the area of Oran.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Owing to very strong defense, no photographic reconnaissance has been made of the harbors of Algiers - Bougie and Tripoli for several weeks. Thus, information about the disposition of landing craft is limited to the harbors in the area of Oran, Jijelli - Bone and Tunisia, as well as Malta and Gibraltar. Therefore it is impossible to say whether or not, and to what extent, preparations for landing have been shifted to the eastern Mediterranean. No substantial changes are to be seen in the number of landing craft in the harbors under observation, according to a survey by Naval Intelligence Division of 10 June.

The landing vessels, previously observed in French North Africa, could accommodate some eight landing formations, each in the strength of one division, in the first wave, four of these from the Oran area and two divisions each from Algerian and Tunisian ports.

In addition the enemy has at his disposal two airborne divisions and a large number of parachutist formations.

With these forces it is also possible to launch two large-scale landing operations simultaneously in the western and central Mediterranean.

According to air reconnaissance at 0635, there were 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers and 4 small naval vessels 25 miles northeast of Hammamet, on northerly course, and at 1150 5 vessels off Sousse.

At noon submarines were reported 35 miles west of the Straits of Messina and off Cape Monte Santo on the east coast of Sardinia. The latter sank the war transport KT "12" en route from Leghorn to Cagliari with 391 tons of fuel and other cargo aboard.

According to an intelligence report from Spain, a reliable agent reports that before 20 June an Allied landing is intended on the Italian coast, in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. All British and American flyers have received orders to take off for different points in the Mediterranean. Only a few flyers are to remain in Gibraltar. Great misgiving is said to prevail in Gibraltar and London, since it is feared that landings will fail.

No sighting reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Our Situation Mediterranean:

The Italians did not reply to the new enemy demand for capitulation of Pantelleria. Our own command is much hindered by damage to communications and by the small number of roads. The ammunition shortage which already exists and the low supplies of provisions (water for 4 days, flour for 10 days) will probably allow only a resistance of short duration.

Air reconnaissance established a considerable increase in landing craft in Sousse. Sufficient transports are now available for a landing operation against Pantelleria.

The sinking of the water-tanker in Pantelleria, reported by the Naval Attaché in Rome, is not correct according to a report of German Naval Command, Italy. Rather, the tanker has been unloaded according to plan.

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area. No special reports have been received from our submarines.

Without any engagement with the enemy, the 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas carried out their operations during the night of 9 June west and east of Pantelleria according to plan.

A torpedo boat left Toulon for submarine chase to the east.

Group West reports minelaying operation H 5 D carried out as planned.

According to a statement made by the Foreign Office, the Red Cross has again conveyed the course directions issued by Naval Staff to its ships. At the same time the Red Cross has directed a further inquiry to the British Government (see War Diary 4 June). Further delay in the laying of barrages H 3 and H 4 off Marseilles is, therefore, no longer necessary and also not advisable from the military point of view. Group West therefore receives orders from Naval Staff that laying of barrages H 3 and H 4 is now approved.

Group West reports on barge operations:

The execution of barge operations is gravely endangered due to insufficient patrol of the canals. An increase in organized sabotage has become noticeable. During the night of 9 June Lock 57 of the Rhine-Rhone canal south of Besancon was damaged by

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

explosion. Shipping will probably be interrupted until 18 June. During the night of 8 June the bridge over the Briars - Loire side canal was likewise damaged by explosion. Shipping will probably be interrupted for three to four weeks. The immediate start of careful patrolling meets with difficulties as to personnel which cannot easily be overcome. In view of the extension of barge operations and surveillance of further waterways, Commander of the German Occupation Forces, France estimates that 4,000 to 5,000 more men will be required for patrol. Therefore he is communicating with High Command, Army and is assembling more forces from the French area, which, however, are insufficient at present.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Except for the sinking of the war transport KT "12", no special reports have been received. For particulars see Daily Situation and Telegram 1800.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Quartermaster Division informs Naval Staff for information of the following directions to: Commanding General, Armed Forces, South; Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas; Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean:

The fact that Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has been granted authority to have in the future at his disposal all ships of a serviceable nature for the central Mediterranean area, has led to not a single ship being transferred to the Aegean Sea for some time. On the other hand, the measures taken in the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast for strengthening coastal defense urgently demand similar supplies and maintenance for the troops. Therefore it is essential that Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, in agreement with Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean and Armed Forces High Command, Supply and Transportation Office, Armed Forces Overseas, again review shipping available in order to determine and report those vessels which can be transferred to the Aegean Sea. Most rigid standards with regard to his own needs must be applied.

Group South and German Naval Command, Italy will be informed accordingly by Naval Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The intelligence reported by the Hungarian General Staff (see Special Items II) has reached Group South via the Bulgarian Military Attaché with the additional note that a commando operation against the Aegean Sea, the Peloponnesos and Italy is possible simultaneously with the Anglo-American assault on Portugal on 12 June (see Telegram 2020).

Own Situation:

The minelayers DRACHE and BULGARIA left Piraeus for Patras for minelaying.

Anti-submarine operations by "Q" ships G "41" and "43" were broken off without result after five attacks with depth-charges on 10 June; contact was lost. For brief report see Telegram 1708.

The follow-up detonations observed during all anti-submarine operations by Commander, 21st Submarine Chaser Flotilla appear to be diversionary maneuvers and attempts to jam location. The camouflage of "Q" ships G "41" and "43" is now probably known to the enemy.

In the course of air attacks on the harbor of Pigadia (Scarpantos) on 8 June one auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk and on 9 June another auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk and a tug en route to Patras was damaged; casualties were sustained.

Troop transports and convoy service were carried out without special events.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Around midnight of 9 June a submarine was detected southeast of Feodosiya. There was another submarine eleven miles south of Cape Tschauda.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

Submarine chase by two boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla south of Cape Tschauda was without result. During the operation against the landing places at Myschako during the night of 9 June the 1st PT Boat Flotilla had no contact with the enemy..

In the evening of 10 June four boats of the flotilla were in patrol line south of Anapa. Naval artillery lighters MAL "1" - "3" and three motor minesweepers left Temriuk in the afternoon for a special operation in the Sea of Asov.

Submarine U "18" put into Constanta, returning from operations, in the afternoon of 9 June; submarine U "9" is on return passage from Feodosiya to Constanta; submarine U "19" left Constanta on 10 June for the operational area.

Minesweeping planes swept one mine during operations in the Beresanski channel. At 1425 enemy planes with fighter cover attacked the 108th Anapa transport with bombs and machine-gun fire. The naval landing craft sustained no damage. There were a few casualties. The 1st Air Corps reports that our fighter cover shot down five enemy planes.

Other escort and ferry traffic was completed as planned without special events.

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has agreed to the proposal of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast to set up the Armed Forces Transshipment Staff, Varna. No statement from the Foreign Office as to the attitude of Turkey has yet been received. Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast has received directions from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to take the uncertain attitude of Turkey into consideration when selecting positions of ships which are to be used on the route planned.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

No special news regarding naval warfare has been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

I. Report by Chief, Operations Division:

a. It has been agreed with the Italian Admiralty in Rome that nine operational German submarines are to be delivered to the Italian Navy in exchange for the same number of Italian submarines to be used for transportation of rubber. In the meantime however, two Italian submarines were lost before being fitted-out for this special purpose so that, in accordance with the agreement, only seven operational German submarines have to be provided. Speaking on behalf of Admiral Riccardi, Admiral Bertoldi has approached Naval Staff, Operations Division with the request that, for reasons of psychology and morale, delivery of nine German submarines be adhered to, in view of Italy's present situation.

Chief, Naval Staff will decide at a later date.

b. Furthermore the Italians request that, on the basis of the willingness expressed during the May discussions in Rome by Commander in Chief, Navy, the Italian submarines BRIN and DANDOLO - in addition to the submarines mentioned under a. - be placed at the disposal of the German Navy and that two German type IX C submarines be sent to Italy in exchange. This was agreed to by Naval Staff. It is understood that the two Italian submarines will only be withdrawn from operations after the two German replacement submarines with German crews have arrived in the Mediterranean, in order to avoid a weakening of Italian naval warfare in the Mediterranean in the present critical situation. Naval Staff proposed that submarines type VII C be used instead of type IX C which are unsuitable for warfare in the Mediterranean. The Italian Navy has now stated that the BRIN and DANDOLO will be ready for departure to Bordeaux at the beginning of July and will start as soon as two German submarines

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

type VII C have arrived at Pola. As it is most risky to bring submarines through the Straits of Gibraltar at this time of the year and as the fitness of the BRIN for the transportation of rubber is doubtful, Chief, Naval Staff intends to await the return of Captain Grossi and Captain Becker to Berlin on 17 June before making a final decision.

c. The first Italian submarine to be used for transportation of rubber, the AQUILA I was lost on outward passage. Submarines "8" and "9" were lost even before conversion. Appreciable deliveries to Japan and rubber transports to Europe are only possible with large submarines. Thus it appears desirable to contemplate the participation of Japanese submarines in these transportation operations.

Chief, Naval Staff authorizes Naval Staff to raise this question with the Japanese.

For this purpose, the Naval Attaché, Tokio will first be asked for his views as to whether a request for participation of Japanese submarines is desirable and promising and what conditions would have to be met. Copy of instructions to this effect 1/Skl I opa 1695/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.

d. Regarding the question of escorting submarines in the Bay of Biscay by torpedo boats, Naval Staff, Operations Division has ascertained that the carrying out of a regular escort service, comprising the escort of all incoming and outgoing submarines, would require some 7,000 cbm of furnace oil monthly, which is 4,000 cbm above the present quota. Since the furnace oil situation is very critical at present - the amount needed for June would surpass the quantity allotted by 10,000 cbm - the introduction of a permanent escort system by torpedo boats would be justified only if very important military advantages were to be gained. It cannot be estimated at present to what extent this will be the case. Chief, Naval Staff therefore agrees to the proposal of Naval Staff, Operations Division, that, in order to gain experience, outgoing groups of submarines will be escorted up to the 200 m. line, when proceeding there at night, by torpedo boats. The torpedo boats will provide anti-aircraft protection, because submarines may not submerge on these routes owing to the danger of mines.

Group West receives instructions accordingly, with copy to Commander Submarines, West and Submarine Division, with a note

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

attached, saying that this task must be restricted to available furnace oil supplies. Group West is to report intentions and experiences (see Telegram 1717).

II. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division.

a. Naval Staff has rejected a request by Group North/Fleet for permanent assignment of a minelaying submarine. Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

b. Group North/Fleet has submitted operational order for laying barrages 18 a, 20 a and 22 b to strengthen the West Wall (code names "Erzengel", "Wildschwein" and "Steinadler"). Naval Staff has nothing to add. Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

c. Ship "28" left Batavia on 4 June to resume operations against merchant shipping. Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the following radio message to Ship "28":

"Naval warfare against Britain and the United States is coming into the foreground more than ever, because the enemy can only be hit effectively in this sphere. Therefore the new operation of the MICHEL - disrupting enemy trade in the most remote seas of the world and forcing him to scatter his forces - is of special importance for the whole conduct of the war. Bon voyage and good hunting!"

d. Group North/Fleet has recommended a repetition of operation "Wunderland" in the Kara Sea (see War Diary 5 June). After a comprehensive discussion on the possibilities of carrying out this operation, Chief, Naval Staff decides that there is no worth-while objective for battleships in this area. Whether operations by the LUETZOW will be successful depends on whether sufficient data needed for the proper evaluation of the situation can be obtained. Three submarines are to be assigned to Commander, Submarines, Norway to carry out this reconnaissance as soon as the waters around Novaya Zemlya are free of ice. At the same time the submarines can engage enemy shipping and, if necessary, be used for landing sabotage parties.

Directions to this effect were issued to Group North/Fleet and Admiral, Northern Waters with copy to Commanding Admiral, Task Force and Commander, Submarines, Norway, as well as to Submarine Division.

Copy of order 1/Skl I op 1698/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II b.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Report by Naval Air and Air Force Liaison Section, Operations Division: Naval Staff requests participation of as large a part of the Air Force as possible not only in the submarine war but also in warfare against merchant shipping.

Proper designation of aims desired by Naval Staff, sufficient number of forces and adequate training of personnel should help the Air Force to accomplish its tasks. Operations to this end must be concentrated in the west area.

Thus it is not necessary in the warfare against merchant shipping, and especially against the life-line on which England depends, to extend operations to all naval theaters of war. Such an attempt would lead to the setting-up of a second Air Force organization - besides the existing Air Force - which would have to solve not only operational, technical and training questions, but also would have to control the disposition of forces. However, the Navy is in no position to work out such a solution as regards personnel and organization, nor does it seem practical during a war to create something completely new.

This proposal regarding organization must, therefore, be approached in such a way that it can be materialized in practice without disrupting the structure of the Air Force. At the same time the whole training basis of the Air Force must be extended in order to meet naval requirements. In addition a considerable part of the Air Force will have to be diverted to naval warfare.

The recommendations made by General Kessler constitute a solution on a small scale. They however take into consideration only the needs of the submarine and warfare against convoys. But not only convoys at sea are important, the British Isles with their coastal shipping and ports are equally important. For this reason a solution on a broader scale must be attempted.

It is therefore proposed that the existing Air Force organizations in the west area be devoted to the aims outlined above by reorganizing the 3rd Air Force into an air force for naval warfare. This group would have the necessary properly trained forces and would be used exclusively for operations against naval power, for the destruction of ships and for the annihilation and blockading of ports.

On the basis of the forces available it should be proposed at the same time that two air corps be put under the Air Force entrusted

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

with the conduct of naval warfare with the following tasks:

Air Corps A:

Patrol of the Bay of Biscay and attacks on air bases of the enemy's anti-submarine planes.

Reconnaissance and contact with convoys at sea for submarines and bombers.

Attacks on convoys at sea.

Air Corps B:

Attacks on convoys in coastal waters and co-operation with PT boats.

Large-scale minelaying around the British Isles.

Attacks on the main supply ports and on shipbuilding centers. This linking-together of operational aims of the Air Force and Navy from the west area would require closest co-operation between the headquarters concerned.

Moreover, it would be necessary that the operational staff of Air Corps A, which has to fight over the sea, i.e. in co-operation with submarines, be situated close to the headquarters of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, West.

For this task Air Corps A would be dependent on direct co-operation with Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

The Navy would have to take measures regarding communications in order to effect connections for operational requirements between Naval Staff - Group West - 3rd Air Force - Air Corps B on the one hand, and Naval Staff - Commanding Admiral, Submarines - Commander, Submarines, West - Air Corps A on the other hand.

Naval Staff would request the assignment of a further Air Force officer who would have to maintain practical co-operation between the headquarters.

This proposed solution has the advantage that no basic changes are necessary in the organizational structure of the Air Force, but that solely for reasons of demands made by the branch of the

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Armed Forces responsible for carrying out naval warfare, regarding operations by the Air Force, an adjustment in training and command to this task would be effected. The Air Force entrusted with this could make use of all existing Air Force organizations dealing with personnel, materiel, technical matters and supply.

This Air Force (naval warfare) would remain a part of the Air Force and would be entrusted with the highest possible powers of control needed for this task. The extent of its organization would, at the same time, assure utilization of fighter and anti-aircraft defense, ground organization, supply and the communications, radio and air safety network, etc.

As already mentioned the creation of an independent air corps (naval) would entail no apparent advantage, on the contrary, numerous disadvantages. It would lead to inevitable friction with the other offices of the 3rd Air Force. In addition, this solution is not comprehensive enough.

For the immensity of the task the best possible solution must be found; it is provided for by adjusting an entire Air Force, that is a whole combat area, to this end, i.e. the battle against the seapower of the enemy.

Responsibility for success or failure may not be assumed by the Navy through fictitious forms of organization; this responsibility for success must be made to rest with the Air Force by the Fuehrer himself.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with these statements.

It is intended that these views first be submitted as a proposal to Chief, Air Force General Staff. However, Chief, Naval Staff must reserve for himself the right to inform the Fuehrer of these views if necessary.

Copy of letter 1/Skl I L 16977/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume V.

Special Items.

I. In accordance with the renewed reference in the report of Commanding Admiral, Group South of 9 June (see War Diary 9 June),

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval Staff has taken up and referred to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff the question of transferring large ships from the western Mediterranean into the Aegean and Black Sea and the shifting of seaborne supplies to the Aegean Sea area from the Adriatic Sea to the route via the Dardanelles. Transports now available are not sufficient either in the Aegean or the Black Sea to fulfil existing transport demands, let alone increased ones which are to be expected. Despite the directions issued by the Fuehrer no appreciable transfers have taken place from the western Mediterranean for either area. Once again Naval Staff emphasizes the grave danger and the serious consequences which a closing of the Corinth Canal would bring about; the strategic importance of this canal is slight for the enemy but decisive for the Axis powers. Therefore enemy operations are to be expected against western Greece with the aim of permanently closing the Corinth passage, simultaneously with imminent enemy attacks on the large islands in the western Mediterranean. Once the Corinth passage has been sealed off, it will be impossible to increase the number of large ships in the Aegean or Black Sea. Because of the lack of suitable shipyards it will be impossible to build new ships. It is imperative to provide the necessary reserves, as an intensification of enemy attacks against our shipping in the Aegean Sea must be expected. It is the opinion of Naval Staff that the number of large ships to be kept in the western Mediterranean should not exceed those actually required for supplying the German troops in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica.

Italian ships must be used extensively for supplying the island population and Italian units. Naval Staff considers it necessary to speed up the transfer of the entire supply traffic for Greece from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, even though it entails temporary disadvantages. Increased shipping in the Aegean and Black Sea demands an increase in escort forces in both areas. In the Aegean Sea this is only possible with the aid of forces available at present in the western Mediterranean and must be carried out with the actual transfer of shipping. The transfer of fast escort forces is considered possible south of the Peloponnesos even after the closing of the Corinth passage.

Copy of telegram to this effect to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, with copy to Group South, German Naval Command, Italy, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South as per 1/Skl I m 1690/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. In the course of a conference at Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, a representative of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South submitted the demand for construction of 200 Siebel ferries for the Transport Staff of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, indicating that these vessels have proved to be good in the area around Sicily and in Italy. He added that the Air Force was prepared to build the ferries for which engines are available.

After investigating all circumstances, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division adopts the following views:

1. The Navy considers the naval artillery lighter and the naval landing craft more suitable than the Siebel ferry.

2. Because of a shortage of engines it is not possible to increase the numbers of naval artillery lighters and naval landing craft. Thus engines for Siebel ferries cannot be delivered to the Air Force.

3. The Navy has no objections to the construction of 200 Siebel ferries by the Air Force as long as the program of the Navy (i.e. the Fleet Construction Program 1943) is in no way affected by it, even indirectly. Moreover, the Air Force must assume responsibility for fuel.

4. The Navy is prepared to take over the vessels and man them.

III. The eight floating torpedo batteries which will become ready in home waters between the middle of June and the end of August will be allocated as follows:

Naval Command, Norway will receive the first six; Naval Station, Baltic will receive the last two provided a suitable use for them can be found. However, Naval Staff is of the opinion that they are not needed in the area of the Gulf of Finland.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Torpedo Branch were instructed to restrict the testing of the batteries by the Torpedo Trials Command to the extent essential, so that these vessels, which are not particularly seaworthy, may be transferred during the favorable season and made ready for action as quickly as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Regarding the report forwarded by the Hungarian General Staff concerning operational plans of the enemy in Portugal and the Mediterranean, the Naval Attaché, Lisbon, in agreement with Intelligence Center, Portugal, reports that there are no indications as yet noticeable in Portugal. The Military Attaché, Budapest reports that an evaluation of this report cannot be given as the source is not well known.

According to a report by the Military Attaché, Bern, from an allegedly reliable intelligence source, the invasion of Europe is to take place in the summer of 1943; first Italy will be invaded, from there the Balkans and some time later, according to developments in France, landings will be made at different points, with a simultaneous Russian counter-offensive. An American in Bern remarked that Stalin has withdrawn his promise of a summer offensive because his own generals declared it to be hopeless. Furthermore, the Russians do not wish for a speedy end to the war and in particular do not wish the British and Americans to gain a complete victory.

Situation 11 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from Lourenco Marques, a second auxiliary aircraft carrier is stationed at Capetown. On 5 June the following was reported from Cairo to Capetown and Bombay:

"All facilities for repair in the Middle East are fully exploited. The dry dock at Massawa is occupied till the end of July; Haifa can carry out fast repairs at the end of June."

According to further radio decoding, Cairo reported to Aden and London on 6 June:

"All ships needing furnace oil and diesel oil may refuel at Aden. All incoming ships from 9 June to end of June must refuel at Aden. In July some 5,000 tons of oil should be available for merchantmen in Suez." (Text partially distorted.)

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

According to an intelligence report via Lisbon, a large convoy, including several tankers as well as troop transports with air force units aboard, is to leave the Chesapeake Bay on about 17 June bound for England.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché, Tokio reports on 8 June that Ship "28" left Batavia on 4 June, and that the ALSTERUFER left Batavia on 4 June and is expected to arrive at Yokohama on 14 June.

In addition, the Naval Attaché, Tokio reports that, according to a report received from the three southern stations, the accommodation of personnel had been well prepared on the part of the Japanese and that reception was warm. Freedom of movement is still partly restricted. There is every prospect of this and other questions being settled soon. Penang and Singapore report that they are ready to receive, but permission for setting up a radio receiver in Batavia has yet to be obtained. In the clearance of the OSORNO, ALSTERUFER, MICHEL and QUITO our own offices have given proof of great efficiency.

Naval Staff informs Ship "28" by Radiogram 0955 that complaints as to supplies communicated by the Naval Attaché, Tokio will be investigated and a statement will follow.

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN received sailing instructions with Radiogram 1137. The tanker will be awaited at position "Lotte" by several of our submarines beginning 22 June. For particulars see order 1/Skl I k 1675/43 Gkdos. Chfs., in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.

All vessels in foreign waters were informed by Radiogram 1010 on new American warship constructions and the use by the enemy of new depth-charges against submarines.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has drawn up a summary of the operations of the blockade runner season 1942/43 and forwarded it to Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section III, Group West and Chief, Naval Communications Division. Copy of order 1/Skl I k 1617/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II.

After relating the development of events, as known, Naval Staff comes to the conclusion that extremely high losses must be anticipated, because the enemy has realized the importance of the cargoes for the conduct of war by the Axis powers. During next

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

winter, success can be expected only if certain conditions are fulfilled:

1. Sufficient air reconnaissance able to obtain a useful picture of the enemy situation in the Bay of Biscay.
2. Careful operational planning, observing the strictest secrecy.
3. Utilization of every possibility to deceive the enemy. The high losses of the past winter oblige us to limit the number of blockade runners to be sent out for the season 1943/44. Eight blockade runners are available for the run to Japan, including the auxiliary supply ship OSTFRIESLAND, and for the return passage to Europe there are six ships in Japan, one of which is doubtful.

Naval Staff intends to accomplish their departure in two waves during the favorable months from November to January, and each time to bring in two to three homeward-bound vessels simultaneously.

By this measure Naval Staff thinks it possible to cut down risks and hopes to support the successful return by concentration of our operations. The value of the cargoes also requires acceptance of the greatest risk, since a single blockade runner brings in more goods than could be carried in a year by the transport submarines which are just being organized and have not yet been tested.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Destroyer Z "37" put into Bordeaux. Escort and patrol service was carried out according to plan and without special events.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Channel Coast:

The transfer of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla to Cherbourg and of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla to Le Havre was carried out. Two EFA mines were swept off Boulogne. It is planned to have the 4th and 5th PT Boat Flotillas carry out minelaying during the night of 11 June. Escort and patrol service was carried out without particular incidents.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

One ground mine was swept north of Norderney. Escort and patrol service was carried out as planned.

Between 1700 and 1900 strong enemy bomber formations attacked Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven. In Wilhelmshaven slight damage was sustained in the shipyard and in harbor installations.

The accommodation ship TANGANIKA was badly damaged. In the city the "Graf Spee" barracks were heavily damaged and the warrant officers' school destroyed. Two bombs hit the quay of the submarine base.

No military damage was sustained in Cuxhaven.

Numerous bombs fell into the sea in the Heligoland area.

Nineteen planes are reported shot down in the Wilhelmshaven area, 13 by fighters. For details see Telegram 2350.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

One Russian submarine was detected off the Norwegian Arctic coast. Three planes were detected over the North Sea and seven planes of the Iceland squadrons were also detected.

Our reconnaissance sighted at noon about 15 fishing vessels off the north coast of Iceland. According to photographic reconnaissance

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

of 9 June, the following ships were detected: from Kola to Wanjenga: 1 large destroyer, 2 destroyers in dock, 6 submarines, 2 of them on a cross slipway, 12 merchantmen, 2 tankers.

In Yokonga: 4 steamers.

In Molotovsk: 7 merchantmen, 2 destroyers and small vessels under construction, 2 merchantmen on a slipway, 1 icebreaker and 2 floating cranes.

Own Situation:

The 8th PT Boat Flotilla put into Trondheim. The KARL PETERS has anchored off Roervik. During the night of 8 June eight enemy planes raided Kyberg, sinking a cutter. Escort and patrol service was carried out as planned and without special event. Twenty nine ships were escorted north and 33 south.

Naval Command, Norway proposes that the net barrage off the harbor of Honningsvaag should not be laid, as merchantmen rarely use this port and naval vessels only stay for a short time.

Naval Staff has issued directions to Group North/Fleet, Admiral, Northern Waters and Commander, Submarines, Norway as to radio monitoring groups, map material and other preparatory measures for operation "Wunderland II". The Japanese have been requested to furnish data relative to the departure of the Russian ships. After the situation grows tenser on the Aleutian Islands, Naval Staff expects that this shipping from Vladivostock to the Russian Arctic Sea ports will become more difficult and will, therefore, decrease. Copy of telegram 1/Skl I op 1699/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II b.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

During the day and night there was the usual guardboat traffic in Kronstadt Bay, as well as strong air activity.

It was observed that a tug with ferry carried out minesweeping on Kronstadt roads. Between Leningrad and Kronstadt and between Oranienbaum and Kronstadt there were numerous tugs and ferries. Normal guardboat traffic was observed around the island of Lavansaari and in Luga Bay. Air activity was slight in the Tyters area.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Thirty one planes and one minesweeping plane were engaged in sweeping channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. One ELM/J mine each was swept in the Sound and southeast of Skagen.

Escort service in the Baltic Sea entrances and in the Baltic Sea was carried out without special event. These convoys included six troop transports.

After being run-over seven times, an ELM/J mine was swept off Eckernfoerde Bay.

Near Sassnitz a mine exploded in a tow-net.

Sweeping was continued on the "Wartburg II" barrage.

Patrol of barrages "Seeigel" and "Nashorn" was carried out as planned by 34 planes.

During the night of 11 June the Finns reported a westbound submarine between Lavansaari and Seiskari. Clearance of the submarine chase area south of Vigrund is completed; no mines were swept.

There was the usual gunfire and mortar activity in the Voronka sector. The enemy scored numerous hits in our positions. A fortified position was destroyed.

Battery "Bluecher" opened fire on a large ferry between Kronstadt and Leningrad in the evening, which put up a smoke-screen.

V. Merchant Shipping.

The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping reports the following shipping requirements for the month of June:

Traffic to Norway	about 450,000 BRT
Supplies to Finland	about 61,500 BRT
Baltic States traffic	about 206,000 BRT.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In German coastal traffic, besides coal, some 40,000 tons are to be carried in both directions. In coastal coal traffic 223,000 tons of coal are to be loaded, 25 of the ships from Rotterdam.

600,000 - 700,000 tons of ore are to be expected from Lulea, and about 80,000 - 100,000 tons from Oxeloesund.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports on sinkings by our submarines have been received.

Passage of submarines through the Bay of Biscay in groups has proved satisfactory. In spite of repeated locations and sighting of enemy planes, no contact was made with the enemy. Some of the groups were escorted by several Ju 88's.

During an attack by seven Mosquitoes, one Ju 88 of our air cover was shot down. The aerial combat prevented an attack on the submarines.

A final opinion on the advisability of proceeding in groups is still reserved.

According to our reconnaissance, enemy air patrol in the Bay of Biscay is at present apparently only slight.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 161 planes out on operations in the west area, mostly fighters, and seven planes in the Mediterranean. There was strong enemy air activity during the

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

day in the west area. Traffic installations in the coastal area and the coke factory at Zeebrugge were attacked and damaged.

There was further enemy activity in the area of St. Omer and Dunkirk and over the Dutch area.

The raids on Wilhelmshaven were carried out by 120 planes and the attack on Cuxhaven by about 100 planes. Two hundred and eighteen of our fighters were sent out for defense; one was lost.

During the night of 11 June, altogether 300 enemy planes flew into the industrial area of the Rhine and Westphalia, concentrating the attack on Duesseldorf. Further attacks were carried out on Muenster. The raid on Duesseldorf was a very bad one and caused extremely heavy damage.

Damage caused in Muenster was also considerable. According to reports received so far, 36 enemy planes were shot down, nine by anti-aircraft guns and 27 by night fighters.

For further details see Daily Situation.

Thirty five enemy flights were reported tonight over western France; no attacks took place.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the morning 50 four-engined enemy planes attacked Pantelleria again. Landing operations against the island began at 0630. Eighty one of our fighter-bombers in several waves went into action against the enemy forces concentrated at noon in the area around Pantelleria. Twelve landing craft and 1 merchantman were sunk and other landing craft and steamers, in addition to 1 destroyer, 1 light and 1 heavy cruiser, were damaged. The attack was continued by 40 bombers during the night of 11 June; 5 destroyers, 3 landing craft and 5 steamers, two of them large ones, were damaged.

It could not be ascertained, however, that our air attacks had any tactical effect on the operations of the enemy naval forces.

In the course of the afternoon the enemy attacked Lampedusa with 24 planes. The town and Italian anti-aircraft gun positions were totally destroyed. A daylight attack on the airfield at Porzallo caused no particular damage.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Eastern Front:

On 10 June fighters and anti-aircraft guns shot down over the Army fronts 96, and on 11 June 26 enemy planes.

Fighter-bombers sank seven barges on Lake Ladoga and damaged three others.

For result of reconnaissance by the 5th Air Force, see Enemy Situation, Northern Waters.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

According to the report of an Italian agent 1 large tanker, 1 steamer and 4 light vessels passed through the Straits of Gibraltar from the west at 0630. At 1900 11 LCI's left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

No reports have been received concerning the heavy task force.

At 1840 air reconnaissance detected off Bougie 4 steamers putting out to the west and 2 vessels, probably destroyers, proceeding west at high speed. The Italian Navy reported at 0100 3 unidentified vessels 7 miles northeast of Catania on northerly course. The evaluation of photographic reconnaissance showed that at 1100 there were at Soussse: 18 LCT's with 22 tanks and 80 trucks and armored cars on board; in addition 4 other LCT's, 5 LCF's, 24 LCI's, 2 escort boats, the LST QUEEN EMMA, 4 LCA's, 3 tankers, 2 steamers, several PT boats and 15 small naval vessels.

In the area southwest to northwest of Pantelleria our air reconnaissance detected at 1012 several enemy formations, among them 30 large and several small vessels 5 miles west of the island; at 1120, 2 cruisers, 5-6 destroyers, 15-20 large landing craft and 60-70 small vessels 8 - 18 miles northwest of the island.

An Italian report states that the naval forces opened fire at 1110.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1234 radio intelligence picked up the following radio message from Pantelleria to Malta:

"Willing to surrender owing to lack of water, Admiral Farvesi."

German Naval Command, Italy reported at 1335 that, by order of the Italian High Command, Pantelleria hoisted the white flag due to shortage of water and food.

The subsequent landing operation was carried out in three waves from the southwest and northwest and was completed towards 1800.

The bulk of the escorts and landing craft participating already started on return passage to the west between 1500 and 1600.

At 1540 German air reconnaissance sighted a minelayer northeast of Pantelleria on easterly course, laying mines.

The surrender of this base, which was of decisive importance for the disruption of enemy shipping in the Sicilian Channel, signifies a very effective and moral defeat for the cause of the Axis powers. It is quite incomprehensible and does not correspond with the reports made to Chief, Naval Staff in Rome, that this fortress was not sufficiently provided with water and provisions so as to be able to continue resistance for quite a time even if cut off from supplies. No attempt at all was made to offer resistance to a landing. The possibility of a military success which might have assumed considerable proportions, was completely unexploited. The enemy himself was surprised by the capture of this point almost without any losses. According to British press reports, Admiral Cunningham and General Eisenhower were aboard a British cruiser which participated in the shelling of the island. Pantelleria is no credit to the Italians and, it is to be hoped, no omen for their behavior in the coming battles for the islands.

Lampedusa was attacked at 0240 by numerous naval and air forces. Obviously the enemy has landing operations in mind.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Submarines were sighted off the southern point of Corsica and on the east coast of Sardinia.

No reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Owr Situation Mediterranean:

In the evening of 10 June two PT boats were sent out to assist six Me 109's north of Pantelleria. One of the boats was pursued by enemy destroyers; the rescue operation was unsuccessful.

The 3rd and 7th PT Boat Flotillas as well as Italian PT boats were to have been sent out in the evening of 11 June under the command of Admiral Messina against enemy naval forces in the Pantelleria area. Because of a delay in receipt of orders from the Italian headquarters, the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was not able to leave until 2050 with seven boats.

For the same reason the 7th PT Boat Flotilla could not put out at all.

The operation by six Italian PT boats was carried out.

No reports on the success of these operations have yet been received.

Submarine chase and escort operations by German naval forces were carried out according to plan and without special event.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Nothing to report.

For particulars see Telegram 1840.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The minelayers DEACHE, BULGAFIA, BARLETTA and NOPOSINI carried out their special operations off Navarino as well as between Zante and the Peloponnesos according to plan.

An Italian report states that an enemy submarine was sighted in the afternoon of 10 June between Khios and Mytilene and is being attacked by planes.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

From 8 June it is reported from the area between Paros and Antiparos that four enemy planes sank a Greek auxiliary sailing vessel and damaged five others.

Escort and transport traffic in the Aegean Sea was carried out according to plan.

The steamer TANAIIS was refloated and entered Salonika.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There was strong air activity during the night of 10 June over Temriuk Bay. Four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla lay in lurking position south of Anapa, but had no contact with the enemy despite very good visibility. Because of a leakage in the hull, submarine U "19" had to return and put into Constanta again.

Minesweeping planes swept two mines in the Strait of Kerch.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch and Anapa transports were completed as planned.

During the period 1 - 10 June altogether 33,271 tons were transported, 22,701 of them by the Navy, on the various supply lines from the Crimea to the east.

IX. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

No special discussions and decisions.

Situation 12 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from South Africa received via "Ostrow", 11,000 - 12,000 troops were embarked between 2 June and 5 June at Durban and Port Elizabeth bound for the Nile or ports in the eastern Mediterranean. Anyway, the order for one of the transports to proceed to Haifa has been established. Two to three further troop transports are still expected at Durban. Together with a number of freighters, these are to form one of the largest convoys which will sail around the Cape before re-opening of the Mediterranean passage. Very special defense measures are said to have been initiated by South Atlantic Headquarters. For details see Telegram 1800.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff has strong objections to rendezvous point "Eritrea", proposed for the AQUILA by the Japanese; waiting there could entail many dangers. Therefore Naval Staff conveys, via the Naval Attaché in Tokio, the proposal to shift the rendezvous to the southeast into the Strait, and also urges a short call at Sabang to obtain information on the enemy situation (See Telegram 1930.)

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

established. At 2315 on 11 June there were four westbound merchantmen of 2,000 - 4,000 BRT five miles south of the southeastern point of the Eibachi Peninsula. According to a report from Admiral, Northern Waters, there were: at 1050 on 9 June in AE 3523 three destroyers on course 60°, speed 10 knots; at 1409 on 11 June in AB 3959 one destroyer on course 270°, proceeding at high speed. At 1000 on 12 June two persons were observed working on a radio installation on Bear Island. Admiral, Northern Waters believes that there may be some connection between the three observations. On 12 June submarine U "711" reported definitely sighting a carrier-borne plane at 1408 in AB 6622.

An intelligence report from Portugal, dated 11 June and based on a Portuguese Consulate report from the U.S.A., dated 24 May, states that the largest convoy yet destined for England is being assembled along the coastal stretch off Bath Salem. The convoy is to take troops and materiel aboard for operations against Baltic and Scandinavian countries and consisted up to 24 May of 204 ships which are to be joined by another 40. Main ports of destination are said to be Dover and Portsmouth. It is understood that the convoy left the American coast in the first week of June and the offensive is expected to begin in the middle of July. The attack in Norway and Denmark is to serve as relief for the operation in the Mediterranean. (See Telegram 1700.)

Own Situation:

Three further anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut on 11 June off Kwaenangen Fjord. Enemy air activity was restricted to single sorties into the Vardoe, Trondheim, Egersund, Kors Fjord and Bergen areas.

Escort service was carried out according to plan. Twenty nine ships were escorted north and 25 south.

The CARL PETERS put into Trondheim on 11 June.

In order to increase protection of shipping and coastal defense, Naval Command Norway requested on 3 June the strengthening of flanking barrages 2, 3 a and 3 b laid in February 1942 in the Loppe Havet by two single-row mine barrages NW 58 and NE 59 with altogether 193 ELC (obviously meant to read 391 ELC - see below. Tr.N.) mines.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval Staff also considers this desirable as Russian submarine-laid mines have recently been detected several times on routes south of the Loppe Havet. The number of mines required is small, but they are not available at present. As the barrages are primarily intended against submarines, the UMB mine would also suffice if necessary. Naval Staff therefore agrees in principle with plans for barrages NW 58 and NW 59 and will assign the 391 EMC with a note that the mines cannot be delivered immediately as stocks are exhausted. Delivery will be effected with second priority after the projects at present proceeding in the Mediterranean and the Channel. Underwater Obstacles Branch is authorized to supply UMB mines instead of the EMC's if the supply situation of these mines is more favorable.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

There was the usual guard boat traffic and strong air activity during the night of 11 June in the Kronstadt Bay area. Considerable barge and shipping traffic was observed between Leningrad and Kronstadt or Oranienbaum. Part of the sea area between Oranienbaum and the Karelian coast was completely covered by a smoke-screen.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty one vessels and two minesweeping planes were out sweeping channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. One mine was swept south of Anholt.

A patrol boat swept an FLM mine south of Foenne in water 16 m. deep. The boat was damaged.

Two troop transports left Stettin bound for Oslo. One leave transport is en route from Hangoe to Reval and three troop transports are to leave Danzig for Turku on 13 June.

Sweeping of barrage "Wartburg II" is completed. The Oeland declared area can be opened completely for the 27th Submarine Flotilla.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The operation by coastal minelayers near Someri had to be broken off for the time being on account of the weather. The route on the south side of the Irben Strait was swept along a width of 1,500 m., but no mines were cleared.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Six hundred and sixty miles west of Cape Finisterre a submarine fired a fan of two torpedoes, which missed, on a steamer of 9,800 BRT which was proceeding alone.

Six hundred miles west to south of the southern point of Ireland one of our submarines was attacked for 40 minutes by a Liberator. The plane dropped about five bombs into the wake of the submarine, 30 m. astern. The submarine's anti-aircraft fire apparently scored hits, as the plane flew off on fire. Three hours later a second attack by a Liberator was warded off. It was confirmed by radio intelligence that one plane was damaged.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 184 planes out on operations in the west area. Eight enemy planes were shot down during the day. Enemy flights were numerous in the Channel area and over western France. A minesweeper in Foyan was hit. For further details see Daily Situation.

Seventy six of our bombers were sent out against Plymouth during the night of 12 June. They succeeded in starting several large fires in the Foyal Shipyard and in the harbor area. Seven fighter-bombers carried out a diversionary attack on London and three fighter-bombers one on Ramsgate.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

During this night the enemy attacked the areas of Osnabrueck, Bielefeld and Wuppertal. The attack was concentrated on Bochum, where heavy damage was caused to the city. According to reports so far received, 29 planes were shot down, six by anti-aircraft guns.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The enemy carried out heavy attacks during the day. Attacks were carried out, among other places, on Castell Vetrano, where 19 FW 190's and another fighter were damaged, and on Palermo and Trapani. In the evening 51 of our bombers attacked shipping targets in the Lampedusa area and 58 bombers attacked shipping targets in the area of Pantelleria. It was observed in the case of both operations that landing craft, destroyers and transports were damaged.

Ten to twelve Liberators attacked the city and airport of Catania during the night of 12 June. One Ju 88 and one Fieseler Storch were destroyed. A nuisance raid was carried out by single planes on Reggio.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

Special Items:

By order of Commander in Chief, Air Force, the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy has now taken over full responsibility for speedy conversion of BV 222 A planes.

A second BV 222 A plane will be put into operation in the west area from 12 June. Submarine Division has been informed.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

According to an Italian report, 3 merchantmen, 1 destroyer and 2 tugs put into Gibraltar from an unknown direction and 18 LCI's with an escort boat from the Atlantic.

No reports have been received concerning the heavy task force.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Our air reconnaissance established considerable shipping in the Pantelleria and Lampedusa areas. Destroyers, PT boats, landing craft and transports were sighted. There were several warships in the harbor of Pantelleria in the forenoon. Off the harbor there were one cruiser and nine destroyers and to the west of the harbor one large warship on northerly course.

The attacks on Lampedusa from the air and sea continued during the whole day. The last Italian report from this island was issued at 1625. A Reuter report states that Admiral Cunningham and General Eisenhower embarked on the AURORA on 10 June. Besides this cruiser, the cruisers NEWFOUNDLAND, ORION, PENELOPE and EURYALUS as well as nine destroyers are said to have participated in the shelling of Pantelleria.

North of Sidi Barani our air reconnaissance sighted 13 freighters, each allegedly of 10,000 BRT as well as 12 escort boats on westerly course, and 35 miles east-northeast of Alexandria 5 freighters on westerly course. Photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria showed that the French vessels had not changed their positions.

An intelligence report of 4 June from London via Madrid states that since 23 May chiefly Canadian troops, amounting to 17,000, apparently bound for Algiers, are being embarked in the harbors of the Bristol Channel. However, disembarkation is to take place in the Atlantic ports of Morocco. Intelligence report as per Telegram 1802 contains further particulars about transfer of troops and materiel in North Africa. According to this, there are strong garrisons of British commandos in Bizerta, Fany and Sousse.

According to data of Naval Intelligence Division, the bulk of the landing craft - as far as can be ascertained - is still in the Oran - Algiers area. With the expected arrival of additional convoys from England, the number of ships in the western Mediterranean on 13 June will be considerably above the normal. The mass influx of landing craft from the Atlantic has decreased in the meantime. Because of incomplete air reconnaissance, the number of landing craft in the central and eastern Mediterranean cannot be ascertained.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Four Italian submarines are reported in the operational area.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

At 2321 on 11 June the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla unsuccessfully engaged six gunboats.

As no reports have been received from Lampedusa since 1625, it is apparent that the island surrendered at this time because all the batteries were destroyed.

Minelaying operation H 5 B was carried out on 11 June according to plan in the area of the 6th Coast Patrol Force. Coming from home waters, four motor minesweepers reached Marseilles on this day.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Traffic to Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily was carried out as planned without special event.

For supplies to these islands, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has requested that 34,850 BRT of shipping be used monthly plus 18,500 BRT on one occasion. According to information from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Mediterranean, this demand can be met if 40 barges can each make two runs per month. The intended transfer of a steamer into the Aegean Sea was postponed because of the bright moonlight nights.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

An Italian report states that an auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine at 1700 on 11 June near Piscopi in the Dodecanese. Submarine chase was unsuccessful. On the same day enemy planes attacked two small towns on the Peloponnesos with machine guns.

The DRACHE, BULGARIA and submarine chaser "2101" put into Piraeus from Patras. Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea was carried out according to plan. The Spanish steamer RIEGEL, which was damaged on 29 May by an enemy submarine near Trikeri, was towed into Oreos Bay.

Black Sea:

The enemy submarine attack reported on 11 June on a convoy east of Yalta has proved to be a false alarm. On 12 June one enemy submarine each was reported 120 miles east of Constanta,

CONFIDENTIAL

12 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

30 miles south-southeast of Feodosiya and 30 miles south-southwest of Feodosiya. Submarine chase lasting three hours and carried out by three planes between 45° and 46° N., was unsuccessful.

During the night of 11 June there was an enemy air attack on Mariupol, while three armed vessels opened fire from the sea with small caliber guns. No damage was caused. Defense by naval and anti-aircraft batteries was without noticeable effect. At 1240, despite close air cover and fighter protection, the steamer BIRGIT (1,971 BRT), sailing in convoy, was sunk off Eupatoria in an enemy air attack.

It is now reported regarding the shelling of Achtari in the morning of 11 June by naval artillery lighters, that hits were observed on mooring jetties and harbor installations. Three armed vessels left the port during the shelling and attacked our formation. After sustaining hits by our motor minesweepers they were, however, forced back into port. On return passage, the naval artillery lighter formation at 0420 engaged a fast vessel putting in from the north, which withdrew behind a smoke-screen. The formation was attacked at 0545 by two enemy planes. One plane was probably shot down.

In the evening of 12 June four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla were out on operation against enemy supply shipping between Tuapse and Cape Idokopas. Three other boats were in lurking position south of Gelendzhik. Three boats of the 11th PT Boat Flotilla are forming a patrol line south of Anapa during the night of 12 June.

Escort, transport and ferry traffic was completed according to plan and without special incident.

Replying to an inquiry of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Group South reports that previous supply traffic through the Dardanelles has not led to any difficulties with the Turks. The Group recommends that this question be not discussed with the Turkish Government, in order to avoid arousing attention.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

According to a report of the Spanish news agency EFE, the American press announced that General Eisenhower will probably be appointed Commander in Chief of the Allied invasion forces on the Continent.

According to an announcement of the Canadian Minister of Armaments relayed from London, altogether 221 frigates have been launched in Canada. The majority of the 8,000 planes and 11,000 tanks recently built in Canada will go to Russia.

Special Items.

I. Naval Staff, Operations Division has made a summary of the achievements of blockade runners to date and of plans for blockade running during 1943/44. It has been sent to Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section III and Special Staff for Mercantile and Economic Warfare. Copy as per 1/Skl I g 1667/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume IX. The summary gives a survey of the goods shipped and deals with the preparations which have been made in respect to the exchange of goods with Japan during the winter 1943/44. The data of the last blockade running period show that it is not the amount of available goods that is decisive for the extent of the future program, but rather the shipping available at present in western France and in the Far East. As this is limited, the shipping of rubber and hard goods takes first priority. Only a fraction of the 56,000 tons of liquid food fats available can probably be shipped to Germany. It is intended that transport submarines carry 3,000 tons of cargo, mainly rubber, and in addition zinc, tungsten, opium and quinine. Of the new constructions or conversions started in winter 1941/42, six will be ready in the course of this winter. Group West is, therefore, to make arrangements for their transfer from shipyards in the east area to the west area, as soon as this is possible. Three ships, which have already been finished, have been placed until 1 Oct. 1943 at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping for transport tasks in the Baltic Sea.

II. The Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West has published an official neutral foreign intelligence report from the U.S.A., believed to be reliable. It contains statements made in the

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

middle of May by a high ranking American officer, who must have been in North Africa at the beginning of April. The following points of its contents are worth noting:

1. The large-scale attack on Europe has been decided upon.
2. The attack will be concentrated in the Mediterranean area.
3. The operations in that area will be led by General Montgomery.
4. Operations will start in two separate sectors. American forces will go into action chiefly against French territory, supported by U.S. naval forces. The majority of the British forces will go into action at another "less difficult" point.
5. Pressure on neutrals - presumably Turkey- for the purpose of securing safe bases for attack, plays a role in Montgomery's plans.

Foreign Armies West considers this report a confirmation of present views on enemy plans providing for two independent operations in the Mediterranean area, i.e. not against the Balkans or against Sardinia/France, but against both. The reference to operations by the American group against French territory seems to be of special significance. It shows that the initial operations against Sardinia will be followed up by operations against the south coast of France. Thus, a simultaneous operation against Corsica appears more than ever probable, as the elimination of both islands is a preliminary condition for the thrust against the south coast of France. There are as yet no indications about the sector of the south coast of France selected for the continuation of operations. The occupation of the eastern sector by Italian forces might be a determining factor. In arriving at this decision, the enemy might hope for a great gain in prestige in the world, and especially with the French people. Strong support from the French population can be expected after the landing. Likewise, the 10 - 12 French divisions, which are being equipped in French North Africa, constitute a considerable contingent particularly suited for the task. Together with 9 - 12 Anglo-American divisions, the enemy has at his disposal the forces needed for large-scale operations.

This report offers no new indications as to operations in the eastern Mediterranean. In view of the small amount of enemy

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

shipping at present in the eastern Mediterranean, it seems likely that operations in the Balkans will be scheduled later than those in the west area.

Already in the middle of April Naval Staff, Operations Division had recognized enemy plans for landing in southern France as imminent and had informed the branches of the Armed Forces to this effect. Naval Intelligence Division is endeavoring to obtain further data for evaluation of the report. In the opinion of Naval Staff, the pressure on neutrals may just as well refer to Spain and Portugal as to Turkey.

Situation 13 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from British India via "Ostrow" dated 19 May, a convoy consisting of 26 vessels entered Indian ports in the middle of May. It is understood that the convoy was not even attacked once en route. Two or three of the troop transports in this convoy are said to have carried principally tank troops. The war materiel brought over to India consisted of trucks, tanks, bombs, machine-guns and 50 fighter planes in parts, but no gun ammunition, production of which in India is said to be adequate to meet normal demands. Two ships with materiel for Russia went to Karachi.

2. Own Situation:

There has been no news from our vessels.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity of the 19th Group was normal with 34 planes. It was extended over the outer Bay of Biscay up to 15° W.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

A British vessel was located at 0708 in DJ 1420.

War Diary, Part D contains a summary by Naval Intelligence Division of convoy traffic in the coastal waters around England, as of 1 June.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Escort and patrol service was carried out according to plan. One ELM/J mine was swept off La Pallice. Group West reports laying of an experimental barrage with active mines in the area west of Contis, which also endangers shallow-draught vessels. Shipping and fishing vessels have been informed of the declared area accordingly.

According to a report from Submarine Division, submarine U "564", unable to dive and with heavy damage after a bombing attack, was in BE 9462 at 2300 on return passage; she is proceeding at 12 knots on course 100°, accompanied by submarine U "185".

Commander, Submarines, West has requested Group West for destroyer protection and suggested that the submarines be met in approximately BF 7550.

Channel Coast:

Escort and patrol service was carried out as planned. The 2nd and 6th PT Boat Flotillas have been transferred from Boulogne to Ostend. The 24th Minesweeper Flotilla swept eight ATE mines in the Sark Barrage. In the enemy air attack on Rouen on 12 June, apart from the damage sustained by minesweeper M "4627", a French dredger was sunk.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Convoy Hook - Elbe was attacked at 2155 south of Helder by about 60 enemy planes. The steamer STADE EMDEN (5,180 BRT), with a cargo of coke, and patrol boat VP "1109" sank after being hit by a torpedo. Two minesweepers are out of action on account of damage sustained. Four planes were shot down. Other patrol and convoy traffic was carried out according to plan and without special incident.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1000 a strong enemy formation of 125 planes attacked the dockyard and harbor area of Bremen. Docks 1 and 2 were sunk. The harbor repair workshop was destroyed. The minesweepers being constructed at the Atlas Works did not suffer any damage. However, some of the installations of this dockyard were heavily damaged.

At 0912 twelve enemy planes carried out an attack on the dockyard and lock in Flushing. The damage caused was slight. The use of the lock was assured by improvised means.

Another enemy formation of some 100 planes flew into the Kiel area north of Heligoland. For particulars see Telegram 1948.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance for an enemy aircraft carrier suspected west of Bear Island, carried out particularly in the sea area between 10° and 25° E during the night of 12 June and during the day, was without success.

At 1708 submarine U "711" reported a westbound destroyer proceeding at high speed in AB 6385. Group North/Fleet suspects that the garrison on Bear Island is either being called for or reinforced. Nothing remarkable was noticed on Bear Island.

Own Situation:

At noon on 11 June Russian batteries fired three rounds on a steamer leaving Petsamo. At 2343 on 12 June an eastbound convoy was attacked by an enemy submarine in AC 8178 near Tanahorn, which fired two torpedoes; both missed their targets. Submarine chase is in progress. On the same day two more Russian anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut in the Stjernerund.

From 2117 on 11 June to 0720 on 12 June 16 - 18 enemy planes carried out an attack on Ekkerøy. The battery was not damaged. On 12 June slight air activity was reported in the Banak and Petsamo areas during the day. At 0720 on 13 June our eastbound convoy was unsuccessfully attacked north of Petsamo by an enemy plane. Escort and patrol service was carried out according to plan. Twenty one ships were escorted north and 27 south.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

On account of the sighting of a destroyer, Group North/Fleet has requested the 5th Air Force by telephone to carry out speedy reconnaissance east and west of Bear Island as well as of the west coast of Spitsbergen and of the fjords in that area, as soon as the necessary forces are available. Reconnaissance in the area of Bear Island was promised for the night of 13 June, if at all possible.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Further towed convoys and minesweeping operations were observed in Kronstadt Bay. Enemy harassing gunfire was directed against our coastal strip. There was intense air activity in the Lavansaari sector.

2. Own Situation:

Escort service in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic was carried out according to plan.

The ELSASS and OSTMARK will proceed in the morning of 14 June from Copenhagen to Kiel.

About 120 enemy planes carried out an attack on Kiel between 0915 and 1004. The bombs fell almost entirely on the edge of the city. For particulars see Telegram 2045. As far as can be ascertained to date, altogether 27 enemy planes were shot down in attacks in the Baltic and North Seas.

Mine-exploding vessel "132" of Transport Unit Stettin - Oslo swept a ground mine in AO 7932 at 0502. The vessel was damaged.

An enemy air attack was carried out at 2327 on our battery in Luga Bay; no casualties or damage were sustained. Thirty four vessels patrolled mine and net barrages in the Gulf of Finland according to plan. Transport service was carried out as planned without special incident.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

West of Cape Finisterre a group of five outgoing submarines was attacked by a Sunderland, which was shot down. As a result of bomb hits, one of the submarines is heavily damaged and unable to dive. She is returning accompanied by another submarine. For details see Situation West Area.

Refuelling of Group "Trutz" is completed. The Group will take up position again, as an eastbound convoy is expected on 17 June. The loss of submarine U "118" is particularly serious, as this was until now the only tanker carrying 300 cbm of fuel; she was to supply 10 submarines on operations in the Carribbean Sea and in Brazilian waters. Large submarines must now be used to supply fuel, although they are only equipped with one machine-gun.

The damage sustained by the submarine which warded off an attack by eight carrier-borne planes on 8 June has been repaired to such an extent that she is now reportedly able to dive deep again and is ready for a long operation.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 244 planes out on operations in the west area, and five in the Mediterranean. There was strong enemy air activity during the day. Between 0635 and 0845 four planes flew into the areas of Wesermuende - Hildesheim - Paderborn but did not attack. A report has already been given on the attacks on Flushing, Bremen and Kiel, as well as on our convoy off Helder. It is reported that nine planes flew into the Cherbourg area in the afternoon. Three Mosquitoes were shot down north of Brest.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

During the night of 13 June altogether 20 enemy planes flew over Reich territory, ten of them over Cuxhaven - Schwerin - Stettin - Frankfurt on the Oder - Dresden - Hildesheim, and ten over the Wuppertal - Cologne area. No attacks were carried out and no planes were shot down. Hamburg, Postock, Wismar and Stettin put up a smoke-screen.

During the same night seventy fighter-bombers were out on operation against Grimsby, while two planes carried out a nuisance raid on London.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Eighteen Liberators attacked the city and airport of Catania at noon. Heavy damage was caused; the airfield cannot be used for the time being. Another attack by 15 Liberators was directed against the airfield at Gerbini (southwest of Catania) where 5 Ju 88's, 3 FW 190's and a fighter, as well as 4 Italian planes were destroyed. One bomber was shot down. In the forenoon 4 Blenheims approached the west coast of the Peloponnesos at low altitude. Two of the planes were shot down. During the night of 13 June 20 enemy planes attacked Messina, causing considerable damage to buildings in the city and harbor.

In the afternoon 33 of our fighter-bombers attacked shipping targets off Pantelleria, sinking a merchantman of 2,000 BRT.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Five MGB's and twelve motor launches put into Gibraltar from the Mediterranean on 12 June. In the evening a convoy of six freighters left the port bound for the Atlantic. Eighteen LCI's left for the Mediterranean in the afternoon of 13 June.

Only single merchantmen under escort were observed off the Algerian coast. There were nine ships of between 3,000 and 10,000 BRT in Bone. Photographic reconnaissance revealed at

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Bizerta 99 landing craft, 74 naval vessels, as well as several tankers and merchantmen, totalling about 90,000 BRT. There were 4 merchantmen off the harbor. During the night of 3 June there were 3 tankers on southeasterly course, escorted by 2 destroyers, 15 miles northeast of Cape Bon.

At noon 16 large and a number of small ships were sighted off and in the harbor of Pantelleria, and 6 miles southwest of the harbor 17 naval and merchant ships proceeding to the island.

A convoy of 13 ships was detected shortly after midnight 30 miles southwest of Pantelleria on westerly course. A report by Commanding General, Armed Forces, South states that the small island of Linosa, with a garrison of about 150 Italians, was occupied by the enemy in the morning.

Submarines were reported west of Naples, east of Bastia, northwest of Messina and southeast of Toulon.

No reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

Churchill sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, in which he conveyed his congratulations on the admirable work accomplished by the Navy during the entire Tunisian campaign and especially at its conclusion. The message reads:

"Thanks to the courage and devotion of the Navy, our submarines succeeded in sinking 47 ships, our surface vessels 42 ships, together about 268,000 BRT. If we add to these figures the ships sunk by the Air Force, we arrive at a total of 137 ships amounting to 433,400 BRT, i.e. 32% of the merchantmen which the Axis was estimated to have had at its disposal at the beginning of the Tunisian campaign. In the course of the long campaign the Navy and Air Force, acting in close co-operation, sank 21 enemy destroyers and torpedo boats and numerous smaller vessels, and prevented 35% of the enemy's supply ships and transports from reaching Tunisia. The mine-sweepers were faced with the task of reopening the Mediterranean by sweeping a 600 mile long channel in the period from 9 to 21 May. The protection of our convoys was brought to a very high standard. Of the total, tremendous number of merchantmen which entered the Mediterranean between 8 November 1942 and 8 May 1943, losses amounted to less than 2%. During all operations, which grew in intensity from March to May, PT boats displayed great audacity and sank nine ships during the first

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

half of March, losing only four. Destroyers of the Royal Navy, supported by torpedo boats and cruisers, established during the final battle for the point of Tunis a close blockade, through which practically nothing could pass, thus depriving the enemy of any possibility of a "Dunkirk". All this could not have been accomplished without the support of the battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers, even though they were robbed of an encounter with the Italian battle fleet, which they fervently desired."

According to a report from Ankara, the new Commander in Chief of the Levant, Admiral Cunningham, has arrived in Ankara from Cairo to visit the Turkish Commander in Chief, the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

There was one Italian submarine in the operational area. One of our submarines sank a transport of 6,000 BRT out of a westbound convoy, 40 miles west-southwest of Derna.

Two boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla transferred air force personnel from Lampione. Submarine chaser "2206" carried out anti-submarine operations off Bastia. From 2237 to 2336 highest alarm readiness was ordered in Trapani. The enemy carried out air attacks on Catania during the night of 12 June and during the day. Numerous large fires were caused.

As a result of the report by Group West regarding the danger to which barges en route to Marseilles by way of the French canals are exposed (see War Diary 11 June), Army General Staff has been directed by Chief, Operations Division, Armed Forces High Command to issue orders to the Commander of the German Occupation Forces in France to safeguard immediately and with all means available not only the Bourgogne Canal but particularly the Rhine-Rhone Canal as well as all other vulnerable French waterways. (See Telegram 1150)

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Nothing to report. For details see Telegram 1920.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The minelayers MOROSINI and BARLETTA left Piraeus for Patras to carry out minelaying. The enemy submarine reported in

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

the Dodecanese area on 11 June has sunk another auxiliary sailing vessel. Near Leukas an auxiliary sailing vessel was destroyed by three enemy planes. A merchantman was attacked in the morning of 13 June southwest of Kephallonia. There are no details yet. At noon on 12 June the Italian steamer CITTA DI SAVONA (2,500 BRT) sank by the bow to the bottom in Piraeus after an explosion forward. It has been established that the explosion - probably of an adhesive mine - was due to sabotage; 69 horses were drowned. Repair work will take only a short time.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Only slight shipping was observed along the Caucasian coast. A minesweeper was located at 0749 ten miles south of Adler on southeasterly course and around midnight a westbound destroyer was sighted 20 miles southwest of Sotschi.

Own Situation:

While on passage to Sevastopol two naval landing craft were unsuccessfully attacked at 1805 on 12 June by an enemy submarine south of Eupatoria. During the night of 11 June the enemy carried out repeated air attacks on the railway station and airfield at Kerch. Buildings were damaged but no casualties were suffered.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla carried out its operation during the night of 12 June according to plan, without sighting the enemy. While on its way one group of the Flotilla was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy planes. While in patrol line south of Anapa the 11th PT Boat Flotilla had, shortly before midnight, an engagement with five enemy PT boats of a more powerful type. The engagement was broken off after a short exchange of fire. No casualties or damage were sustained. While proceeding from Constanta to Ivanbaba PT boat S "49" was chased by enemy PT boats and a destroyer south of Cape Sarytsch at 0225. The enemy was shaken off. Coastal patrol in Temriuk Bay sighted enemy vessels. A fast enemy vessel was chased to the northwest without result. During the night of 13 June shelling of Achtari by three naval artillery lighters and three motor minesweepers is again planned, also an operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in Temriuk Bay and patrol line north of the mouth of the Kuban by naval landing craft and harbor defense vessels.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Escort, transport and ferry traffic was carried out without special incident.

Special Items:

Regarding the use of adhesive mines against ships, Group South has inquired whether gear is available which would reveal the presence of magnetic bodies in ships' sides. (see Telegram 2020)

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

No special reports bearing on naval warfare have been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. With regard to the question of exchange of merchantmarine crews between Germany and England, which is now taking place, Chief, Naval Staff desires that no British merchant captains and officers be included who have been in our submarines.

II. In the fight between our submarines and enemy air forces in the Bay of Biscay, the latter have started countering the anti-aircraft defense of our submarines by attacking in groups of three. Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that submarines in the area south of Iceland shall also proceed in groups of at least two.

Special Items:

I. Vice Admiral Weichold submitted on 20 May a recommendation as to the conduct of war behind the enemy Mediterranean front. The extensive coastal stretches of North Africa and their connecting highways, which must serve the enemy as a staging area for a southern front in Europe, offer a number of weak points which must be attacked not only by the Air Force, but also by other means. Thereby the enemy will be compelled to take protective measures which will permanently require a considerable number of forces, whereas our own forces need only to be small. Excellent targets would be highways, bridges, bends and curves on mountain roads, watering points and water control installations, camps, ammunition dumps and airfields, location gear, harbor installations as well as shipping targets in the harbors and on roads, especially any kind of highway traffic.

Small combat units of about 10 - 20 men appear suitable for carrying out these tasks. By attacking shipping targets in the harbors and on the roads, small battle weapons of the Navy

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

must supplement on the water the attacks made on land. Surface forces, planes and submarines could serve as means of transportation over the Mediterranean and if necessary planes also, in connection with parachute jumps.

The activities of the combat units must have nothing to do with espionage or intelligence service. The units must assume a purely military character and be simply combat formations of the Armed Forces. It is recommended that there be a formation consisting of men of all three branches of the Armed Forces, assembled into a brigade and put under the command of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Mediterranean as a military combat unit.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff had ordered that Vice Admiral Weichold work out a request to this effect for Armed Forces High Command.

Proposal as per 1/Skl 1569/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in files 1/Skl I op.

II. By special request of the Fuehrer, Armed Forces High Command intends to counter highly exaggerated Russian announcements on alleged successes against our naval forces and merchantmen in the Arctic Ocean and in the Baltic and Black Seas. High Command, Navy is to provide Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff with statements of actual losses incurred between 1 May 1942 and 10 June 1943, as well as of Russian losses as far as they have been ascertained.

Situation 14 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Three Canadian corvettes and two British block vessels arrived in East London in the middle of May.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our vessels.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

It was observed that the 19th Group carried out extensive reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay up to 17° W.

This Group reported one eastbound and one westbound group of submarines. However, no reports of attacks were intercepted. At 0800 a southbound part-convoy reported an attack by planes near Cape Vincent. An Allied vessel was reported at 1451 in AM 6780 (110 miles north-northwest of the Faroes).

Our air reconnaissance reported at 1845 2 destroyers in BE 6872 on course 45° proceeding at moderate speed, and at 0750 a convoy consisting of 8 merchantmen and 2 escort vessels in CG 8314, on course 180°.

An incomplete photograph of the harbor entrance of Plymouth showed 13 harbor and coastal vessels and 40 barges and landing craft.

According to an intelligence report via "Ostrow", dated 31 May, the entry of a British convoy consisting of eleven ships into Lisbon on 30 May caused some alarm, because the formation, which approached the mouth of the Tagus in close formation and apparently without escort vessels, was at first taken for an invasion fleet by the population. (For particulars see Telegram 1820).

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The 2nd battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 284 in Coubre was attacked with machine-guns by three enemy planes during the night of 13 June. Six patrol positions were taken up along the Atlantic coast. Patrol and escort service was carried out as planned. One ELM/J mine was swept by a mine-exploding vessel off Lorient.

Destroyers Z "24" and Z "32" left Poyan at 0430 for BF 7644 to aid submarine U "564". Because of a defect in the starboard engine, destroyer Z "32" had to be recalled at 1130; she was ready again at 2000 and able to proceed at 30 knots. Destroyer Z "24" continued her mission alone. Destroyer Z "37" left Bordeaux at

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

1500 for support and is to go out to meet the submarine escort together with destroyer Z "32". Three boats of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla have been lying in Foyan roads in immediate readiness since 1800. While destroyer Z "37" was leaving port, mine-exploding vessel "21" struck a mine in the Gironde near Buoy 1 and sank. Minesweeper M "32" sustained damage near Buoy 3 after striking a mine and was towed in. Destroyer Z "37" then returned to Royan.

In the meanwhile submarine U "564" sank at 1730 in BF 7549 after another air attack. The escorting submarine U "185" is proceeding, with those of the crew rescued from submarine U "564", to the destroyer rendezvous which has been arranged for 2100 in BF 7566. In the morning of 15 June destroyer Z "24" and submarine U "185" will be met by two boats of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla in BF 8631 (150 miles southwest of the mouth of the Gironde). Destroyer Z "32" and one boat of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla will take up rendezvous position off the Gironde. It is expected that all vessels will enter port at about 1100 on 15 June.

Channel Coast:

Escort and patrol service was carried out according to plan without special event.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

The number of enemy planes shot down during the attack on our Hook - Elbe convoy has increased from four to eight. In addition, four more planes were damaged. On 14 June escort service was carried out as planned and without special event. One ELM/J mine was swept north of Schiermonikoog. Three enemy planes were fired on at 1500 by naval anti-aircraft guns from Ameland and hits were observed. The harbor defense flotilla at Cuxhaven brought in 15 prisoners from two enemy bombers which made a forced landing near Pellworm.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Four planes were detected on operations in the North Sea and one plane of the Iceland squadrons was also detected. No naval forces were detected by our air reconnaissance in the sea area of Jan Mayen - Bear Island. Two merchantmen of 2,000 BFT were sighted 40 miles east of the Faroes, on course 280°. At 0440 our air reconnaissance observed two destroyers on course 230° 60 miles east of the Faroes. In the north-eastern part of Bear Island two men were observed near radio station Tunheim. Two light anti-aircraft guns were observed at Barentsburg on the Eisfjord. On 13 and 14 June movements by two PT boats were seen in the area of Motka Bay. In addition four escort vessels and altogether one large and four small steamers were sighted.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the area of Naval Command, Norway.

A Do 24, belonging to Organization Todt, was shot down in the afternoon of 13 June by a British plane near Haugesund.

Thirty four ships were escorted north and 16 south.

The sighting of an enemy carrier-borne plane on 12 June by submarine U "711" caused Group North/Fleet to consider the question of a change in the state of readiness of the Task Force. In agreement with Operations Division, the Task Force was not put in an increased state of readiness after further air reconnaissance showed that in all probability no enemy force or convoy is to be assumed in the area up to 250 km west of Bear Island. For details on results of air reconnaissance and their transmission to the Group see Telegram 1633.

Group North/Fleet has given a short review on the situation to the 5th Air Force, with copy to Admiral, Northern Waters, Commanding Admiral, Task Force, Naval Command, Norway and Naval Staff. According to this review, reconnaissance over Northern Waters - between Bear Island and the England/Iceland area - shows as a whole increased enemy activity, but no certain interpretation of individual sighting reports is possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The Group draws attention to the inadequacy of our very incomplete air reconnaissance, which does not permit a really comprehensive picture of the situation to be drawn. These individual observations might, therefore, easily given rise to erroneous conclusions. Therefore the Group has proposed to the 5th Air Force that in the next few days the area in which hitherto no reconnaissance has been carried out be searched, if possible all at once, and covered completely, in order to eliminate the uncertainty at present existing. Ascertainment of the fact that the area is free from naval forces, floating fuel bases and similar vessels would help considerably.

On the basis of a definite picture gained in this manner the convoy route can then be controlled sufficiently every day by means of a patrol on the southern edge of the area approximately along the Iceland - Stadtlandet line to the width of a day's run of a ship making 20 knots. In the opinion of Group North/Fleet the Norwegian coastal waters can be left out.

Naval Staff is of the same opinion as Group North/Fleet. The Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Territory of Norway informed the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture on 29 May that Naval Command, Norway has received directions from Naval Staff to concentrate the closed areas off the Norwegian coast, which have been kept as small as possible in view of fishing, into larger closed areas in order to give the enemy as few indications as possible as to the actual mine situation. In view of this, the Minister has requested Naval Staff to afford Naval Command, Norway the possibility of taking the interests of fishing into consideration as far as possible when establishing closed areas.

The directions in question were issued to Naval Command, Norway by Naval Staff on 7 May and stated that the declared areas NW 25 and NW 29, planned by Naval Command, Norway, only took into account to a small extent the basic requirement that form and size of the declared area should give no indications of the actual mine situation. The Naval Command was instructed to extend the declared areas if possible to both sides up to the coast and to put gaps for our own shipping under the control of shore-based batteries. The point of these instructions contested by the civil authorities is the reference that local fishing interests must take second place to military requirements as far as no special local **ruling** is possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In a conference with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Naval Staff established clearly that the directions issued on 7 May referred only to declared areas or fishing interests of local significance, as should be evident from the motive underlying the directions. Naval Command, Norway was notified of these views on 12 June and subsequently informed of the request made by the Ministry of Food that it is necessary, in view of the yield of Norwegian fisheries which has up to now gone down considerably this year, to make up the deficiency which has now arisen, still in this season, as far as this is allowable from the military point of view.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Normal towed convoys were observed in Kronstadt Bay and during the night slight air activity near **Tytersaari**.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty three vessels and four minesweeping planes were out sweeping channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. A minesweeping plane swept an ELM/J mine near Falsterbo in water 15 m. deep. The Swedes have resumed the Sassnitz - Trelleborg traffic with a Swedish ferry. Escort and transport service was carried out according to plan and without incident in the entire Baltic Sea area.

Anti-submarine patrols in the Gulf of Finland were carried out as planned by 34 vessels.

One of our bunkers in the Voronka sector was hit by gunfire on 12 June and damaged.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

After handing over the survivors of submarine U "564" to destroyer Z "24", submarine U "185" continued her outward passage. An outward-bound group of submarines warded off an attack by four heavy enemy fighters north of Cape Finisterre on 14 June. However, two submarines will have to return to land a number of seriously wounded. Another group of submarines was attacked by bombers in the inner Bay of Biscay, but reported no casualties or damage. For several days two submarines in the North Atlantic, about 400 miles apart from each other, have been sending out dummy messages and signals to deceive the enemy. Our radio intelligence has ascertained that these measures have led the enemy to believe that a large number of submarines is in the areas in question.

Submarine Division has now established that of the four submarines which were to break through into the Mediterranean, only one was successful; the loss of the other three must now be assumed. Increased enemy defense and the unfavorable season are joint factors which make the transfer of submarines to the Mediterranean area appear rather unpromising for the time being.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 80 planes out on operation in the west area and 21 in the Mediterranean. The following were shot down: over the Bay of Biscay 1 Catalina by a fighter, 1 Fortress by a Ju 88 and 1 Halifax with a large glider in tow by 4 FW 200's; over western France 1 Mosquito by a fighter. Northwest of Cape Vincent a southbound enemy convoy consisting of 8 steamers was attacked by 4 FW 200's and 1 steamer of 4,000 BRT was heavily damaged and showed a list.

Enemy air activity over the Norwegian, Dutch and French areas was slight during the day. According to final reports of Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area, altogether 32 four-engined enemy bombers were shot down by our fighters during the daylight attacks on Kiel and Bremen.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Nuisance raids were carried out during the night of 14 June by four fighter-bombers each on London and on the town and airfield of Cambridge.

The enemy attacked the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area with 200 planes, concentrating the attack on Oberhausen, where very heavy damage was caused.

Other attacks were directed against Duisburg. According to reports received so far, 4 enemy planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and 16 by night-fighters.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Thirty three fighter-bombers carried out an attack on shipping targets near Pantelleria at 1100, scoring hits on landing craft and transports; one of the latter exploded. Later observations showed that three ships had sunk at the pier. In the evening the enemy attacked Castell Vetrano and the airport at Palermo. Nuisance raids were also carried out on Porzallo and Marsalla.

3. Eastern Front:

Twenty two enemy planes were shot down on the Army Front on 12 June. Strong bomber formations of our own attacked the railway station at Jelez as well as the oil refinery at Saratov during the night of 11 June. Good results were observed.

The 5th Air Force had 49 planes out on operation.

Special Items:

Bomber Wing 102, the training wing for aerial torpedoes, was transferred from Grosseto to Riga at the beginning of June for additional training purposes. Torpedo firing exercises are to take place in the Gulf of Riga. The Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy states that the steamer BUKAREST will be used as target ship, the motor schooner HANNOVER as torpedo transport ship and eight covered motorboats as torpedo recovery vessels. The five crash boats which were used in Grosseto will be transferred to Riga on the canal route. The Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy requests that the necessary measures be taken to keep the firing area free from mines. The Navy has no forces at its

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

disposal to carry out continuous mine patrol of the torpedo firing area of Bomber Wing 102 to the extent of twelve times 18 miles. Danger from ground mines is hardly to be expected in waters over 40 m. deep. Local commands must keep a watch over the practice area for the possible laying of moored mines from planes, which can be carried out from Veliki Luki. However, it is impossible to keep the entire area continuously free from mines should the enemy drop mines on a large scale, as only narrow channels, but never large surfaces, can be swept with the vessels and sweeping gear available. This applies not only to the Gulf of Riga, but to all firing and practice areas of the Navy or Air Force in the Baltic Sea. A statement to this effect by Naval Staff was conveyed to the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy, with copy to Naval Station, Baltic.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

One auxiliary aircraft carrier and 2 destroyers arrived at Gibraltar from the Atlantic. A convoy, coming from the Atlantic and consisting of 46 loaded freighters and 1 tanker, entered Gibraltar during the night of 14 June. Photographic reconnaissance revealed the following on 13 June:

In Mers el Kebir 1 battleship of the KING GEORGE class, 1 ILLUSTRIOUS, 1 VINDICTIVE, 3 destroyers, 5 escort vessels, 11 vessels, apparently French minesweepers, 12 PT boats (artillery), 6 PT boats, 4 LST's, 56 other landing craft, 1 vessel, apparently a repair ship, 1 passenger ship, 3 tankers, etc.

In Oran: 9 submarines, 6 vessels, apparently submarine chasers, 2 PT boats (artillery), 12 auxiliary naval vessels, 1 floating dock, 11 LST's, 3 of them in dock, 20 landing craft, 21 freighters, 5 tankers, etc.

In Arzeu: 13 LST's, 58 landing craft, 2 French minesweepers, 3 freighters; off the harbor: 22 LST's and 11 other landing craft, 3 freighters.

In Bone on 14 June: 2 cruisers of the DIDO class, 12 auxiliary naval vessels, 12 auxiliary minesweepers, 16 PT boats, 1 barrage patrol boat, 8 landing craft, 21 steamers and 1 tanker.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In Philippeville on 14 June: 5 steamers, 1 tanker, 7 auxiliary naval vessels, 5 crash boats, 4 LST's and 1 landing craft.

In Bougie on 14 June: 6 LST's, 10 landing craft, 1 auxiliary naval vessel, 2 crash boats, 3 auxiliary minesweepers, 8 steamers; off the harbor: 2 landing craft, 1 LST.

In Bizerta on 13 June: 4 destroyers, 1 vessel, apparently a corvette, 15 PT boats, 8 auxiliary minesweepers, 4 auxiliary naval vessels, 20 motor boats, 6 crash boats, 17 LST's, 83 landing craft, 7 steamers, 4 tankers; off the harbor: 1 destroyer, 3 LST's, 6 landing craft, 1 motor boat, 5 auxiliary naval vessels and 2 steamers.

In Goulette on 13 June: 3 motor boats, 3 auxiliary naval vessels, 6 steamers.

In Tunis: the number of ships is unchanged since 6 June.

In the harbor of Sousse 4 transports and 22 smaller vessels were sighted. Two transports were lying at anchor off the harbor; in addition there were 4 destroyers and 12 vessels, apparently large landing craft.

Our air reconnaissance located 4 large and 6 - 8 smaller eastbound vessels 15 miles east of Cape Bon. Several small ships were sighted in the Pantelleria area and 4 large and 10 small vessels detected in the harbor. No shipping was observed between Pantelleria and Sicily.

No sighting reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

According to an intelligence report from Spain dated 9 June, it is revealed from Commando officer circles in Gibraltar that the next Allied offensive is called the "Battle of the Islands" as Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Crete and Rhodes are the targets for landings. The landing on Pantelleria will be the initial operation. From 8 May to 8 June some 600 very light tanks of 5 - 6 or 9 - 11 tons are said to have been transported through Gibraltar into the Mediterranean.

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, from Portuguese Consulate reports in Africa dated 25 May and 27 May,

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

which sound reasonably credible, 32,500 Americans have been assembled in the Constantine and Philippeville areas for operations against the Italian islands in the Mediterranean. At the end of June 10,000 South Africans are expected via the Near East. The commencement of the attack is said to be planned for the middle or the last week of June or early in July. A direct landing from the Oran area is not to be anticipated for the following reasons: all guns which have recently arrived are being shipped direct to Constantine or Tunis; no landing craft are available; the assembled troops are ready for immediate departure; all specialists are being transferred to the east. The battles in Tunis are said to have caused extremely heavy losses and also considerable casualties through sickness and much loss of materiel, so that a pause is necessary to refresh the troops and repair materiel. Brazilian troops are also expected as **reinforcements**. There are no indications in Constantine of an attack on Spain and Portugal, although there is much anxiety of a threat to Spanish Morocco, the frontier of which is heavily **guarded**.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The PT boats sent to Lampione returned without success as they found no German troops there.

The Fuehrer has issued orders for the reinforcement of Sicily and Sardinia. In addition to strong Army forces, the Navy is to assemble a coastal artillery battalion comprising three newly established batteries and deliver this to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South when required, for transfer to Sicily. Transport readiness is to be reported to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas. Copy of order as per 1/Sk1 17189/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

Furthermore the Fuehrer has ordered that Assault Brigade Reichsfuehrer SS is to be transferred to Corsica and that the ground organization for fighter forces on this island be prepared. (see Telegram 2130)

3. Sea Transport Situation:

In traffic to Sicily submarines sank the steamer VALENTINO CODA (4,486 BRT) at 0205 northwest of Cape Vaticano and at 1230 the steamer RINGULF (5,153 BRT) near Cape del Armi.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The steamer AVERSA proceeding from Messina to Taranto is overdue. Other island traffic was carried out according to plan.

One German and three Italian naval landing craft were lost in Pantelleria.

As regards the question of transferring large ships from the western Mediterranean to the east, (see War Diary 11 June), Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has stated his views to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and Naval Staff, Operations Division. After giving a survey of the tonnage already transferred to the Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas since 1 January, he stresses the necessity, in view of the possibility that the Corinth Canal might be eliminated, of extending unloading facilities in the Gulf of Patras and particularly of organizing small shipping from southern Italy to Patras. Among others eighty five Greek auxiliary sailing vessels could be used. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South considers it still possible to transfer large ships from the Adriatic to the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, he maintains that the shipping available in the Tyrrhenian Sea area can ensure the most urgent supplies for German troops on the islands of Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily. He is counting here only on German shipping in the Mediterranean.

Naval Staff informs German Naval Command, Italy, with copy to Group South, of the statements of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, with the remark that, in the opinion of Naval Staff, supplies to German forces on these islands must not rest only with German shipping but must be accomplished partially by Italian shipping, so that the shipping essential for the Aegean Sea can still be made available from the western Mediterranean and transferred in time. German Naval Command, Italy is to state its views on this and have Chief, Supply and Transport give a survey of the present use made of shipping, so as to enable Naval Staff to gain a clear picture of the situation. Copy of telegram as per l/Skl I m 1706/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

In the morning of 12 June an auxiliary sailing vessel was fired on near Naxos by enemy planes, and sustained slight damage. Escort duties in the Aegean Sea were carried out according to plan and without special incident.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There was only slight shipping off the Caucasian coast. In the morning there was an eastbound destroyer 10 miles northwest of Batum.

Own Situation:

A formation of naval artillery lighters reports having carried out the shelling of Primorski - Achtarskaya at 0445. Naval artillery lighters MAL "1", "2" and "3" as well as three motor minesweepers participated. Fire was opened at 0412 and was returned ineffectively by an enemy battery of apparently 15 cm. Good hits by our vessels were observed on the beach and mooring jetties. During the shelling, naval artillery lighter MAL "1" directed its fire on the enemy vessels which, after accurate salvos had been observed, took cover behind a smoke-screen and withdrew. While on return passage the formation was fired on by an enemy battery, probably of 7.5 cm. Withdrawing on northerly course, naval artillery lighter MAL "3" engaged an enemy vessel without observing the effect. The formation entered Kerch again at 1930. For report see Telegram 2350.

While in patrol line in Temriuk Bay the 1st PT Boat Flotilla had an engagement with three motor gunboats at 0133. A 7.6 cm. coastal battery participated in this. The engagement was broken off at 0228 because the 4 cm. anti-aircraft gun broke down on three of the PT boats.

During the night of 14 June four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla were again in patrol line in Temriuk Bay. Four further boats of this Flotilla are lying in immediate readiness in Ivanbaba for operations against naval forces on the south coast of the Crimea. Three boats of the 11th PT Boat Flotilla are in patrol line south of Anapa.

A naval landing craft proceeding from Feodosiya to Yalta as an escort vessel for a convoy struck a mine and **sank** off Cape Meganon. The route Yalta - Feodosiya is closed as mines are suspected there. In the Beresanski Channel a plane swept a mine outside the buoyed channel.

Escort, transport and ferry traffic was carried out according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The Naval Liaison Officer to High Command, Army has informed Naval Staff of the demands of the Quartermaster General that, in view of the assignment of further divisions to the Kuban bridgehead and supplies to Army Command 17, instead of the 3,000 tons to be shipped as previously requested, another 550 tons - 450 tons from Sevastopol and 100 tons from Genitschesk - are to be carried. In addition an increase of 150 tons over all routes should be effected for ten days, in order to make up for a previous deficit of altogether 1,500 tons. The Quartermaster General requests an investigation as to whether an increase in supplies can be achieved by having steamers which hitherto only went to Sevastopol occasionally proceed farther to the east. The improvement of the railway network in the Crimea, urged by High Command, Army, will not take effect before the end of fall. Construction on the bridge over the Strait of Kerch has been started. The capacity of the aerial railway is to be increased from 500 tons to 1,000 tons. The construction of a gasoline pipe over the Strait of Kerch is delayed as the fuel had corroded the material, which must be replaced.

The views of Commanding Admiral, Black Sea are awaited.

Group South has urgently requested a replacement for the total loss of the steamer BIRGIT.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

There is nothing to report regarding naval warfare.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Operations Division reports that there are seven captains and officers listed among the merchant marine personnel to be exchanged, who were captured by German submarines. In accordance with the order by Chief, Naval Staff their withdrawal has been effected.

II. In addition, Chief, Operations Division reports that Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy has requested that further submarines be sent during the next new moon period into the Mediterranean, as the considerably reduced number of submarines now operating in this area no longer guarantees submarine warfare that will be **felt** by the enemy, and, on the other hand, heavy enemy traffic continues to offer good opportunity for attack, since the enemy cannot deviate as in the Atlantic. The achievements of the echo-ranging sets are substantially lower than in the winter.

Chief, Naval Staff remarks that, because of the heavy losses suffered while passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, further transfer of submarines into the Mediterranean is not possible for the time being. Conditions for successful transfer are longer nights and the existence of a new and effective radar interception set. Chief, Naval Staff is contemplating having the Straits of Gibraltar mined again in July with mines with time setting. A decision on this will be made at a later date. In the question of the rubber-carrying submarines BRIN and DANDOLO and the submarines intended as substitutes for these, the above views must also be taken into consideration.

Decision accordingly will be communicated to Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy.

Furthermore, Chief, Naval Staff states that as long as Sicily is still in our hands, operations by increased PT boat units are at present to be preferred to submarine operations. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff urges the use of the 8th PT Boat Flotilla for this task as soon as its dockyard period is completed.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Today Chief, Naval Staff will go to Fuehrer Headquarters to report to the Fuehrer that, despite the present grave crisis in naval warfare, the battle against enemy merchant shipping must be continued with all determination as soon and as effectively as the measures introduced to overcome the setback allow. Chief, Naval Staff is of the opinion that a weakening of naval warfare would strengthen the morale and the determination of the British people to win this war to such an extent that all hopes of ever making them ready to seek peace would have to be given up. England would consider a final release of pressure on her shipping already as a sign that the war is won. Therefore, Chief, Naval Staff intends to report to the Fuehrer the necessary requirements in personnel and materiel for the continuation of naval warfare and to request that they be granted.

The preparatory memorandum by Naval Staff (1/Skl I b 1629/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C a) has in the meantime been submitted to the Fuehrer by Admiral at the Fuehrer Headquarters.

The personnel and materiel requirements for the Naval Construction Program 1943 have been worked out and are ready for the conference with the Fuehrer. A copy is in War Diary, File "Points for Discussion 16 June 1943".

IV. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division reports that the basic code of the British Navy has been changed so that no results from radio decoding are to be expected for a while.

Special Items.

I. War Diary, Part B, Volume V contains under 15 June 1943 a copy of the order of Commander in Chief, Navy issued in view of a special incident (submarine Tiesenhausen) for regular instruction of the officer corps, dealing with the old military and naval principle: "Better to go down honorably than to lower the flag".

II. Regarding the considerations and preparatory measures for operation "Wunderland II" (see War Diary 5 June and 11 June), it should be added:

On the basis of the experiences of the cruiser SCHEER in August 1942 during operation "Wunderland", Naval Staff, Operations Division has investigated and established the necessary conditions and circumstances which come into consideration for a repetition of

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

this operation against the enemy shipping route in the North Siberian passage. (1/Skl I op 1577/43 Gkdos. Chfs.) The exceptionally favorable ice conditions this summer will possibly result in increased use of the northern sea route, perhaps even for U.S. supplies to Russia.

First of all Naval Staff has asked Commanding Admiral, Task Force, with copy to Group North/Fleet and Admiral, Northern Waters, to give an assessment of the possibilities and prospects for an operation by the LUETZOW along the North Siberian Sea route in summer 1943. The remark is added that, in the view of Naval Staff, the risk might be no greater but prospects of success substantially less, considering anticipated enemy measures (particularly permanent reconnaissance), than for the SCHEER last year. (1/Skl I op 1577/43 a Gkdos. Chfs.)

Further, Group North/Fleet, Admiral, Northern Waters and Commander, Submarines, Norway have been requested to give their views on the question of using three to four submarines at a time in the West Siberian Sea in summer 1943, with the remark that in the opinion of Naval Staff the operational possibilities and prospects of success are relatively favorable. (1/Skl I op 1577/43 b Gkdos. Chfs.)

The evaluation of all views requested is contained in order 1/Skl I opa 1637/43 Gkdos. Chfs., dated 7 June. After a conference with Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary 5 June and 11 June), the directions of Naval Staff dealt with on 11 June were then issued to Group North/Fleet, with copy to Admiral, Northern Waters, Commanding Admiral, Task Force and Commander, Submarines, Norway. These provide for the allocation of three submarines for operations in the Kara Sea and preparation for operations by the LUETZOW and the submarines. (1/Skl I op 1698/43 and 1699/43 Gkdos. Chfs.)

Regarding this Commander, Submarines, Norway reports that submarine U "601" will carry out ice reconnaissance and supply to BV 138 for minelaying operation "Dickson", and that three operational submarines from Northern Waters, including a radio monitoring submarine, will attack shipping in the Kara Sea and at the same time carry out reconnaissance for the LUETZOW. Commander, Submarines, Norway requests that the three newly allocated submarines, if possible of the 11th Submarine Flotilla, be ready in Narvik from 15 July for operations against convoys in Northern Waters.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Further, Naval Staff, Operations Division has informed Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff of intentions to use the cruiser LUETZOW along the North Siberian shipping route in the Kara Sea and of the initial reconnaissance of this area by submarines, planned for beginning of July. It requests approval for two BV 138's to be made available by the 5th Air Force, as the support of air reconnaissance is necessary for successful submarine operations. At the same time it is requested that the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy be informed of this approval, as possibly an oiling of the planes by submarines will be necessary and magnetic conditions in the Kara Sea may require that the BV 138's be specially equipped with a sun compass or a similar device.

All reports and orders mentioned above are contained either in the original form or as copies in War Diary, files "Wunderland II".

Situation 15 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, the British radio station at Suwa transmitted on 12 June Q signal from U.S. steamer "W.D.E.P." at 23° 25' N., 123° 17' W.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio was informed that AQUILA 3 has reported her day's run as 220 miles and probable arrival at the rendezvous point in the morning of 8 July.

All vessels in foreign waters were informed of the enemy situation by Radiogram 1737.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Brisk reconnaissance was observed over the whole Bay of Biscay up to Cape Ortegal and 19° W. Forty planes were detected.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The survivors of submarine U "564" were transferred from submarine U "185" to destroyer Z "24" at 2045 on 14 June in BF 7556. In the course of this transfer 8 Ju 88's shot down an enemy shadowing plane. At 0543 on 15 June destroyer Z "24" was met by two torpedo boats according to plan in BF 8631. The destroyer disembarked the submarine crew in Royan at 1400 and anchored at 2030 in the Gironde. Destroyer Z "32" entered Bordeaux at the same time. It is intended that the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla shall return to La Pallice.

Patrol and escort service in the area of the Atlantic Coast was carried out according to plan. Two ELM/J mines were swept off Brest and one in the mouth of the Gironde. As has already been reported, mine-exploding vessel "21" sank during these operations. In the eastern entrance to Lorient, which has already been closed, it was observed that two mines were laid. The entrance to Brest was closed temporarily as minelaying was observed there.

Channel Coast:

At 0614 a mixed formation of 20 bombers and fighters attacked the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla in the area of the Channel Islands. Five of the planes were shot down. Others sustained damage but were lost from sight. Minesweeper M "483" sank as a result of a bomb hit. Minesweeper M "452" was damaged.

Escort and patrol duties in the English Channel were carried out as planned.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol service was carried out according to plan. Patrol boat VP "1308" was heavily damaged by a mine detonation in AN 8553 and brought into IJmuiden. One ELM/J mine was swept near Scheveningen and one north of Ameland.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

On 12 June and 15 June altogether ten Danish fishing smacks were observed within the North Sea declared area or west thereof.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

No planes were detected in the North Sea; likewise no planes of the Iceland squadrons were located by direction-finding.

Own Situation:

Five enemy planes were reported on 14 June in the Vardoe area and one in the Lister - Lindesnes area. At 0019 on 15 June a westbound convoy was attacked near Vesterneset by a plane firing two torpedoes which missed their target. Twenty five ships were escorted north and 27 south.

The sighting of a carrier-borne plane, which was reported by submarine U "711" in a short message with time of origin 1408, only became known to Naval Staff at 1800, not through Group North, but by way of Submarine Division. Chief, Operations Division then communicated with Group North by telephone in order to inform Naval Staff, as a reaction to this report, of the state of readiness of the Task Force. Group North is directed to ensure that Naval Staff is informed in future without delay of all events and observations in Northern Waters which could be of any significance for operations by the Task Force or for other operations. If necessary, Group North is to issue directions that Admiral, Northern Waters or others report direct to Naval Staff. It must be taken into account that radio messages are not received direct by Naval Staff. Submarine Division was informed and requested to continue to effect the transfer of news of importance to Naval Staff, Operations Division in the previous manner.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively traffic consisting of tugs and barges was observed between Leningrad, Kronstadt and Oranienbaum. When

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

fired on, the vessels immediately took cover behind a smoke-screen. There was little air activity near Tyters during the night of 14 June.

In the opinion of the Finnish Naval Staff, as seen from the situation report dated 31 May, conveyed by the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland to Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic, the enemy had the opportunity, by increased use of transports, minesweepers and light surface vessels, of transferring several thousand men - especially to Lavansaari - as well as a considerable amount of materiel, apart from necessary supplies to his islands. It is also worthy of note that boats suitable for landing purposes were transferred. Finnish circles believe themselves justified in assuming that special operations are being planned, possibly against the islands occupied by us or against the south coast of the Gulf of Finland.

2. Own Situation:

Twenty nine vessels and two minesweeping planes were out sweeping channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. In the entire Baltic Sea area escort and transport duties were carried out according to plan. Thirty four vessels were engaged in submarine net and barrage patrol in the Gulf of Finland. At 2200 one of our reconnaissance planes carried out a bombing attack on an oil patch eight miles west of Vaindlo. Minesweeping in Ahrensburg Bay was broken off on account of the weather.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

In the North Atlantic a newly built tanker, escorted by planes, was sunk off the east coast of America. An outward-bound group of submarines was attacked several times by enemy planes in the Bay of Biscay. A four-engined land-based bomber was shot down. The submarines sustained little or no damage;

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

two boats lost one man each. Beginning today outgoing submarines will proceed through the Bay of Biscay submerged and in groups; they will proceed surfaced only to charge their batteries.

Radio intelligence revealed that on 23 May a steamer making 16 knots was unsuccessfully pursued by a submarine in the central Atlantic. On 9 June the same submarine, operating off the east coast of America, fired torpedoes, which missed, on two large tankers making 15 knots and escorted by planes.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 130 planes, mostly fighters, out on operation in the west area and 20 in the Mediterranean. Between 0615 and 0800 three enemy formations totalling 65 planes flew into the area of the Channel Islands. Attacks were carried out on Guernsey, in the Guernsey area as far as the Cape de la Hague peninsula, and in the Cherbourg area. See Situation West Area for attacks against the 24th Minesweeper Flotilla.

Between 0800 and 0840 a mixed formation flew into the Rouen area without carrying out any particular attacks. Altogether 42 planes were reported over Germany and German-occupied territories during the night of 15 June; ten of them, probably Mosquitoes, flying over Northern Germany passed over Berlin. The Air Force General Staff suspects probable reconnaissance of future targets with the Robinson gear during moonlight nights.

Four of our planes carried out a nuisance raid on Ramsgate.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 14 June 33 of our bombers attacked shipping targets in the Pantelleria area, damaging a steamer of 3,000 - 4,000 BRT. Thirteen bombers operated against Bone where they scored bomb hits among landing craft. At noon 16 fighter-bombers attacked enemy shipping targets near Pantelleria, damaging a destroyer and an LST. In a new attack by 24 fighter-bombers two LST's were sunk in the afternoon. The enemy continued his attacks on our air bases on Sicily and Sardinia. Nine German planes were destroyed and 18 planes and a location gear of the Air Force damaged. In addition, several Italian planes were destroyed and other damage was caused. Seven enemy planes were shot down, 6 of these by fighters and 1 by anti-aircraft guns.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

Special Items.

According to information from Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Liaison (Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff), night operations by long-range fighter-bombers have begun over English territory. During the night of 14 June two British airfields were attacked by two fighter-bombers each.

The results of reconnaissance in the western Mediterranean have lost much of their value, as air reconnaissance cannot be carried out by trained reconnaissance planes, due to heavy enemy fighter defense. It can now only be carried out mainly by fighters.

Air operations in the east have been in progress now for several weeks and have achieved good results in the attacks on industrial centers. Russian defense is almost ineffective at night in spite of extensive use of anti-aircraft guns. Our first night fighter was shot down during the night of 13 June by enemy night fighters in the area of the 17th Army.

A large part of the bomber formations has been transferred from the west area to the southern front. Therefore, aerial warfare against England has come practically to a standstill. This shifting of forces may, however, have the advantage that operations by bomber formations in the Mediterranean will have a greater effect on enemy sea power than is achieved by terror attacks on Britain herself. It must be feared that the use of the new aerial mine, which was intended with 50 - 60 planes in August, will now have to be abandoned.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the morning one KING GEORGE class, one FORMIDABLE class and five destroyers entered Gibraltar from the Mediterranean. In the forenoon six steamers and an ocean-going tug with the stern of the destroyer G "93" left for the Atlantic. In the afternoon six steamers entered Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

No further reports have been received from the western Mediterranean.

Photographic reconnaissance showed that there were only ten landing craft in Bone. Since 7 June the number of landing craft in Bizerta has increased from 58 to 133 and that of landing transport ships from 10 to 26.

There were 2 large steamers off Pantelleria at 0615 and 8 steamers and 4 escort vessels between Pantelleria and Kelibia, all en route to Pantelleria.

Submarines were reported 40 miles northwest of Maddalena, 32 miles east of Stromboli and 20 miles northeast of Messina.

Thorough reconnaissance of coastal waters between Derna and Tobruk in the morning sighted no vessels.

A photograph showed that the French cruiser SUFFREN is lying in dock in Alexandria. The position of the other French vessels is unchanged. The tonnage of freighters and transports in the harbor of Alexandria has increased by 51,000 BRT since 7 June.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines are disposed in the operational area.

No special reports have been received from our submarines. Our PT boats were not out on operation.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Nothing to report. For details see Telegram 1840.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

During the night of 12 June two boats of Coast Patrol Flotilla Attica were unsuccessfully attacked in Canea Bay by an enemy dive bomber. Anti-aircraft defense was also unsuccessful. Because of submarine danger the BARLETTA and MOROSINI entered Corfu on 14 June. An Italian report states that at 1900 on

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

13 June several heavy detonations and water columns were observed from Zante in the area of our mine barrage. The question is whether an enemy submarine was destroyed or whether there was self-detonation of the mines. Investigations are under way. Escort service in the Aegean Sea was carried out according to plan and without special event.

Black Sea:

During the night of 14 June, while proceeding from Sevastopol to Skadovsk, two naval landing craft engaged a surfaced enemy submarine 40 miles west-northwest of Eupatoria with gunfire, and with depth-charges after she submerged; no success was observed. During the same night there were three boats of the 11th PT Boat Flotilla in waiting position south of Anapa which sighted eight enemy PT boats on northerly course about 5,000 m. away at 2245.

Use of torpedoes was impossible on account of the enemy's high speed. Interception of the enemy on return passage was unsuccessful. Nothing is reported from the patrol line in Temriuk Bay.

On 15 June submarine U "24" sank a single escort vessel 25 miles southwest of Suchum and detected a "Q" ship in the operational area.

Six enemy planes attacked the town and harbor of Feodosiya at noon. A captured Russian submarine chaser was heavily damaged.

The anti-torpedo barrage between Kossa Tschuschka and Pavlovski was laid.

Owing to suspicion of mines off Cape Midia, naval artillery lighters MAL "8" and "9" interrupted their passage from Constanta to Sevastopol escorted by Ship "19".

Ferry and transport traffic was carried out according to plan and without special event.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Japanese report having sunk in May, by submarines, 14 ships totalling 158,000 BRT and, by planes, 2 ships totalling 11,500 BRT,

CONFIDENTIAL

15 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

making a total of altogether 369 ships with 2,246,500 BRT.

This contribution to the war against merchant shipping is as important as it is gratifying.

Nothing further to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

Reuter reports that Radio Leningrad announced on 15 June that the Red Army offensive will begin when the Allies carry out their invasion of the continent.

Again according to Reuter, Knox stated on 15 June that one cannot say how long the pause in the submarine war will last. At any rate, however, the total number of losses in comparison to military requirements is influenced most favorably by it. Twenty escort destroyers were completed in the United States in June. The foreign press report of Armed Forces High Command dated 16 June contains numerous excerpts on the differences between de Gaulle and Giraud.

At the annual conference of the British Labor Party a proposal for the cessation of party coalition in England was rejected with a majority of 6 to 1. There was only one vote against further co-operation with Churchill.

Foreign missions in Argentina have been permitted again temporarily to send cypher messages until noon on 16 June.

Of certain significance is the United Press report from Ankara which states that British authorities have closed the Syrian - Turkish frontier on the Syrian side beginning at 0600 on 15 June.

Finally, the report that Finland has paid her war debt for the current year to the United States of America is worthy of note.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. According to a report by Quartermaster General, Naval Staff, the investigation of the question of shipping in the Adriatic Sea has shown that there appears to be no delay as far as the Italians are concerned.

II. Chief, Operations Division: For the increasing training tasks of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, Naval Staff proposes, on the basis of an application put forth by him, that from 1 July

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

four further torpedo boats type 35/37 be assigned as torpedo recovery boats. For this purpose three boats of this type should be withdrawn from the west area, where torpedo boat T "14" and one other boat will then remain. T "13" or T "17" will be the fourth recovery boat, depending on the conclusion of the dockyard period; assignments to the Torpedo School have priority. Torpedo boats T "24" and T "25" are intended as replacements for the west area, being especially suitable on account of their heavy anti-aircraft armament.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees. Directions to this effect, 1/Skl I op 1730/43 Gkdos. Chefs., in War Diary, Part C, Volume d. Group West is to carry out transfers as soon as possible, independent of the date set for 1 July, merely according to tactical considerations, and is to report intentions.

III. Chief, Naval Staff gives a survey of the course and results of the conference with the Fuehrer and issues the necessary instructions. Notes on the conference as per 1/Skl (blank space. Tr.N.)/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume VII.

The Fuehrer does not in the least intend to restrict the efforts which are being made in respect to naval warfare. The statements in the memorandum of Naval Staff, dated 8 June, were not discussed explicitly but Commander in Chief, Navy was able to ascertain that the Fuehrer was in full agreement with the opinions stated in the memorandum previously submitted to him. Therefore it was no longer necessary for Commander in Chief, Navy to go into detail on the basic question. The Fuehrer was equally determined to accept the necessary consequences arising from his views.

However, the personnel requirements of the Navy at first produced a bombshell. The Fuehrer pointed out that the necessity of giving priority to anti-aircraft guns and fighters in order to prevent the further destruction of German cities and production centers, as well as the need to maintain the eastern front, require considerable personnel so that a simple withdrawal from reserves of the other branches of the Armed Forces for the Navy is impossible.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Improvisations must be made in order to procure personnel for the Navy. To this end the Fuehrer orders an immediate survey showing the actual requirements first of all for 1943, according to time and place, as well as the type of personnel. Commander in Chief, Navy orders that Officer Personnel Division include 500 officers in the survey for 1943.

The survey is to be submitted to the Fuehrer and Chief, Armed Forces High Command. The Fuehrer arrived at a very positive decision on the question of labor: No more men will be withdrawn from naval construction. The 1943 Construction Program must be carried out under all circumstances. The Fuehrer was surprised at the limited scope of the Program. In spite of this, Commander in Chief, Navy does not wish that an increase should be made now. However, it is to be emphasized that the 1943 Program constitutes a minimum which will stand no reductions. As regards the necessary allocation of materiel and facilities for carrying out the Program, the Fuehrer will first of all call in Minister Speer, who has been ordered to report for this purpose at Fuehrer Headquarters within the next few days. Commander in Chief, Navy orders that Minister Speer receive immediately all the data as presented and reported to the Fuehrer.

The result of the conference with the Fuehrer must, therefore, be taken as very positive. It is now a question of all-out efforts to make up for lost time and to meet the requirements of the situation without regard to anxiety that the measures planned will require much time yet and that many difficulties must still be overcome before they can actually be carried out.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has ordered that preparations for operation "Gisela" are to be discontinued until further notice, but are to be kept up to date in such a way that they can be resumed if necessary. Instead of "Gisela" there will be defense of the Pyrenean passes by two reinforced regiments to be set up by the 66th Reserve Corps should need arise, with the Reinforced Frontier Guard Control Service guarding the Spanish frontier and, in this case, under the command of Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. The reinforced defense of the Pyrenean passes will be given the cover name "Nuernberg".

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group West receives instructions accordingly with a note that further directions will follow.

Special Items.

I. As regards the dockyard periods and engine overhaul of the large ships, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division has made the following decisions:

1. The TIRPITZ: Plans must be made for the dockyard period in fall 1943. Decision to carry this out is reserved.
2. The LUETZOW: Dockyard period is planned in fall 1943, probably at the Deutsche Werke, Kiel. In that connection a new electric engine would be installed and the 28 cm gun barrels exchanged.
3. The PRINZ EUGEN: Engine overhaul is to be carried out following that of the NUERNBERG, probably from the end of June to beginning of August in Gdynia.
4. The EMDEN: Dockyard period is to be carried out in the middle of October to middle of December in Libau.
5. The SCHLESIEN: Constructional repair and engine overhaul are to be carried out following the PRINZ EUGEN, from the beginning of August to end of September, probably in Gdynia.
6. The ADMIRAL SCHEER Engine overhaul is planned for spring 1944.

II. In report No. 12/43 on the enemy situation, Naval Intelligence Division states:

"While the enemy, by taking possession of the Italian islands in the Sicilian Channel, was able to expand his naval position in this area, his preparations for the next offensives were continued with no special indications of their immediate imminence.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The transfers of freighters into the Mediterranean went on according to plan.

The influx of new landing craft from the Atlantic has slowed up since the beginning of the month, being limited chiefly to LCI's. However, this situation may change very rapidly.

Shipping movements in the Mediterranean as well as the disposition of merchantmen and seaworthy landing craft also give no clear indications as to the imminent conclusion of the enemy's deployment. What renders the evaluation of the situation more difficult is the incomplete air reconnaissance which for some time has not allowed any insight into the number of ships in important ports, above all Algiers and all ports from Tripoli on, to the east.

Only about 60 - 70 percent of the landing craft transferred, according to definite data, from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean are at present in the ports of the western Mediterranean (except Algiers) up to and including Sousse. It is therefore not out of the question that some of them have been moved into the central Mediterranean. This would be in accord with the supposed plans of the enemy which provide for two separate operations beginning simultaneously in the western and eastern Mediterranean, the jumping-off areas probably being Oran - Algiers and Tripoli - Tobruk - Alexandria.

If this transfer has not taken place, which can only be determined through air reconnaissance of the ports of Tripoli and east thereof and which is most urgently required, the enemy may have the following reasons:

1. Preparations in the Tripoli - Tobruk - Alexandria area have not yet advanced sufficiently.

2. The forces provided for the operations in the eastern Mediterranean will not be carried from the Tripoli-Tobruk - Alexandria area, as originally planned, but directly from the Oran - Sousse area where there are enough ships and landing craft with a sufficient radius of action available. This assumption may be contradicted by the fact that the Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West has determined that the landing forces apparently intended for operations in the eastern Mediterranean are being

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

assembled in the Lybian and Egyptian areas.

3. Instead of the original plan providing for simultaneous operations in the western and eastern Mediterranean, they have been scheduled so that operations in the western Mediterranean for the final securing of the Sicilian Channel to the north are carried out first.

There are no new data as to the aims of the next operations. In the western Mediterranean the conclusion can be drawn from credible reports that the initial operations, which will probably be directed against Sardinia will, in accordance with enemy plans, be extended later to "French soil" (Corsica? Southern France?). From this source it cannot be seen whether this expansion will follow immediately upon the achievement of the first operational objectives. On the other hand, from general information on enemy intentions, the impression is at present gained that the enemy attack on Europe, which is probably planned to take place in the Balkans and to be decisive, will not follow immediately on the successful establishment of bridgeheads in the western and eastern Mediterranean (probably Sardinia or the Peloponnesos).

It would be in accordance with tactics of the enemy observed up to now if, after gaining bridgeheads, he were at first to use his air supremacy for some time to bring about a decisive weakening of the German-Italian war potential, before beginning the actual attack on Europe.

Copy as per 1/Skl 17408/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Files "Reports on the enemy situation of Naval Intelligence Division."

Situation 16 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty nine planes of the 19th Group were observed carrying out considerable reconnaissance. One of our westbound groups of submarines was twice reported by planes in BE 9844.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Destroyers Z "24" and Z "37" anchored at 2030 on 15 June in the Gironde. At the same time destroyer Z "32" entered Bordeaux. Escort and patrol traffic was carried out according to plan and without special incident. An ELM/J mine was swept off Lorient by a plane.

In reply to the inquiry by Naval Staff, Group West reports that aerial torpedo net defense for destroyers and torpedo boats on the roads of Brest is available only on one side for two anchorages in the direction of the chief danger and that, owing to lack of net materiel, defense for two further necessary anchorages on the roads of Brest and for anchorages on Royan and Verdon roads must be foregone. It is urgently requested that fresh net materiel be provided since, at the latest with the beginning of fall weather conditions, the maintenance of net barrages already laid will only be possible with the materiel of other barrages to be taken up. Underwater Obstacles Branch will deal with the matter further. (See Telegram 1645).

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up on account of stormy weather. Convoy traffic was carried out as planned.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Eight ELM/J mines were swept north of Ameland and Terschelling. As recent enemy air attacks were concentrated on convoys off Helder, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

requests that a flight (about 5. Tr.N.) of fighter planes be sent to Helder on days when convoys are scheduled in order to enable direct fighter protection to be given to convoys between Texel and IJmuiden. Station North supports this application. Naval Staff approached Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff accordingly and pointed out that our fighters were sent out too late during the two last air attacks on our convoys off Helder.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

A Russian submarine was detected along the Arctic coast. There was considerable air reconnaissance over the North Sea but no planes were detected by direction-finding. One of our submarines reported at 0348 an eastbound destroyer proceeding at moderate speed in AB 6366 (30 miles south-southeast of Bear Island). Later on this was reported "settled", which probably means that the report was cancelled. At 1530 our air reconnaissance reported six trawlers 20 miles north of Iceland in AE 1988 and four merchantmen of about 1,000 BRT on course 300° 160 miles southwest of the Faroes.

Own Situation:

In the evening of 14 June Russian batteries opened fire on a fishing boat near Petsamo. Our batteries fired on a Russian construction column on the Ribachi Peninsula. Group North/Fleet reports that reconnaissance of the sea area of Bear Island from 25° E. to 0° and of the whole Spitsbergen area was carried out on 14 and 15 June. Reconnaissance was to some extent incomplete owing to the weather but was supplemented by radar. Nothing was sighted. No change was observed on Bear Island on 15 June.

The closing of the Stjærnsund has been cancelled after search-sweeping. During the night of 15 June single flights were reported in the Banak and Vardoe areas. Twenty six steamers were escorted north and 15 south.

The KARL PETERS and the 8th PT Boat Flotilla left Bergen southbound on return passage to home waters.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

A small number of towed convoys was observed in Kronstadt Bay and near Lavansaari.

2. Own Situation:

From the Skagerrak the steamer DRAU reports being unsuccessfully attacked between 2000 and 2300 by an enemy submarine. Apparently four torpedo tracks were sighted in position 34 miles northwest of Skagen. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic has sent out six boats of the 16th Patrol Flotilla for submarine chase. The 5th Air Force was requested to carry out submarine chase with all available forces.

German merchant shipping received confidential warning.

Nineteen vessels and two minesweeping planes were out sweeping channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Escort service in the entire North Sea area was carried out according to plan.

Having completed its operation in the Gulf of Finland, Net Defense Group, Central Area has been transferred to Kiel. A net layer, with 3 tenders and 3 work boats, is available in Reval for current work on nets. There was little enemy gunfire in Kronstadt Bay. The command station at Peterhof was fired on by batteries from Leningrad and Kronstadt. Shelling of the coastal area increased in the evening. Numerous towed convoys were observed during the night of 16 June. Battery "Bismarck" was ineffectively shelled from Seiskaari.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 51 planes out on operations in the west area and seven in the Mediterranean. Enemy air activity was slight. A total of four enemy planes was shot down. During the night of 16 June the enemy carried out attacks on Cologne, Duesseldorf and ten other places in this area with strong forces. They were concentrated on Cologne, where considerable damage was reported in Cologne - Muelheim and Cologne - Deutz. Fourteen planes were shot down, 13 of them by night fighters. Another group of planes, probably 16 Mosquitoes, flew into the Heide - Fehmarn - Stendal - Lingen areas without attacking, probably for reconnaissance and harassing purposes. Twenty one enemy planes were also reported from the French area; they did not carry out any attacks.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

There was no combat activity. Photographic reconnaissance of the airfields in Malta showed that since 4 June the number of planes had risen to 359, this being an increase of 200 planes, chiefly fighters.

3. Eastern Front:

A merchantman of 2,000 - 3,000 BRT was attacked with two bombs by a FW 200 northeast of Siglu Fjord (Iceland) and apparently heavily damaged. The plane was fired on heavily by 2 cm anti-aircraft guns of vessels anchored nearby which were taken to be trawlers.

Special Items.

The 3rd Air Force Command informs Naval Staff that the crews of the 5th Group of the 40th Bomber Wing have all observed a great superiority in speed of the heavy-fighter groups of the enemy, each consisting of 6 to 7 planes of the Mosquito type. They have appeared since the beginning of June in the Bay of Biscay and in the Atlantic up to about 10° W. It is impossible for our planes to evade them in cloudless weather.

A Ju 88 and a FW 200 were lost during the last few days to these fast planes. The 3rd Air Force points out that an

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

increase in the number of Mosquitoes in this area and in our losses is to be expected.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Coming from the Atlantic 6 freighters entered Gibraltar in the evening of 15 June; 15 freighters, 3 tankers, 1 troop transport and 2 destroyers entered Gibraltar in the afternoon of 16 June. The ADVENTURE, which also put in in the morning of 16 June, left again in the afternoon eastbound, escorted by a destroyer. In the morning of the same day a convoy of 45 freighters, 2 tankers and 7 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. A further convoy consisting of 68 vessels, of which 47 were thought to be loaded freighters, 14 loaded tankers, an LST, 4 destroyers and 2 corvettes, passed Ceuta from the Atlantic at noon bound for the Mediterranean. Observation was impaired by fog.

According to an Italian report, the battleship HOWE is presumed to be in the Oran area.

In the Pantelleria area 4 eastbound destroyers were observed at 0240 32 miles southwest of the island; 7 medium to small merchantmen were observed west and southwest of the island.

There were two merchantmen and several barges in the harbor at noon.

At 0945 there was a submarine north-northeast of Cape Colonna.

Evaluation of aerial photographs of Jijelli, Benghazi and Derna revealed no significant changes in the number of ships in port. Precision evaluation of the aerial photograph of Alexandria taken on 15 June showed that there was a considerable number of freighters in port. Sixty three merchantmen were identified, totalling 433,000 BRT. In addition, a considerable number of landing craft was detected for the first time - 3 LST's and 65 landing craft. At noon on 15 June there were 8 steamers

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

north of Alexandria making for the harbor. Radio intelligence detected five convoys under way in the eastern Mediterranean during the night of 15 June.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Nothing to report. The Deputy Chief of the Italian Naval Cabinet has given the Naval Attaché in Rome some details on the loss of Pantelleria, a copy of which is contained in I/Skl 17302/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIII.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Traffic to the islands was carried out as planned. According to a report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the steamer ROSSANDRE was sunk by an enemy submarine northwest of Corfu.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

According to an Italian report, an auxiliary sailing vessel was attacked and damaged in Antiparos in the afternoon of 15 June by six enemy planes. Convoys were carried out as planned.

Black Sea:

Enemy submarines were located at 0115 south-southwest of Feodosiya and sighted at 0504 south of Feodosiya. During the night of 15 June there was a lengthy enemy air attack on Kerch, where slight damage was caused to buildings and a searchlight was put out of action.

During the night of 15 June the 1st PT Boat Flotilla sighted no enemy forces south of Anapa. The boats were ineffectively machine-gunned by an enemy plane. Nothing was sighted during this night either in Temriuk Bay. While on passage from Temriuk to Genitscheck a towed lighter struck a mine in the western part of the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch and was beached.

Submarines U "18" and U "19" have left Constanta for the operational area.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Transport, supply and ferry traffic was carried out according to plan.

Convoys with steamers over 2,000 BRT are being suspended during the full-moon period.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

The Japanese Prime Minister gave a general survey to Parliament of the war situation and emphasized that military preparations on all fronts take any future development into account. Nothing has been left undone to strengthen the fortifications along the India - Burma frontier. The favorable strategic positions on New Guinea and in the area of the Solomons have been further strengthened. Attempts by Chiang Kai Shek to interrupt Japanese shipping in the East and South China Sea, with his war planes - about 300 in number - as well as attempts to raid the Japanese mainland have been completely frustrated.

Chinese circles again referred in London and America to an increase of planes and to the necessity of re-opening the Burma Road.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reports that according to instructions from the Fuehrer, the crews for the barges are to be provided by branches of the Armed Forces. According to an estimate, 1,000 men will fall to the share of the Navy. Necessary arrangements have been made.

II. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports on the statements which the Japanese Naval Secretary made in Parliament concerning achievements of the Japanese Navy since the outbreak of war. According to these, 369 merchantmen totalling 2,225,000 BRT have been sunk, apart from planes and warships. According to data of Naval Intelligence Division, this figure may include also ships damaged. Adding the successes of the Japanese Army and Air Force against enemy merchant shipping, the total figure ascertained of enemy shipping sunk by the Japanese amounts to about 2.4 million BRT.

Chief, Naval Staff desires an investigation by Naval Intelligence Division as to how high enemy increase of tonnage must rise at present in order to produce normal conditions in England for shipping imports and exports, taking into consideration military shipping requirements. This is required to gain a survey on what effect the present decrease in our submarine warfare will have in this respect.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

III. Chief, Operations Division reports that the exchange of merchant marine personnel has been arranged in accordance with the instructions from Chief, Naval Staff.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division concerning intelligence operation in Argentina for landing of agents for the purpose of carrying out sabotage measures. The transfer of agents was already carried out before and was effected on motor fishing vessels.

Special Items.

I. Regarding the expansion of the shipyard supply base of Marseilles and establishment of Marseilles and Toulon as bases for PT boat flotillas in the Mediterranean, ordered by Group West, Commander, PT Boats requested on 29 May that these two places be expanded immediately to real PT boat bases, Marseilles being the main base. However, the materiel and personnel demands of Commander, PT Boats exceed the limited means of the west area. At any rate it cannot be judged at Operations Division whether the demands can be met with the means available. In this connection it is pointed out to Quartermaster Division that Toulon and Marseilles are not the only two bases to be newly established for PT boats in the Mediterranean area, but that such bases are also to be established in the Aegean Sea as it is intended to transfer some of the PT boats there later. Group South has been invited to furnish proposals for the expansion of bases and operational harbors for PT boats in the Aegean Sea. (See War Diary 2 June).

Quartermaster Division is asked, when expanding the two bases on the south coast of France, to see that the necessary expansion and equipment of similar bases in the Aegean Sea is not prejudiced.

II. The 11th Minesweeper Flotilla will be commissioned as the next flotilla of minesweepers Type 40 on 1 Aug. 43. The original plan to divide the next three flotillas (11th, 12th and 13th Minesweeper Flotillas) over the west area, Norway and Baltic/Skagerrak cannot be adhered to, as a serious shortage has arisen in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. Considering the tough situation in this area and the

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

important task of maintaining Dutch traffic, an increase in the forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North is of prior importance.

Therefore Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has decided that the 11th Minesweeper Flotilla shall be commissioned for Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. Copy of order as per l/Skl I op. 17376/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume d.

III. A summary of enemy intelligence gained during the period from 7 to 13 June by radio decoding and radio intelligence is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 24/43. Very little intelligence from decoding is expected for the near future owing to a change of code by the enemy.

Situation 17 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Information concerning enemy shipping movements to all ships in foreign waters was transmitted by Radiogram 1129. Otherwise nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan. Harbor defense boat GOUGY sank east of Ile de Croix off Lorient after striking a mine; there were considerable casualties.

Channel Coast:

Patrol positions were not taken up owing to stormy weather. Otherwise nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

As the great risk to submarines in the waters of Iceland/Faroes is increasing further, Group West received orders from Naval Staff to investigate whether the passage of submarines through the Channel is practicable.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Nine ELM/J mines were swept north of Terschelling and Ameland.

The German steamer NARVIK (5,822 BRT), with a cargo of ore, was beached at 0515 in AN 9647 after striking a mine. Salvaging has been started. Boats of station Windhuk in the East Schelde were attacked at 0445 by five enemy planes, of which two were shot down. Casualties were caused on the patrol boats. Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan as far as restrictions were not necessary owing to weather conditions.

Special Items.

1. Referring to the appearance of Danish fishing boats again in the declared area of the North Sea, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North again requested permission for attacks which was temporarily suspended by our Air Force at the end of May.

2. With reference to the responsibility entrusted to him by the Fuehrer's Directive No. 40, Admiral, North Sea Station thoroughly investigated the question of the coastal defense of the Heligoland Bight and reported on 30 April that defense against a large-scale enemy landing is not possible with available forces and facilities to the extent ordered in the Fuehrer's Directive. Admiral, North Sea Station considers it necessary to state clearly the limits existing for fulfilment of the task assigned to him, quite apart from how great - from a military viewpoint - is the possibility of sea and air landings on the islands or on the mainland. He requests a decision as to whether:

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

- a. the individual demands made are appreciated
or
b. whether an increase in personnel and materiel
is not possible in view of the defense situation as a whole.

From the view that the demands of Admiral, North Sea Station are made as Commander, Armed Forces, Naval Staff, Operations Division transmitted its views as follows to Armed Forces High Command, **Operations** Staff on 17 May, concerning the statements of Admiral, North Sea Station:

1. Landings by sea on the mainland as well as on the out-lying islands are regarded as very unlikely at present. The enemy is still laying aerial mines, also with the newest types of firing mechanism, on a large scale in the sea area of the Heligoland Bight. From this the conclusion can be drawn that he does not intend to penetrate into the Heligoland Bight with large transports and warships of destroyer size and larger. Possible, but not likely, might be operations with small landing boats less sensitive to mines, for harassing operations with restricted aims.

Air landings of course would be possible at any time but are also not believed to be very likely. It is not thought that the enemy will carry out air landings without starting landing operations from the sea at the same time in order, in the case of large-scale operations, to expand the beachhead captured and bring up new forces or, in the case of small-scale harassing operations, to bring back the personnel landed from the air after completing their task.

2. Therefore the demands of Admiral, North Sea Station are appreciated, but a reinforcement of personnel and materiel to the extent requested must be postponed for the present.

3. Of the islands lying off the coast only Sylt, Wangerooge, Norderney and Borkum are of strategic importance. There are **airfields** only on these islands. Therefore only these islands would be suitable as bases for extensive operations. Should the situation as a whole change and there be a possibility of large-scale enemy landings also in the area of the Heligoland Bight, these islands would have to be reinforced first of all.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Besides the airfields, there are numerous military targets on all the islands, including Heligoland (location gear, training fields, signal stations etc.), the destruction or damaging of which by a sudden attack by sea or from the air would not be of special military importance but would be a gain in prestige for the enemy. The defense of all such objectives should always be strengthened as much as possible in accordance with their degree of importance.

Group North was informed accordingly.

Concerning the statements of Admiral, North Sea Station, High Command Army, (Chief, Army Equipment and Commander, Replacement Army) submitted views dated 10 June in which it is mentioned, among other things, that the provision of experienced army troops for the North Sea Islands is out of the question but that transfer of naval troops to the islands is considered appropriate. The desired strengthening of defense force on the islands could be carried out by naval troops from the mainland and their vacated camps and training installations could be occupied by army troops if this were urgently desired for reasons of defense.

At present it is not known if these views of Chief, Army Equipment and Commander, Replacement Army are supposed to represent the answer of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to the application of Naval Staff.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity was first lively and later on moderate in the North Sea in the direction of Jutland and the southwest coast of Norway. Of 23 planes on operation five were detected by direction-finding. No operations of the Iceland squadrons were detected. No tactical results were obtained by reconnaissance of the sea area east of Jan Mayen on 16 June. Several small merchantmen and fishing steamers were sighted and attacked by our air reconnaissance between the north coast of Iceland and 69° N. A merchantman was sighted on course 320° at 0525 on 17 June 30 miles east of the northern point of the Faroes.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

On the Arctic Coast our air reconnaissance detected in Kolski Bay two destroyers on cross slipway, twelve freighters and three tankers, of which one was in dry dock.

Own Situation:

A steamer was shelled by Russian batteries in Petsamo Fjord at 1600 on 15 June. Single planes flew into the area of Vardoe and Banak as well as near Kvittingsoey on 16 June.

The METEOR was transferred from Hammerfest to Tromsøe on 15 June. The destroyer THEODOR RIEDEL is under way from Trondheim to Alta on the skerries route. Twenty five ships were escorted north and 19 south.

According to a report from the 5th Air Force, seven Ju 88's attacked at noon the radio station on Bear Island presumably put into operation recently by the enemy. The radio masts were destroyed by a direct hit and existing radio equipment was probably destroyed. No men were observed.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

There was lively air reconnaissance during the night in Kronstadt Bay. Gunfire was on a small scale. Twelve tugs and 20 barges were observed between Kronstadt, Leningrad and Oranienbaum. There was very lively guardboat traffic near Lavansaari. Five PT boats were sighted at 1907 on easterly course west of the island and ten guardboats on northerly course at 2025. A Finnish reconnaissance plane sighted a submarine 15 miles north of Yuminda, no course being stated.

2. Own Situation:

Baltic Station transmits details of the enemy submarine attack on the steamer DPAU on 16 June (see Telegram 2107). In connection with the appearance of enemy submarines in the Skagerrak, Naval Command, Norway draws attention to the

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

report of a reliable agent, according to which eleven American submarines of the S-class have arrived in Aberdeen for patrol duties in the North Sea, in order to enable the British Navy to concentrate their submarine operations in the Mediterranean area. (See Telegram 1616).

The submarine chase in the Skagerrak carried out by nine patrol boats has up to now not confirmed the presence of enemy submarines in this area. The chase will be continued on 18 June.

Escort duties in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic were carried out according to plan. The KARL PETERS and the 8th PT Boat Flotilla are under way from Kristiansand South to home waters; destroyers Z "27" and Z "30" are under way from home waters to Kristiansand South.

Thirty four vessels carried out submarine and net patrol in the Gulf of Finland according to plan.

Six enemy planes attacked a minesweeper formation near Tyters at 2047. Minesweeping operations in Ahrensburg Bay had to be cancelled owing to weather conditions.

Naval Staff urged Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff on 9 June to lay mines by planes on the Russian route from Kronstadt Bay for submarines and for minesweepers, patrols and supply ships to the islands, ascertained to be at 60° 1.5' N., and to lay them as well in the easterly adjacent sea area. Regarding this, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff reports that mining of Kronstadt Bay was suspended on orders from the Fuehrer and that there is no reason for Commander in Chief, Air Force to effect a cancellation of these orders from the Fuehrer as the barrage laid by our naval forces in the Gulf of Finland has proved up to now to be an effective protection against enemy submarines.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

One submarine chased a steamer proceeding on northerly course at high speed 400 miles west of Cape Finisterre but was forced to submerge by a plane equipped with searchlight.

Three submarines pretended to carry out an operation in the North Atlantic by sending out pre-arranged radiograms and signals.

A group of 15 boats is in patrol line in AK 50, 60, 80 and 90. Three submarines are operating off the east coast of the U.S.A. and one in the Gulf of Mexico. Two boats are proceeding into the Caribbean Sea, one into the Gulf of Guinea and one into the area off Freetown.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 100 planes were out on operation in the west area and 18 in the Mediterranean. Three Spitfires were shot down during the day. No appreciable number of planes flew in.

Three fighter-bombers were sent out against London and Ramsgate during the night, and twelve fighter-bombers against Portsmouth. Sixty two enemy planes flew into Germany and German-occupied territory, six of them into Northern Germany up to the Oder and to Thuringia and four into the area of Crefeld - Eupen; no attacks were carried out. In northwest France machine-gun attacks were carried out on anti-aircraft gun positions and airfields and one bombing attack on an airfield southwest of Amiens.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

For evaluation of our air reconnaissance and photographic reconnaissance see "Enemy Situation Mediterranean".

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Forty one of our bombers attacked shipping concentrations in Jijelli during the night of 17 June. At noon the enemy carried out an attack on an airfield in the south of Sicily in which five fighters were destroyed and ten damaged. The attack was repeated during the night of 17 June without causing particular damage.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

A convoy of three steamers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean at 1830. The following arrived in this port:

From the Atlantic at 2100 on 16 June: 16 LCT's, 2 LCF's, 14 motor minesweepers, 1 destroyer, 2 minesweepers and 2 barrage patrol boats; at 1200 on 17 June: the transport ORDUNA with troops, escorted by a U.S. destroyer.

From the Mediterranean at 0830: 24 freighters, 3 tankers, 2 destroyers, 1 minesweeper as well as a towed convoy with destroyer; at 1830 1 battleship of the KING GEORGE class, 3 destroyers and 1 corvette.

A convoy of 6 freighters and 5 escort vessels left at 1700 for the Atlantic.

Our air reconnaissance reported at 1505 on 16 June a light cruiser on northeasterly course 48 miles north-northwest of Cape Bougaroni; at 1510 1 LST and 2 LCT's 8 miles north of Cape Bougaroni on easterly course and 4 more LST's on northerly course 13 miles north of Bougie.

In Bizerta the following were detected at 0720 on 17 June: 16 steamers, 4 tankers, 4 destroyers, 16 auxiliary naval vessels, 5 escort boats, 2 auxiliary minesweepers, 35 LST's, 96 LCT's and 9 further landing craft, 4 motor boats and 7 landing bridges.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In Benghazi at noon on 16 June there were, besides a steamer, 6 landing boats and 8 small naval vessels. Four steamers were off the harbor.

In Derna there were at the same time four small vessels.

Rough evaluation of photographic reconnaissance of Mers el Kebir, Oran, Arzeu, Bone and Bizerta/Ferryville again showed a transfer of landing vessels to the east. No parts of the Task Force were detected in any of the harbors. Due to the arrival of the two last large convoys in the Mediterranean, the tonnage situation in the Western Mediterranean has altered considerably. The number of freighters and tankers detected at midnight on 16 June has increased from 205 totalling 893,000 BRT to 321 totalling 1,633,000 BRT.

There was one submarine in the morning of 17 June six miles north-northeast of Cape Vaticano. Four steamers and two destroyers on westerly course were detected north of Sidi Barani in the early morning hours of 17 June and one destroyer on westerly course north of Sollum Bay.

Photographic reconnaissance of the island of Cyprus, concentrating on the area of Famagusta, revealed no landing vessels. No planes were made out on six airfields covered. The seaplane base of Famagusta was also empty.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area.

One of our submarines probably sank a steamer from an eastbound convoy ten miles north-northwest of Appollonia.

Two of our PT boats rescued the crew of one of our planes in the evening of 16 June southwest of Empedocle.

According to a report from Group West, the 6th Coast Patrol Flotilla has carried out minelaying operation H 4 E according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The steamer TERNI (2,998 BRT) was sunk by an enemy submarine east of Catania at 1905 on 16 June. Supplies to the islands were carried out otherwise according to plan.

According to a report from Group West, 84 tank-barges, 8 tank-lighters and 9 freight-barges arrived in Marseilles up to 16 June; of these 45 tank-barges and 4 tank-lighters were transferred to Genoa. Ten tank-barges put out for Toulon for repairs. Group West draws attention to the fact that the transfer of barges which are ready is considerably delayed since, according to a report of the Naval Liaison Staff in Toulon, the Italians are using too few escort vessels. Therefore, Naval Staff has issued directions to Group West and German Naval Command, Italy to attempt transfer if necessary without escort, accepting reasonable losses, if too much time is lost owing to a lack of escort vessels. A similar wish was expressed to Commander in Chief, Navy by the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 14 June the BARLETTA and MOROSINI carried out minelaying according to plan.

Air reconnaissance did not observe either traces of oil or wreckage near Zante in our barrage. The assumption that an enemy submarine was destroyed may therefore be without foundation. At the eastern point of Methana (20 miles southwest of Piraeus) heavy detonations with bursts of fire and a high column of water were observed on 16 June, and later three drifting mines were sighted at the same spot. Three auxiliary sailing vessels were sunk by machine-gun fire and two damaged at 1245 on 16 June in an enemy air raid on Mykonos.

Escort duties were carried out according to plan in the Aegean Sea. Five of our submarine chasers were used for escort duties.

In reply to the inquiry from Naval Staff (see War Diary 2 June), Group South reports as intended bases: for seagoing naval forces Navarino, besides the already existing bases of Salamis and Suda; for torpedo boats Suda and Nauplia; for PT boats Salonika, Suda, Kalamata, Patras as well as Argostoli, Prevesa

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

and Navarino. (See Telegram 1855)

Further arrangements by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 16 June radio intelligence detected a destroyer on the south Caucasian coast on north-westerly course and five submarines each in the central to western part of the Black Sea as well as in the sea area of the Crimea and on the Caucasian coast.

One of our submarines sighted a submarine 25 miles southwest of Suchum at 1054.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla was in patrol line south of Anapa during the night of 17 May (probably meant to read June. Tr.N.), without result. Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch as well as Anapa and Temriuk transports were carried out according to plan.

An enemy air attack was made in several waves on the supply transport Feodosiya - Kerch at 0945 in the southern outlet of the Strait of Kerch. One lighter sank. Two naval landing craft were damaged. Three planes were shot down by ship's anti-aircraft guns and two by fighters. Taganrog was shelled by an enemy armored train at 1830 on 16 June; slight damage was caused in the harbor area. The shelling was repeated at 0230 on 17 June. At 2230 on 16 June a patrol boat sighted four miles south of Taganrog 16 small motor boats proceeding at high speed and heading for the mouth of the Don. Two boats were engaged.

Aerial mines are suspected 20 miles south-southwest of Mariupol. Sweeping of channels is being carried out. Naval artillery lighters MAL "1", "2" and "3" and two motor minesweepers will be transferred from Berdiansk to Mariupol in the evening of 17 June and naval artillery lighter MAL "4" from Sevastopol to Kerch probably on 18 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

In an official announcement the White House repeated the warning to the Axis Powers that the use of poison gas will be answered by reprisals. This statement is said to have been instigated by an official report from Chungking on the dropping of gas bombs by the Japanese.

The Swedish Prime Minister repeated in Parliament his statement previously made that, in case of an enemy invasion, resistance, even by civilians, would be put up to the last under all conditions and in all situations.

To make it clear once and for all, any announcement which might be issued concerning the cessation of resistance is false.

The frontier between Syria and Turkey was re-opened on 17 June.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division.

a. In reply to the inquiry concerning use of Japanese submarines for the transportation of rubber, the Naval Attaché in Tokio transmitted the confidential information from the expert in the Japanese Admiralty, Admiral Kojima, that five submarines, probably old submarine-cruisers, have been converted into transports for supplying **Guadalcanal** and Attu; at present they are carrying provisions to Kiska. One of these was lost. Admiral Kojima assumes that the submarines might be available later for the desired purpose.

Another authority also believed Japanese participation to be possible. The Attaché is urging the transfer and proposes that steps be taken by Berlin, making reference to the transfer of two of our operational boats; it would be opportune in this connection to point out that the Bay of Biscay can be passed without difficulty, as the Japanese have apparently become startled by the loss of three Aquila boats.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, Naval Staff orders that the Japanese Navy be now officially approached.

b. In connection with the plans contemplated by Group North, Baltic Station proposed on 15 June three groups of barrage projects for the purpose of reinforcing the Skagerrak declared area for 1943. The first group concerns immediate measures for the laying of barrages XVIII, XIX and XX north of Skagen.

The second group comprises barrage XXI to be laid north of Hanstholm in September 1943 and the third group a further reinforcement of barrage XX in the southwestern part of the Skagerrak declared area after winter 1943/44, in order to make up for weakening during the winter months.

The KAISER is being considered for immediate use as minelayer for the first group of barrages; the OSTMARK as well as the ROLAND for later use. Further minelayers are expected from Group North/Fleet after minelaying now being commenced by this command has been carried out.

Proposals concerning further reinforcement of the Skagerrak declared area are to be expected.

According to the views held by Naval Staff, Operations Division, the three contemplated barrage sections of the first group north of Skagen cannot ensure the desired flank protection for supply ships to Oslo in the case of an enemy break-through; they would only protect the southernmost 20 miles of the approximately 80 mile-long run, the part which is anyway least endangered due to the proximity of our coastal waters defense. A break-through into the Kattegat is believed unlikely as there is a widespread danger of ground mines here, apart from the deep channel. For these reasons the plan does not seem to be urgent; anyway a tying-down of mines and minelayers in Frederikshavn is not justified.

The position of the contemplated barrage section of the second group north of Hanstholm is actually well chosen as the southern part of the declared area has only a relatively small number of mines. Anti-sweeping devices can also be used effectively owing to the shallow waters. However, the plan is not so urgent that it could not be postponed for a few months according to the development of the situation, in view of the small mine stocks available.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Operations Staff, Baltic Station therefore received the following temporary instructions on 15 June:

Re: Group 1):

"The situation as a whole and the small stocks of mines prohibit tying-down of minelayers and mines for barrages H, J and K.

Re: Group 2):

Agree in principle with barrage position. Full use of anti-sweeping devices appropriate. Not to be carried out before late summer, however, as available mine stocks are required for barrage projects of more urgency in sea areas directly endangered by the enemy."

The instructions were supplemented on 18 June as follows:

"1. Agree in principle with intended bar-like expansion of the Skagerrak declared area against surface forces. However, this project can only be designated as being of second priority on the basis of the means available. As an enemy break-through into the Skagerrak is not likely during the present short summer nights and present stocks of mines are required for more urgent barrage projects in the Mediterranean, Channel and Northern Norway, reinforcement of the Skagerrak cannot commence until the beginning of August.

2. For the present 360 EMC and 540 EMF mines are assigned for the end of July.

3. Barrage projects XX and XXI will probably have to be postponed further. This seems possible as the southern part will be covered by the new barrage XVIII and the central part by the new barrage XIX; the northern part was reinforced at the beginning of the year by the barrages XVII and XVIII, still fully active. A final decision will be made at the end of July in accordance with mine stocks then available.

4. Fresh reinforcement of the southern part in spring 44 will depend on weather conditions next winter and the development of the situation. It is not yet possible to reserve mines for this.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

5. A decision concerning minelayers and escort forces will be issued in due course."

In the course of these discussions, Chief, Naval Staff studied a chart showing the development of our mine stocks. Chief, Naval Staff believes it necessary that a remedy be found here too and that a plan be drawn up without delay concerning increase of mine production. On 20 June Chief, Naval Staff will meet with the Minister for Armament and Ammunition and draw his attention to the necessity of carrying out this program also.

c. Commanding Admiral, Submarines informed Commander in Chief, Navy on 10 June of the request made by Commander, Submarines, Italy to issue as soon as possible final directions concerning the transfer of the 29th Submarine Flotilla to Toulon. According to the views of Naval Staff, the lack of anti-aircraft defense in Toulon, the labor difficulties in the dockyards and their requisitioning for unusual work (for instance conversion of barges) do not allow the complete transfer of the 29th Submarine Flotilla to Toulon until further notice. On the contrary it is necessary that repair facilities and bases for German submarines be maintained at La Spezia and Pola for a while. The matter should be treated dilatorily as regards the Italians.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division was informed accordingly and asked to instruct Commanding Admiral, Submarines, Group West, German Naval Command, Italy and Commander, Submarines, Italy as soon as possible.

Copy of order l/Skl I u 1748/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol IV.

Special Items.

According to an intelligence report from Portugal based on information gathered in diplomatic circles and transmitted by a reliable agent, preparations for simultaneous landings of

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

Anglo-American forces on Sicily, Sardinia, the Dodecanese Islands as well as at different points of the west and northwest coast of Norway are not yet quite concluded.

Operations in the Mediterranean are to start with a heavy air bombardment mainly of points in southern Sicily; it is said that 3,000 planes will be used for this. About 85,000 men are said to be ready for the landing in the Mediterranean area. The first wave will be directed against Trapani, Marsalla, Agrigento, Licato, Gela and Porzalla. Several aircraft carriers, about 12 heavy cruisers, 35 destroyers, 40 transports and numerous tank landing craft will be used for this purpose.

Under the protection of heavy naval forces the second wave will bring up troop and supply transports as well as landing vessels. The islands of the Dodecanese will be attacked by units stationed in Cyprus and Syria. For the simultaneous attack on Norway, naval forces are lying ready in Iceland and ports of northern Scotland. Especially mentioned are the ports of Dundee and Aberdeen. Large troop movements are reported from northern Scotland.

All commands concerned were informed of this report.

Situation 18 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Portugal based on a Consulate Report from Dakar dated 9 June, 8,000 colored troops sailed with a convoy from Dakar to the north on that day. Ten more ships were expected on the same day from Freetown, proceeding to the north on 11 June.

Supply bases for Axis submarines are suspected near the Canary Islands. Convoy escort is strengthened from Rio del Oro.

Shipping circles suspect an intention to divert South African troop transports to the East Africa route owing to submarine

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

danger along the west coast.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from our vessels in foreign waters.

Ship "28" was informed by Radiogram as follows:

1. The first Italian transport submarine, cover-name "Aquila", is proceeding via 00° N. 89° E. and is expected at $06^{\circ} 10'$ N. $94^{\circ} 50'$ E. on about 8 July, day's run 220 miles, no torpedo tubes on board.
2. Our own submarine bound for Japan will be south of Capetown on 18 June according to dead reckoning, day's run 170 miles, proceeding via the same points as "Aquila"; has freedom of attack up to 90° E., but this will be restricted in view of Ship "28".
3. The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN will meet our submarines on 22 June at a point lying 20° further south and half a degree further west than "Tipperary". The MARCO POLO will probably also meet the SCHLIEMANN there.
4. Therefore Ship "28" is not to cross 70° E. to the west.

Copy of order I k 1745/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

All vessels in foreign waters were instructed regarding enemy shipping movements by Radiogram 1131.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Only moderate reconnaissance of the 19th Group was observed over the Bay of Biscay up to 14° W.

A convoy was attacked at 0911 near St. Vincent by our planes.

Bombs were dropped on an Allied steamer in the same area at 1021.

One British vessel was detected in CG 8624 at 1955.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J mines were swept off Lorient.

Torpedo boat T "23" will transfer from Brest to La Pallice for engine overhaul, proceeding alone under relay escort.

Channel Coast:

One "Mark I" and one "Mark XIX" mine with snag line were swept 5 miles northeast of Sark.

The route between the Channel Islands was closed owing to danger of mines. Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan and without special incident.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

Patrol boat VP "1304" was slightly damaged in an attack by two enemy fighters with machine-guns on patrol position near Ijmuiden at 0658.

A few men were wounded in an attack on an anti-aircraft vessel and buoy-layer. In a further attack on the same vessels the buoy-layer was damaged and had to be brought into Terschelling. Two planes were shot down and a third damaged. Two British fighters unsuccessfully attacked a group of the 34th Minesweeper Flotilla off the Hook of Holland at 0655.

One ELM/J mine was swept north of Schiermonikoog by a plane.

Minesweeping operations could not be carried out during the night of 18 June owing to weather conditions.

Some patrol positions were withdrawn.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Numerous enemy balloons appeared in the Heligoland Bight and in the North German coastal area during the night.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

There was lively defense patrol but little air activity in the morning over the North Sea, 17 planes being intercepted in radio traffic.

One plane of the Iceland squadrons was detected on operation.

Radio intelligence intercepted at 1030 a report of a Russian plane of one of our convoys in the sea area of Nordkyn. Our air reconnaissance sighted three patrol boats (400 BRT), one merchantman as well as two small patrol boats in the Denmark Strait at 1610.

Own Situation:

Russian batteries shelled fishing vessels in the fjord entrance of Petsamo during the night of 17 June. Two enemy planes were sighted in the area north of Bergen in the evening of 17 June.

Twenty five steamers were escorted north and 13 south.

Submarines U "269", "355" and "629" were placed at the disposal of Commander, Submarines, Norway by Commanding Admiral, Submarines for operations in Northern Waters.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff directed the 5th Air Force, in accordance with the request from Naval Staff, (see War Diary 15 June) to provide two BV 138's for a special operation of the Navy and, in direct agreement with the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy and Admiral, Northern Waters, to equip them for this purpose.

Operations will be carried out by the 5th Air Force on request from Admiral, Northern Waters.

Group North and Admiral, Northern Waters were informed by Naval Staff accordingly.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

One of our submarines has received orders to ascertain, by means of an armed landing party, the result of the attack carried out by the Air Force on the probably unmanned weather radio station of Tunheim on Bear Island.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Slight enemy gunfire against our coastal area was reported in the Kronstadt Bay.

Further minesweeping by a tug with barge was detected on the east and west roads of Kronstadt.

Numerous motor minesweepers, PT boats and guard boats, barges and tugs were sighted in the area of Lavansaari, between Lavansaari and Schepel. There were ten guard boats east of Seiskari.

2. Own Situation:

The submarine chase in the Skagerrak, supported by three planes, produced no result.

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic doubts the report from the steamer DRAU. He is of the opinion that a ship of 5,000 BRT with a speed of 12 knots could not have escaped undamaged from a submarine attack lasting three hours.

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic also presumes that there is probably no connection with a large-scale operation in the Skagerrak planned from England; the submarine would then not have revealed her presence beforehand by attacking. It cannot be assumed either that a submarine which had broken through into the Skagerrak would have attacked as the first target a vessel proceeding alone. It is, however, decisive for the views of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic that submarine chase was unsuccessful up to now and that no further attacks on Route 43 have been reported since the evening of 16 June.

Therefore Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic intends to call off the submarine chase at 0800 on 19 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Operations Staff, Baltic Station agreed with this plan. For particulars see Telegram 0019.

Two mines were swept by a mine-exploding vessel near Middelgrund.

Sweeping of channels and escort duties were carried out according to plan in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

A Russian submarine-laid mine was exploded off Memel; it is estimated to have been lying there for nine months. A further mine was exploded near Putzig. Transports were carried out according to plan in the area of the Baltic Sea.

Submarine and net patrol in the Gulf of Finland was carried out by 34 planes.

Six enemy planes attacked Battery 'Dubnia' in Luga Bay. One plane was shot down east of Peipia.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

A steamer proceeding at high speed on course 20° was sighted by a submarine west of Cape Bianco.

2. Own Situation:

Two submarines were bombed by enemy planes in the Bay of Biscay. One of the boats suffered casualties and had to start on return passage to repair damage.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force nine planes were out on operation in the west area and four in the Mediterranean.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

One enemy plane was shot down near Dunkirk.

Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reports an attack by a FW 200 on a steamer of 2,500 BRT south of Cape Vincent, in which 4 bombs were dropped which missed, and an engagement lasting 10 minutes with a Hudson, without result.

In an attack by two FW 200's on a merchantman which was painted white, proceeding alone north-northwest of Lisbon, a hit was scored on the bow. The ship sent out an urgent request for assistance.

For enemy attacks on German patrol forces in the Channel area and off the Dutch coast see "Situation West Area and North Sea".

There were no operations on our part and no enemy air activity over Reich territory during the night of 18 June.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

For evaluations of air reconnaissance in the western and central Mediterranean see "Enemy Situation Mediterranean".

During operations by our forces against Jijelli during the night of 17 June, one ship of 4,000 - 6,000 BRT was sunk and two smaller ships were damaged. Hits and fires were observed on landing craft and berths. Seven bombers were out on operation against Bizerta during the night of 18 June.

Owing to fighter defense no particulars could be ascertained about a large eastbound convoy consisting of 70 steamers and about 20 escorts in the Bay of Algiers at 1750. The Italian Air Force reported sinking on 16 June a transport of 15,000 BRT and damaging a merchantman of 5,000 BRT near Cape Bougaroni. The enemy continued his attacks against harbors and airfields in Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica on 18 June.

Messina, Trapani, the airfields of Villa Cidro and Oristano, the town and harbor of Olbia and the harbor of Golfo Aranci, as well as Syracuse were involved.

One ferry and one German Siebel ferry were damaged in Messina. One Italian ship of 8,000 BRT exploded in Olbia.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Altogether eighteen enemy planes were shot down.

For particulars see "Daily Situation".

3. Eastern Front:

Four steamers totalling 10,300 BRT were sunk in a raid against the harbor and armament works of Astrakhan during the night of 17 June.

Two vessels totalling 800 BRT were sunk by our fighter-bombers in the early morning hours of 18 June in the area of the Ribachi Peninsula.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The following left Gibraltar: at 2130 on 17 June, for the Mediterranean, 2 destroyers; according to an Italian report, at 1520 on 18 June 32 landing craft, including 16 tank landing craft and 2 anti-aircraft landing craft.

At 1630 30 landing craft, including 4 anti-aircraft landing craft, 2 minesweepers and other small vessels arrived from the Atlantic.

According to a report from Intelligence Center, Spain, the following were lying in Gibraltar at 1300: 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE class, the FORMIDABLE, 1 British auxiliary aircraft carrier, the MANXMAN, 1 auxiliary cruiser and presumably 1 infantry landing ship of the QUEEN EMMA type. As photographic reconnaissance of Gibraltar at 1058 had only revealed one battleship, the second battleship must have arrived in the meantime.

A large convoy of probably more than 60 vessels which passed Alboran at 0500 on 17 June was detected at 1750 northeast of Algiers on easterly course. According to air reconnaissance, there was a convoy of eight merchantmen and eight escort vessels 40 miles west of Cape Tenes on easterly course.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

A large number of ships proceeding east was sighted in the morning in the area of Jijelli and Philippeville. Two cruisers, 3 destroyers, 8 LST's, 35 LCT's and 2 PT boats were sighted. A large number of ships was also observed in the area of Pantelleria. Apart from several merchantmen, 2 destroyers and 2 PT boats, as well as some escort vessels were sighted.

Eight large ships of an unidentified type were lying in the harbor of La Valetta at 1900.

Submarines were reported in the evening hours south of Stromboli, 45 miles south of Toulon, 80 miles west of the southern point of Corsica and 30 miles south of Pola.

Reconnaissance of coastal waters around Sidi Barani was incomplete and nothing was sighted.

According to an intelligence report which is based on statements by a Turkish General Staff Officer, there are 80,000 to 100,000 men on Cyprus. Up to 2,000 planes are said to be ready in northern Syria, which will soon be used for an attack on Rhodes and the Dodecanese.

Regarding the situation on land, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports that, with the present landing craft available in the area of Algeria - Tunisia, the enemy will probably be able to put into action in the first wave three and a half American landing divisions from the area of Algiers and three British landing divisions from harbors of Algeria and Tunisia. In addition, the enemy operations control has at its disposal for the first attack two more airborne divisions and about 12 - 15 parachutist battalions. This organization of enemy forces with strong American concentration in the area of Oran and the assembly of British formations in Tunisia emphasizes the possibility of two simultaneous landing operations.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area. Three boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla left Licata in the evening, bound for Augusta.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Four motor minesweepers transferred from home waters were reported ready for action on 17 June in Toulon.

German Naval Command, Italy submitted the order for the laying of mine barrages off the Gulf of Orestano through which a new Italian mine barrage lying outside the Gulf of Orestano is to be reinforced and any attempt to enter the Bay prevented to a great extent. Minelayers BRANDENBURG and POMMERN are provided for this with a total of 380 EMC mines. The operation will be carried out under the command of the Italian Navy together with German Naval Command, Italy. The Italian Command station will be at Maddalena and the commander of the formation Commander, 3rd Escort Flotilla.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

For intelligence report concerning maneuvers which took place recently on Cyprus and in which parachute troops and gliders towed by transport planes participated, see Telegram 1820. The number of troops stationed on the island is estimated to be altogether 50,000 men.

Own Situation:

The DRACHE and BULGARIA left Piraeus on 18 June to carry out minelaying in the Gulf of Patras. Submarine chase by our planes, concentrating on the area of Lemnos - Mytilene was without result. Transport and convoy traffic was carried out according to plan and without special event.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Lively traffic consisting of small coastal vessels, tugs and lighters was observed between Gelendzhik and the beachhead.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

One of our submarines unsuccessfully attacked an enemy submarine south of Feodosiya.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla was in patrol line in Temriuk Bay during the night of 18 June. Four naval landing craft are en route from Varna to the Bosphorus for transfer into the Aegean Sea.

Naval artillery lighters MAL "1" to "3" and two motor minesweepers put into Mariupol on 18 June. The vessels had an engagement with an enemy plane 15 miles south-southwest of Mariupol, particulars of which have not yet been reported. Shelling of the coast by these vessels, planned for the night of 18 June, had to be broken off owing to weather conditions.

Naval artillery lighter MAL "4" en route from Sevastopol to Kerch arrived in Yalta. MAL "5" and "6" are proceeding from Sulina to Sevastopol via Odessa. MAL "7" and "8" are still lying in Constanta.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch and supply transports were carried out according to plan.

Regarding the increase in supplies across the Strait of Kerch requested by the Quartermaster General of the Army, (see War Diary 14 June) Commanding Admiral, Black Sea reports that the demand can be met if: supplies from Sevastopol and increase of Anapa transports are foregone; the aerial railway is used for transporting supplies with at least 500 tons daily; shipping already requested is allocated; there is smooth arrival and departure of supplies and provision of sufficient workers for loading and unloading. Passage of large ships on from Sevastopol to the east can only be carried out as long as there are sufficient fighter forces available for continuous fighter defense of the convoys, owing to the extremely critical situation as regards large ships and very lively enemy activity along the Crimean coast.

Commanding Admiral, Black Sea anticipates a further request for assignment of tugs and lighters and believes that the Gotenkopf is the most important focal point in the southern sector of the front and that, therefore, the request must

CONFIDENTIAL

18 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

definitely be complied with. The settlement of this lies first of all with the Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping. (See Telegrams 2100 and 2115)

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Japanese Liaison Officer reports that the Japanese Air Force made a mass attack with fighters and bombers on 16 June on an enemy convoy near Lunga, sinking 7 steamers and 1 destroyer and damaging 1 steamer.

In addition 32 enemy planes were shot down, the Japanese losing 20 planes.

According to further statements of the Japanese Liaison Officer, a Japanese convoy observed on 9 June, in waters around the Solomon Islands, that beside several ships water columns with columns of fire occurred, from which the Japanese Navy presumes that floating mines with time fuzes were involved which are laid by submarines and detonate by electric or magnetic firing.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

The House of Representatives in Washington passed the bill of the War Department amounting to 71.5 billion dollars for equipment and costs of maintenance of an army of 7,500,000 men and 600,000 officers for the financial year starting 1 July 1943. This includes 23.5 billion dollars for the Air Force, provision of 36,000 bombers, 38,000 fighters, 12,000 transport and 9,000 training planes being planned for this year. In addition a sum of 1.1 billion dollars is included for chemical warfare; in granting this, the Committee expressed the hope that none of the Axis powers would ever adopt chemical warfare.

The granting of this item is very badly framed by this wording.

Seven provinces situated in southern Italy have been declared operational zones according to the official German news agency.

The King of England visited Gibraltar and went aboard a cruiser bound for Malta. This journey is widely stressed by propaganda as a symptom of British naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. The Syrian/Turkish frontier is heavily guarded by British troops apart from the official frontier guard stations, according to a report from Transocean.

Field Marshall Wavell was appointed Viceroy of India. General Auchinleck has been appointed his successor as Commander in Chief in India.

It is planned to relieve the Commander in Chief of the British Armed Forces in India of his responsibilities for operations in Japan and to set up a separate East Asia Command for this purpose.

On the occasion of the unanimous acceptance of draft laws and bills presented by the Government, the Japanese Parliament issued a resolution expressing the determination of Parliament and, with it, that of the whole Japanese nation to make an all-out effort for victory in very close co-operation with Germany and Italy.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

According to a report of the official German news agency, Chandra Bose arrived in Tokio and started his conferences with leading Japanese circles on 14 June.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Report by Quartermaster General concerning the Fuehrer's Directive to effect supplies to Sicily at all costs in the amount ordered. As railway ferry traffic is greatly hampered by the threat of enemy air operations, it is suggested that an aerial railway be set up over the Straits of Messina. It will also be investigated whether the use of submarine hulls, which can be towed under water on a cable, or the use of submarines which carry out transports under their own power is practicable. In view of the possibilities of enemy action, a decentralization of traffic to the island appears advisable to as many loading places as possible. Chief, Naval Staff orders that Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy should express the uneasiness of the Fuehrer concerning this question to the Italian Admiralty, by way of Admiral Sansonetti, in order to urge the Italians also to make every effort to carry out this task.

II. Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports regarding a conversation which the German Military Attaché had with Franco on 11 June, in which the latter stated that he did not see any real threat to Spain from the British and Americans. In spite of this, measures are being taken along the coast to resist an invasion. General Munoz Grandes has been ordered to request an acceleration and increase of German armament deliveries. Of interest in this connection is the report by the German Air Attaché in Madrid concerning statements made to him on 4 June by the former Spanish Air Minister, General Yague, who is now Commanding General in Melilla. Yague, who opposes in every way the increasing defeatist view of the war situation, blames the effect of British propaganda for the uncertain attitude of Franco towards the enemy powers and his lack of decision; he sees only one possibility of making the Head of the State, who

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

is with heart and soul pro-German, take up a really definite attitude, i.e. by supplying him continuously and directly with information from the Fuehrer or another high German Government official, even if such information could not be made known to the public. Franco will prove by his actions that he has full confidence in Germany and in a final German victory, if Germany also shows trust in him. The reference by the Air Attaché to Spanish reserve, which has often been observed and which does not indicate such confidence, was answered by Yague with a sharp attack against the Spanish Foreign Office which is still making advances to Great Britain and America and which can only envisage the welfare of Spain in neutrality. With the taking over of the question of armament supplies by the Foreign Office, Great Britain had gained a victory, as valuable months will pass before the first arms arrive in Spain.

III. Chief, Naval Staff agreed to the following letter to Admiral Bertoldi:

"It is requested that the following information be passed on to the Italian Admiralty: Commander in Chief, Navy welcomes the proposal to exchange the two Italian submarines BRIN and DANDOLO for two German submarines type VII C and to convert them for the transportation of rubber, and agrees to the proposals made. In order to spare the boats the two passages through the dangerous Bay of Biscay and not to lose any time through these trips, Commander in Chief, Navy proposes that conversion be undertaken in Italy and the submarines then put out directly from there. The military situation at present does not allow submarines to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar. Therefore passage by these submarines into the Mediterranean cannot be effected until conditions have changed. Therefore an investigation is requested as to whether it is not possible to start conversion before arrival of the German boats in exchange, perhaps after return from an operation when a lengthy dockyard period is anyway necessary and the submarines will not be out on operations during this time."

The letter was handed over to Admiral Bertoldi personally by Chief, Operations Division. The transfer to Italy of the cargo destined for Japan, which will become necessary through direct departure of the submarines from Italy, will be arranged by Operations Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

I. The Fuehrer ordered that the anti-tank defense of all branches of the Armed Forces on the coasts, with the exception of the operational area in the east, be investigated by a special staff according to instructions of the General Inspector of Tank Troops.

II. A conference was held on 18 June with Commander in Chief, Navy for the purpose of reaching a decision as to whether the project of the "Engelmann" boat is to be pursued or not.

During this Chief, Operations Division stated that the draught and structure of the boat make its use in the Channel and in the northeastern entrance of the Straits of Dover impossible, as it is too vulnerable to the danger of mines. Its use would be possible in Northern Waters, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and in the western outlet of the Channel. The present operational range is of course insufficient for these areas. A further weakness of the boat is its vulnerability to planes. Various cases are of course conceivable in which the vessel might well be used, especially in rough sea. However, it is unsuitable for extensive operational use (in the Atlantic).

Commander in Chief, Navy agrees with the view of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division, as reported, that it would not be wise to adjust construction to tactical demands, which naturally change, but that it would be better not to hinder the constructor by any demands, as this is an experimental project which must first of all prove its efficiency without too many restrictions. Commander in Chief, Navy decided that the towing trials planned shall be carried out and that every support shall be given to the constructor.

III. According to an intelligence report from Tangiers dated 25 May, from a source connected with the U.S. Military Attaché in Tangiers whose statements have up to now proved correct, it is concluded from confidential conversations with the above mentioned Military Attaché that the attack against Europe will be undertaken in the second half of July. The 9th and 10th British Armies are to march into Turkey, who will start the attack against Bulgaria on the side of the British and Americans. At the same

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

time a small landing operation is planned in northwest France. The large-scale landing operation planned will be directed from the western Mediterranean (area Algiers - Tunis) against Marseilles, Toulon and Nice, in connection with which operations will take place against Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. At the same time it is planned to start an air offensive on a very large scale against France from England and North Africa. This will be synchronized with a call to the French population to rise up against the German occupation troops with every possible means.

Situation 19 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN received supplementary instructions by radiogram on supplying six submarines at point "Lotte". Copy of radiogram l/Skl I k 1752/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.

All vessels in foreign waters were instructed concerning enemy shipping movements by Radiogram 2006.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Moderate reconnaissance by 20 planes was detected in the Bay of Biscay up to about 12° W. Six British vessels were located in the area between Rockall Bank and Porcupine Bank in the evening.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The transfer of torpedo boat T "23" from Brest to La Pallice took place according to plan. Escort and patrol duties were carried out without special incident. Five torpedo boats left Brest at 2100 for an exploratory sweep on the outer routes. A French freighter sank southwest of St. Nazaire presumably after hitting a floating wreck.

See Telegram 0920 for report on bomber operation of Air Commander, Atlantic Coast on a merchantman off Lisbon on 18 June.

Channel Coast:

PT boats S "122" and S "90" were attacked by enemy fighters while transferring from Boulogne to Rotterdam. The boats arrived in Dunkirk soon after midnight with many wounded. Otherwise no special incidents.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There were 31 merchantmen of up to 5,000 BRT and four destroyers on northerly course at 0040 north of Great Yarmouth, according to air reconnaissance.

Own Situation:

Escort and minesweeping activities as well as patrol duties were impaired by weather conditions. Only the Elbe - Ems traffic was carried out under escort according to plan.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Lively air reconnaissance was observed over the

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

North Sea, concentrating throughout the day off the west coast of Norway. Thirty four planes were intercepted in radio traffic. A convoy of eleven ships on easterly course was detected at 1500 near Kolguev by radio intelligence. Group North/Fleet reports the following interpretations of this:

1. Approach of coal traffic to Fetchora Bay,
2. Supply traffic to Novaya Zemlya,
3. Assembly of a QP-convoy, possibly in Belushya Bay.

The 5th Air Force was requested to carry out reconnaissance up to the mouth of the Fetchora as well as of Belushya Bay and the sea area south of 72° N. and east of 48° E.

According to a further report from the Commander of Submarine U "711", it is understood that definitely at least two, and probably three different carrier-borne planes were sighted on 12 June. According to observations of the direction from which the planes came and returned it is to be concluded that the carrier was west of Bear Island outside our own area of reconnaissance, which extended up to about 250 km. west of the island. Group North/Fleet believes that the presence at sea of the carrier is connected with the two British destroyers which obviously transferred the personnel to or from Bear Island for setting up the radio station. (See Telegram 1548).

Own Situation:

Russian batteries fired 15 rounds at boats in Petsamo Fjord during the night of 17 June. An enemy submarine unsuccessfully attacked an eastbound convoy in Bas Fjord at 0935 on 19 June. An eastbound convoy was attacked by planes with three torpedoes, which missed, near Vardoe at 1435. Two Russian fighters flew over the convoy and shot down one of our fighters. An enemy torpedo plane unsuccessfully attacked patrol boat VP "5301" between Lister and Lindesnes at 0745. Submarine chaser "1708" was sunk near Lister by a torpedo hit at 0749 during an attack by two planes. A further unsuccessful attack was carried out by two torpedo planes against one of our convoys northwest of Obrestadt at 0808.

The destroyer RIEDEL passed Loedingen at 0030 on 18 June, transferring to Alta. The 8th PT Boat Flotilla arrived with the KARL PETERS in Kiel on 18 June.

Minelaying operation "Erzengel" has been temporarily postponed for 24 hours owing to weather conditions and in view of the arrival of a Swedish steamer.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group North/Fleet reports that the 5th Air Force agrees entirely with its views concerning the situation at sea (see brief assessment of the situation in War Diary 14 June). The Air Command reported further that planes for an almost complete reconnaissance of the sea area around Scandinavia, up to their range limit, have been ready since 11 June and this can be started entirely or in sectors by code word "Hagel". Group North will receive the order giving the code word, for information.

As this single reconnaissance operation will require about one million liters of fuel it can, however, only be ordered if enemy operations against Norway are recognized or appear likely, if it is a matter of discovering enemy intentions and the extent of the enemy operation. The patrol, proposed by Group North, would have to cover completely every day a sea area of 480 miles extending from north to south, i.e. between about 63° and 71° N. Apart from the fact that this reconnaissance would very often be incomplete owing to weather conditions and therefore not achieve its true purpose, the 5th Air Force has neither sufficient forces nor the necessary fuel for it.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively tug traffic with barges was observed between Leningrad, Kronstadt and Oranienbaum. There were numerous guardboats and PT boats in the area of the island of Lavansaari and near Schepel. Enemy gunfire was active in Kronstadt Bay during the night of 18 June. For the first time a Boston was seen when a plane flew in north of Reval at noon on 18 June.

On 7 June the Finnish Navy picked up the body of a Russian sailor equipped with submerged escape apparatus and rubber suit, which had been in the water for about four days and might be connected with the attack on the submarine near Vaindlo.

2. Own Situation:

Sixteen vessels were out sweeping channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. Escort duties were carried out according to plan. The ROLAND and OTTER put into Kristiansand South. Fleet tender HELA put out from

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Kiel to the east. Submarine net and barrage patrol was carried out according to plan in the Gulf of Finland. Minesweeping was carried out in Ahrensburg and Reval Bays without special event.

Special Items.

Commanding Admiral, Denmark informs Naval Staff for information of the new request for the transfer of the 13th Landing Flotilla to Limfjord so that transfer of our troops across the Great Belt is ensured in case of an enemy invasion in Jutland. (See Telegram 1350).

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 83 planes were out on operation in the west area and 19 in the Mediterranean. During the day enemy planes carried out attacks with machine-guns and single bombs against traffic installations and freight trains in western France. For attacks on our escort forces see Situation West Area. Eleven of our fighter-bombers attacked Ramsgate and five fighter-bombers attacked London during the night of 19 June. The enemy carried out 125 sorties into western France, where mines were probably laid in the coastal areas of La Rochelle and off the mouth of the Gironde, and the Schneider-Creuzot plant was attacked by 60 to 80 planes. Three planes were shot down.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The large convoy off the Algerian coast was detected by photograph in the area of Philippeville towards 1700. It consisted of 8 transports, 30 freighters, 6 tankers totalling about 240,000 BRT, 1 LCT, 1 vessel, presumably a cruiser, 3 destroyers and 1 escort vessel. The slight escort is remarkable. Bombers were sent out in two waves against the convoy. The first attack was

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

made at 1920 off Bone and the second attack not until after midnight off Tabarca. Results are not yet reported. Further results of reconnaissance from the western Mediterranean are under Enemy Situation, Mediterranean Theater.

Our light bombers attacked shipping targets in the area of Pantelleria as well as airfields and harbor installations on the island on 19, as on 18 June. Results were not observed on 19 June. Italian torpedo planes sank a merchantman of 6,000 BRT off the Algerian coast during the night of 18 June and damaged a further steamer.

Only damage to buildings in the town was caused by the enemy Air Force in an attack on Syracuse during the night of 18 June. Further attacks were made against Reggio and San Giovanni during the day. A new enemy attack was made on Messina as well as a nuisance attack on Naples during the night of 19 June.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report from the area of the Black Sea. From 16 June it is now reported that a number of enemy planes was out in the area Galatz - Ismail - Tulcea from 0218 to 0248, according to locations. Two high explosive bombs were dropped east of Galatz. Minelaying in the Danube is suspected.

See Situation Norway, Northern Waters for enemy air activity in the area of the 5th Air Force. Out of 6 enemy bombers and 14 fighters, 2 Bostons and 9 fighter planes were shot down without losses on our part in the area north of Petsamo.

Special Items.

1. From interrogation of a captured navigator of a pathfinder squadron, it is learned that the smoke-screen over St. Nazaire is only partially effective. The large submarine pens with their characteristic structure are always clearly visible and are welcomed as a target. In England the fact is recognized that the pens cannot be damaged by high explosive bombs. Therefore it is being planned to attack them with torpedoes or mines which will be dropped from a low altitude. Authorities concerned were informed.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. For participation in tactical maneuvers of Training Unit, Fleet, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has provided one squadron each of bombers, aerial torpedo planes, long-range reconnaissance planes, a fighter squadron as well as planes equipped with ship detection sets. In addition the available seaplanes of the Reserve Flying Group (Sea) will participate. The Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy is entrusted with preparation and control of the training formations on the part of the Air Force. The operations of the training formations will be under his command for the duration of the maneuver. He will arrange all details direct with the authorities concerned. Training Unit, Fleet and Group North/Fleet were informed by Naval Staff accordingly. (See Telegram 1555).

3. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff describes the statements transmitted by Naval Staff concerning the delay in making the BV 222 A available for Air Commander, Atlantic Coast (see War Diary 10 June), as incorrect. He reports that if no special events occur, Air Commander, Atlantic Coast will have four BV 222's at his disposal by the end of June, of which two were already transferred on 13 June. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff is of opinion that co-operation between Naval Staff and Air Force, Operations Staff concerning operational questions would be best effected in direct agreement and Naval Staff will continue to be informed by him about plans influencing naval warfare. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff does not intend to follow up the proposal to give the Air Force General attached to Commander in Chief, Navy further authority to influence the progress of making the long-range reconnaissance planes type BV 222 ready for operations, as this is the affair only of Quartermaster General, Air Force.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, two battleships of the KING GEORGE V class, the FORMIDABLE and an auxiliary aircraft carrier were lying in Gibraltar on 18 and 19 June. According to an Italian report the following were also

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

detected: 1 light cruiser, 12 destroyers, 17 fast escort vessels, 11 gunboats, 3 submarines, 2 submarine chasers, 71 freighters, 3 troop transports, 3 cargo passenger vessels, 16 tankers and 249 planes.

The FOMIDABLE left for the Atlantic at 2100 with four destroyers. A French destroyer flying the Rear Admiral's flag put in at noon from the west. An American cruiser and two destroyers passed the Straits of Gibraltar towards evening from the Atlantic making for the Mediterranean. According to an Italian report, 250 vessels left Arzeu and Mostaganem on 18 June and, according to a radio report, 150 vessels left eastbound. Up to now this report has not been confirmed.

Concerning the large convoy off the Algerian coast see Aerial Warfare.

The following were lying in Bone at noon, according to photographic reconnaissance: 13 freighters, 2 tankers, 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, 4 auxiliary naval vessels, 12 minesweepers and 15 PT boats.

Lively shipping was observed in the Gulf of Hammamet. Four merchantmen and two patrol vessels left La Valetta and a large merchantman left Marsa Shirocco on southeasterly course.

There was a convoy of 9 medium-sized vessels and 6 escorts north of Sidi Barani on westerly course. Five large steamers with 2 destroyers and 5 corvettes were sighted on course 300° north of El Baba. There was a tanker with 4 escorts north of these, also on westerly course. Nine landing craft of about 2,000 tons were lying off the harbor of Tobruk.

According to an intelligence report, information was received by the Spanish General Staff in the evening that large-scale operations by the Americans were pending from Algeria and Tunisia, probably in the direction of Sicily.

From Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, a report of the Italian Air Attaché in Madrid from the Spanish Air Force General Staff is transmitted that landing operations will take place on Sardinia during the night of 19 June or on 20 June. In these a division of British parachute troops as well as about 1,000 ships - landing craft and escort vessels - will participate.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The impression of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is that enemy defense against our reconnaissance planes has become particularly strong, as three of these planes were lost today.

An intelligence report, on the basis of a Portuguese Consulate report from Tunis dated 15 June, states that all difficulties between the British and American High Commands have been settled by England accepting all proposals. The beginning of the attack is planned by 15 July, mainly from the area of Hammamet - Gabes. The troops have been ready in this area since 15 June. Further transfers of troops and materiel to the east from the area of Constantine - Algiers are in progress. The Syrian army will not start operations until the Axis forces have been tied down by the main thrust against Sicily and Corsica. Transfer of the landing craft, lying up to now in shelters in the area of Algiers, into the Bay of Hammamet indicates that this will be the main point of embarkation. The report also mentions preparations by the Americans along the frontier of Spanish Morocco to guarantee a quick advance should the Spanish Government put up armed resistance to an occupation of Tangiers.

A further intelligence report from Spain dated 19 June contains detailed statements about troop landings in Algerian ports and allocation of British formations to the 8th and 1st British Armies. For particulars see Telegram 1800.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Mainly buildings were damaged in the air attacks on 18 June on the harbors and towns of Messina, Palermo, Trapani and Syracuse. Messina was again attacked in the afternoon of 19 June. No reports have been received owing to breakdown of communications. Continuous attacks were made off Syracuse by a single plane dropping bombs on three PT boats transferring from Licata to Augusta during the night of 18 June. No damage or casualties were incurred. Four motor minesweepers of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla left Marseilles for Nice. Two boats are on their way from Marseilles to Leghorn.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The tanker ROUSSILLON was damaged by an aerial torpedo hit at 0250 while under way from Leghorn to Maddalena and is being towed into Porto Vecchio. Other escort traffic was carried out according to plan and without special incident.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy reconnaissance flights were observed in the area west and north of Crete during the night of 17 June and in the area west of the Peloponnesos throughout the day on 18 June.

The DRACHE and the BULGARIA carried out minelaying in Patras Bay according to plan. Transport and convoy traffic was carried out without special incident. For the first time the railway track Salonika - Athens was attacked by enemy planes south of Lamia during the night of 16 June. The attack was ineffective.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

A merchantman and a minesweeper on northwesterly course were south of Gelendzhik at 2250, according to air reconnaissance. Altogether six submarines were at sea according to radio intelligence. One of our submarines sighted a westbound enemy submarine shortly before midnight 20 miles southwest of Suchum; this was attacked unsuccessfully.

Own Situation:

Naval artillery lighters MAL "1" - "3" and two motor minesweepers left Mariupol to carry out coastal shelling. Patrol of Temriuk Bay by four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla had to be broken off in the evening of 18 June owing to weather conditions. The operation was repeated in the evening of 19 June. Three further boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla were lying in Ivanbaba in immediate readiness.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked the convoy of tanker DRESDEN at 0725 on the way from Yalta to Feodosiya.

In the shelling of Novorossisk the quarters of Port Commanders 16 and 18 received direct hits. Three men were wounded.

Supply and ferry traffic was carried out according to plan and without special event.

Group South considers mine-exploding vessels, suited to local conditions, urgently necessary for the operation in the Sea of Azov. The Group intends to fit up one naval landing craft as a mine-exploding vessel as quickly as possible. Further arrangements will be made by Quartermaster Division.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, an Under Secretary of the U.S. War Department stated that armament production in May was 5.5 % behind the target set. Only the production of planes was encouraging. This statement is obviously meant to eliminate the erroneous assumption that the war is practically over, which has arisen in view of events in Tunisia and through aerial warfare in Europe. The declaration demands drastic adjustments in the armament industry for the transfer of the war to Europe.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. In a verbal report to Submarine Division, the commander of submarine U "564" reported that destroyer Z "24" could have met his submarine promptly and could have repulsed the attack of the Sunderland if the execution of the operation by destroyer Z "24" alone, after detachment of Z "32", had not been delayed owing to the fact that orders were held up for two hours by the authorities. The commander reported further that he scored numerous hits on the enemy plane with his quadruple gun which, however, had no effect on the target. This critical situation will doubtless be remedied after introduction of the new ammunition. Group West was requested to give its views on the issuing of orders to destroyer Z "24".

Concerning the passage of submarines through the Channel, Group West reports, as a result of the investigation ordered, that the occasional passage of single submarines seems possible under certain conditions, but that there are serious objections to continuous transfer. This would not go unnoticed by the enemy and he has the means at his disposal to inflict serious losses on the submarines. Therefore the Group does not consider passage through the Channel advisable and promises details of the reasons for this.

III. Concerning operations by the Air Force in the war against merchant shipping (see War Diary 11 June), Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has sent the following reply to the statements submitted by Naval Staff:

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

"To Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

Commander in Chief, Air Force is specially thankful for the very detailed plan for operations by the Air Force in the war against merchant shipping. The proposal from there to consider the statements as a basis for further conferences is agreed to. After examination of the proposal, Air Force, Operations Staff will again contact Naval Staff. Of course in this Air Force, Operations Staff will not go into details of naval warfare such as necessary forces (number of submarines), organization of command of naval warfare and training of submarine crews, as it holds the view that this is exclusively the affair of Naval Staff."

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff will take the opportunity to confer in person with Chief, Air Force General Staff about this reply, which shows that Air Force, Operations Staff has unfortunately failed to appreciate the meaning of the statements of Naval Staff. The suggestions of Naval Staff had to go into details of aerial warfare as they deal with a joint objective and adjustment for the war against merchant shipping and as, according to the view of Naval Staff, new methods must be adopted in organization and tactics which are aimed at dealing a joint blow by the Navy and Air Force against the same target. If these suggestions were to have some meaning they had to go into just those points which need adjustment and constitute the conditions necessary for practical successes, namely questions of command and training of Air Forces for the new war against merchant shipping. Naval Staff would be very pleased if the Air Force would also make suggestions, at the discussions now arranged, regarding naval warfare aimed at the common target and without regard to the fact of whether these are questions which are actually only the affair of Naval Staff. The most decisive factor is increase in the effect of the war against merchant shipping, the main burden of which has been borne up to now by the Navy through submarine warfare. It is obvious that greater application of the Air Force to a task which actually belongs to naval warfare mainly requires adjustments on its part which are directed to the exigencies of naval warfare.

The strange reaction of Air Force, Operations Staff however causes Naval Staff to fear that the points of view such as mentioned above have been fully overlooked. In view of the phrasing of the

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

telegram Naval Staff is purposely not sending a written reply.

Special Items.

In a conference with Commander in Chief, Navy proposals of Director Broeking were put forward by Naval (Ship) Construction Division concerning the installation of three batteries in the hull of the Walther submarine for the purpose of achieving 2,500 h.p. for each shaft in conjunction with engines. In addition, with the previous, known driving elements an increase in radius of action would be attained for proceeding surfaced, which is estimated at 21,000 miles proceeding at 6 knots and 9,500 miles at 12 knots, compared with 13,000 and 6,200 miles in the case of the Walther boat. Compared with the Walther boat this would have at its disposal an additional fuel reserve of about 80 tons, which could be used for charging the battery. Consequently the possibility of charging the battery is practically unlimited, while the Walther boat is only once able to utilize its maximum speed and its radius of action submerged. A further advantage of the new project lies in the fact that the maximum submerged engine capacity can be used at once, so that the boat can quickly dive. Commander in Chief, Navy views as real advantages: the fact that, owing to the available driving elements, the new type will be more quickly produced than the Walther boat; its improved diving quality. In this type he sees an improvement and supplement of the present type and states that it is a matter of course that construction of the Walther boat will be continued in spite of this new construction. Naval (Ship) Construction Division is to submit a proposal at once for serial construction of the new project.

Situation 20 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Moderate reconnaissance activity of the 19th Group was observed without any noticeable concentration. Twenty five planes were detected. One British vessel was located in BE 9890 at 2000.

According to air reconnaissance, there were 6 steamers on various courses at 2155 in the area of the Isle of Wight and 15 vessels on northwesterly course at 2210 southwest of Start Point.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off St. Nazaire. Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan. Three minesweepers were attacked by an enemy plane south of Brest at 0100 and suffered casualties. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla carried out an exploratory sweep of the new outer route from Brest, according to plan. The new route is intended as an alternative for present route "Kernbeisser" - "Kernleder" and is to be called "Liebesbank" - "Liebeslaube".

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report. For detailed report of the air attack on PT boats S "122" and S "90" en route from Boulogne to the Hook of Holland see Telegram 1120.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Patrol and escort duties were carried out according to plan. Vessels of the 34th Minesweeper Flotilla were attacked by four Spitfires off the Hook of Holland at 0950. They suffered casualties. The group commander was among those killed. A

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

further enemy air attack was made against patrol boats and minesweepers off the Hook of Holland during trials by the Warship Construction Testing Command. Casualties were also suffered here including the commanders of patrol boat VP "1417" and minesweeper M "496".

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance was observed in the morning and moderate reconnaissance in the afternoon over the northern part of the North Sea as well as in the direction of the west coast of Norway and in the Faroes - Iceland area. Altogether 24 planes were detected.

According to an intelligence report from Norway from a Swedish naval source, all men on leave were recalled on 17 June without any reason being stated. Naval circles expect an Anglo-American invasion between 24 and 27 June. Transports in England are loaded and ready to put to sea. Ports are Fetlar - Voe on the Shetland Islands and Duneet Bay on the north coast of Scotland. The main fleet is lying in Edrachillis Bay in west Scotland. On the basis of experiences gained in North Africa, a large number of special invasion vessels of 3,000 BRT are to be used, which can carry 60 tanks with equipment per vessel. As a diversion, simultaneous nuisance operations will take place against Nieuport, Belgium and an unknown coastal stretch, as well as southeastern Italy. The airfields of Fevok, Kristiansand, Sola and Herdla will be subjected to mass attacks at the same time by large American bombers but not, on the contrary, the airfields near Trondheim and Oberlandet, in order to conceal the direction of the thrust. The main attack is to be directed against Molde/Trondheim.

The recalling of Swedish members of the Armed Forces on leave was done through the Swedish radio and is known.

Own Situation:

Russian batteries on the Ribachi Peninsula shelled one of our steamers without effect in the afternoon of 18 June. An eastbound convoy was shelled with 400 rounds on 19 June. No damage was caused. Our batteries returned fire with 120 rounds.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

One hit was observed. In the fog motor minesweeper R "53" was rammed by another motor minesweeper and underslung.

Two enemy planes unsuccessfully machine-gunned a Norwegian cutter north of Vardoe. Ship's anti-aircraft guns shot down one plane in the aerial torpedo attack made on one of our convoys near Vardoe on 19 June. The steamer CANIS was hit in an aerial torpedo attack on one of our convoys northwest of Obrestad. The torpedo did not explode. The ship's side was not pierced. The presence of single planes was observed in the area of Alta - Banak in the afternoon of 19 June, as well as small formations south of Stavanger. A Catalina flew in north of Sandnesjoen at 0300 on 20 June.

Several British cases of provisions and a British rubber dinghy were found hidden under stones during a patrol to comb out the island of Ognoey north of Stavanger. A Norwegian was arrested.

The destroyer RIEDEL entered Kaafjord at 2200 on 18 June. The destroyer LODY started on passage from Alta to Trondheim in the evening of 19 June.

The submarine sent to Bear Island for investigation reports that an automatic weather radio station was not found. Two radio stations with only Norwegian inscriptions were found destroyed, all houses were in ruins and no trace of persons was to be seen.

Weather radio station "Nussbaum" on Spitsbergen reports at 1632 an enemy landing near the station. The crew withdrew to Kra (code name for pre-arranged place) and asks to be taken off by a submarine as quickly as possible. At the request of Group North/Fleet and Admiral, Northern Waters, Commander, Submarines, Norway sent submarine U "302" at once for this purpose. The 5th Air Force intends to carry out air reconnaissance of Spitsbergen with 2 FW 200's as well as strip-reconnaissance of the sea area southwest of Spitsbergen by 4 BV 138's.

According to the opinion of Group North/Fleet, the enemy attack on the weather station on Spitsbergen is connected with the presence of destroyers and carrier-borne planes. It is possible that the capture of the weather station is a preparation for

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

establishment of a naval and air base perhaps with an auxiliary aircraft carrier in Spitsbergen Fjord for defense of the convoys to Russia. The Group proposes to Admiral, Northern Waters that reconnaissance of the fjords and of the west coast of Spitsbergen be planned at latest after the return of submarine U "302". (See Telegram 2000)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to Finnish air reconnaissance, 2 Fugas (Russian minesweepers or patrol boats. Tr.N.), 8 guardboats and 4 PT boats were lying in the harbor of Lavansaari in the morning and 10 further guardboats in the northern harbor. The Finns reported during the night of 20 June a battleship and 11 PT boats on southerly course north of Lavansaari.

Minesweeping by a tug with barge was observed off the west roads of Kronstadt. There was a plane on a barge being towed from Kronstadt to Leningrad. The whole sea area between Oranienbaum, Kronstadt and Leningrad was at times completely covered by a smoke-screen.

2. Own Situation:

Sixteen vessels were engaged in sweeping channels in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. One ELM/J mine was swept south of Bornholm by a mine-exploding vessel in water 31 m. deep. Escort and transport traffic in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic as well as in the rest of the Baltic Sea was completed according to plan and without special incident. There is also nothing to report from the areas of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic and Admiral, Baltic States.

Special Items.

In agreement with Naval Staff, Operations Division, Operations Staff, Baltic has had to reject the proposal of Commanding Admiral, Denmark to bring up the 13th Landing Flotilla, as the

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

training of personnel urgently required for naval landing craft makes it necessary to keep the flotilla in its former area. (See Telegram 1340)

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Air attacks against submarines were again carried out in the Bay of Biscay on 16, 17 and 19 June. All three suffered casualties. One of the submarines had to start on return passage. Group "Trutz" in the southern part of the North Atlantic has not yet contacted the expected convoy and will be withdrawn to the east for new disposition south of the Azores.

A convoy which left Gibraltar on return passage to New York is expected on 22 June. The lack of radio decoding makes itself felt very much in starting operations against convoys, which is otherwise only possible on the basis of further estimation of the previous convoy schedule.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 159 planes were out on operation in the west area and 8 in the Mediterranean. During the day there was great activity by both mixed and pure fighter formations of the enemy. In coastal waters machine-gun attacks were made against anti-aircraft gun positions, location gear and naval vessels. (Compare Situation West Area.) Single enemy reconnaissance planes carried out reconnaissance of the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area and the area of Cuxhaven. Friedrichshafen was attacked by about 80 enemy planes in three waves during the

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

night of 20 June. Considerable damage was caused by about 200 high explosive bombs and 2,000 incendiaries, including damage to the Zeppelin works. A very serious loss was caused at 2230 as a result of an attack by several enemy planes with machine-guns on the Air Force Station of Biscarosse, where the two BV 222's and a BV 138 were destroyed or sank. The destruction of these long-range reconnaissance planes is extremely serious for submarine warfare.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the operation against the large convoy off Tabarca one large transport and six freighters totalling about 25,000 BRT were damaged by bombs, according to a report from the 2nd Air Force. Part of the convoy with probably 20 vessels put into Bizerta. At 1340 35 to 40 vessels were detected off Cape Bon on course east-southeast.

In the morning the enemy attacked the airfield at Trapani and the railway line Trapani - Palermo, as well as the airfields of Comiso, Chinisia and Castell Vetrano. Naples and Giovanni were attacked during the night of 20 June. For particulars of these enemy attacks see Daily Situation.

No reports have been received on our bomber operations during this day.

3. Eastern Front:

Forty six enemy planes were shot down on the army front on 18 June, five of ours being lost. In the evening of 19 June a new operation was carried out by 16 bombers against the branch canal of the Volga near Astrakhan. During this a steamer of 5,000 BRT was sunk and three steamers damaged.

For reconnaissance operations by the 5th Air Force in the sea area between Jan Mayen and Spitsbergen see Situation Northern Waters.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The following arrived in Gibraltar: 3 freighters and

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2 destroyers from an unknown direction; from the Atlantic 2 LST's, escorted by an American submarine chaser and 2 British minesweepers. Thirty six landing craft and a buoy-layer left for the Mediterranean. A cruiser of the FIJI class which arrived in Gibraltar from the Atlantic in the morning sailed for the Mediterranean in the evening. The number of ships in harbor could not be ascertained owing to poor visibility. A report was made concerning the large convoy off the Tunisian coast under Aerial Warfare. There are no further reports from the western Mediterranean.

The westbound convoy reported on 19 June east of Marsa Matruh was detected in the afternoon northwest of Ras Azzaz.

There was a destroyer 30 miles northeast of Tobruk at 1615 on easterly course, proceeding at high speed.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

According to a situation report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, advanced detachments of division "Hermann Goering" have arrived in Sicily.

No special reports were received concerning the situation at sea today.

According to the weekly report of German Naval Command, Italy for the period from 11 to 17 June, ferry traffic across the Straits of Messina has increased to 2,200 tons daily. German ferry traffic of the landing flotilla carried an average of 300 tons per day.

Supplies for the traffic to Sardinia are insufficient as Olbia is blocked to an increasing degree. The expansion of the defensive barrages is proceeding slowly. The minelaying operation by two destroyers on the southwest coast of Sardinia had to be broken off owing to boiler damage. One naval landing craft was lost off Pantelleria. At present the danger of submarines is the most serious, enemy air activity being comparatively small. An increase is to be expected after the Pantelleria operation is completed. The repair capacities of Italian shipyards have increased from 25,000 to 50,000 tons per month.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Traffic to the islands was carried out according to plan. No losses occurred.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Examination of the mine barrages laid by the DRACHE and BULGARIA was carried out without incident. Minesweeping operations in the Straits of Kephalaria achieved no result. An Italian torpedo boat reported the probable location of mines near the island of Arsida (18 miles southeast of Piraeus), by echo-ranging set. Up to now no mines have been swept.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The operation against Yeisk was carried out according to plan by naval artillery lighters MAL "1" - "3" and two motor minesweepers during the night of 19 June. A good effect was reported from the shelling which ended at 0340 and was carried out at a distance of 40 - 60 hm. An enemy vessel which was putting out received a direct hit and put up a smoke-screen. A ground-attack plane was shot down by a motor minesweeper during air attacks when the formation was returning. Two fighters were shot down by the fighter cover. Owing to engine trouble two naval artillery lighters had to be towed by motor minesweepers. MAL "5" and "6" arrived in Sevastopol. MAL "4" is on the way from Feodosiya to Kerch. The operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla off Temriuk during the night of 19 June achieved no result.

Submarine U "18" received an order to attack a tanker of 7,000 BRT on northwesterly course, which was reported by air reconnaissance at about 1300 northwest of Sotschi and which was escorted by one destroyer and four escort vessels.

CONFIDENTIAL

20 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Four anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were swept off the entrance to Sevastopol. A plane swept one mine in the mouth of the Bug.

Four naval landing craft en route from Burgas into the Aegean Sea passed Istanbul.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch as well as supply and towed convoys along the Crimean coast were carried out according to plan.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

No special information has been received concerning naval warfare.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

A) As planned Commander in Chief, Navy discussed the question of carrying out the Naval Construction Program for 1943 and other points with the Minister for Armament and Ammunition on 20 June. Informing the Chiefs of Divisions, Branches and Sections of High Command, Navy, Commander in Chief, Navy stated on the subject of "Raw Material, Industrial and Labor Facilities" that Minister Speer has agreed to accept the responsibility for carrying out the Construction Program for 1943 as presented to the Fuehrer by Commander in Chief, Navy. He will ask the Fuehrer to issue instructions accordingly, allowing him to have at his disposal as he thinks fit the facilities of the above mentioned categories concerned, as he alone will then be responsible. Minister Speer demands this as he is not in a position to obtain the necessary wholesale facilities to the extent in question and to place them at the disposal of the Navy - as done up to now - but must cover any necessary requirements of the Naval Program only by utilizing the most expedient methods through shifting or diversion from other spheres outside and inside the Navy. How this measure, which is of great importance as regards organization, is to be carried out in detail, is still under consideration. In the main Minister Speer intends to re-establish the Main Committee for Naval Ship Construction and to use this committee for practical accomplishment of the task. A forceful personality of the Navy should be a member of this Main Committee. The Naval (Ship) Construction Division will remain unchanged within the Navy. It will remain the authority for planning, setting assignments and determination of types. Its functions will come to an end, however, before orders are passed on to the shipbuilding yards, which will be a matter for the Main Committee which will have the right to have exclusively at its disposal all construction and repair yards including those of the Navy, in view of the sole responsibility for carrying out the Program demanded and granted to it. For certain border-line cases exceptions in favor of a partial or complete execution of projects by the Navy are conceivable and provided for. Very close and confident co-operation is

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

necessary between the Naval (Ship) Construction Division and the Main Committee, in order to guarantee smooth working of the future organization. Commander in Chief, Navy is convinced that the significant step which is being taken by this new organization in connection with new naval ship constructions and repairs is correct under the circumstances and will lead to the objective aimed at. As in the case of the transfer of the provision for merchant shipping to the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping, in this case also one point of view alone is decisive, i.e. how the highest efficiency can be achieved, considering all the circumstances prevailing and to be expected, without regard for any kind of prestige or other pretensions. As conditions are today, the transfer of the responsibility for naval ship construction and repair to the Minister for Armament provided with sole all-round authority, can be only of advantage. The critical situation demands quick action. We cannot permit basic objections or apprehensions to be decisive which may be justified under different conditions some time in the future.

In the conference following the statements of Commander in Chief, Navy, no remarks were made by the participants on the basic aspect of the decision. Quartermaster General, Naval Staff draws attention to the fact that Minister Speer might concentrate his interest on the questions of ship construction and overlook the fact that only half of the iron demanded will be used for this, while the other half is allocated to weapons etc.

Commander in Chief, Navy confirms that the whole question of responsibility must be clearly established.

On the question of labor, Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament remarks that at present the exemption of workers for naval production does not yet seem fully assured. Chief, Armed Forces High Command is of opinion that exemption should not exceed the previous extent according to the instructions of Speer and apparently wishes not to exempt the men liable for service in the Air Force and also wishes to call up the 17 year-old group to the Army through the German Labor Service. Commander in Chief, Navy orders that objection be raised to these intentions in a letter to Armed Forces High Command, as they contradict the definite order from the Fuehrer.

In order to give the Minister, as desired, a survey of the types of naval ships available and under consideration, Commander in Chief, Navy orders that a comprehensive statement of all plans

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

of the Naval (Ship) Construction Division concerned as well as a survey of types be prepared for the Minister in the near future.

Discussions concerning the settlement of details are to start already this week.

Questions of personnel connected with this measure will be dealt with following the discussions by Commander in Chief, Navy in a restricted circle with Chiefs, Naval Ordnance Division and Bureau of Naval Armament, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Chief, Supply and Finance Branch, Naval (Ship) Construction Division.

The question of the armor protection of submarine conning towers is a further point for discussion. Naval (Ship) Construction Division is instructed to examine as quickly as possible the draft of an armored cupola submitted by Captain Schnee. Minister Speer has under consideration diverting the armor used for the infantry armored car from the Army Program for installation on submarines. The Armament Minister should be informed of the requirements of the Navy. It must be taken into consideration here that the desire for a strong armor protection must be adjusted to a tolerable increase in weight.

The problem of armor protection applies to the smaller vessels of the patrol forces, the crews of which are exposed to the machine-gun attacks of enemy planes, as well as to submarines. This question also should be discussed with the Armament Minister in the same manner.

Commander in Chief, Navy orders a further investigation as to whether, in the case of the armor for light vessels which is at present still very weak and does not meet the demands made in the slightest, a greater protection for the crews can be achieved by a coating of glass wool which causes oblique shots. (See relevant tests by the Air Force)

B. Conference on the Situation:

1. Chief, Naval Staff describes the loss of the two BV 222's as a heavy one, equal in terms of naval warfare to the destruction of two cruisers, and considers measures for the protection of these valuable planes, perhaps through construction of camouflaged sheds close to land, urgently necessary. This point will be mentioned by Chief of Staff, Naval Staff during his intended visit to Chief, Air Force General Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Quartermaster General, Naval Staff reports that the Ministry of Food has requested that the oil mill at Gdynia belonging to the Navy be put at its disposal in view of the extraordinarily favorable harvest of oil fruits. Commander in Chief, Navy agreed. Quartermaster General also reports that the Fuehrer has issued instructions that all quarters suitable for living accommodation, at present occupied by Supply and Transportation Offices of the Armed Forces, are to be vacated. Necessary measures for the Navy have been arranged by Quartermaster Division.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

3. Vice Admiral Weichold reports on the possibility of operations against Iceland and Gibraltar.

The planting of an agent as well as a short operation by a group of about ten men of the coastal rifle battalion of Regiment "Brandenburg" is possible against Iceland. Transfer would have to be ensured by the Navy. For the agent a submarine could be used but for the coastal rifle battalion only fishing smacks, as in this case they would be picked up again.

Concerning Gibraltar, possibilities of attack in the inner harbor and in the inner bay lie only in the sphere of Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence Division, from the land.

A third possibility outside the Bay of Algeciras can be carried out by the Navy with the aid of Spanish fishing vessels.

4. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Regarding the report from the commander of submarine U "564", Group West reports that the delay until the receipt of the order by destroyer Z "24" to carry out the operation alone was mainly caused by the long time taken up by the radio messages and also by the necessary investigations as to whether destroyer Z "37", lying in Bordeaux, or the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla, lying in La Pallice, could be brought up in time to avoid an independent passage of the destroyer by day. The time required for this, however, had no decisive influence on the assistance for submarine U "564", as destroyer Z "24" continued her passage with Z "32" during the time in question and duly reached the point of rendezvous in

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

BF 7566 agreed with Commander, Submarines, West for 2100. The meeting with submarine U "185" took place here at 2045. The point where submarine U "564" went down in BF 7549 would not have been reached by 1730 even without the breakdown of Z "32's" engine. Chief, Naval Staff orders that the question of destroyers proceeding alone be settled.

b. The Naval Liaison Officer attached to Army General Staff transmitted the view of the General Staff on enemy plans on the eastern front, that the Russians are attempting to accelerate a decision under pressure of the situation. Therefore Army General Staff is expecting an enemy summer offensive.

5. Chief, Naval Staff explained the question as to when submarine warfare in the North Atlantic can be recommenced. Decisive successes can only be achieved in this sea area. The new-moon period at the beginning of July is out of question as the nights are still too short and our own defense measures will not have progressed far enough. A longer period of darkness can be expected already at the beginning of August, so that this objection will be eliminated. At this time the submarines will be equipped with quadruple guns but not yet with the Zaunkoenig torpedo, which can only be expected in large quantities in October. Against the intention to allow submarine warfare to lapse until then in order not to have any failure when it is resumed, there is the unfavorable effect of such a long passivity on our troops, especially also in view of the fighting which will certainly take place on land and in the air during the waiting period. Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports that 60 Zaunkoenig torpedoes will be ready for testing in July. Should this anti-destroyer torpedo then prove successful it would have to be considered whether we should wait until October in order really to achieve a decisive success. However, if the tests should not come up to expectations so that this weapon will not be available even in October, it would have to be considered whether the battle against convoys in the North Atlantic should really be resumed in August. Naval Staff urges that offensive mine warfare be intensified in the meantime. Chief, Naval Staff will discuss this point with the Fuehrer.

Chief, Naval Staff left for France until 24 June for inspection of naval artillery battalions and coastal batteries.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

1. Increased enemy activity in the Aegean Sea, the pending transfer of supplies for Greece from the Adriatic through the Dardanelles and increased enemy attacks on shipping in the Aegean Sea, which are definitely expected, make it necessary to strengthen our minesweeper and convoy forces in the Aegean Sea soon. This is only possible through the allocation of a motor minesweeper flotilla from the Mediterranean. Of the three motor minesweeper flotillas in this area the 11th is out of question owing to its late operational readiness and the 6th owing to the great necessity of a dockyard period for the vessels which are more or less in need of overhaul.

Therefore Naval Staff decides that the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is to be transferred at once. Group South, German Naval Command, Italy and Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea have received instructions accordingly. The transfer will be arranged by German Naval Command, Italy in agreement with Commanding Admiral, Aegean. Quartermaster Division is asked to make the necessary arrangements resulting from this transfer. Attempts will be made to transfer the first six boats on 30 June to the Aegean Sea and the rest according to readiness. Copy of relevant order 17522/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

2. The Italian Admiralty Staff approached Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy at the beginning of June with the request that the Todt Organization construct sheltered workshops and submarine pens for the Italian Navy. The same suggestion was made by Italian dockyards direct to members of the Todt Organization. As against Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section, Operations Division takes the view that basically there is an interest in reinforcing the defensive strength of Italy. However, according to the views of Quartermaster General, our own shelter projects are still so far behind that for the present it is impossible to meet the Italian request.

3. The Naval Liaison Officer attached to High Command, Army, Army General Staff has submitted a graphic representation of losses in the traffic to Africa, drawn up by High Command, Army, in which, in addition to the supplies carried from 1 June 42 to 1 May 43, the total losses since the start of the German attack in North Africa are set out. Copy of this very informative representation as per 1/Sk1 17774/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV. It is seen from this that the losses in the transfer of men and materiel were comparatively small. Of altogether

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

300,457 soldiers only a total of 2,000, of 1,656 tanks only 184 and of 3,624 guns only 562 were lost. Losses in fuel, ammunition and other Armed Forces materiel are actually higher in percentages but also within moderate limits.

Situation 21 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

The following report from London became known on 17 June via Geneva:

"The complete disappearance of the Union Castle Line steamer GLOUCESTER CASTLE and of two further British ships which were lost in the Atlantic with all on board at the beginning of last year is still one of the greatest mysteries of the war, writes the Daily Mail (15 June). These ships were "written off" long ago and the next-of-kin informed of the presumable death of the members of the crew. Unexpected news has now been received from Japan by the International Red Cross in London that about 30 men from the GLOUCESTER CASTLE and the crews of the other two ships are prisoners in Japan. It cannot be imagined in London how they came to Japan. It can only be thought that the ships were sunk by a German blockade-runner and that a large part of the crew was rescued. The GLOUCESTER CASTLE of over 8,000 tons was before the outbreak of war on the route Captown - London."

The GLOUCESTER CASTLE was seized on 17 June 42 by Ship "28" in the South Atlantic and sunk.

Two Dutch submarines proceeded from South Africa to Australia at the beginning of June. An American convoy with air force personnel and materiel will put out on 25 June from Captown for Australia.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" reports in a short message at 1958 her first success after resumption of cruiser warfare. The vessels HUGH SILVERDOWN (7,715 BRT) and the FERNCASTLE (9,940 BRT) were seized

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

without breaking radio silence and sunk on 15 June in grid square KV 14 and on 17 June in KV 46. As decoding of the short message will require some more time, confirmation from Naval Staff could not yet be sent today.

Ship "28" was informed by Radiogram 2315 about the Geneva report from London (see Enemy Situation). By Radiogram 1632 all vessels in foreign waters were informed of enemy shipping movements and submarine warnings which were intercepted for 26° S. 155° E. and $22^{\circ} 23'$ S. 177° E. as well as 30° S. 159° E.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty six planes were detected on reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located

at 1149	in CG 2110,
at 1339	in BF 1810,
at 1408	in BF 7520,
at 1820	in BF 1850,
at 2230	in BF 1766,
at 2345	in BF 7180.

Twenty merchantmen of up to 1,000 BRT were detected by air reconnaissance north of the Isle of Wight at 2115.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept south of Lorient. The entrance and roads of La Pallice were closed to shipping owing to suspicion of ground mines. Casualties were caused on minesweeper M "444" in a low-level attack by an enemy plane at 0100 south of Brest. Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

Group West reports on 17 June that the new situation resulting from the absolute air supremacy of the enemy in the Channel area, which will not change in the near future, forces a fundamental change in mine tactics in this area. The Group intends, in mining operations by our PT boats and torpedo boats, to abandon the previous fixed form of barrage and to lay barrage sections with time settings in those areas which lie in observed or presumed enemy directions of attack. The gaps in the barrages allow Commander, PT Boats the possibility of movement. After the time setting has expired, barrage sections will be laid at other points in order to make it difficult for the enemy to assess the situation and enable Commander, PT Boats to change his incoming routes. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West has been instructed to investigate how far the old flank barrages are still effective. The Group requests information on whether the situation as regards production of mines allows for these new tactics.

Naval Staff welcomes the change to an active barrage system with time setting for the Channel area and informs the Group that after allocation of 1,000 EMC mines, monthly supplies of up to 500 EMC mines with time setting, 250 EMF mines with time setting and 200 UMB mines can be expected, starting at the end of August. A time setting of 200 days is being developed. Supplies can be expected in late fall. As this only weighs one kg. it can also be used in UMB mines.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan. One ELM/J mine each was swept north of Schiermonnikoog, Terschelling, Ameland and Langeoog. Eight British fighters carried out a low-level attack on one of our convoys at 1037 west of Texel. All the boats were slightly damaged and suffered casualties. Three of the attacking planes were shot down.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

The planes employed on reconnaissance "Nussbaum" made no special observations in the target area. Six bomb craters were detected in the ice in bay AG 7258. Complete reconnaissance of the sea area of Spitsbergen - Jan Mayen could not be carried out owing to fog.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity with small forces was observed on 20 June in the areas of Petsamo and Vardoe - Banak as well as near Kristiansand.

The destroyer LODY put into Trondheim at 0730. The mine carrier OTTER had to enter Stavanger owing to engine damage. The mine-layer SKAGERRAK entered Harstad at 2100.

Thirty two ships were escorted north and 20 south. Group North/Fleet informed the 5th Air Force that the reconnaissance of Beluschya Bay carried out by only one Ju 88 is insufficient to establish the position of a convoy. (See Telegram 1544.)

Naval Command, Norway announced a new declared area for naval forces in Malangen Fjord Groetoeydjupet. (See Telegram 2030.)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Further lively traffic consisting of tugs with barges was observed between Kronstadt, Leningrad and Oranienbaum.

Our air reconnaissance detected: in Lavansaari 1 MOSKWA class, 1 repair ship, 1 auxiliary vessel, 2 tugs, 2 barges, 35 PT boats and motor boats; in Batareinaya Bay 6 guardboats; in Grafskaya Bay 9 guardboats; east of Lavansaari 1 minesweeper, 2 tugs, 1 MOSKWA class and 14 guardboats at anchor. About 18 guardboats were observed in position around Lavansaari at 2100.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy transmitted at 1630 on 20 June the desire of the Fuehrer to be informed of Russian traffic in Kronstadt Bay and the area of Lavansaari by the morning of 21 June. The summary, which was requested from Baltic Operations Staff, arrived at 0600 and was passed on to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff at 0615. Copy of telegram 1/Skl 17700/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume III.

Baltic Operations Staff assesses the situation as follows:

1. Significant reinforcement of troops on Lavansaari not definitely established.
2. Slight reinforcement may be caused by fears of our own operational intentions on Lavansaari and Seiskari in view of the reinforcement of the island garrison of Tyters.
3. If our presumption regarding the arrival of 4,000 to 5,000 further men is correct, there is the possibility of an attack on the Korgolovo Peninsula and Kolgambia, with a simultaneous attack on our positions on Kronstadt Bay from the Oranienbaum pocket and from Leningrad. But as landing craft were not observed up to now, an attempt at landing on a large scale on the mainland or the island of Tyters seems at present rather unlikely.

2. Own Situation:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. A mine detonation in a fishing net was observed southeast of Aarhus. The ADMIRAL SCHEER started out from Swinemuende escorted by mine-exploding vessel "132". The sail training ship DEUTSCHLAND left Memel at 1600 for Riga in tow. Other escort and transport traffic in the area of the Baltic Sea was completed without special incident.

Minesweeping in Riga Bay was completed without any mines being swept. One mine was swept in the Irben Straits. Submarine and net patrol was carried out by 34 vessels according to plan.

There was gunfire on both sides in the Voronka section.

A strong scouting operation by us surprised the enemy in his main defense line and inflicted heavy casualties on him.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

The British Admiralty and Air Ministry have issued a joint report concerning the successful convoy battle in the North Atlantic in May, which lasted for five days and in which combined forces, escort vessels and planes of the Navy and of Coastal Command participated. During the engagements lasting five days two of our submarines were destroyed, according to this report, three more probably destroyed and others possibly damaged. 97% of the ships which made up the convoys reached harbor safely and without losses. The aircraft carrier BITTER played an important part in this success. Apart from the air forces of this vessel and of Coastal Command, the destroyers BROADWAY, PATHFINDER, HESPERUS, as well as the frigates or corvettes LAGAN and DRUMHELLER participated in these successes. For copy of the report published by Reuter, see foreign press report of 21 June and official German news agency report No. 171 of 20 June in War Diary, Part C, Volume IV.

2. Own Situation:

The fact that the W0 convoy expected on 17 June in the area south of the Azores was missed by submarine group "Trutz" is another proof of the importance of sufficient air reconnaissance in the war against merchant shipping. The important large transport convoy entered the Mediterranean on 21 June without having been attacked. The loss of the two BV 222's is particularly serious in view of the necessity of reconnaissance in the central Atlantic.

An outward bound supply submarine which was intended for refuelling of the submarines on their way to the Arabian Sea was damaged by an enemy plane in BF 81 and has to start on return passage, being only able to dive to a limited extent.

Group West, Naval Staff, Submarine Division, Quartermaster Division, Submarine Section, Chief, Naval Communications Division and the Naval Attaché were informed that the departure of a Japanese submarine for a second passage to Europe (operation Flieder) was postponed until the end of June so that the submarine is not expected to arrive in western France until the end of August.

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Aerial Warfare.1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 79 planes were out on operation in the west area and 4 in the Mediterranean. Single enemy fighter formations and heavy fighters entered the west area during the day and carried out machine-gun attacks. Fifty propaganda balloons and ten balloons carrying phosphorus incendiary charges were shot down in the morning in the area Oldenburg - Bremen. During the night of 21 June the 3rd Air Force made nuisance attacks with twelve fighter-bombers on Folkestone, with six fighter-bombers on London and ten bombers on Southampton. Altogether four hundred and fifty enemy planes flew into Germany and German-occupied territory. Attacks were concentrated on Crefeld, where heavy destruction was caused. For particulars see Daily Situation.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

In the attack against ships in Bizerta during the night of 20 June by 42 Ju 88's, bomb hits were observed on a cruiser, a destroyer and six steamers. Italian torpedo planes report from the same night the sinking of a steamer of 10,000 BRT off Bone and a hit each on a merchantman of 10,000 and 7,000 BRT. During the day the enemy attacked Naples, Cagliari and San Giovanni. Five of the attacking planes were shot down. The damage caused is serious.

3. Eastern Front:

The branch canal of Astrakhan was mined by four planes during the night of 20 June. Two freighters were damaged by bomb hits in this area.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The following entered the Mediterranean from the Atlantic: from 0325 to 0410 14 fast vessels, painted grey,

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

including 4 large vessels, 6 medium-sized ones and 4, probably destroyers; at 0600 6 transports, 6 freighters and 12 escort vessels. One of these convoys was escorted by an aircraft carrier according to an Italian report. At 1410 to 1450 18 transports, 2 tankers and 3 freighters followed, all loaded, escorted by 2 American cruisers type PHILADELPHIA and WICHITA, 1 coast patrol cruiser and 8 destroyers. According to a report from Tangiers, all vessels had troops on board and carried large boats as deck cargo.

Further, 22 merchantmen, 9 small vessels and 3 escorts left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean at 2330. The following left for the Atlantic: at 2000 15 freighters, 3 tankers with 3 escorts, all ships in ballast; at 2030 4 freighters and 3 tankers. The 2 battleships, 1 minelayer and 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier were detected in Gibraltar at noon. Other ships in harbor could not be ascertained owing to poor visibility. The large convoy on the Tunisian coast was last detected at 1940 on 20 June south of Tunis off Kelibia, consisting of 17 freighters, possibly making for Sousse. Besides the part which put into Bizerta, further vessels must therefore have put into other ports, probably Tunis.

Air reconnaissance detected: 4 merchantmen off Bizerta at 0700; 3 PT boats on westerly course 15 miles northeast of Bizerta; at 0625 1 destroyer, 1 steamer and 3 small auxiliary vessels also on westerly course 20 miles southwest of Pantelleria.

Submarines were reported in the early morning hours northwest of Leghorn, east of Bari and northwest of Ostia. In addition an Italian submarine reported what were apparently two enemy submarines west of the Straits of Bonifacio.

No reports have been received from the eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area. One of our submarines (U "73") sank a steamer of 3,000 BRT from an eastbound convoy 35 miles west of Algiers. The same submarine on 19 June fired two single torpedoes which missed on a westbound convoy. One submarine each put out from Messina and Toulon for the operational area in the western Mediterranean. Minesweeping and submarine chaser activities were carried out without special incident.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

According to a report from Group West, motor minesweepers R "195" and R "210" of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla left Marseilles for Maddalena. The carrying out of minelaying off the south coast of France will be substantially delayed owing to elimination of one naval artillery lighter through engine damage.

According to information from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff dated 11 June, the Army and Air Force plan to designate approximately the 18th degree of longitude E. as the boundary of operational areas in the eastern and central Mediterranean.

Upon inquiry Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy was informed by Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division of the boundary between the areas of German Naval Command, Italy and Group South. Naval Staff, Operations Division on its part drew the attention of Quartermaster Division to the fact that an adaptation of the area boundaries of naval offices in the Mediterranean to the boundaries planned by the Army and Air Force is not possible as they have to remain in agreement with the boundaries established between the German and Italian command.

Through the development in the situation in the last weeks the west coast of Greece, including the outlying islands from the southern point of the Peloponnesos to the former Greek/Albanian frontier, has actually become the "sphere of interest" of Group South. In the interest of a central representation of German naval affairs as regards the Italian Admiralty in certain questions of coastal defense, Naval Staff for this reason transferred responsibility for this area to Group South and instructed German Naval Command, Italy to represent the proposals of Group South in so far as "German" proposals to the Italian Admiralty. Through this no change of area boundaries was made and was also not intended.

On the other hand the eastern Adriatic coastal area north of the former Greek/Albanian frontier is not to be regarded as the "sphere of interest" of Group South. Whether this area will become such depends on whether and how far the military command of this area will be transferred to German hands, i.e. to Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast and what German-Italian political agreements will be arrived at regarding this. Presumably German influence on the Italian Naval Offices will then have to be ensured by appointing German Chiefs of Staff or German Liaison Officers.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Vessels in tow were attacked by enemy torpedo planes at 1400 20 miles east of Maddalena and one tug was sunk. Other traffic supplying the islands was carried out without losses.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

According to air reconnaissance there was an enemy submarine at 0800 east-southeast of Lemnos on easterly course. Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan in the Aegean Sea. The four naval landing craft transferred from the Black Sea arrived in Mudros.

Group South requests the setting up of a new naval artillery battalion on the Peloponnesos to man five 15 cm batteries of four guns each as well as fourteen further guns near Cape Grepito, Calamata, Githion, Kephallonia, Corfu and Zante. (See Telegram 1130).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence there was a submarine 20 miles west of Sevastopol shortly after midnight.

Own Situation:

An unsuccessful enemy submarine attack was made at 1030 on 20 June against a Feodosiya - Taman transport. Two naval landing craft attacked the submarine unsuccessfully with depth charges. An enemy submarine was also depth-charged in the evening of 21 June while under way from Feodosiya to Yalta, without any success being observed. The enemy shelled the harbor of Temriuk and the mouth of the Kuban from the sea from 2230 to 2400 on 20 June and the outer harbor of Temriuk with a simultaneous attack from the air. Several vessels were slightly damaged. One naval landing craft which left for defense had a short engagement with several enemy vessels without observing results.

The transfer of naval artillery lighter MAL "4" to Temriuk for reinforcement of coastal defense was already ordered for 21 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Evaluation of photographs of Yeisk showed the considerable effect of the shelling carried out by naval artillery lighters.

Submarine U "20" will leave Constanta on 22 June for her first operational run.

Three more anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut west of Sevastopol. As from 22 June two planes will be transferred to Galatz for sweeping mines in the mouth of the Danube. A coast patrol boat sank on account of heavy seas and without casualties when sweeping channels from Mariupol to Berdiansk. Transport and ferry traffic was hindered by weather conditions.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The Military Attaché in Tokio reports on 15 June:

1. For the first time for a long while again disturbing description of Japanese situation on New Guinea:

Eastern New Guinea. Five enemy divisions now south of Lae Bay. Also on the north coast - up to now in Japanese hands - between Lae Bay and Humboldt Bay the enemy is pushing on from the south with ground forces which are still weak; airfields are also being advanced. The shortest distance here is 100 km.

2. The General Staff still hopes to hold the north coast of New Guinea. The loss of this would force it to abandon the Bismarck Archipelago which is unassailable from the Solomon Islands. Surrender of the Bismarck Archipelago would entail a heavy burden for operations by the Japanese Navy in the west Pacific.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter the Moscow press has given a warning, on the second anniversary of the war between Germany and Russia, against under-estimating Germany's strength.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section reports on the German/Italian agreement which has now been reached concerning extension of the operational area in the Mediterranean. For particulars see War Diary, Part C, Volume VIII.

II. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff discussed the question of the critical situation as regards ammunition for coastal batteries on the Arctic coast and in the Gulf of Finland and requested from Quartermaster Division vigorous measures against this unbearable state of affairs. Captured ammunition is running short and there is only very little or none being produced. Supplies out of our own production could only be effected at the expense of ammunition needed for our own guns. Exchange of captured guns is also a difficult problem in view of the strain on all armament facilities.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff ordered that demands for guns and ammunition be made to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, the area of Petsamo and the Gulf of Finland being given prior consideration.

III. Deputy Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports on the passage of the King of England aboard the AURORA to Malta and the apparently projected meeting of the King with the Turkish President.

IV. Operations Division, Mine Warfare Section reports on plans of Group North/Fleet for laying barrages with TMB and TMC mines in coastal waters of the Murman Sea against north Siberian traffic off the bases of the Belushya Bay and Kostin Strait or of Yugor Strait and the mouth of the Petchora, as well as on the coastal route. The operations are not planned merely for minelaying but the submarines, type VII C, which will carry them out will take along 6 torpedoes so that they are able to use any opportunities for firing these while outward or homeward bound.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In this plan the western entrance to the Matochkin Strait is not taken into account; it should also be mined with ground mines depending on water depth. On the other hand the Kara Strait is only to be mined with moored mines owing to its depth. However, there are no submarines available as minelayers for this in the Arctic area. Naval Staff plans to send three more submarines into Northern Waters in July in another connection and for other purposes. The possibility of a further increase is being investigated and will be decided by Chief, Naval Staff.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff approves the plan and issues instructions to investigate also the possibilities of mining the western outlet of the Matochkin Strait. Data concerning traffic and bases in the sea area in question are being worked on by Naval Staff. Changes and additions to the plan resulting from this will if necessary be passed on to the Group.

Situation 22 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

From Lourenco Marques it is reported that 11 American ships passed Durban in the middle of the month; of these 2 were bound for India and the others for harbors of the Persian Gulf with materiel for the railway which is to run to the Caspian Sea. A convoy of 18 American ships, which will bring planes to Syria, is expected off Durban on 10 July. Probably the transports with troops lying in Durban will join this convoy. About 100 American naval officers are expected in Port **Elizabeth**, probably destined for the Persian Gulf or for India.

Bombay reported on 16 June to Capetown and London that no objections are made to a British steamer putting into Mormugao (Portuguese). This is, however, not desired if the ship has mail on board for India. This fact should be kept secret in any case.

London requested Ankara on 10 June to have information concerned directly or indirectly with the activity of enemy forces reported

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

first to the local commissioner for shipping at the Consulate, and not to inform the Ministry in London direct.

The Dutch steamer TABIAN which is said to have sailed from Port Sudan on 17 June carried, in addition to mixed cargo, 220 tons of military goods, 500 tons of cargo and 468,000 tons of empty cartridges, all for U.S.A.

Forty two tankers were loaded during May in Abadan. Breakdowns and delays in loading were mainly caused by necessary repairs. The harbor was closed for six days by a tanker running aground.

2. Own Situation:

Acknowledgement of the report on her successes was sent to Ship "28" by Radiogram 1053.

As both ships were seized without breaking radio silence, Naval Staff leaves it to Ship "28" to carry out further operations in the Indian Ocean and to transfer into the Pacific Ocean. Relevant instructions were given by Radiogram 1735. In recognition of this pleasing success at the beginning of the new cruising expedition Chief, Naval Staff awarded the Iron Cross 1st class to three members of the crew. (See Telegram 1806.)

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty four planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay up to 12° W. One British vessel was detected towards noon about 270 miles northwest of Cape Villano and another 145 miles southwest of Cape Finisterre.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Three ELM/J mines were swept by mine-exploding vessels off La Pallice and off the Gironde. The entrance and roads of La Pallice are open again.

Two boats of the 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla left La Pallice at 0200 to meet submarine U "462", which is returning damaged.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Mine-exploding vessel escort was dismissed at 0625 at point 442. Point "Schloss" was reached at 30 knots at 0900. At 1000 submarine U "462" reported position for 0800 as BF 8229 and was met at 1446 to be escorted to Bordeaux. She is expected to arrive at 0600 on 23 June.

A floating dock of 10,000 BRT will be transferred from Brest to Nantes during the night of 22 June. The tow will be escorted by modern minesweepers.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

One ELM/J mine was swept in front of a convoy north of Terschelling. Patrol duties of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North were carried out according to plan. The enemy carried out lively air attacks. The first attack was made at 0819 against the Wilton Shipyard at Rotterdam. Mine-exploding vessel "179" was hit forward, and patrol boat VP "1304" was damaged and beached. In the shipyard the ship construction shed, the boiler workshop, the coppersmith's workshop, the crane railway and the construction dock were damaged.

In an attack on Antwerp the building of General Motors was destroyed at 0900. One barge and three cranes were damaged.

Harbor defense vessels fired on four-engined enemy bombers near Harlingen from 0906 to 0945. One Boeing was shot down near Flushing at 1030 by naval anti-aircraft guns.

At 1610 there was another flight by 100 to 150 enemy planes against Rotterdam but no bombs were dropped.

Our convoy No. 445, consisting of 5 steamers with 5 patrol boats, 1 minesweeper and 1 mine-exploding vessel, was attacked off Scheveningen by 45 bombers and torpedo planes at 1708. Apart from

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

aerial torpedoes in large numbers the attack was carried out with bombs and machine-guns. Patrol boats "2022" and "1108" were hit by bombs, and patrol boat "811" was hit by a dud. The boats which were hit suffered heavy damage but stayed afloat. Twelve aerial torpedoes were out-manuevred by the steamers and escort vessels. Defense was ably supported by balloons, flame throwers and line-carrying rockets. Seven of the attacking planes were shot down. After this defensive success, which deserves recognition, the convoy put into the Hook of Holland.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Our air reconnaissance sighted north of Iceland 7 fishing steamers, 3 vessels of an unidentified type and 1 steamer of 2,000 BRT proceeding on course 300° at high speed.

Air reconnaissance detected lively reconnaissance activity over the North Sea in the morning and normal activity later. Twenty four planes were intercepted in radio communication.

Own Situation:

Our planes attacked a Norwegian ship of 106 BRT, which broke through from Vardoe and tried to escape into Russian territorial waters, from 0903 to 1241 and sank her by two direct bomb hits five miles north-northwest of Cape Majakka.

It was reported that one enemy plane flew into the area of Hammerfest in the evening of 20 June and three planes each into the areas of Alta, Banak, Vardoe and Petsamo on 21 June, as well as one plane into the area of Kirkenes - Vardoe.

Escort service covered 11 ships proceeding north and 22 proceeding south.

Submarine U "302" took on board weather party "Nussbaum" at 1700.

Commander, Minelayers reported minelaying operation "Erzengel" carried out according to plan.

In reply to the reference of Group North/Fleet (see War Diary 21 June), the 5th Air Force stated that reconnaissance of the sea area between Kolguev, Petchora and Belushya was so hindered by weather conditions that operations even by several planes would

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

have been of no consequence. The 5th Air Force will carry out reconnaissance in accordance with prevailing weather conditions. It is of the opinion that the convoy suspected in the Belushya Bay is really the usual seasonal fishing traffic. (See Telegram 1107).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Shipping movements and air activity in the Kronstadt Bay and in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland were the same as on previous days. In addition one destroyer was sighted in the Kronstadt Bay.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

The naval correspondent of the "News Chronicle" claims that more than 50 German submarines were destroyed in the last two months. Therefore the total number lost since the war started has exceeded 300. According to Associated Press, only 14 ships in all were sunk in May 1943 compared with 102 in May 1942. Apparently the figures only refer to the western Atlantic, where altogether 668 Allied and neutral ships are said to have been sunk up to now according to the same press report, of which only 89 occurred in the year 1943 according to announcements so far.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "402" reports warding-off five enemy planes and probably shooting down one. Damage was only slight. One man was killed and four wounded. No further reports of importance have been received from the Atlantic.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 304 planes were out on operations in the west area, mainly fighters, and four in the Mediterranean.

Seven Fortresses were shot down in the attack on Antwerp.

For the first time fighters penetrated in large numbers during the morning into the interior of Reich territory. The attacks were concentrated on the Huels Buna plant near Recklinghausen which was put out of action for several months. Therefore German Buna production will be reduced by about one third for a long time. For further damage see Daily Situation. Thirty of the attacking planes were shot down by fighters and anti-aircraft guns.

Flights and attacks were carried out in the afternoon in Holland and Northern France, where nine more planes were shot down. Of these eight were shot down by ship's or naval anti-aircraft guns. (See Situation North Sea). Three of our own fighters were lost with their crews and 21 were damaged or destroyed, some of the pilots escaping by parachute.

During the night the Royal Air Force launched a heavy attack with strong forces concentrating on Oberhausen and Muelheim. Huels was also attacked again. For particulars see Daily Situation. Of 38 planes shot down during this night 14 were brought down by anti-aircraft guns and 24 by night fighters.

Twelve of our bombers were sent out on a nuisance raid against London.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the day the enemy did not carry out any attacks. Small enemy forces were out on operation against Olbia and Comiso during the night of 22 June. The radio station at Olbia was destroyed. For results of our reconnaissance see Enemy Situation Mediterranean.

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty eight enemy planes were shot down on the Army fronts on 21 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The following arrived in Gibraltar from the Mediterranean at 1930 on 21 June: 9 freighters and 2 tankers in ballast, also 1 destroyer or small cruiser in tow escorted by 2 destroyers. Three freighters escorted by 2 French gunboats arrived in Gibraltar from the Atlantic at 1300 on 22 June; at 1800 2 loaded troop transports, 1 tanker and 3 freighters as well as a British auxiliary aircraft carrier and 7 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the Atlantic. At 1300 a cruiser of the FIJI class and at 1945 a cruiser of the AURORA class put into harbor from the Mediterranean.

The task force consisting of 2 battleships left for the Mediterranean with 8 destroyers at 1430.

According to an intelligence report, a convoy of 6 tankers, 6 steamers and 2 destroyers passed Alboran on easterly course at 1330, presumably a part of the convoy which had left Gibraltar on the previous evening at 2300. Air reconnaissance reported: at 0927 a formation of 8 ships with 2 escorts proceeding at high speed on easterly course 40 miles west-northwest of Cape Tenes; at 0735 a vessel, presumably a cruiser, 6 destroyers and 6 escorts, also on easterly course, 30 miles west-northwest of Cape Serat; at 1337 4 large merchantmen, 11 small vessels and 2 minesweepers on easterly course north of Algiers. Radio intelligence intercepted at 2140 the report of an unknown steamer being torpedoed; no position was given but it was probably in the Algiers area.

Through the arrival of the two large convoys, probably from England and America, the tonnage in Gibraltar has increased to 444,000 BRT and that in the western Mediterranean to 1,947,000 BRT. The convoys were apparently according to schedule but the U.S. convoy was unusually large.

Photographic reconnaissance of Tunis showed the presence of 6 steamers and in La Goulette 4 steamers and 1 LCT. The following were recognized in Algiers at 1326: 3 cruisers, the MAIDSTONE, 6 destroyers, several minesweepers and gunboats, 10 LST's, 6 LCT's, 28 LCA's, a large number of small landing boats, 54 freighters, 3 LSI's, 1 special service ship, 3 tankers and others.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Two LST's, 2 LSI's, 8 LCT's and others were lying off the harbor.

Six vessels, presumably warships, making for the island, were six miles south of Malta at 1830 on 21 June. The following were sighted: a large ship southwest of Comino; 2 destroyers making for the harbor off La Valetta; 3 destroyers on westerly course 45 miles northwest of Malta.

Submarines were detected at 0030 on 21 June off the northwest corner of Sardinia, at 1700 southeast of Toulon, at 2005 southwest of Nice, in the afternoon of 22 June northeast of Syracuse and at 2130 southwest of Genoa.

In the eastern Mediterranean there was a convoy off Alexandria at 1710, probably being assembled. One cruiser, 5 destroyers, 4 patrol boats and 8 freighters were sighted.

At 1745 there were 7 steamers and an uncertain number of unidentified vessels 30 miles east of Derna. Their course was not determined.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Three Italian submarines are reported in the operational area. One of our submarines heard three detonations early on 21 June 15 miles north-northeast of Cape Tres Forcas after firing a spread of four torpedoes on a westbound formation which included the cruiser FROBISHER.

Submarine chase and escort duties were carried out without incident. Enemy planes attacked Reggio and San Giovanni at noon on 21 June. Another heavy raid was also made during the day on Naples. Little damage was caused in an attack on Salerno. The raid on Naples caused very heavy casualties and material losses. The destruction of the air park at Canello is to be expected.

The transfer of the "Hermann Goering" division to Sicily was continued. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South believes that this will be concluded at the beginning of July. The first parts of two further divisions arrived in the area of Spezia.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

German Naval Command, Italy reports that only four boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla are ready for operation and that these are under way to carry out urgent minelaying operations on the Sicilian coast. As enemy air attacks require a stronger convoy escort, the Command proposes that the first four boats be left in Italy, the next four be sent to the Aegean Sea and the remaining four distributed according to the situation. On this Naval Staff decided that at all events the current minelaying operation is to be carried out. German Naval Command should report which barrages are involved and what delay will arise in transfer to the Aegean Sea.

In accordance with a request of German Naval Command, Italy, Quartermaster Division has ordered that all Siebel ferries available at present are to be transferred. The small number in the Black Sea must remain there. Forty new ferries will also be transferred. In addition, the naval supply lighters under construction which, however, will not be ready before October, are intended for German Naval Command, Italy.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

According to a report from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the Italian steamer OLBIA (3,514 BRT) was sunk by an enemy submarine near Cape Spartivento. Otherwise traffic to the islands was carried out according to plan and without losses.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

An enemy submarine was sighted by our air reconnaissance at 0700 southeast of Athos. Traffic of small ships in the area of Naval Shore Command, Salonika was closed and submarine chase was started with planes.

The Italian motorship MARCELLO (1,412 BRT) sank on 19 June near Cape Ducato as a result of striking a mine, probably on our own barrage.

The minelayers MOROSINI and BARLETTA put into Piraeus again after carrying out special operations in the sea area off Corfu.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Traffic of small ships off the north coast of Crete was closed as drifting mines were observed near Rethymnon. Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan in the Aegean Sea.

Special Items.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast intends also to confer at the Fuehrer Headquarters about the use of coastal guns in the Greek area, according to a report from Group South, and has requested a final plan from Group South. The plan set out by Group South exceeds the material facilities of the Navy. Therefore it seems undesirable to provide the intended final plan now as data for the conference of Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast at the Fuehrer Headquarters. Particulars are contained in order 1/Skl 1776/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume X.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

An enemy submarine was sighted near Cape Tarchanskutski at 0806 on 21 June. Submarine chase was ordered. According to radio intelligence there was an enemy submarine 90 miles south of Kerch and one 65 miles southwest of Sevastopol on 22 June.

Own Situation:

A coast patrol boat had a short engagement south of Taganrog at 0100 on 20 June with two enemy vessels which gave the current German recognition signal without request. The coast near Taganrog was bombed by enemy planes during the night of 20 June. No casualties were caused but buildings were damaged.

Submarine U "20" put out from Constanta for operations against the enemy. Owing to weather conditions no actions by operational forces are planned for the night of 22 June.

Coastal defense of Temriuk Bay was carried out by 1 naval landing craft, 4 harbor defense vessels and 10 combined operations craft. No special incidents occurred in minesweeping, convoy and ferry operations.

Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch was hindered by weather conditions. For the same reason a Kerch - Temriuk transport had to be postponed for 24 hours.

CONFIDENTIAL

22 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

No important information in connection with questions of naval warfare has been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Group South informed Chief of Staff, Naval Staff by telephone that the two Italian Admirals in the Aegean area have not yet been informed about the agreements arrived at between Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division and the Italian Admiralty concerning settlement of command in the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time Group South communicated with German Naval Command, Italy. Naval Staff, Operations Division will approach Admiral Bertoldi.

II. Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division reports that commissioning of the LEIPZIG is intended in order to use the cruiser, according to the request of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, for the training of navigation personnel. At the wish of Bureau of Naval Administration it is also under consideration to assign the fourth sail training ship under construction at Blohm and Voss to the Navy for the same purpose. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff has no objections.

III. Report of Deputy Chief, Naval Intelligence Division on: compromise made between de Gaulle and Giraud under Anglo-American pressure; the denial of the U.S. Secretary of the Navy concerning the checking of Russian ships in the Vladivostok traffic, which is estimated at 1 million BRT annually; report of the Military Attaché in Tokio concerning the situation in East Asia. According to this Japan is no longer in a position to launch an offensive against India and must limit herself to defense in the southwest Pacific area. She feels sufficiently strong to counteract the enemy attack expected after the end of the monsoons against the Burma position. In order to recapture the initiative a precautionary attack on the Russian coastal province is being contemplated. The Army General Staff is in favor of such a step but the Admiralty Staff is cautious; a political decision is still to be made.

IV. Chief, Operations Division states that information to Minister Speer about the types of ships in a Baltic port, ordered

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

by Commander in Chief, Navy, is the affair of Quartermaster Division. Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division confirms this.

Special Items.

I. The priority list of the personnel requirements of the Navy for increasing the submarine program to 40 submarines for the period from June 1943 to September 1944, ordered by Commander in Chief, Navy, was drawn up by the Bureau of Naval Administration and will be presented to the Fuehrer and to Chief, Armed Forces High Command by Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters according to instructions. The total personnel requirements for this period amount to

437,822 men

for the submarine arm, personnel required on board, for coastal guns, aerial defense, the radio and radar program as well as base and supply organization, enlargement of schools and training centers. With an available number of 102,984 there is a deficit of

334,838 men.

Allocation of the following is requested

335,000 men,
15,000 officer cadets and
2,100 officers.

II. The Fleet Construction Program for 1943 will necessitate the extension of our shipyard industry. In addition to an increase in output by enlarging individual plants, it will be necessary to open up new plants or to re-open plants which are not being fully utilized. One of the first strategic aims of our enemies is obviously to smash German production centers. A beginning has been made already by planned bombing attacks on German industrial and traffic centers. Up to now these attacks were concentrated in the west of the Reich. The efficiency of the planes sent out by the enemy allows him to extend these

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

heavy attacks under favorable weather conditions to the whole area of the Reich. However, it is to be assumed that the enemy will continue to concentrate on the west as the losses to the formations sent out will increase considerably with the extension of the flights. Heavy attacks on Reich territory must also be expected again from the east as soon as the nights grow longer. However, they will presumably not be on the same scale.

Therefore it is necessary, when extending shipyards and other plants, that attempts be made to transfer them to the greatest possible extent to the interior of the Reich or to the east.

A further dispersal can be achieved by the transfer of plants for constructing ships' parts or small special service vessels from the coast into the interior, for instance along the large rivers.

Disadvantages which might result from the freezing-up of the rivers during winter must be accepted here to a certain extent.

Chief, Naval (Ship) Construction Division and Quartermaster General were requested on 18 June to consider the above facts in connection with the pending plans.

III. Commander in Chief, Navy (Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division) issued the following orders dated 18 June concerning the furnace oil quota to all consumers of the Navy:

The decreasing export capacity of Rumania has made it necessary for the German Navy for more than two years now to make continuous extra allowances of furnace oil to the Italian Navy, which has resulted in a permanent decline of German naval stocks from month to month.

On account of this situation and the necessity of not allowing the total supplies of the Navy - distributed over all bases - to sink below a minimum level, in order to meet sudden demands, High Command, Navy duly introduced rationing in order to balance demand and supply.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The principle had to be accepted that only that quantity of furnace oil can be issued which is obtained by the Navy from current home production and from imports, the extra allowances to the Italian Navy thereby being taken into consideration.

Through continuous negotiations with the competent Reich offices, the Armed Forces High Command and the industry producing oil from coal, we were successful in increasing the furnace oil allotment for the Navy to such an extent that the monthly quota of about 50,000 tons could be raised to about 75,000 tons.

High Command, Navy is still making every effort to increase the furnace oil allotment within the chemical-technical mineral oil plan and it can be expected that the Navy will have at its disposal by the end of 1944, accumulating monthly, about 120,000 tons of furnace oil for each month. The quota however can only be raised at any time within the limits of the monthly increase received.

As repeatedly ordered, no independent exceeding of the quota is allowed, as that would result in disorganization of the supply service of the Navy in the present shortage of mineral oils.

Rationing is of use only if it is carried out to the last and all consumers take the shortage into consideration, by carefully planning their intentions and exercising rigid economy in fuel, and adhere strictly to the monthly allotment.

Under no conditions can I sanction that some commands considerably exceed the allotted monthly quota on their own responsibility, not recognizing the situation and lacking the necessary responsibility, and have afterwards reported a larger consumption.

I forbid methods of this kind and will in the future call to account these responsible.

No additional demands are to be made unless they are based on reasons of special importance for winning the war.

IV. In addition reference is made to the suggestion of the Task Force, dated 11 June to Group North/Fleet, for information

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

to Naval Staff, which described as a worthwhile operation for the Task Force the destruction of Russian ice-breakers, escorted by destroyers, which it is learned are transferring into the Kara Sea. On account of the uncertain data, Group North/Fleet questioned the success of such an operation and is rightly of the opinion that the objective is unsuitable for the whole Task Force; moreover a possible success would be in no proportion to the oil consumption. Naval Staff has taken steps to see that all reports received concerning the enemy situation on the Kola coast be carefully collected, so that as clear a picture as possible is always to be had for any eventuality as an operation by the Task Force off the Kola coast might still be considered if the expected opportunity for operations in connection with PQ convoys should not arise before fall this year.

Telegram to this effect as per 1/Skl 1693 and 1707/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II a.

Situation 23 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports were received from our ships.

Naval Staff informed all vessels in foreign waters about the new names of German ships sold to Spain by Radiogram 0942, and about enemy shipping movements by Radiograms 1936 and 2056.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance flown by twelve planes was detected over the Bay of Biscay up to 12° W. According to air reconnaissance

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

there were four destroyers about 320 miles west-northwest of Cape Finisterre at 0820, 2,000 m. apart from each other, lying stopped on bearing north-south. A merchantman was set on fire by our air forces at 1935 25 miles west of St. Vincent. There were six fairly large merchantmen and twelve escorts on northwesterly course at 2030 southwest of Portland.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Six ELM/J mines were swept while clearing channels off the Atlantic coast. During this operation mine-exploding vessels "137" and "8" were heavily damaged.

Submarine U "462" passed Royan on her way in at 0915, escorted by torpedo boats T "5" and "19". The torpedo boats afterwards entered La Pallice. Trials and maneuvers were carried out by destroyer Z "24" on 22 June and Z "37" on 23 June. Up to now the floating dock convoy has proceeded according to plan. Torpedo boat T "22", the GREIF and FALKE left Brest at 2200 to escort a submarine from point "Kern" to Lorient.

According to instructions, Group West reports plan to transfer torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" starting from the evening of 25 June from Brest, passing the Channel straits during the new moon period between 28 and 30 June under Commander, 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla; also passage of torpedo boats T "24" and "25" together to the west under Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, starting from 1 July, as torpedo boat T "25" will not be ready for transfer before 30 June.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

to plan. Eight ELM/J mines were swept off the East Frisian Islands. Five vessels of the 21st Minesweeper Flotilla are being transferred from Aarhus via the Skagerrak to the Weser with Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North on board one of them.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity was observed in the morning in the direction of the northern part of the North Sea. Thirty two planes were intercepted in radio traffic. No operations of the Iceland squadrons were detected.

Four Russian submarines were off the Norwegian Arctic Coast.

Own Situation:

The crew of the Norwegian cutter FOULA, reported sunk on 22 June, was to sail with cargo for the Air Force to Vadsoe. The crew consisted of three Norwegians and one member of the Air Force. Before it was sunk by our planes a bearing was obtained on the cutter for the last time by Battery "Kiberg" of 130°, distance 28 km. Therefore an attempt to desert is quite certain.

One of our westbound convoys was attacked by enemy fighter-bombers at 0230 on 23 June near Vardoe, by torpedo planes and fighters at 0700 northwest of Vardoe and by an enemy submarine at 0832 north of Vardoe. All the attacks were unsuccessful. The attacking planes were warded-off by our fighter escort, one of which was lost. The chaser group sent in to attack the submarine was also attacked by enemy planes; three men were killed and ten wounded. The vessels were not damaged. Two Bristols attacked three steamers heading north at 1149 near Askevold; one was shot down by ship's anti-aircraft guns. The steamer PASSAJES was slightly damaged and several men were wounded as a result of machine-gunfire. The tanker TAIFUN proceeding north ran aground in the Skatestroemen from 0548 to 1425 on 22 June and then continued her passage. Twenty nine ships were escorted north and 32 ships and one submarine south.

Naval Command, Norway reported on 19 June that a floating hawser barrage 210 m. long was laid from available material

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

in Bakarvaager Bay as a protection for the telegraph cable to Bergen.

Group North/Fleet informed Naval Staff of instructions to Commander, Minelayers about operations by minelayers. For particulars see Telegram 1547.

Group North/Fleet also informed Naval Staff of instructions to Admiral, Northern Waters, with copy to Commanding Admiral, Task Force and Commander, Submarines, Norway, regarding the necessity of passing information on quickly to Naval Staff and requests Naval Staff not to make an evaluation of the reports from the area of Northern Waters arriving at Naval Staff at the same time as at Group North/Fleet, until the views of Group North/Fleet have been received. (See Telegram 1734.)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Only slight traffic was observed during the day in Kronstedt Bay. Sixteen tows consisting of barges, as well as lively air activity were observed during the night of 23 June. Air reconnaissance detected a convoy in two sections each of five freighters and in all five escort vessels northwest of Schepel at 2300 on 22 June, which was again detected about 20 km east of Seiskaari at 0130 on 23 June. Altogether 34 guardboats and motor minesweepers were lying in Grafskaya and Batareinaya Bays.

2. Own Situation:

Patrol and escort duties were carried out according to plan in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic. In the Little Belt a mine exploded in a fishing net in water 14 m. deep. The Danish Navy detected one ELM/J mine off Snogebaek in water 4 m. deep.

A mine exploded ten miles north of Swinemuende at 0917 in the direct vicinity of target ship HESSEN, which was able to

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

put in under her own power and reported the remote control room out of action as well as three compartments leaking.

The Swedish steamer IWAN reported heavy vibrations near Gdynia in the evening of 22 June; mine detonation is possible. The position was searched without result.

In the eastern area five convoys were carried through.

Patrol and mine defense service was carried out according to plan in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. One of our minesweeper units was bombed by one enemy plane near Tyters outside the range of the island anti-aircraft guns. Our own Stukas successfully attacked shipping targets in the harbor of Lavansaari on 22 June.

The command post of Naval Artillery Battalion 531 was fired on with explosive shells in the Voronka sector on 21 June.

V. Merchant Shipping.

The valuable Norwegian motorship HUGH SILVERDOWN was sunk by Ship "28" in a position which allows no doubt that the vessel had taken the route around Australia. According to data from Naval Intelligence Division, the ship sailed at the beginning of May from New York for the Persian Gulf with 8,521 tons of cargo on board for Basra and Abadan. Therefore, contrary to previous assumption, it is to be expected that ships also from the east coast of the U.S.A. take the circuitous route which is 5,000 miles longer, across the Pacific Ocean to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.

Naval Staff, Operations Division will inform the Japanese Navy.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

A submarine unsuccessfully chased a fast ship, type C 3, 500 miles northeast of Porto Rico on 8 June.

In the southern part of the North Atlantic submarine U "572" detected a heavily escorted convoy in DR 4133 on course 110°, and scored two hits. It is possible that this was the USG convoy expected by Group "Trutz" which passed far to the south and behind schedule. Operations on this convoy by the Group offered no prospects.

Submarine U "650" was again seriously damaged in the Bay of Biscay in an enemy bombing attack at 80 m. depth but was still able to dive. At least three bombing attacks were made on submarines in BE 90 and BF 70. One has reported damage.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force, 243 planes were out on operations in the west area and 32 in the Mediterranean. During the day six planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns of the Air Force and two by naval anti-aircraft guns. An enemy merchantman was set on fire at 1935 25 miles west of St. Vincent. Particulars have not yet been received. There was lively enemy air activity in northern France in the late afternoon. For particulars see Daily Situation. Only three enemy flights into the area of the Reich are reported during the night of 23 June.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Porzallo was attacked during the day and planes flew over Comiso. Fifty enemy planes started an attack on La Spezia at 2335. The submarine base was hit by two bombs and the barrack installations by seven. Three oil tanks were set on fire. Serious damage was caused in the town and arsenal. Two of the attacking planes were shot down by anti-aircraft guns. Shortly before midnight eight enemy planes flew into the Greek area to supply partisans.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Our Air Force only carried out reconnaissance and air defense during the night of 22 June and on 23 June.

3. Eastern Front:

Four of our planes were lost on the army front and 15 enemy planes were shot down. On Lake Ladoga our planes sank a merchantman of 500 BRT and a barge near Ossinowez.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the afternoon the following arrived in Gibraltar from the Atlantic: the battleships NELSON and RODNEY, 2 vessels of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class, the FORMIDABLE and 1 further vessel of the ILLUSTRIOUS type with 12 destroyers. The concentration now of 6 battleships and at least 2, probably 3 aircraft carriers, appears to indicate that the commencement of important operations in the Mediterranean is imminent. The attacks by aerial torpedo planes on our sea transports, which have been resumed during the last few days, the heavy air raids on harbors and supply lines and the intensified activity by submarines using torpedoes and mines also support this. The large convoy which entered the Mediterranean on 21 June was detected at noon on 22 June south of Alboran and at 1015 on 23 June 43 miles north-northeast of Oran on easterly course. There was another convoy consisting of 8 vessels at 0730 between Bizerta and Tunis on an undetermined course.

According to a photograph, the 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE class, as well as 3 light cruisers, 25 destroyers and others were lying in Mers el Kebir at 1000.

Taking the total landing craft detected in the Mediterranean:

of the 112 LST's:	36 % were detected in the area of Oran-Algiers,
	11 % in the area of Jijelli - Bone and
	33 % in the area of Tunisia,

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

of the 167 LCI's: in the above mentioned areas 23%,
51% and 25% respectively,
of the 720 LCT's: 45% could not be detected, while
11%, 15% and 22% respectively
were divided over the above mentioned
areas.

Tonnage in the western Mediterranean including Gibraltar reached, with over 2,000,000 BRT - including at least 34 troop transports - the highest level so far.

In the eastern Mediterranean a westbound convoy of 5 steamers near Marsa Matruh and a convoy of 6 steamers, 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers as well as about 20 other vessels were reported.

The detection of 8 LST's, 13 LCT's and 35 LCS's in Alexandria, combined with previous insufficient reconnaissance of the Levant coast, leads to the conclusion that there are more landing vessels in those areas than were known to be up to now. In a short survey of the situation Naval Intelligence Division therefore comes to the conclusion that operations with a restricted objective in this area, perhaps against the Dodecanese, are not impossible, but draws attention especially to the fact that it is difficult to estimate the situation in the area of Tripoli and the Levant owing to insufficient aerial reconnaissance. Copy of survey of the situation by Naval Intelligence Division as per l/Skl 17922/43 Gkdos., which was transmitted to Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Air Force, Operations Staff, Army General Staff, Foreign Armies West and to the three Group Commands of the Navy, is in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Submarine U "593" scored three hits on two tankers of an eastbound convoy in CH 9546 on 22 June. They probably sank.

Serious damage to buildings was caused in the German submarine base in the enemy air attack on La Spezia in the evening of 23 June. No submarines were damaged but one tank-barge burned out.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Submarine chaser "2212" was sunk by an aerial torpedo hit between Naples and Palermo at 1417 while escorting a convoy. One of the attacking planes was shot down.

German Naval Command, Italy reports:

1. The mine defense of Sicily is far behind schedule owing to the lack of available minelayers, after the loss of the three destroyers originally provided for this. In order to alleviate the threatening situation it is essential that barrage projects be carried out during this new-moon period.

2. Against landings the following are to be laid: 40.5 miles of 15 barrage sections as quickly as possible and 27 miles of 10 barrage sections as supplementary barrages. The mines are available.

3. Minelaying along the south coast of Sicily is only possible with small maneuverable vessels which are to some extent able to go into action, owing to the danger from the air and appearance of motor gunboats. The Italians have at their disposal for German mines only three slow motor barges which are little suited for this purpose but which will also be used. Minelaying with PT boats is uneconomical and was stopped due to the readiness of motor minesweepers. The use of motor minesweepers has been under discussion for weeks with the Italian Navy. In this area also the enemy situation has become perceptibly more acute during the last few days. Group West informed Naval Staff for information of the following request to German Naval Command, Italy:

"Of the two obsolete vessels of small capacity which are the only ones available for carrying out the barrage program along the south coast of France, one is out of action for some time. Therefore it is impossible to carry out the operations in the time required. According to report there is a break in operations at present there for minelayers POMMERN and BRANDENBURG. It is urgently requested that one or both ships be made available for the time being."

The request cannot be met as the laying of the Sardinian barrages is now commencing.

Group West reports that minelaying operation H 4 F has been carried out.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

According to the situation on 18 June 12 naval landing craft, 38 tank-barges and 8 tank-lighters left Toulon for Italy. For re-fitting there were 12 naval landing craft, 10 motor minesweepers, 38 tank-barges and 8 freight-barges in dockyards in the Mediterranean and 28 freight-barges and 102 "Seeloewe" barges in dockyards outside the Mediterranean. There were 15 naval landing craft, 2 motor minesweepers, 57 tank-barges, 151 freight-barges and 24 "Seeloewe" barges being transferred into the Mediterranean.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

On 22 June an enemy submarine sank an Italian auxiliary sailing vessel off Syracuse and unsuccessfully attacked a motor ship escorted by a torpedo boat. The steamer POMO (1,425 BRT) from convoy Syracuse - Messina was sunk, presumably by the same submarine, off Augusta on 23 June, and the steamer MARCONI was torpedoed. Two Italian tankers sank in an enemy air attack on Messina during the night of 19 June. Other supply traffic was carried out according to plan and without losses.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

One auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk near Scarpanto by an enemy plane on 21 June. Two drifting mines were shot up by a flying boat near Grambusa.

The torpedo boat SAN MARTINO, which should have replaced the HERMES, cannot be transferred into the Aegean until the middle of July at earliest owing to turbine damage during trial run.

Owing to sabotage, teletype and telephone communications from Salonika to Piraeus were interrupted for seven hours. Four railway bridges were blown up by insurgents in the area of Lamia. Railway communication between Salonika and Athens is interrupted by this.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported at 1009 a towed convoy

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

and one motor minesweeper on northwesterly course 12 miles south-southeast of Tuapse. Submarine U "18" reported 2 steamers, 1 motor minesweeper and 1 patrol boat in the same area at 1512. One submarine was detected 10 miles south-east of Cape Tchauda at 2230 on 22 June.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "18" torpedoed a freighter of 1,000 BRT at 1538 south-southeast of Tuapse. Sinking was not observed as submarine U "18" was being depth-charged. A Taman - Feodosiya convoy was attacked by an enemy submarine with two torpedoes which missed at 2230 southeast of Cape Tchauda. No effect was observed from depth charges which were dropped. The harbor of Taganrog was shelled from the direction of Primorka from 0425 to 0455 on 22 June. The enemy stopped shelling when our own guns returned fire.

The Navy suffered no casualties in an enemy air attack on Yalta at 1045 on 23 June.

Seven boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla were out on operation from Ivanbaba against enemy supplies southeast of Cape Idokopas and against the landing point at Myschakov in the evening of 23 June. The patrol carried out by two boats of the 11th PT Boat Flotilla south of Anapa had to be broken off on account of engine damage.

Otherwise no special incidents.

Special Items:

1. In reply to the proposal of Group South (see War Diary 17 June), Naval Staff decided:

An electro-magnetic testing gear is not available for searching for magnetic adhesive mines. Theoretically this is possible by searching at points of the inner ship's walls but is of practically no value. The best protection is a thorough watch over the ships on the land and sea side and, in case sabotage is suspected, scraping the ship's walls with rods or underslinging lines. Adhesive mines are mostly attached closely (1 - 2 m.) below the water line.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. In view of the mine situation on the Danube, Bug and Dnieper, Group South has urgently requested quick transfer of four sets of towed cylinder remote sweeping gear to the shipyard at Nicolayev and provision of further sets.

Naval Staff has arranged that Group South be assigned out of turn two sets of towed cylinder remote sweeping gear. The distribution ratio up to now between Groups North, West and South is changed in favor of Group South to 2 : 2 : 1 (so far 5 : 4 : 1). Group South will be informed accordingly, with the remark that with a total monthly supply of six sets on the average only gradual assignment is possible.

IX. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

A Russian commission arrived in Ottawa to make purchases on the basis of the Canadian one billion Dollar credit. This may mean that the Pacific transport route to Vladivostok will assume new importance.

The Russians are again discussing the question of the second front. Particulars are contained in daily survey of Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Press Branch, No. 112. The denial from Knox regarding Japanese infringement of Russian Pacific traffic is also dealt with here; a Japanese statement has now been received on this to the same effect.

According to Exchange Telegraph, the Minister of Production, Lyttleton, declared that never before had any country in the world mobilized for a war to such an extent as Great Britain is doing today. She has now reached the point in production where the main tasks lie in the development of new weapons and assurance of maximum quantities through greater skill. The British armament production in the first quarter of the year 1943 surpassed that of the first quarter of the previous year by 40%. Of every three workers in the armament industry, including ship and engine construction, one is a woman. Of the total production in several main branches of equipment for ground troops one third to one half now goes to weapons which were not yet in production a year ago.

According to an American report from New Delhi, a new road from India to China is said to be already completed and in operation.

Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff.

I. Quartermaster General reports that Group West has requested an additional 2,000 tons of furnace oil to be made available for June for operations by destroyers and torpedo boats in assisting submarines, torpedo firing by destroyers and re-transfer of torpedo boats. This request must be rejected for the present owing to the oil situation as a whole.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. The Naval Attaché reports that the Spanish Naval Attaché has inspected the first two PT boats which it is planned to hand over to Spain. The boats were on trial with Spanish crews in the Baltic; German crews will take them through the Channel to Bordeaux and there the Spanish crews will again take over.

Otherwise no special reports and decisions.

Special Items.

I. The considerable reinforcement of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean appears to indicate that landing operations in the area of the Mediterranean, as well as diversionary operations on other coasts, are imminent.

Naval Staff called this to the attention of all Groups, German Naval Command, Italy and Naval Command, Norway.

Naval Staff was sent a copy for information of instructions to this effect from Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to Commanding Generals, Armed Forces, Southeast, South, West, Norway and Denmark and the 20th Mountain Army Command.

II. The request from Naval Staff to the Japanese Navy to investigate whether Japanese submarines can be used for transportation between Europe and Japan was transmitted to the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin in letter 1/Sk1 I op. 1771/43 Gkdos. Chfs. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Volume XV.

III. In reply to the questions asked by Naval Staff, Operations Division on 23 June concerning ignorance of agreements on organization of command in the eastern Mediterranean (see War Diary 23 June, Conference on the Situation with Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, No. I), Vice Admiral Bertoldi transmits the following information from the Italian Admiralty:

"The agreements with Admiral Schubert depended on the consent of the Italian High Command as they concerned some authorities who do not receive their orders from the Italian Navy; the German Deputy was informed of this verbally similarly as in the case of the previous agreement with Admiral Schuster, which at the time did not receive the expected consent from Naval Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The Italian High Command has not yet approved the agreements and intends to ask for alterations in order to bring them into line with the new establishment of the Italian Army Group, East. Therefore the agreements have not yet reached the working stage.

For the time being Marimorea and Mariaegeo have received orders to consider these as temporarily in force."

IV. On the basis of the reports requested from Group West, Naval Command, Norway, North Sea and Baltic Stations concerning torpedo batteries within the expansion of coastal defense in the manner of the West Wall (see War Diary 18 Mar. Special Items No. III), Naval Staff, Operations Division takes the following views as opposed to Quartermaster Division:

1. According to present experiences the value of torpedo batteries has in general diminished, especially along shallow coasts and steep coasts with a shallow foreground. They constitute a valuable supplement to coastal defense against landing operations in which special entrances and channels have to be penetrated, as for instance in Norway.

2. For reasons of materiel, torpedo batteries can only be made available in a limited number.

3. Details:

a. Norway: Construction of the torpedo batteries planned so far is still so far behind that provision of further batteries is at present not to be considered.

b. Baltic Station: The batteries proposed for the Sund and the Belts are also, according to the views of Baltic Station, not urgent as an enemy operation, if any, would be directed against the Jutland peninsula and not against the inner Baltic Sea.

c. North Sea Station: The mounting of the three harbor barrage batteries requested for the area of Admiral, Netherlands demands considerable expenditure of materiel and work for defense constructions and is therefore to be postponed until the recoil torpedo is ready for operational use.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

d. Group West: The same as stated under c. applies to the five to six new batteries requested.

e. Group South: Proposals not yet received.

4. A further provision of torpedo batteries is out of the question for the near future or can only be effected to a very small extent.

V. A summary of enemy intelligence gained by radio decoding and radio intelligence during the period from 14 to 20 June is contained in Radio Monitoring Report No. 25/43 of Chief, Radio Monitoring Reports, Communications Intelligence Branch, Naval Communications Division.

The report includes organization and distribution of tasks of U.S. naval forces as of 10 June 1943. (Pages 12 to 15.)

Situation 24 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships.

Naval Staff informed ship "28" by Radiogram 1042 about course instructions for "Aquila" and our own submarines which were obviously issued by the Japanese in view of the appearance of Japanese submarines north of the route given.

Reference points for the BRAKE were transmitted by Telegrams 0100 and 0930 to the Naval Attaché in Tokio.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty nine planes were detected in the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel was located in BE 9620. Two reports from British ships concerning the sighting of our shadowing plane were intercepted from the area southwest of Cape Villano. Our air reconnaissance reported in the morning six steamers off Falmouth on southwesterly course and eight merchantmen off Lizard Head on westerly course, as well as at 2220 a convoy about 260 miles west of Oporto, no further details of this being given.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept by a mine-exploding vessel off the Gironde. In view of the fact that two mine-exploding vessels were put out of action on one day (see War Diary 23 June), Group West again draws attention to the catastrophic situation as regards these vessels. From 20 mine-exploding vessels for the Brest-Gironde area only one large and three small ones are still ready for operation at present. The proposals which Group West makes in detail to alleviate this emergency, which endangers submarine warfare, are to be examined by Quartermaster Division and High Command, Navy, Naval (Ship) Construction Division. They are urgently supported by Naval Staff, Operations Division (see Telegram 0015).

Torpedo boat T "22", the FALKE and the GREIF anchored in Brest roads at 2207. Particulars concerning the escorting of the submarine are not reported. According to plan torpedo boats T "2" and T "5" sailed from La Pallice at 2000 for Brest.

Group West transmitted a brief report from Commander, 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla about the return escort of submarine U "462" on 22/23 June. For copy see Telegram 1240. Concluding, the Flotilla Commander reports:

"In a strong Atlantic swell and proceeding at high speed, the type of boat again proved to be very satisfactory. The boat

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

ran against an Atlantic swell for seven hours at a cruising speed of 30 knots without any breaker on the forecastle and practically without losing speed. The cruising speed of 30 knots was definitely endured by the engine. This made it possible to meet the damaged submarine quickly."

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla transferred from Cherbourg to Peterport. Four boats of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla were sent out in the area north of Cherbourg against enemy naval targets which were detected during the night of 22 June but which made off to the north. No contact was made with the enemy.

Escort and patrol duties were carried out without special incidents.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted at 2100 near Great Yarmouth 25 to 30 ships, among which were heavy transports, on southwesterly course.

Own Situation:

One ELM/J mine each was swept north of Juist and Borkum. Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan.

An enemy air attack was made on the shipyard at Flushing at 0835, where quite serious damage and casualties were caused. The 32nd Minesweeper Flotilla was not damaged, but lost one man.

Operations Staff, North informed Naval Staff of instructions to Admiral, Denmark concerning investigation through intelligence as to whether Danish fishermen meet English vessels or vessels coming from England in the western declared area. (See Telegram 1723.)

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence detected two Russian submarines off the Arctic coast, 15 planes over the North Sea and two of the Iceland squadrons.

According to air reconnaissance there were: 2 merchantmen on 23 June 120 miles southwest of the Faroes, 1 steamer (5,000 BRT) with guardboat 290 miles west of the Shetland Islands on course 270°, 1 merchantman and 3 coastal vessels north of Murmansk on northeasterly course. Three coastal vessels were lying in Kildin harbor. For the first time, on 22 June photographs were taken of Naryan harbor in the mouth of the Petchora. The following were identified: 1 floating dock about 95 m. long, 1 armed coastal steamer, 9 large and 34 small tug barges, 5 tugs and 2 paddle steamers. Three freighters were lying in Yokonga on 23 June and 2 freighters and 1 beached freighter in Motka Bay. Four coastal vessels were detected on the south coast of Kildin.

Nothing was sighted during incomplete reconnaissance on 24 June of the Barents Sea up to the west coast of Novaya Zemlya and in Northern Waters over Bear Island up to Spitsbergen.

Own Situation:

Two FW 190's bombed two enemy motor minesweepers on 23 June east of Zyp Navolok. Damage through close hits is probable. Three enemy planes flew in southwest of Stavanger at noon. Minelaying operation "Wildschwein" was postponed for 24 hours owing to weather conditions.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Two naval vessels, presumably a destroyer and a large warship, were sighted in the morning near Kronstadt on easterly course. The westbound convoy consisting of ten ships reported on 23 June near Schepel was not confirmed by our own or by Finnish

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

air reconnaissance. Otherwise enemy shipping in the Gulf of Finland is unchanged.

2. Own Situation:

A mine was swept near Middelgrund. The steamer JUERGENSBY (about 1,500 BRT) capsized in the southern part of the Belt owing to shifting of her coal cargo.

Three Russian mines type "M 31" were swept in the Irben Strait. The tug PILOT capsized in Tallinn.

Otherwise no special incidents are reported from the whole Baltic Sea area in connection with escort, patrol and minesweeping duties carried out according to plan.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Radio intelligence intercepted reports of several air attacks on our submarines in the Iceland and Biscay areas. Reports to this effect have not yet been received from the submarines in question.

Submarine U "271" shot down a Martin flying boat in AK 7253.

Nothing further to report.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Of the 3rd Air Force 462 planes were out on operation in the west area, of which 379 were fighters, and 5 planes in the Mediterranean. Four enemy planes were shot down. Enemy air attacks during the day were directed against Flushing, where damage was caused to the shipyard, the air bases of Coxyde, Omer, Abbeville, Theville and Brest-North. See Daily Situation for particulars and damage.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Twenty five of our bombers attacked Hull during the night of 23 June; good results were observed. Four of our fighter-bombers carried out a nuisance attack on Folkestone during the night of 24 June.

During this night the enemy attacked the Ruhr area with strong forces, concentrating on Wuppertal and Elberfeld. See Daily Situation for particulars of this heavy attack. Of approximately 400 planes, six were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and 14 by night fighters.

Mines were probably dropped by 15 enemy planes in the sea area of La Rochelle - St. Nazaire.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our own bomber formations were not out on operations during the night of 23 June and on 24 June. Reconnaissance and aerial defense was continued day and night. The submarine base at La Spezia was attacked during the night of 23 June; during the day Golfo Aranci, the airfields of Venetiorita and Chilivani on Sardinia, as well as the airfield of Sedhes near Salonika were raided. Damage was particularly serious in the last mentioned attack as our defense was lacking. For particulars see Daily Situation.

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty four planes of the 5th Air Force were out on operation. The 4th Air Force reports mining of the mouth of the Volga during the night of 23 June and attacks on factories at Saratov with good effect.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

In the evening of 23 June 4 destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean and at 0045 on 24 June 14 merchantmen, including 1 tanker, 4 small vessels and 1 cruiser or minelayer in tow left for the Atlantic.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Intelligence is trying to establish if the vessel in tow might be the FROBISHER. At 1230 a convoy consisting of landing transports, 1 tanker, 1 freighter with 2 destroyers and 4 escort vessels arrived in Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

the NELSON, BOLNEY, WARSPITE, QUEEN ELIZABETH, FORMIDABLE, one ship of the ILLUSTRIOUS class, one of the AURORA class and others were detected in harbor at 1300.

The four LSI's which arrived at noon put out again for the Mediterranean at 2030.

No sighting reports were received from the western Mediterranean.

Five large merchantmen with 15 escorts were sighted in the central Mediterranean in the morning south of Kelibia on southeasterly course, and 1 destroyer and several landing boats west of Linosa heading for Malta. There was a west-bound convoy of 5 freighters with 2 escort boats 8 miles north of Tobruk at 1735. One submarine each was reported at 2030 on 23 June west of Cape Passero and southwest of Savona.

Radio intelligence detected 12 planes of the Gibraltar squadrons and 48 planes of the North African squadrons on reconnaissance. Reports of our own convoys being sighted were intercepted from the north Tyrrhenian Sea.

Intelligence transmits with reserve a conversation between a reliable chief agent in Athens and a former active Greek colonel who is assumed to have connections with the insurgents, according to which a landing is expected in the area of Prevesa Arta and Albania.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Five boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla were transferred from Augusta to Palermo. Four boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla arrived in Trapani. Seven boats of the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla were out on escort duties. Torpedo boat TA (no number given. Tr.N.) was transferred from Toulon to Marseilles.

The Italian steamer CORJESU (3,994 BRT) was sunk in an enemy air attack during the night of 23 June on the harbor of Golfo Aranci.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group West reports minelaying operation H 4 D carried out.

German Naval Command, Italy refuses to place the BRANDENBURG and POMMERN at the disposal of Group West, as its own mine-laying tasks are urgent, having only been interrupted for a short time (see Telegram 1000.)

Naval Staff issues instructions to German Naval Command, Italy to transfer into the Aegean Sea continuously and without delay groups (of two boats. Tr.N.) of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla which are ready to proceed.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Small shipping is again permitted in the northern part of the Aegean Sea.

The enemy air raid on the air base of Sedhes near Salonika was dealt with under Aerial Warfare.

The four naval landing craft brought up from the Black Sea were transferred to Salonika after mounting of anti-aircraft guns in Mudros.

Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea was carried out according to plan.

Special Items.

1. German Naval Command, Italy reports that the Italian Admiralty has informed Mariaegeo and Marimorea officially of the arrangement made between Naval Staff, Operations Division and the Italian Naval Attaché in Berlin. This refers to the agreements arrived at in Rome between Chief, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Quartermaster Division and the Italian Admiralty concerning organization of command in the eastern Mediterranean. German Naval Command, Italy

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

reports further that Naval Staff was informed on 19 June in connection with the setting up of an Army Group East, that the Italian High Command proposes alterations to the arrangement made. Mariaegeo and Marimorea were instructed at present to adhere to it; it is, however, not yet in force.

2. The report from Group South that the Italian motor vessel MARCELLO sank on 19 June south of Leukas, probably in our own mine barrage, has caused Naval Staff to instruct Group South and German Naval Command, Italy:

a. to confirm that prompt information to Group South, to German Naval Command, Italy and from the latter to the Italian Admiralty is always guaranteed regarding barrage plans and the laying of them in the area of western Greece,

b. to report regarding the MARCELLO if the competent authorities and the ship herself were informed and

c. to present barrage plans and reports always also to Naval Staff, Operations Division. Up to now the exact position in the area of western Greece is only known of barrages P1, P3 and G 47.

In this connection German Naval Command, Italy reports that, according to information from the Italian Admiralty, new sailing instructions were promptly transmitted to all Italian authorities and that faulty navigation is assumed in the case of the MARCELLO.

Group South reports also that prompt instructions to all offices concerned are guaranteed. Marimorea will in future announce declared areas and sailing instructions according to the German method. Owing to participation of several German and Italian offices, barrage plans are subject to alterations up to the moment they are carried out. The barrage reports made by Italian minelayers were only received by Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea with considerable delays. Group South reports further the position of barrage sections PA between Cape Passas and Missolonghi, CS 1 - 5 between Corfu and Paxos, AP 1 - 4 south of Antipaxos.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance eleven PT boats were

CONFIDENTIAL

24 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

proceeding to the southeast at high speed west of Novorossisk during the night of 24 June. There was a submerged submarine at 1537 on 24 June 65 miles southwest of Adler. Submarine U "18" reported at 0813 a southeast-bound convoy ten miles south-southeast of Adler, without stating its strength.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "24" started return passage to Constanta.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla had a short engagement during the night of 23 June south of Mychakov with two enemy submarine chasers which withdrew under the protection of the shore batteries. Another operation by the Flotilla with three boats started during the night of 24 June in the area south-east of Gelendzhik.

After an engine explosion a harbor defense boat burned out in Genitchesk.

The minesweeping group using towed coil gear swept three mines between Kerch and the fish salting factory.

The route Sevastopol - Yalta is re-opened to traffic. Two naval artillery lighters are under way from Constanta to Sevastopol. Naval artillery lighters "1 - 3" will be under repair until 2 July in Mariupol.

Otherwise no special incidents. The Group informed Naval Staff, Operations Division of the views on the request of Army General Staff concerning an increase of supply transports at the Kuban bridgehead to 3,550 tons daily. This is only possible if two tugs and 23 more lighters are assigned, which have been requested from the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. On account of too great danger from the enemy and the shortage of Rumanian escort forces, no extension of steamer traffic beyond Sevastopol to the east is possible. (See Telegram 1705.)

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

According to a diplomatic report, the pressure formerly applied by the U.S.A. on Ireland to concede bases to the British or at least to the U.S. Fleet has completely ceased. The relations between Ireland and Britain and America have improved considerably since the beginning of this year.

According to a report from the Naval Attaché in Madrid, several ammunition dumps exploded on 22 June in the naval harbor of Ferrol. The fires resulting from this caused considerable damage. A large part of the ammunition of the Spanish Navy was destroyed through this incident, which is probably due to sabotage.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. During the report on the situation in the Mediterranean by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff remarked that available information indicates that the main enemy thrust in the Mediterranean is to be expected against the Italian islands or in the eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, plans for invasion on the continent may not at present be critical. This view is also shared in Berlin diplomatic circles, as Chief of Staff, Naval Staff was able to determine personally.

II. Chief, Artillery Branch, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the refusal of Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to the request by Naval Staff to increase the assignment of 2 cm quadruple gun ammunition for submarines.

III. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament reports on the setting up of labor columns with a total strength of 100,000 men by Minister Speer for reconstruction in the Ruhr area, which must be supported by all contractors. The Navy has obtained permission for only 500 men in all to be withdrawn for this purpose from its own building projects. Constructions in the Baltic and North Seas are involved.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament reports further that, according to information from Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, the exemption from the special priority measure promised to Commander in Chief, Navy by the Fuehrer applies, according to the views of Chief, Armed Forces High Command, only to the 8,200 men, the exemption of whom was already promised by Minister Speer.

Commander in Chief, Navy insists that the Fuehrer meant the total number (10,000) and orders that this number be requested from Chief, Armed Forces High Command. Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters is to be informed accordingly.

Commander in Chief, Navy orders that Minister Speer should also participate in the discussion regarding the increase in the production of twin guns. Commander in Chief, Navy states that at present the most important task of Chief, Artillery Branch, Naval Ordnance Division is to equip submarines with anti-aircraft guns.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

IV. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. Group North/Fleet transmitted the views which the 5th Air Force has adopted in regard to the instructions issued by Admiral, Northern Waters as well as to the order for operations by naval forces in the northern area. The Air Force objects to the fact that Admiral, Northern Waters takes for granted as a basis for an operation by the heavy Task Force against convoys, that all forces at the disposal of the 5th Air Force are available exclusively for auxiliary purposes for operations by the Fleet. It should be considered that the forces available in the area of the 5th Air Force are not in the least sufficient to meet these conditions. The 5th Air Force draws attention firmly to the fact that these conditions cannot nearly be met even in favorable weather conditions. A complete reconnaissance can be expected in hardly any case. Operations by the available fighting forces for reconnaissance tasks are once again refused, as already done previously, in view of the binding instructions issued by Commander in Chief, Air Force. Transfer of further reconnaissance forces cannot be expected.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group North/Fleet requests that for the present no further measures be taken as attempts will be made by Group North/Fleet to arrive at a direct settlement with the 5th Air Force.

b. Naval Staff proposes that the suggestion of the Spanish Navy not to blow up the wreck of submarine U "167", lying near the Canary Islands, but instead to salvage the secret material still in the submarine by divers under German supervision be agreed to. Obviously this proposal is aimed at the possibility of repairing the submarine again for purposes of the Spanish Navy. Chief, Naval Staff ordered that for the present it be determined what valuable material is still in the hull.

V. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff reports on the visit of Admiral, Baltic Station to Denmark. The Commander of the Danish Armed Forces has requested instructions in case of an enemy landing in Jutland. Admiral, Baltic Station observed that the fortifications on the peninsula are far behind schedule and would not be at all sufficient against a landing with strong forces.

VI. The Naval Liaison Officer to Army General Staff reports on the views of Army General Staff regarding the situation on the eastern front. The unsettled situation as a whole has a very hampering effect on the operations planned on the eastern front. The strength of the enemy is estimated as comparatively great. He is concentrating in the south towards the industrial area on the Dnieper and in the area around Moscow, where he apparently expects the German thrust. However, an attack by the Russians is not expected until the second front has actually been established on the continent. With regard to our own plans, in the northern area a thrust along the Volkov sector to Schluesselburg may be considered. Trondheim is regarded as a critical landing area in Norway, where we would not be successful in throwing the enemy out again if he should succeed in gaining a footing with six to seven divisions. The Army formations are altogether quite fresh. The morale of the troops is good and is only impaired by the unfavorable news from home about the effects of the enemy air offensive.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Our own tank output of 400 per month at present is to be increased to 1,300 in the fall. The formations to reinforce the southern front have been withdrawn from the west area.

In reply to a question from Chief, Naval Staff the Naval Liaison Officer reported that no directive of the Fuehrer has been received to adopt a purely defensive attitude on the eastern front and it is not expected under the prevailing circumstances. With regard to the heavy tension in the situation in other sectors (war against merchant shipping, air defense, southern front), Chief, Naval Staff considers a decision of this kind by the Fuehrer to be obvious and he intends to express this view also to the Fuehrer. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff draws attention to the importance of taking the area of Oranienbaum - Schepel where use of a comparatively small number of forces promises considerable strategic effects which would favor the important question of maintaining a position in the eastern part of the Baltic, with all its strategic and political consequences.

Special Items.

I. The intended increase in numbers of our submarines on operations in the Indian Ocean will probably lead to more submarines putting into the supply base at Penang placed at our disposal by the Japanese Navy. In order to control traffic, Naval Staff considers it urgently necessary that a transmitter and receiver system, according to the procedure which has proved satisfactory in submarine warfare, be set up and operated in this area. It concerns the setting up of two German transmitters, already in Japan, locally at Penang and Tokio. The German radio traffic would function only in connection with submarine and blockade-runner warfare and would avoid anything that could disturb the course of Japanese radio traffic. Copy of a request to Vice Admiral Abe to approve carrying out of this project is to be found in 1/Skl I op. 1811/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XV.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. In connection with the question of an anti-mine escort for submarines in the area of western France. Underwater Obstacles Branch stated that the sweeping gear of mine-exploding vessels is no longer effective in the present situation as regards mines, but only the ships' hulls. At present anyway the mine is developed so far with regard to its firing methods that the expenditure of sweeping gear would have to be so complicated or large that use of actual mine-exploding vessels, as in World War I, would be cheaper and more effective. Underwater Obstacles Branch has proposed that for the time being vessels of suitable resistance be constructed which resemble as far as possible a submarine proceeding surfaced, as regards size, form and manner of drive. A draft of such a vessel will be presented by Naval (Ship) Construction Division. Naval Staff is of the opinion that attempts to continue development of practicable and effective sweeping gear should not be abandoned. The use of new construction facilities for vessels with the specific task of mine-exploding is not justified in the long run. This view is, of course, acknowledged by Underwater Obstacles Branch but cannot be taken into consideration at present.

Situation 25 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Naval Staff informed the Naval Attaché in Tokio of new point "K" by Radiogram 0325.

Items of political importance were transmitted to Ship "28" by Radiogram 1508. For copy see Telegram 1508. This radio

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

message deals with Italy and Finland. Transmission of the items is being continued.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity was normal in the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located at 1000 in BF 8110, at 1033 in CG 5776, at 1214 in BF 1658, at 1456 in BF 7150, at 1819 in BF 7410 and at 1857 in CF 6430.

Photographic reconnaissance of Falmouth revealed nothing unusual.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The transfer of the floating dock from Brest to Nantes was carried out without incident.

According to instructions from Naval Staff (see War Diary 11 June, Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff under I d), Group West reports experiences and intentions regarding the bringing out of submarines. Up to now submarines were only escorted occasionally when proceeding alone, but regularly when proceeding together, by minesweepers up to the outer points. The anti-aircraft defense by minesweepers appears sufficient for submarine groups on these routes. Operations by torpedo boats for this task are, therefore, only intended if the number of submarines putting out together is very large, as far as minesweepers available are not sufficient. Restrictions are necessary for reasons of fuel and so that torpedo boats may be available always for other tasks, especially for assisting submarines. The torpedo boat escort which was planned for the first time in the evening of 24 June for a group of six submarines was cancelled when the number of submarines was reduced to three. While in France, Chief, Naval Staff already stated his agreement to Admiral, West Station. (See Telegram 1140.)

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply to the report from Group West with regard to the escorting of submarine U "564" by destroyer Z "24" (See War Diary 21 June), the 1st Submarine Flotilla transmits a further report from the submarine commander saying that the commander and engineer officer of destroyer Z "24" have both stated that the destroyer had to wait about two hours after destroyer Z "32" was put out of action for the order to continue passage alone.

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" left Brest at 2030 for St. Malo. Otherwise no special incidents.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Four enemy formations of about 150 planes flew over the area of Wilhelmshaven and Bremen between 0812 and 0931. On account of clouds and smoke-screen the targets could not be found. The enemy planes patrolled over the fortress area up to the area of Bremen for a long time without carrying out attacks. A fifth formation was operating south of Heligoland, dropping bombs over the sea and off the East Frisian Islands. A number of planes were observed to have been shot down by anti-aircraft guns and fighters. Eighteen of the returning bombers dropped numerous bombs at 0856 on one of our convoys off the Ems. One bomber was shot down by a mine-exploding vessel. The convoy arrived undamaged in the Elbe. A westbound convoy of five steamers put into Borkum owing to weather conditions.

One ELM/J mine each was swept north of Terschelling, Texel, Ameland and Norderney.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Twelve planes over the North Sea but none of the Iceland squadrons were detected. Our air reconnaissance sighted

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

north of Iceland 5 merchantmen, 6 armed fishing vessels and several escorts and in the Denmark Strait 2 steamers and 7 fishing vessels as well as 2 patrol boats. A submerging submarine was sighted at 1250 200 miles west of Namsos.

Own Situation:

Russian batteries on the Ribachi Peninsula unsuccessfully shelled incoming and outgoing vessels in the Petsamo Fjord on 22, 23 and 24 June. Four enemy planes were observed on 23 June in the area of Vardoe - Nordkyn. Escort service covered on 24 June 34 northbound and 22 southbound ships.

Commander, Submarines, Norway transmits a report from submarine U "302" according to which the weather observation station "Nussbaum" is occupied by the enemy and one wounded member of the crew of the German station is in enemy hands. The submarine was shelled near Barentsburg and was not able to carry out complete reconnaissance of the Ice Fjord and Bellsund. The submarine has received orders to enter Hammerfest.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Shipping movements in Kronstadt Bay do not reveal any essential changes. Air activity near Tyters was slight.

2. Own Situation:

No special incidents are reported. Three troop transports, one tanker and the HESSEN were escorted in the Baltic Sea area.

Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Command, Baltic reported to Naval Staff, Operations Division after inspecting naval installations in the area of Admiral, Baltic States and drew attention among other things to the completely inadequate

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

anti-aircraft defense of the Estonian oil slate areas for which the Air Force is responsible. The Navy is especially interested in this as it will be the one to derive benefit from the acquired oil. Further, the enlargement of the plane reporting service in the Baltic countries is endangered as numerous Estonians evade their duties with the German Armed Forces by escaping.

V. Merchant Shipping.

With reference to the increasing air attacks by the Russians on merchantmen, the Finnish Naval Staff has requested that arming of Finnish merchantmen, which was refused up to now, be considered again and proposes that the ships each be equipped with a 2 cm anti-aircraft gun. The setting up of machine guns is rejected by the Finns as they believe them to be of no value. Some of the ships' crews are already trained on the 2 cm anti-aircraft gun. It would involve about 50 guns for the larger Finnish vessels. To this Naval Staff transmits its views to Quartermaster Division as follows:

A decrease in armament of merchantmen in the North Sea in favor of use in the Baltic Sea area is at present out of the question in view of the danger in the North Sea which is considered greater.

However, for political reasons it is desirable to make a gesture in favor of Finnish ships in the Baltic Sea, especially as it is understood from the report of the Naval Liaison Staff in Finland that single, even smaller German ships proceeding to Finland are armed. Therefore it is requested that for the present about six 2 cm guns (instead of the requested 50) be provided for this purpose and that they be withdrawn, if absolutely necessary, from the German ships in the Elbe/Weser or Elbe/Ems traffic.

VI. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "513" sank a steamer off Rio de Janeiro and torpedoed another one. New operational areas were assigned to the submarines disposed in the north Atlantic. Recently three American submarines were out in the north Atlantic on patrol duties and for attacks on our submarines.

VII. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Eighty three planes of the 3rd Air Force were out on operation in the west area and 5 in the Mediterranean.

In a daylight attack on the North German coastal area, which did not develop owing to weather conditions and smoke-screen, 216 of our fighters were out on defense. Twenty five planes were reported shot down, mainly by fighters. During the night of 25 June the enemy again attacked the Rhine-Westphalian industrial area with strong forces, concentrating on Bochum. Twenty two industrial installations were hit. For further particulars see Daily Situation.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force was only out during the night of 24 June and on 25 June on reconnaissance and air defense. Italian torpedo planes sank two large steamers off the Algerian coast during the night of 23 June and a further steamer during the night of 24 June. Single planes of our Air Force attacked the harbor of Bizerta during the night of 24 June. Fires were observed on the ships. The enemy Air Force attacked Messina and St. Giovanni with very strong forces during the day and caused heavy damage to houses. Further attacks were made during the night of 24 June on Olbia and on 25 June on the airfield of Comiso. Bari, Messina and Reggio were raided during the night of 25 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Eastern Front:

Thirty seven enemy planes were shot down on the Army front on 24 June without loss on our part. Fifty three planes of the 5th Air Force were out on operation. According to information from Air Force General Staff, the Fuehrer does not consider it expedient in the long run to continue mining of the Volga, but believes it will be more effective to use the planes against the building yards, oil tanks and towns along the Volga, as for instance Astrakhan.

Special Items.

An intelligence report dealing with the losses suffered by Bomber Commands in attacks from England against the area occupied by Germany is to be found as per l/Skl 17674/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume V.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

According to an Italian report, 1 cruiser and 2 gunboats entered the Straits of Gibraltar at 1000 from the west. In the main there were no changes at 1300 in the number of warships in the harbor. Two hundred and twenty three shore-based planes were counted on the airfield. Four freighters, 4 landing vessels, 1 French destroyer and 1 French auxiliary vessel sailed at 1930 for the Mediterranean.

Alboran reports at 0740 4 destroyers south of the island making for the Mediterranean. Our air reconnaissance sighted in the morning off Arzeu about 30 ships and off Mostaganem about 10 ships. Photographic reconnaissance of Bougie of 24 June showed an increase of 13% in LST's and 3% in LCI's, according to detailed evaluation as compared with 13 June, which must have been transferred from the areas of Oran - Algiers or Tunisia. At 0700 a freighter of 6,000 BRT was sighted on easterly course proceeding at high speed north-east of Bone.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Submarine positions were reported on 24 June off Messina and 120 miles west of Naples and on 25 June south-southeast of Bastia and south of Civitavecchia.

According to a reliable intelligence report, a convoy of 4 American transports bound for Tobruk with Canadian and British troops and materiel arrived on 21 June in Tripoli and on the same day a transport with American troops and air forces arrived in Benghazi. According to a further intelligence report, the cruiser towed into Gibraltar on 21 June from the Mediterranean was not a cruiser of the FROBISHER class and the minelayer which was towed out to the west on 21 June was the MANXMAN.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Five boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla were transferred from Palermo to Cagliari and along the way picked up three British airmen drifting in a rubber dinghy. The first four operational boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla carried out a minelaying operation in the coastal area of Sicily according to plan and put into Trapani. Three torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked motor minesweeper R "13" at 1430.

The minelaying operations off Marseilles with French mines were carried out. Minelayer ML "6061" is being fitted up for laying German mines. Two naval landing craft sailed from Toulon to Genoa.

Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy urges, in view of the strengthening of enemy naval forces and transports in the Mediterranean, that the question of reinforcing our own submarines in the Mediterranean be investigated. The same request was made in a personal telegram from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South to Chief, Naval Staff.

In the present situation as regards defense in the Straits of Gibraltar, a break-through by submarines is not possible in the season of short nights. In the last attempt during the previous new-moon period, three submarines were lost out of four. Therefore Chief, Naval Staff has decided that at

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

present no further submarines be sent into the Mediterranean. Relevant orders were sent to Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy and to Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

The damaged steamer ROUSSILLON was towed into Leghorn. Other transport traffic was carried out according to plan and without losses.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The BARLETTA and the MOROSINI put out for a minelaying operation on the west coast of Greece. Convoy traffic in the Aegean Sea was carried out according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There was a tanker with escort boats 20 miles south-southeast of Tuapse on northwesterly course at 0600, according to air reconnaissance. The following were detected by aerial photographs: at noon in Tuapse 1 torpedo boat, 1 minesweeper, 7 motor minesweepers, 4 PT boats, 1 large tanker and smaller vessels; in Sotchi 1 motor minesweeper and 15 small vessels; in Suchum 3 small steamers and several coastal vessels; in Gelendzhik 5 motor minesweepers, 18 PT boats, 2 small naval vessels etc. Reconnaissance was made with photographs of tug traffic on the lower Volga from 0200 to 0530. Down-stream altogether about 40,000 BRT of shipping and a further 17,000 BRT of stationary tankers were recognized.

Own Situation:

The operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla was unsuccessful during the night of 24 June. A short engagement developed on the return passage at 0235 with two groups of enemy PT boats each of six vessels. The enemy did not return fire. The guns broke down on two of our boats. No hits were observed. Four boats of the Flotilla were sent out in reconnaissance line during the night of 25 June in the south-

CONFIDENTIAL

25 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

eastern part of the Sea of Asov.

An enemy air attack on an Anapa transport was warded off by our fighters. In a fresh attack on the returning Anapa transport one naval landing craft was badly damaged by a bomb hit in the southern outlet of the Strait of Kerch, but was towed into Kerch with casualties. Enemy air raids were made on Berdiansk and Feodosiya during the night of 24 June. The building of the port commander's quarters and the dockyard in Berdiansk were damaged.

An enemy mine barrage was located 18 miles north of Sevastopol by a minesweeper escort at 0945, out of which until now five mines have been swept. The mines in question are submarine-laid mines. Other convoy traffic was carried out according to plan.

IX. Situation East Asia.

According to a British report, the Australian steamer MANKIN, en route from Sidney to India, was captured in the Indian Ocean by the Japanese. According to report from enemy circles, the Japanese base of Macassar on Celebes was attacked with heavy bombs on 23 June, hits being scored on a Japanese cruiser lying at anchor and on a freighter. For the attack the planes had to cover a distance of 3,200 km from an Australian base. According to Domei, a formation of Japanese naval planes made a night attack on the enemy air center on the island of Horn on the north coast of Australia.

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

No special reports have been received concerning naval warfare.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division reports:

a. Admiral Bertoldi has transmitted a request of the Italian Admiralty to postpone the transfer of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla into the Aegean Sea in order to have the boats available for minelaying operations to protect the islands in the Tyrrhenian Sea. Naval Staff has transmitted a refusal, giving the reasons, in a letter to the Liaison Staff at Naval Staff. Copy of letter l/Skl I m 18216/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

b. Eight thousand tons of oil were destroyed in a fire in the oil district of Ploesti. Sabotage is assumed but the Rumanians state that it was caused by lightning. Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will make further investigations.

II. Quartermaster General:

a. In reply to the request by Naval Staff to reinforce the anti-aircraft defense of the submarine bases in western France, Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has answered that a decision by the Fuehrer is necessary, which will be obtained.

Chief, Naval Staff ordered that Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters be informed but that, in view of the urgent anti-aircraft requirements in the Ruhr area, the matter itself should be allowed to rest.

b. Report on the demand by Officer Personnel Department concerning provision of 600 naval gunnery officers by 1.1.44 for transfer into the executive officer branch. Combat readiness and training facilities of naval artillery battalions will be endangered to a great extent by the whole affair.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Chief, Officer Personnel Department states regarding this that it is planned to carry out the measures as economically as possible.

Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the views of Chief, Officer Personnel Department. The encroachments reported by Quartermaster General must be accepted in view of the essential requirements of submarine warfare and the war against merchant shipping.

c. As against the views of Naval Command, Norway, Quartermaster General proposes, in accordance with the desire of Group North/Fleet, that the Commanding Admirals at present still have tugs in the Norwegian area at their disposal for operations until fall.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed.

d. Report on the furnace oil situation:

1. Production in June 43:

aa. German home production:		
normal allocation	70,000 tons	
single special allocation	13,000 tons	
bb. Estonian production	8,000 tons	
cc. Rumanian production	<u>8,000 tons</u>	<u>99,000 tons</u>

2. Consumption in June 43:

aa. within the quota	72,620 tons	
bb. outside the quota	8,760 tons	
cc. transferred to Italy	<u>16,980 tons</u>	<u>98,360 tons</u>

3. Expected production for July 43:

aa. German home production	70,000 tons	
bb. Estonian production	8,000 tons	
cc. Rumanian production	<u>8,000 tons</u>	<u>86,000 tons</u>

4. Planned consumption for July 43:

aa. within the quota	72,000 tons	
bb. transfer to Italy	<u>10,000 tons</u>	<u>82,000 tons</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Therefore the reserves are extremely small and are not sufficient to carry out transfers of ships and operations outside the quota.

5. From reserves 6,280 tons have been taken by overdrawing of quotas up to now on the part of Commanding Admiral, Submarines and Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic among others. This will amount to 102,000 tons on 1 July 1943. It is not permissible to exceed this amount if a regulated furnace oil economy is to be maintained.

All special applications must, therefore, be refused. Group West has reported already that the quota is only sufficient to transfer torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" back. Maneuvers by destroyers and torpedo boats have been postponed. Use of the torpedo boats in the west area for tasks of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West is out of the question before 1 July. Submarines can only be assisted by exceeding the June quota.

e. The question of plans for construction in the harbors was settled with Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy. The following priority list was established:

- aa. landing points
- bb. slipway installations
- cc. construction of bunkers.

Chief, Naval Staff emphasizes that the construction of bunkers is practically out of the question for the Italians. For us Toulon and Marseilles are of prime importance.

f. The question of anti-aircraft training of the crews of merchantmen was discussed and arranged with the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping. His desire to have a sail training ship of the Navy put at his disposal must be refused as three are already in use for our own purposes and the fourth is requested by Bureau of Naval Administration for training navigation personnel. Of the four training ships of the Merchant Marine, three are being used by it in the Gulf of Riga and a fourth is still laid up.

In a Highly Restricted Circle.

III. The Naval Attaché in Istanbul reported on 18 June about military preparations by the Allies in the eastern part of the

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Mediterranean and on the question of operations by German submarines in this sea area.

Copies as per 1/Skl 18781 and 18786/43 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XIV.

Chief of Staff, Naval Staff agrees with the statements of the Naval Attaché. The preparations which the enemy is making for operations in the eastern Mediterranean have brought about an obvious increase in traffic of warships and merchantmen. There are, therefore, strategic prospects for success for increased operations by submarines. The report of the Naval Attaché gives proof of these operational possibilities with a series of separate particulars, according to number and type of enemy ships which offer themselves as targets. However, the political side of this matter is also of importance. Successes of German submarines, especially off Turkish harbors, would counteract most effectively the really noticeable danger to the military and political esteem of Germany in Turkey. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff considers it advisable to instruct Commander, Submarines, Italy to operate with three submarines against shipping off the Turkish harbors.

Chief, Naval Staff agreed to this proposal.

Special Items.

I. The Naval Attaché in Tokio will be informed that Naval Staff approached the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin on the question of transport submarines and that special measures have been ordered for the passage through the Bay of Biscay of the Bose submarine, in order to disperse Japanese doubts. Telegram 1/Skl I op 1825/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XV.

II. From British captured material, which served as a preparation for the landing in North Africa, Naval Intelligence Division has evaluated the experiences gained in the British landing operation against Madagascar. Copy as per 1/Skl 19242/43 geh. in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Situation 26 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

The Military Attaché in Tangiers reported from a Spanish source in French Morocco that heavy American troop transports arrived in Casablanca between 31 May and 14 June. The various convoys included altogether 2 transports with 38,000 men (Question mark in margin. Tr.N.), 56 freighters and 2 tankers. One aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser and 5 destroyers were escorting convoys.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio transmits statements made by prisoners from the American submarine GREENADIER: The Headquarters of the American Commanding Admiral, Submarines are in Pearl Harbor. Bases are Pearl Harbor, Sidney, Freemantle and Dutch Harbor. The submarines carry 20 torpedoes on board. No angled-shot. Magnetic firing. Depth-setting 2 - 3 feet deeper than presumed. Recognition signal for ships three, for planes one letter, in addition black-white, red, yellow or green colored smoke cartridges which can also be fired under water.

According to Exchange Telegraph, the British steamer NANKIN was captured by the Japanese en route from Sidney to India, according to information of the Swiss Government. The crew of 150 men and 112 passengers are safe. Originally it was assumed that the ship had sunk.

The presence of the following ships is assumed in the Indian Ocean:

The RAMILLIES, RESOLUTION, REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN and ILLUSTRIOUS, exact positions unknown. In the Indian area: the BIRMINGHAM, CARADOC, COLOMBO, DANAE, DAUNTLESS, FROBISHER, GAMBIA, HAWKINS and MAURITIUS.

In the Cape area: the CAPETOWN, CERES, DURBAN, EMERALD, NEWCASTLE and in addition the American cruisers PORTLAND, CINCINNATI and DETROIT. First class bases are: Durban, Diego Suarez, Trincomali; second class: Mombasa, Aden, Karachi, Bombay.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attaché in Tokio requested a statement on the present boundaries of the submarine operational area in the Indian Ocean in order to draw up sailing orders for the BRAKE.

Naval Staff informed ship "28" of assumed distribution of enemy naval forces (see Enemy Situation) by Radiogram 1702 and all vessels in foreign waters of the enemy situation by Radiograms 1430 and 2029.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty six planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. British vessels were located at 2211 140 miles southwest of St. Vincent and at 2314 54 miles south of Rockall Bank.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept off the Gironde. A watching mine, Mark I, was cut in BF 6877. Three cutters (minesweeping devices. Tr.N.) exploded in BF 9223. A deep mine barrage is presumed. The sea area in question was planned for maneuvers by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

Channel Coast:

One mine, Mark XIX, was swept six miles north of Sark on 25 June.

The 2nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla, with torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18", was transferred from St. Malo to Cherbourg. While sweeping channels between Dunkirk and Calais motor minesweeper R "114" struck a mine and sank during an attempt to tow her in.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

A minelaying operation by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla with diversionary operation by the 4th PT Boat Flotilla is planned for the night of 26 June.

Enemy fighter-bombers unsuccessfully attacked the 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla and two patrol boats near Calais at 0125 and 0130 respectively. The fighter-bombers were directed to the targets by a ground location station.

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Nothing to report.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Four Russian submarines were detected on the Arctic Coast. Forty planes over the North Sea and three planes of the Iceland squadrons were detected.

According to an intelligence report a convoy of five steamers escorted by a destroyer and two patrol boats left Reykjavik.

Own Situation:

Minelaying operation "Wildschwein" was carried out according to plan (see Telegram 0930). On the return passage the minelaying formation avoided two northbound Swedish ships east of the declared area.

Mine barrages NW 55 and 56 were laid according to plan during the night of 25 June. For report see Telegram 1045.

Naval Command, Norway reports with regard to the instructions of Naval Staff (see War Diary 14 June), that extensive declared

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

areas are necessary to conceal the positions of barrages. Certain fishing zones in the declared areas and channels for fishing will be opened, as far as military interests permit, by local announcement. (See Telegram 1600.)

Single enemy reconnaissance planes were observed in the area of Kirkenes and Bergen on 25 June.

Escort service covered 19 northbound and 39 southbound ships. Owing to shortage of escort vessels at Stavanger, Tromsø and Kirkenes, the departure of convoys was delayed from 24 to 26 June.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

Practice firing by a destroyer in the merchant harbor of Kronstadt was observed from 1700 to 1730. Shipping movements in Kronstadt Bay and near the islands of Lavansaari and Seiskari are substantially unchanged.

2. Own Situation:

Three ground mines were swept 18 miles west of Anholt with magnetic minesweeping gear and clapper buoy in water 16 m. deep. A Danish motor launch sank 10 miles northwest of Anholt on 25 June after striking a mine.

Commanding General, Armed Forces, Denmark ordered first degree of readiness for the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic and for all his units from 1200.

Commanding Admiral, Denmark requested the Danish Admiralty to formulate the order issued for procedure by the Danish Navy etc. in case of an enemy operation against Jutland as follows:

1. Danish naval vessels and others in the east Jutland area are to transfer quickly through the Little Belt to the channel south of Fuenen.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. All other naval vessels and others will proceed to the nearest port outside the Jutland area. In doing this, the main route in the Great Belt and the Sound which is free of mines should be avoided as far as possible.

3. All Danish naval vessels and others and naval radio stations are to observe radio silence but are to be ready to receive.

4. All other directives to Danish naval vessels and others of a basic kind, as far as they are connected with invasion (raid), will be laid down in agreement with Commanding Admiral, Denmark.

As it is possible that the enemy might try during an invasion etc. to capture Middelgrund Fort by landing parachute troops or by a raid from the sea, necessary precautions are to be taken to eliminate the combat readiness of the guns on Middelgrund Fort during this period of time.

Commanding Admiral, Denmark reports that the impression was gained that there is complete understanding in the Danish Navy for the above demands. The important parts of all guns of Middelgrund Fort will be transferred to the Orlogs Dockyard.

Convoy traffic in the whole area of the Baltic Sea was carried out according to plan. Patrol and escort duties were impaired by weather conditions in the area of Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. Reinforcement of mine barrages XIa and XIIa is intended, using eight naval landing craft of the 24th Landing Flotilla.

An enemy battery was put out of action in the Voronka sector by our fire. A Russian scouting operation was repulsed in front of our main defense line.

V. Submarine Warfare.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Various airfields in the occupied west area were attacked by enemy planes during the day. Damage and casualties were caused. An anti-aircraft gun position on Guernsey and a leave ship outward-bound were attacked with machine-guns; no damage was caused. Altogether three planes were shot down during the day. Only small enemy forces flew in during the night of 26 June and there were no important incidents.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance by our Air Force detected in the morning a large eastbound convoy north of La Galite and kept contact. Light bomber formations attacked the convoy in the afternoon and scored hits on three merchantmen. Further attacks with heavy forces are planned. The enemy carried out nuisance attacks on Messina, Reggio and Bari during the night of 25 June. No damage is reported to military installations. No enemy activity was reported from the area of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South during the day. Naples as well as two airfields close to the town were attacked during the night of 26 June. No damage is reported; two planes were shot down.

3. Eastern Front:

Fifteen enemy planes were shot down on the Army fronts on 25 June; we lost three planes. Sixteen planes, ten of them fighter-bombers, of the 5th Air Force were out on 26 June; they attacked shipping in Motka Bay, sinking three small vessels and damaging one. In addition a sailing ship was attacked and damaged 170 miles east of Iceland.

Only results of photographic reconnaissance of Black Sea ports were received from the 4th Air Force, which do not disclose anything special.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The 4 battleships and 2 aircraft carriers were detected at 1300 in Gibraltar. The other ships in harbor could not be seen clearly owing to poor visibility. A destroyer, apparently damaged, was towed into port from the Atlantic in the afternoon of 25 June. A smaller convoy of 4 steamers and several landing craft left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean in the evening of 25 June. A cruiser of the FIJI class put into harbor on her way from the west into the Mediterranean, which she entered with 3 destroyers at 1415. Maneuvers were carried out by 8 - 9 destroyers in the morning east of Gibraltar.

The two battleships of the KING GEORGE V class were still seen at 0900 on 25 June in Mers el Kebir. According to photographic reconnaissance, 4 submarines, 4 auxiliary naval vessels, 32 steamers and 6 tankers were lying at this time in Oran. Twelve more steamers and 7 tankers were sighted off Oran. In the evening of 25 June and during 26 June heavy eastbound traffic and lively activity by minesweepers was observed in the area of the Sicilian Channel, off the African coast. Up to 1845 on 25 June air reconnaissance had already reported 12 merchantmen in the area of Cape Bon on southerly course. A large convoy was detected by our air reconnaissance at 0835 on 26 June and confirmed in the following strength by photograph at 0925 8 miles northeast of Bizerta on easterly course: 19 freighters, 4 troop transports, 20 LST's, 12 LCT's, 7 LCI's, 5 large landing stages being towed by steamers, 3 destroyers, 1 escort vessel and 11 patrol vessels. To the west of this unit there was, according to a sighting report which still has to be confirmed, 1 battleship with presumably 6 destroyers. This convoy was reported at 1005 north of the island of Zembra and at 1545 north-northwest of Cape Bon. Radio intelligence intercepted reports, obviously from this convoy, dealing with repeated air attacks by our planes.

A second large convoy was sighted by our air reconnaissance consisting of 1 cruiser and 24 steamers on easterly course at 1655 20 miles west-southwest of La Galita.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Submarines were reported at 1740 on 25 June south of Leghorn and at 0515 on 26 June northwest of Prevesa off the west coast of Greece.

According to an intelligence report dated 19 June, via Athens, from Cairo, a British naval officer stated that all measures for an expedition have been postponed.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Submarine U "617" sank a destroyer of the H class in CH 7578 and submarine U "81" sank the steamer LIVATHO (1,667 BRT) as well as three sailing vessels in CP 3724.

The minelayers POMMERN and BRANDENBURG left Naples in the afternoon of 25 June to carry out minelaying. The first four boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla left Trapani for Messina at 0400 and should arrive at Patras in the evening of 27 June. Commanding General, Armed Forces, South requests that the decision concerning the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla be re-examined. He takes the view that either an enemy attack on the Italian islands is imminent or combined attacks are planned in the western and eastern Mediterranean, which, however, cannot be launched for several weeks as the preparations are not yet completed. Therefore, Commanding General, Armed Forces, South still considers it essential that the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla should remain at present for urgent tasks, in order to place the large Italian islands into full defensive readiness. Transfer to the Aegean Sea would be acceptable if no attack on the Italian islands should be made in the near future. (See Telegram 2210.)

In the air attack on Messina at noon on 25 June the quarters of the German Chief of Staff were destroyed by a direct hit but no casualties were suffered.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

It is now reported that the auxiliary vessel OLBIA was sunk at 1600 on 20 June near Cape Spartivento through an aerial torpedo hit and the steamer ROSANDRA (8,043 BRT) by a submarine attack on 14 June northwest of Corfu.

CONFIDENTIAL

26 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Convoy traffic was carried out according to plan and without losses on 26 June.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The BULGARIA sailed from Piraeus for Rhodes to carry out a minelaying operation near Leros. Submarine chaser "2110" had to be towed into Khalkis with engine damage. Convoy and transport traffic was carried out according to plan in the Aegean Sea.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to aerial reconnaissance there was a tanker of 7,000 BRT with several escorts 25 miles northwest of Adler on course south-southeast. Submarine U "18" was able to contact this convoy and to maintain contact throughout the day but did not manage to fire on it.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla in patrol line in the Temriuk Bay had a short engagement with enemy patrol boats without effect during the night of 25 June. The boats entered Kerch. Sixteen mines have been swept up to now from the anti-submarine barrage north of Sevastopol. Further successes were achieved in the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch and on the route Kamish Burun - fish salting factory. An enemy submarine unsuccessfully attacked a Feodosiya - Taman transport with torpedoes at 0100.

Naval artillery lighters MAL "7" and "8" arrived in Sevastopol. The 1st PT Boat Flotilla was again disposed in patrol line during the night of 26 June in Temriuk Bay and two boats were disposed in reconnaissance line west of the southern outlet of the Strait of Kerch. Owing to engine damage submarine U "24" entered Feodosiya on return passage.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

According to Reuter, Stalin declared in a new message to Roosevelt that victory will be attained all the sooner the more the enemy is simultaneously hit by joint and co-ordinated plans from east and west.

According to a further report by Reuter, Smuts declared in a speech that the main battle on the European Continent will still take place this year and will be brought to a conclusion next year. All Allied reserves are now being assembled for this battle. The great hour is approaching.

According to Exchange Telegraph, the former American ambassador to Japan, Grew, warned his countrymen not to be deceived by the quietness at present prevailing on the part of the Japanese. It conceals feverish preparations for the coming phases of the war.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

No special reports and decisions.

Special Items.

I. Commanding Admiral, Group West reported on 15 June about the effectiveness of present types of mines in offensive operations and the use of new mine firing mechanisms and drew up the following demands which must be made on an offensive mine:

a. As the enemy locates the dropping of mines, it must be impossible for minesweeping forces to sweep it in their first operations. For the ground mine this means: delay or period delay mechanism, and for the moored mine: delayed release.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

b. after the mine becomes effective it has to offer the greatest possible difficulties to the minesweepers, i.e. it must either be equipped with anti-sweeping devices or must endanger the minesweepers themselves to a great extent.

c. In order to achieve an extension of the operational area for mines, a mine must be produced which can also be dropped by planes in up to 80 m. water depth and meets the demands under a. and b. This last demand is the most important one as regards mine strategy in view of the present situation. A glance at the map shows that barely 150 miles of the British convoy routes can be touched by mining operations at present possible. On the other hand, the enemy uses around England about 2,000 miles of convoy routes on which he need not expect mines as the water depths are over 30 m. From this it is understandable that the enemy would be forced to scatter his minesweeping forces and escorts to a great extent even if only small numbers of aerial mines, effective up to about 80 m. water depth, can be laid in the other convoy routes around England which are not affected now. Through the use of such a mine the enemy would also find it much more difficult to change his convoy routes readily. This applies also to the areas now affected by our minelaying operations.

This problem gains special importance with the sudden use of new firing mechanisms. For this extremely important and most promising weapon only the very restricted operational areas are available still so that their effect must also be limited unless we succeed in making the enemy scatter his direct defense (escorts, night fighters and anti-aircraft guns) and his indirect defense through concentrated operations by minesweepers.

There is no doubt that the enemy will increase his direct defense by escorts and anti-aircraft ships in such a fashion, after the initial successes of the new mines, that our operations in the restricted area will become difficult and costly.

Naval Staff agrees entirely with the military demands. Concerning the technical proposals made in detail by Group West, the views of Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch are requested.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval Staff agrees with the proposals of Group West in the essential points and requests among other things especially that the final tests on the LMF mine with depth-setting adjuster be so accelerated that issue of the mines is guaranteed on 1 Aug. and that the faults in the BMC mine be eliminated quickly so as to make possible production of these mines also for use in August. Chief, Underwater Obstacles Branch remarked in his preliminary reply dated 21 June that these two demands can probably be met. The stocks of BMC mines on 1 Aug. will amount to about 500, and monthly supplies to 260, compared with 500 requested.

II. Intelligence has transmitted statements of the U.S. Ambassador, Harriman, to a British chief correspondent in Bern, which seem to be credible according to the view of Naval Intelligence Division and may be decisive for assessment of the situation as a whole. The main point of the report is Harriman's view that a second front cannot be established this summer but that a new Russian offensive on a large scale and Allied raids on the western front as carried out at Dieppe must be expected. Churchill is quoted with the remark: "No second front before the German interior is destroyed."

Copy of report as per l/Skl 18511/43 geh. in War Diary, Part D, "Data on the Enemy Situation."

Situation 27 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from our vessels in foreign waters.

Naval Staff continued transmission to Ship "28" of information on the political situation with brief summaries concerning

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria as well as Japan, by Radiogram 2042.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence detected in the Bay of Biscay 19 planes and at 1713 one British vessel 60 miles south of Cape St. Vincent.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine each was swept off Lorient and St. Nazaire and two off La Pallice.

Naval Staff informs Group West of the report of the 2nd Submarine Flotilla (see War Diary 20 June) and requests on this amplification of the original report of the commander of destroyer Z "24", as well as an investigation and report on what orders or considerations stood in the way of the commanders of destroyers Z "32" and Z "24" making an independent decision on destroyer Z "24" proceeding alone.

Channel Coast:

Two enemy bombers of a strong formation escorted by fighters were shot down at 1845 on 26 June by vessels lying in the harbor of Dieppe. Own casualties were sustained through a premature explosion in the bore. A towed crane was badly damaged, presumably by a mine detonation, in the morning of 27 June east of Nieuport.

Operations by the 5th and 4th PT Boat Flotillas were carried out according to plan during the night of 26 June. For brief report of the 5th PT Boat Flotilla see Telegram 1845. During outward and return passage planes were continuously observed with radar intercept gear.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Further passage from Cherbourg to Le Havre is planned for torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" during the night of 27 July (obviously meant to read 27 June. Tr.N.).

Batteries "Lindemann" and "Todt" each fired three rounds from 1624 to 1754 on enemy radar sets near Dover as well as on targets in the town of Dover. After the last round heavy smoke was observed in Dover.

Special Items.

Commander, Destroyers informed Naval Staff of instructions to the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla to have torpedo boats T "25" and T "24" ready in Kiel from 1 July for transfer to the west area. Commander, 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla should settle sailing plans with Group North/Fleet, Coast Patrol Force and Group West. Commander, Destroyers requests Group North/Fleet at the same time to issue orders for transfer.

As expected, the Group referred in this connection to the instructions of Naval Staff (see War Diary 16 June) which authorized Group West to carry out the transfer of the Flotilla. Group North/Fleet restricts itself to orders that the 4th Torpedo Boat Flotilla shall arrange passage through the North Sea direct with North Sea Station or Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

One of our convoys was attacked by about 60 enemy planes at 1505 near Scheveningen. No casualties and no substantial damage were caused. About six planes were observed to have been shot down.

Otherwise escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan and without special incident in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Fifteen planes over the North Sea and two planes of the Iceland squadrons were detected on operation. The sailing ship seriously damaged by our Air Force on 26 June in position 450 miles east of Iceland was flying a white flag with a red cross and defended itself against the attacks with machine-guns and five line-carrying rockets.

Submarine chase was started at 0105 with eight vessels off the southern entrance to Trondheim after a periscope had been sighted.

Convoy traffic was cancelled until 1400.

Results of the submarine chase are not reported.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

Apart from the loss of the Danish steamer SIGRID (1,196 BRT) through striking a mine eight miles west of Kullen, no special incidents are reported from the whole area. Reinforcement of barrages "Nashorn" 11a and 12 a is planned for 28 June if weather conditions permit.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

An outward-bound submarine was damaged in CG 1213 in a bombing attack by a Sunderland and started on return passage.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Group "Trutz" is disposed in patrol line between CE 7624 and DG 4839, where a westbound convoy is expected to be on 28 June. No definite reports have been received.

It is planned to dispatch soon ten submarines with mines to the east coast of America and the west coast of Africa. These boats, which are not yet provided with sufficient anti-aircraft equipment, are out of question for operations against convoys.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 110 planes out on operation in the west area and 9 in the Mediterranean. The enemy flew into the west area mainly with fighter formations during the day. In addition to the attack on our convoy near Scheveningen, already reported, an attack was made by ten planes on Dieppe which only caused slight military damage. Air activity on both sides was only on a small scale during the night of 27 June.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

According to a report of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, during attacks on the eastbound convoy in the sea area of Cape Bon on 26 June and during that night, our Air Force scored direct hits on 13 vessels, some of them large ones, including probably 1 aircraft carrier, 2 troop transports and 1 tanker. Light bomber formations were not sent out on 27 June as the convoy was out of range. Italian torpedo planes damaged a further merchantman of the same convoy during the night of 26 June. Italian bombers attacked the harbor of Bizerta during the same night without any effect being observed.

Our air reconnaissance covered during the day the movements of the convoy which had been attacked and detected new shipping movements in the area between Algiers and Bone.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The enemy carried out nuisance attacks on Naples and Sciacca without much success during the night of 26 June. Light bombers also unsuccessfully attacked the airfields of Gerbini and Catania during the day. Enemy reconnaissance planes were observed over Sicily and Elba.

In the eastern Mediterranean an enemy air attack was made at noontime on the airfield of Eleusis near Athens which caused damage, destroyed or heavily damaged eight of our planes and damaged 22 others slightly. No planes were shot down.

A further attack was directed against the airfield of Kalamaki where five of our planes were destroyed and two damaged.

St. Giovanni and Reggio were attacked during the night of 27 June; although heavy damage was done to houses, military installations were not affected.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The ADVENTURE put into Gibraltar in the evening of 26 June from the Mediterranean and put out in the morning of 27 June for the Atlantic. The FORMIDABLE and the ILLUSTRIOUS left Gibraltar at 0900 for the Mediterranean and put in again probably late in the evening. A cruiser of the DIDO class also put in from the Atlantic in the evening.

A convoy consisting of 18 steamers left the harbor for the Atlantic in the morning.

In the western Mediterranean lively shipping was reported in the morning off the Algerian coast, mainly on easterly course. West of Algiers 6 steamers and 2 tankers with 5 destroyers were detected; off Jijelli 6 LCT's, and northwest of Bone 45 vessels

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

which were recognized, according to photographic evaluation, as 8 LST's, 35 LCI's, 1 tanker and 2 destroyers.

No further reports have been received of the large convoy of 24 vessels and two cruisers reported on 26 June west of La Galite. Apparently the formation entered Bizerta.

Submarines were reported in the afternoon and evening of 26 June near Cape Caccia on the northwest coast of Sardinia and north-northeast of Maddalena and early on 27 June off the southeast point of Sicily.

The large convoy which passed the Sicilian Channel on the previous evening to the east was reported at 0955 by our air reconnaissance off Sousse where it apparently broke up.

According to an Italian report, a part of this large convoy went on in the direction of Tripoli or Benghazi; this probably included also a battleship and an aircraft carrier.

Three steamers and two escorts were reported at 0944 on northeasterly course west-southwest of Pantelleria.

Our air reconnaissance no longer located the French warships in Alexandria at 1115.

No definite picture can be gained concerning the number of landing craft in harbors of the eastern Mediterranean.

It is possible that a large number of these vessels were not recognized owing to effective camouflage.

According to an intelligence report from Lisbon from a diplomatic source, the arrival of Dutch invasion troops in North Africa is expected at the beginning of August.

The offensive against Italy and France is not to take place before August. From statements of the U.S. Consul in Oporto it is gathered that Spain will probably line up on the side of the Axis powers in September; therefore the Allies are making preparations to occupy Spanish Morocco. Finally, landings are to be made in southern France in the Gulf of Lyons simultaneously with the occupation of Corsica.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The operation by seven boats of the 3rd MT Boat Flotilla during the night of 26 June against the reported large convoy in the Sicilian Channel brought no contact with the enemy. The formation put into Empedocle again. An unsuccessful enemy submarine attack was made at 1550 on the same day on the minelayer formation which left Maddalena at noon on 26 June. Submarine chase was started.

The Italian cruiser SCIPIONE was detected by enemy air reconnaissance on 27 June north of Messina while under way from Taranto to Leghorn.

Four boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla put out from Messina for Patras at 2300 on 26 June. No substantial damage was caused in the enemy air raid on Naples during the night of 26 June.

At 1704 submarine U "73" sank a tanker of 8,000 BRT from a westbound convoy in CH 8343.

In the eastern Mediterranean a submarine sank a steamer, presumably the steamer LIVATHOS (1,667 BRT) at 1502 north of Tripoli.

Concerning the transfer of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla into the Aegean Sea, Naval Staff replies to the request of Commanding General, Armed Forces, South to re-examine this question (see War Diary 26 June) as follows:

The decision concerning the transfer of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was made after very careful consideration as, according to the views of Naval Staff, we must at all events avoid sea communication to the western area of Greece being interrupted by enemy attacks which cannot be detected beforehand, thereby making reinforcement of our defense forces in the Aegean Sea impossible. Therefore a change of decision is not possible, especially as increased enemy activity in the Aegean Sea already makes it urgently necessary now to strengthen defense forces.

Group West reports that, according to the statement of a French fisherman, a mine detonated in a net on 26 June nine miles south-southwest of Sete. The incident is being investigated.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Concerning the situation as regards barges on 25 June, Group West reports that since 2 April 17 naval landing craft, 4 motor minesweepers, 46 tank-barges and 10 tank-lighters left Toulon for Italy.

Fourteen naval landing craft, 8 motor minesweepers, 27 tank-barges, 24 freight-barges and 12 "Seeloewe" barges are being fitted up in Mediterranean yards.

There are 10 naval landing craft, 4 motor minesweepers, 50 tank-barges, 172 freight-barges and 12 "Seeloewe" barges under way to the Mediterranean. Finally 28 freight-barges and 162 "Seeloewe" barges are lying in yards outside the Mediterranean for fitting up.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report apart from the attack dealt with under "Aerial Warfare" on Kalamaki near Piraeus.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The dropping of mines was observed in the northern outlet of the Strait of Kerch.

Own Situation:

Minesweeping was started north of Cape Tarchan and northeast of Cape Achilleon.

Owing to suspicion of mines the route through this area is temporarily closed.

The operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 26 June was unsuccessful. Owing to weather conditions no operations will take place during the night of 27 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

27 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Owing to technical trouble submarine U "20" started return passage to Constanta. Submarine U "24" continued return passage from Feodosiya to Constanta. Submarine U "23" left Constanta for the operational area. Submarine U "18" sank a lighter of 800 - 1,000 BRT from a towed convoy west of Suchum.

The cable railway over the Strait of Kerch started operating on 26 June; the present daily capacity amounts to 200 tons.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

No special reports of interest for naval warfare have been received.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division reports on the views of Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy regarding the suggestion of Naval Staff not to leave supplies to German troops on the Italian islands entirely to German ships and states that the requisitioning of Italian shipping would not be advantageous for German interests. Further arrangements are for the present in the hands of Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch.

Concerning the transfer of supplies to the Aegean from the Adriatic through the Black Sea, Group South has proposed that first of all one third of the shipping be diverted to the new route. This matter will also be dealt with by Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch.

II. Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that the first meeting of the research association concerning submarine camouflage will take place on 6 July under the presidency of the Communications Experimental Command. Commander in Chief, Navy shows lively interest and will take the opportunity to make personal contact with the members of this important committee.

III. Quartermaster General reports that, according to investigations by Chief, Supply and Fuel Branch, Quartermaster Division, the fire in Ploesti is definitely to be attributed to lightning and not to sabotage.

IV. Chief, Artillery Branch, Naval Ordnance Division reports that the output of the Bochum Verein has been decapitated by 60% through the enemy air raid on Bochum. As this firm produces a large amount of army and navy ammunition - for the Navy this amounts to 70% - a serious situation has arisen through this plant being put out of action for several months, as anticipated.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

V. Chief, Bureau of Naval Armament reports that the Huels Buna plant is expected to be out of action for three months. How far the Navy is affected as regards deliveries of mining materials, rescue devices and batteries is still to be determined. In circles of the Ministry for Armament and Ammunition the Ruhr is considered the only operative front which we have at present.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

VI. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division on plans to meet returning submarine U "180" with destroyers, in view of the particularly valuable cargo in which the Japanese are also especially interested. The submarine which brought the Indian, Bose, among others to the Japanese, has two Japanese officers on board. Chief, Naval Staff orders that everything be done to guarantee safe arrival of this submarine. Group West receives the following instructions:

1. Submarine U "180", returning from the Indian Ocean, is expected in the morning of 28 June in BE 9730. She may be in BF 76 in about 60 hours, i.e. in the evening of 30 June. Owing to the importance of the cargo, submarine U "180" should be met by destroyers or torpedo boats.

2. Group West with Commander, Submarines, West is to report proposal for commitment of destroyers or large torpedo boats, as well as time and meeting place. The submarine will then be asked by Commanding Admiral, Submarines to report if the rendezvous can be reached in time.

3. A special allocation of furnace fuel will be made after presentation of proposal by Group West.

After consultation with Commander, Submarines, West, Group West proposes that the submarine be met by destroyers Z "24" and Z "37" in BF 8442 at 0600 on 1 July. In addition it is planned to provide close escort by a Ju 88. The Group believes the most favorable time for the meeting to be the morning as a daylight escort affords better protection and outward passage of the destroyers by night is not so easily recognized. Copy of Telegrams as per 1/Skl I op 1833 and 1846/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II b.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VII. Chief, Operations Division presented a memorandum prepared by Deputy to Chief, Operations Branch, which deals with the necessity of reviving the war against merchant shipping by submarines and mines. After approval by Chief, Naval Staff a copy will be filed in the War Diary.

Chief, Naval Staff intends to make inspections in East Prussia on 30 June and 1 July and after that will report to the Fuehrer very soon on the Broeking submarine; he will also inform the Fuehrer of the views of Naval Staff with regard to continuation of naval warfare.

Special Items.

I. In accordance with the decision of Chief, Naval Staff, German Naval Command, Italy and Commander, Submarines, Italy received the following instructions:

"Sinking successes by German submarines in the eastern Mediterranean are especially important because the fact that Turkish/British sea communications here are entirely undisturbed undoubtedly has an unfavorable influence on the attitude of Turkey. The number of submarines operating in the eastern Mediterranean is to be increased soon to three. Of these two are to operate in the area of Cyprus. The Naval Attaché in Istanbul has been instructed to obtain all possible information on shipping in ports on the south coast of Turkey and to submit this without delay to Naval Staff and Commander, Submarines, Italy."

The instructions to this effect to the Naval Attaché in Istanbul read as follows:

"The Naval Staff agrees entirely with the views of the Naval Attaché in Istanbul concerning the political importance of German submarine successes in the eastern Mediterranean, especially off Turkish harbors. A necessary condition for successful operations is as thorough a knowledge as possible of the movements of the ships in question. The Naval Attaché in Istanbul is instructed to collect all information which can be obtained on the movements of these ships, especially times

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

of departure, and to ensure immediate transmission to Naval Staff and Commander, Submarines, Italy."

II. Commander in Chief, Navy intends to visit northern Norway at the beginning of July. With regard to this, Commanding Admiral, Task Force was instructed, with copy to Admiral, Northern Waters, Naval Command, Norway and Group North/Fleet, to present the plans for maneuvers by the Task Force, with schedule, as soon as possible.

III. The previous boundaries of route Anton had to be moved repeatedly during winter 1942/43 for operational reasons, especially in the area Natal - Freetown. In order to prevent such changes, Naval Staff, Operations Division has outlined a proposal for new boundaries of route Anton, which can come into force from 1 Oct. 43, and requests agreement from Submarine Division. The proposal, in the form of a map, is to be found as per 1/Skl I k 1812/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in files 1/Skl I k III.

Situation 28 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

For information to the MARCO POLO and AQUILA, the Naval Attaché in Tokio reports:

"1. Two Japanese submarines will pass the AQUILA route on 1 July at 5° 30' S, 7° 80' E. (obviously an error as 80' does not exist. Tr.N.), on course 210°.

2. A Japanese submarine will pass the MARCO POLO route on 10 July at 17° S., 73° E. on course 0°."

Submarine Division will be informed at once.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The Naval Attaché reports that the BOGOTA left Yokohama on 27 June for Kobe and will subsequently proceed to Balik Papan to refuel and will reach Singapore on about 20 July. The vessel is camouflaged as the LCRINNA and will be ready to proceed from 25 July from Singapore. The Naval Attaché assumes that she will be controlled from there by Naval Staff and proposes departure via "Lilie" and "gelb Caesar". Captain von Ruckteschell will be among the passengers as far as Singapore.

Naval Staff informed the Attaché in Tokio that the AQUILA III has orders to sail according to the proposal of Tokio and that it is understood from an inquiry from "Erica" to AQUILA III that the latter is expected in the Sunda Strait, while the previous sailing instructions were made out to the Malacca Strait. The Naval Attaché in Tokio should at once send relevant instructions if diversion into the Sunda Strait is necessary. (See Telegram 1400.)

Further, the inquiry of the Naval Attaché in Tokio on boundaries of the operational areas for submarines in the Indian Ocean was answered by Telegram 2330 to the effect that these boundaries are not yet fixed and it is not desirable that they be given to supply ships. Only waiting areas should be given to the BRAKE. No attack by our submarines is to be feared on passage there.

Ship "28" was informed by Radiogram 2203 that our submarine MARCO POLO passed 26° E. on 18 June and is expected at the rendezvous planned on 15 July; further that a Japanese submarine-cruiser was seriously damaged by enemy gunfire directed by radar near Kiska in thick fog. The enemy was not seen.

Ship "28" was informed by Radiogram 2244 that the MARCO POLO retains freedom of action north of the connecting line KS 33 - LQ 58 and that the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN will soon finish supplying and will return to Batavia on the same route as she took outward bound. Sailing date from KS will be transmitted.

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN received orders to return to Batavia on the same route as she took outward bound, after supplying the six submarines. The seventh boat will not be supplied. Connecting line KS 33 - LQ 58 may not be crossed

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

to the north. Copy of Telegram 1/Skl I k 1834/43 Gkdos.
Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance by 37 planes was detected up to 16°
W. in the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located
at 1012 in AL 3720, at 1324 in BE 4640 and at 1326 in BE 9656.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Destroyers Z "24" and Z "37" left Paulliac at noon
for Royan to carry out maneuvers. An enemy air attack was
carried out with strong forces and from a high altitude on
St. Nazaire from 1649 to 1758. One patrol boat sank in the
southern harbor as a result of a direct hit. A submarine
pen received a direct hit without appreciable damage being
caused. Two light hits were scored on the new east lock
which was slightly damaged.

Channel Coast:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according
to plan. A mine was swept near Calais by a motor minesweeper
flotilla. Torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" were several times
attacked by two fighter-bombers during the night of 27 June while
under way from Cherbourg to Le Havre. T "2" was slightly
damaged. The boats went on from Le Havre to Boulogne in the
evening.

Starting at 2322 British long-range batteries shelled one of our
convoys off Cape Gris Nez with 50 rounds. Fire was returned
by Batteries "Todt" and "Lindemann". According to land
observations at dusk, it was still possible to see that the
first enemy salvos were straddling.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

According to instructions from Naval Staff to break up the operational readiness of Naval Artillery Battalions 612 and 682 for Operation "Gisela" (see War Diary 16 June), for which particulars were issued by Quartermaster Division, Group West proposes that: three batteries of Naval Artillery Battalion 682, each consisting of six 7.5 cm anti-aircraft guns (French) be transferred to Nantes to reinforce anti-aircraft defense; the 4th and 5th batteries be left for reinforcement on the Mediterranean coast; three batteries of Naval Artillery Battalion 612, each consisting of six 7.5 cm anti-aircraft guns (French) be left in La Pallice to reinforce anti-aircraft defense; the 4th battery be used in the mouth of the Seine; the personnel of the 5th battery remain at the disposal of Admiral, Atlantic Coast and the materiel at the disposal of High Command, Navy.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has no objections to this proposal. Quartermaster Division will take care of further arrangements. Relevant Telegrams 1/Skl 1759/43 Gkdos. Chefs., 1/Skl 18108/43 Gkdos. and 1/Skl 1815/43 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume X.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan. Minesweeping activity was hampered by bad weather during the night of 28 June. Six boats of the 13th Patrol Boat Flotilla were transferred from Rotterdam to Cuxhaven.

As now reported, the number of enemy planes shot down in the attack on one of our convoys near Scheveningen on 27 June has risen from six to nine.

In an enemy fighter attack on a minesweeper group of the 13th Patrol Boat Flotilla off Walcheren, patrol boat VP "2019" was badly damaged and burned out. The boat was beached near Westkapelle. Slight damage and casualties were caused through gunfire on three further patrol boats. Three of the attacking planes were shot down.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Two Russian submarines were detected on the Arctic coast. Thirty five planes were detected on operation over the North Sea. One enemy plane each flew in south and northwest of Sola as well as over Bergen in the morning of 27 June. Our photographic reconnaissance on the north and west coasts of Scotland and of the Shetland Islands was incomplete on 27 June owing to weather conditions and revealed no appreciable information. In the Arctic Ocean five small steamers and two coastal vessels were sighted in Belushya Guba and four small ships in Motka Bay.

Own Situation:

An enemy air attack on a submarine chaser group near Nordkyn was repulsed at noon on 27 June. Five men were wounded by gunfire.

Twenty eight ships were escorted north and 19 south. Eight ships were not able to continue their passage in the area of Admiral, Arctic Coast owing to shortage of escort vessels.

Destroyer Z "27" reports plans to leave Bergen at 1400 with destroyer Z "30", to anchor during the night of 28 June in Nordguban and during the night of 29 June in Roervik, reaching Narvik at 0100 on 1 July (see Telegram 1125).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

A smoke-screen was laid over Kronstadt at 0800 and harassing fire was carried out simultaneously on our coastal strip of the Bay. Shipping and air activity was on the usual scale. In the Voronka sector the enemy carried out surprise attacks on our positions with heavy mortars and 4.5 cm anti-aircraft guns on 24 and 25 June. Our own fire silenced the enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Four ELM/J mines were swept in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, in the Baltic Sea entrances, two of them by a Danish minesweeper.

First degree of readiness was again cancelled.

Escort service was carried out in the entire Baltic Sea area without incident. It covered seven troop transports and three steamers.

It has not yet been possible to lay barrages "Nashorn" XIa and XIIa owing to bad weather.

Operations Staff, Baltic reports:

"After overcoming the first troubles and initiating the crews, the coastal minelayers have proved to be very satisfactory. As there are also prospects of success as torpedo carriers, the refitting of two to four boats is requested; this is possible according to the views of Commanding Admiral, Fleet and Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic. From use of torpedo-minelayers an incentive to the Finns to use their PT boats more is also expected. Care etc. of torpedoes is, circumstances permitting, possible in Finnish PT boat bases, so that great expenditure on our part may be avoided."

The question is at present being investigated by Quartermaster Division.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "172" sank the British steamer CORNISH CITY (4,950 BRT), carrying coal for Bahia, in the north Atlantic 420 miles northeast of Cape de Roque.

CONFIDENTIAL

23 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

The expected convoy has not yet been detected by Group "Trutz".

Six submarines which left France are making for the area around CG 15 as their operational area, where it is planned to station them for operations against north-south convoy traffic.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day the enemy flew into the west area with numerous formations, some strong ones, and attacked traffic installations, airfields and the submarine base of St. Nazaire. For particulars see Daily Situation and Situation West Area. From a total of 180 planes eleven have up to now been reported shot down at St. Nazaire.

Strong enemy formations attacked various towns in the Rhine province during the night of 28 June concentrating on Cologne; there were low clouds and a strong wind. The very heavy damage cannot yet be estimated. According to reports received up to now, 22 of the attacking planes were shot down by night fighters and two by anti-aircraft guns.

It is suspected that about 15 enemy planes dropped mines in coastal waters in the area of La Rochelle and the mouth of the Gironde.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force continued reconnaissance and air defense. In the afternoon 41 fighter-bombers attacked shipping targets in Pantelleria, observing bomb hits.

Serious damage was caused in Leghorn at about noon by a strong formation of heavy enemy bombers. For particulars see Daily Situation. Five of the attacking planes were shot down by our anti-aircraft guns and five others by Italian fighters. Olbia was attacked at the same time. No serious damage was caused.

Two airfields on Sardinia were attacked in the afternoon. Two of our own planes and one Italian plane were destroyed; five enemy planes were shot down.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Only one of the two aircraft carriers which left Gibraltar in the morning put in again in the evening of 27 June. The second did not follow until 0930, escorted by five destroyers. The WARSPITE, QUEEN ELIZABETH, FORMIDABLE and nine destroyers put out at 1830 in the direction of the Mediterranean. Firing exercises are presumed as gunfire was heard at 2100. Twelve motor launches left in the afternoon for the Mediterranean.

Single ships and small convoys in both directions were observed off the Algerian coast. There was lively shipping in the area of the north and east coasts of Tunisia. The transfer of landing vessels from Algerian ports to the east seems to be continuing.

A clear picture cannot yet be gained concerning the size and destination of the large convoy movement, which has been proceeding east since 26 June, as strong defense makes our air reconnaissance extremely difficult. However, it appears as if this movement, at least parts of it, goes out via Sousse. The Gulf of Gabes as well as La Valetta were not covered. Our fighters reported again one aircraft carrier in a convoy which was sighted in the morning north of Bizerta. The report should be treated with reserve. Many warships and merchantmen were sighted in Bizerta. There was only a small number of vessels in Pantelleria and Sfax.

Submarines were reported in the evening of 27 June near Bastia and Naples and on 28 June near Naples and Rhodes.

According to a photograph, three French Alexandria destroyers were apparently lying in Tobruk. Whether they were under way to West Africa through the Mediterranean or ready for operations in the Mediterranean remains to be seen. There were no ships in Bardia and Sollum.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla has been lying in immediate readiness since 2000 in Empedocle for operations against special targets.

German Naval Command, Italy reports: Minelaying operation by ~~the~~ POMMERN and BRANDENBURG completed according to plan. Further expansion of defensive barrages is proceeding but is very seriously impaired by the sudden withdrawal of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla. There are no targets for operations by PT boats. The 7th PT Boat Flotilla was transferred to Cagliari.

Group West reports: When choosing Toulon as a PT boat berth it was established that about 15,000 tons of ammunition belonging to the Italians were still stored in the area of the arsenal. For reasons of safety transfer is requested, to which local Italian offices do not agree.

Naval Staff is requested to press this demand to the Italians.

For particulars see War Diary, Part C, Volume VIII.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Supply traffic to the islands was carried out according to plan. Enemy planes unsuccessfully bombed the convoy VOLTURNO proceeding from Maddalena to Spezia. The weekly report of German Naval Command, Italy gives a summary of traffic with Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica for the period from 18 to 24 June. Copy see Telegram 1035. To this German Naval Command reports:

"The organization of supplies has improved since, through Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the responsibilities of the Transport Operations Staff, Chief, Supply and Transport and Deputy for German Sea Transportation in the Balkans were clearly defined and Commander, Supply and Transport, Messina Straits received increased authority. Enemy air activity concentrated on most vulnerable supply points. In addition, increased air activity; enemy submarine activity as usual. Supplies to Sicily and Corsica satisfactory, to Sardinia bad."

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In connection with the transfer of ships from France to Italy altogether 25 neutral ships totalling 94,180 BRT and 123 French ships totalling 439,301 BRT put into Italian ports up to and including 28 June. Two ships totalling 8,526 BRT were lost.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The DRACHE was transferred from Piraeus to Patras to carry out a minelaying operation.

Other tasks in the Aegean Sea were carried out according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

One submarine was reported at 1850 40 miles south of Sudak. Submarine U "19" unsuccessfully chased a westbound submarine 35 miles west-southwest of Batum. Slight shipping was observed off the Caucasian coast.

Own Situation:

Submarine U "18" entered Sevastopol to replenish torpedoes. Two Italian midget submarines are operating 60 miles southeast of Constanta. Enemy planes unsuccessfully bombed the patrol line in Temriuk Bay during the night of 27 June. For the night of 28 June it is planned that four boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla shall operate southeast of Gelendzhik, that two boats of the 11th PT Boat Flotilla shall operate east of Feodosiya and that ship "19" and the XANTEN shall carry out a chase in the area of Cape Tarchankutzk - Sevastopol.

Twenty mines were swept from the enemy anti-submarine barrage north of Sevastopol.

Convoy traffic proceeded without incident.

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VIII. Situation East Asia.

The assistant of the Japanese Naval Attaché states that, according to Japanese views, the U.S. General Staff and Naval Staff have been observing the military situation in the Pacific with rising interest for several months and are trying to convince Roosevelt that the Pacific is a much more important theater of war for the U.S.A. than Europe. The factors given as a basis for this view by American military circles are as follows: the threatening situation in China, increasing economic penetration of the Far East by Japan, the hopelessness of obtaining airfields in the Russian Far East area; these are set out in memorandum dated 28 June in War Diary, Part C, Volume XV. Finally the report draws attention to the easing of the situation as a whole and the necessity of a closer co-operation between the members of the Tri-Partite Pact, not only in military spheres but also in those of propaganda, in case the enemy pressure at present concentrated on Germany were, in fact, partially diverted to Japan.

No actual daily reports on the situation were received.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

Nothing to report.

Conference on the Situation with Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

a. German Naval Command, Italy has reported minelaying plans for the protection of Sardinia near Cape Mannu and off Alghero. Mines against surface vessels and anti-submarine barrages will be laid. A depth setting of 10 and 20 m. is planned for the latter. With regard to the anti-submarine barrages, it seems necessary to reconsider a depth setting of 20 m. as, according to the views of Naval Staff, enemy submarines will either be at periscope depth or at greater depths. Chief, Naval Staff orders that German Naval Command, Italy examine with Commander, Submarines, Italy how enemy submarines are assumed to behave when approaching and operating off a coast which is probably controlled from the air. In addition the relevant orders to German Naval Command, Italy include basic agreement, advice to avoid barrages in the form of a straight line and information that a further allocation of mines from home is not possible at present as stocks are exhausted. Requirements will have to be covered from stocks stored in the Italian area or from earlier allocations from home. Further supplies of anti-sweeping devices are, however, possible at any time. Requirements are to be reported.

b. Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff reports that through the loss of the first two BV 222's in Biscarosse and through delays in further conversion of the next two planes, the date when establishment of the first BV squadron is completed will be postponed until the end of the year. Two planes are to be expected in August and one plane each per month from September.

II. Chief, Naval Communications Division reports on the setting up of a research section in the I.G. Farben, which is working on the questions which concern the Communications Experimental Command. The Navy approves of this measure.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

In addition a telemeter committee of the Reich Marshal has been formed, to which a representative of the Navy should be sent.

III. Quartermaster General: Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North has reported on the first successful use of line-carrying rockets, balloons and flame throwers during the enemy air attack off Scheveningen.

IV. The Naval Attaché's Section reports that, according to information from the Spanish Secretary of the Navy to the Naval Attaché in Madrid, the ammunition losses at Ferrol are not as serious as at first appeared. Losses in heavy ammunition especially were smaller than had been assumed.

In a Highly Restricted Circle:

V. Report of Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division:

Group West has submitted detailed views, as announced, concerning the passage of submarines through the Channel: It is only possible to proceed on the surface on the way to Boulogne, as the waters are too shallow. The outer route in deeper water is just sufficient for submerging, but is not favorable for proceeding submerged on account of the navigational difficulties. This outer route has not been under control for 1½ years and is, therefore, impossible. Submerged passage is only possible en route from Boulogne to Le Havre to a small extent. The route from Le Havre to Cherbourg can be covered in one night, proceeding surfaced. The distance can be covered completely or partially submerged, however here and there navigation is difficult. The route from Cherbourg to Brest cannot be covered in one night, even in winter, proceeding surfaced. Passage on the surface during the day, even in convoy, seems to be out of the question owing to danger from the air. Therefore escorted passage by night and the remainder of passage submerged is to be considered.

The enemy will counter continuous submarine transfer with increased use of ground and moored mines, with operations by light naval forces and increased operations by the

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Air Force, making full use of his location system. The forces of our own minesweeper and escort units are not in a position to deal with the increased demands arising from this. At least, forces would have to be brought up from the Norwegian area and from the west coast. Owing to the air danger it will be necessary to enter intermediate ports in the Channel area. The submarines will be exposed to very great danger by lying in the ports, as protection of pens is lacking and anti-aircraft and day fighter defense is insufficient.

Chief, Naval Staff orders that nevertheless an attempt should be made. The danger to submarines in the intermediate ports emphasized by Group West should be eliminated by lying on the bottom.

VI. Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the memorandum of Naval Staff, Operations Division (see War Diary 28 June). Chief, Naval Staff intends to report first to the Fuehrer personally on its contents and then to present the memorandum to the Fuehrer.

According to a report from Admiral, Fuehrer Headquarters, the Fuehrer remarked during a conference on the situation on 24 June, when reviewing the Tunis disaster, that it is useless to shut one's eyes to this reverse. New achievements and deeds, not propaganda, must wipe out the mark. Not only the Italians but we too have made serious mistakes. It must be admitted that new German naval warfare has really achieved the most that is humanly possible. If all authorities had worked in this manner before, the outcome would perhaps have been different.

Special Items.

I. Chief of Staff, Naval Staff went to the Headquarters of Army General Staff for conferences. Further conferences are planned with Chief of the Air Force General Staff and, if possible, with Chief, Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Naval Intelligence Division has drawn up and explained sketches of British landing craft and vessels as of 15 May 1943. Copy (restricted) No. 67/3 in War Diary, Part B, Volume V.

Situation 29 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

Regarding the intelligence report on the arrival of a large troop transport in Casablanca (see War Diary 26 June), it is rightly stated by Naval Intelligence Division that, according to experiences gained, the transportation of 20,000 or 30,000 men on board a troop transport of 35,000 BRT and of 8,000 men on board a troop transport of 20,000 BRT is considered quite out of question, even for short runs. The transportation of so many troops on a single ship is also such an extraordinary risk that the accuracy of the report must be questioned, quite apart from the fact that the Allies have at their disposal a sufficient number of troop transports (see letter 1841).

2. Own Situation:

No reports were received from our ships in foreign waters.

Naval Staff informed Ship "28" by Radiogram 2302 of the position of Japanese submarines on 1 and 10 July in accordance with information from the Naval Attaché in Tokio dated 28 June. (See War Diary 28 June). In addition, Naval Staff continued instructions to Ship "28" on the political situation with Radiogram 1432. The occupied countries of Europe and, in addition, Sweden and Ireland are dealt with in this.

All vessels in foreign waters were informed by Radiogram 1803 that an Allied vessel reported an engagement with three south-bound destroyers at 5°42' S., 152°23' E. on the morning of 26 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Thirty four planes were detected over the Bay of Biscay. One British vessel each was located at 1405 in BF 5090, at 1616 in BF 5040 and at 2230 in BE 6260.

Our air reconnaissance reported at 1025 a cruiser in BF 1599 on course 240° proceeding at moderate speed. In the sea area southeast of Cork 15 - 20 merchantmen were sighted at the same time over a large area and on various courses.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ELM/J mine was swept on 28 June near St. Jean de Luz and a further one was swept by mine-exploding vessel "122" off the Gironde on 29 June. The mine-exploding vessel was badly damaged. Escort duties were carried out according to plan.

Group West issued orders, for bringing in submarine U "180", for destroyers Z "24" and Z "37" to proceed at about 1530 on 30 June from point 446 with an average cruising speed of 23 knots to the rendezvous with the submarine in BF 7643. It is planned that forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West shall meet her on return passage at point "Gabel". If the engines of one of the destroyers should break down, the remaining destroyer should continue the operation. The Group reports fuel requirements for this operation as 620 cbm. (See Telegram 2050).

Group West reported on 27 June that a deep enemy barrage is suspected in BF 9223 and that this sea area was planned for maneuvers of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. Therefore Naval Staff has instructed the Group to make the training area of the Flotilla outside the 200 m. line, as the mine situation in the inner part of the Bay of Biscay is not sufficiently under control, with the exception of the outer submarine routes which are regularly swept. According to the report of Danish fishermen, mines were suspected in the same area already in

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

September 1942. Naval Staff draws attention further to the fact that EFA mines remain in the same position, inactive, after the time-setting has run out.

To this Group West reports that the training area of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla was changed for the same considerations and was checked by Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. A further shifting of the area is not intended as the available forces of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West cannot operate further out to sea and it does not appear advisable because of co-operation with the Air Force. However, the new training area planned by Group West does not correspond to the instructions of Chief, Naval Staff with regard to crossing the 200 m. line. Naval Staff draws the attention of Group West to this fact and requests that the plans of the Group be adjusted to this order from Chief, Naval Staff, especially as only a slight shifting of the new area to the southwest would lead into deep water.

Channel Coast:

For brief report by the 15th Patrol Boat Flotilla on the enemy air raid and long-range shelling of our convoy during the night of 28 June, see Telegram 1232. Of the four enemy fighters, one was probably shot down. The long-range shelling lasted from 2315 to 0008. About 50 bursts were observed in sprayed firing. The shells mostly had **percussion** firing. Slight splinter effect was caused on the escort vessels. A fresh attack was made by enemy planes which dropped bombs behind the convoy.

For brief report of Naval Shore Commander, Pas de Calais on long-range bombardement and return fire by our batteries see Telegram 0105. Battery position "Bastion II" near Calais was attacked by a low-flying enemy plane with machine-guns. Four to five enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked one of our convoys north of Dunkirk at 2256. One plane was shot down. Torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" continued their passage from Boulogne to the Hook of Holland. A minelaying operation by the 4th PT Boat Flotilla is planned off Dartmouth during the night of 29 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Escort and patrol duties were carried out according to plan. One ELM mine was swept near Schiermonikoog and one ELM/J mine near Borkum. At noon on 28 June a plane sweeping mines was attacked near Terschelling by two Mosquitoes which were driven off by our fighters. A tug was attacked by two enemy planes with machine-guns on the Ems. One civilian was killed.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Two Russian submarines were again detected in the area of the Arctic Coast, including for the first time S "54". Twenty seven planes on operations over the North Sea and none of the Iceland squadrons were detected. According to the views of Air Commander, North (Baltic), the vessels in Belushya Guban, reported by our air reconnaissance on 28 June, comprise a convoy which was detected on 19 June north of Kolguev and which presumably was supplying the base for the first time since the breaking up of the ice. Seven enemy planes were transferred from Maryan Mar to Belushya.

Own Situation:

Our westbound convoy was attacked by enemy planes with four torpedoes which missed northeast of Vardoe during the night of 28 June. Three more Russian anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut in Kwaenangen Fjord on 28 June.

Destroyers Z "27" and Z "30" left Bergen on 28 June for transfer to Alta.

Weather party "Nussbaum" arrived in Narvik on 28 June. For brief report on evacuation of weather station "Nussbaum" see Telegram 2306.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Escort service covered 45 northbound and 30 southbound ships.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

The convoy which arrived in Batareinaya on 27 June, consisting of 1 transport, 2 tugs, 1 barge, 8 motor mine-sweepers and 5 guard boats, continued its passage to the west and was shelled by our coastal batteries for a short time. Otherwise no new information was received from the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and Kronstadt Bay.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

One ELM/A mine was swept in the western part of the Baltic near Falshoeft. The cruiser ADMIRAL SCHEER was escorted from Gdynia to Swinemuende.

Seventeen depth charges were dropped on an oil trace reported by a plane ten miles east of Revalstein. Continuous escape of oil and air was observed. The position is being watched. Submarine chase is also being carried out six miles south of Porkalla, but has been unsuccessful up to now.

Reinforcement of the 'Nashorn' barrage was not possible today either, owing to weather conditions. Fire from both sides and a scouting operation by us are reported on 26 June in the Voronka sector.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Group "Trutz" was dispersed, the expected convoy not having been intercepted. It is planned to send two submarines out off Lisbon, two others off the Canary Islands and to have the remaining boats return in single groups spread over the England - Gibraltar convoy route.

Refuelling is planned for the six outgoing submarines and subsequently further passage into the Caribbean Sea.

Based on reports from British planes, it is presumed that submarines U "449" and U "119", which have not reported again, were destroyed on return passage through the Bay of Biscay. Unfortunately the loss of submarines U "200" and U "194" must also be assumed in the Iceland passage. Therefore Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that no more submarines which are not equipped with a quadruple gun are to proceed from home waters to the north around Great Britain and into the Atlantic during the period of **short** nights. Concerning passage through the Channel see Situation West Area.

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 200 planes out on operations in the west area and three in the Mediterranean. During the course of the day two enemy planes were shot down belonging to formations which carried out the machine-gun attacks against traffic installations in the west area. Nine of our locomotives were put out of action. Three bomber formations, each consisting of 25 - 30 Fortresses escorted by fighters, flew in at about 1900; one formation attacked the industrial plants of Le Mans. This was the first attack by a close American bomber formation in almost ten tenths cloud. Our fighters shot down one of the planes.

Nineteen planes probably mined coastal waters in the area of Brest.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our Air Force carried out reconnaissance on a large scale along the North African coast and in the Sicilian Channel. It is planned to carry out an attack with strong bomber forces against shipping targets and harbor installations in Bone during the night of 29 June.

During the night of 28 June the enemy also attacked Messina and Reggio. No military damage was caused. Only slight damage was caused also in an attack by light bombers on Comiso during the day.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing to report.

Special Items.

1. According to radio intelligence the previous U.S. plane markings will be extended immediately on both sides by two white rectangles of the length of the radius of the previous markings and breadth of the half radius. The whole marking is framed with red. Naval planes carry on the upper part of the wing a star and grey rectangles.

2. The evaluation service of the Foreign Office has obtained press reports from England and America which deal with the procedure of starting the planes for attack on Germany or Italy from England and having them land in North Africa or vice versa (pendulum or shuttle system.)

In addition a press report was evaluated which complains of insufficient activity by the U.S. Air Force over Europe during the month of April. Copies of reports in War Diary, Part C, Volume V.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The RODNEY left Gibraltar at noon eastbound with 4 destroyers and returned to port towards evening. A large

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

convoy consisting of 32 loaded steamers and also 2 monitors of the EREBUS class, 4 destroyers and 3 patrol boats entered the Straits of Gibraltar from the Atlantic. The greater part of the vessels, including the monitors, entered Gibraltar. In addition 3 large American tankers, escorted by 3 American destroyers, entered the Mediterranean and one of the tankers put into Gibraltar.

In the large convoy movement further single convoys were recognized. There were 20 merchantmen northwest of Bizerta shortly before midnight on 28 June and 60 - 70 ships northeast of Bizerta in the morning of 29 June, possibly an assembly of the above mentioned convoy with vessels which left Bizerta. The convoys reported on the previous days were not detected even by intensified air reconnaissance in the Tunisian area. It must still be assumed that the greater parts of them went on to the south and east.

Photographic reconnaissance of Bizerta showed a decided increase in landing craft in this harbor. Altogether 229 landing craft, including 34 LST's and LSI's were detected. It remains to be seen whether this unusual concentration, which was achieved by extensive withdrawal from the Algerian area, will be maintained and must then be taken as a preparation for imminent operations.

According to a report of German Naval Command, Italy, the alleged aircraft **carrier** reported on 28 June is probably a tanker.

A submarine was reported west-northwest of La Spezia.

According to air reconnaissance in the central Mediterranean, further lively air reconnaissance was observed over the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Gulf of Genoa.

In the eastern Mediterranean our air reconnaissance detected three destroyers in the afternoon of 28 June 25 miles northwest of Benghazi.

According to an intelligence report, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 3 torpedo boats and 4 minesweepers all British, arrived in Tripoli from Gibraltar on 23 June; these are to go on to the east.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Photographic reconnaissance of Port Said showed an increase of 8 ICT's as compared with 9 June. The departure of 2 LST's each of about 7,000 BRT, 1 LST of type DEWDALE and 1 LST having the form of a tanker with landing boats on deck is worth noting. Two freighters were also recognized with deck cargo, which included landing boats.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

Owing to the absence of worthwhile targets, no operations were carried out by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 28 June. In addition to the damage reported, the cruiser BARI was slightly damaged in the attack on Leghorn during the night of 27 June.

Five boats of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla left Cagliari at 1930 for the area of La Galite. One boat had to return before time owing to engine damage.

Two more boats of the 12th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla (motor minesweepers R "38" and R "211") left Marseilles for Leghorn. Two naval landing craft also left Marseilles for Toulon, while three freight-barges and two "Seeloewe" barges arrived in Marseilles on 28 June on the canal route.

An ammunition bunker of Naval Artillery Battalion 611 exploded in Marseilles, presumably as a result of carelessness when handling salute ammunition. Four men were killed. Owing to sabotage on a tunnel of the Marne branch canal, the transfer of barges on the Soane and on the Marne - Soane Canal is interrupted. The boats are being diverted. (See Telegram 2020).

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Traffic to the islands was carried out according to plan. No losses are reported.

Naval Staff, Operations Division has investigated whether further suitable vessels can be made available for transfer into the Mediterranean on the western railway section, in order to strengthen transport and operational facilities in the Mediterranean area, as, according to information from Quartermaster Division, four freight trains will not be in use on

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

the western railway section from 1 July. Two freight trains are sufficient to transfer the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla. Examination has proved that further naval landing craft cannot be withdrawn for the Mediterranean as the number of new constructions will be very small until fall 1943. According to a statement from Naval (Ship) Construction Division, Supply and Finance Branch, barges are not suitable for transfer across country, as they become leaky. Their loading and storage on transport cars is also difficult as a different foundation for each boat is necessary. Apart from the vessels provided for up to now, no others are available for transfer on the western land route from 1 July. Information to this effect was sent to Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, the harbor of Polis on Cyprus has been specially fitted up for U.S. shipping. A camouflaged American cruiser of 6,000 BRT is said to have been stationed there for some time. Fourteen submarines are said to be in the submarine base of Lazo on Cyprus, of which ten have small landing craft for commandos on board.

The information obtained by air reconnaissance has not confirmed these statements up to now.

Own Situation:

Minelaying operations in the area of Corfu and near Antipaxos were carried out according to plan by the DRACHE or BARLETTA and MOROSINI. Convoy service in the Aegean Sea was carried out without incident.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

One steamer, one minesweeper and one escort were sighted off the Caucasian coast in the area off Adler on northwesterly course.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

The operation by the 1st PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 28 June had to be broken off owing to weather conditions. Four boats of the Flotilla were operating in the sea area southeast of Gelendzhik during the night of 29 June. The patrol line in Temriuk Bay had an engagement with enemy gunboats shortly after midnight, of which one was probably destroyed by naval landing craft MFP "401". Slight damage was sustained by our boats.

Submarines U "24" and U "20" arrived in Constanta.

Four enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked the Feodosiya - Taman transport at 0542 off the harbor entrance of Feodosiya. During the enemy submarine attack reported on this transport on 28 June three torpedoes were out-maneuvered and a fourth hit a naval landing craft without exploding.

The laying of enemy mines was observed at 0500 in the northern outlet of the Temriuk channel. Traffic to Temriuk has been diverted. Four minesweeping planes have been sent out.

Supply and transport traffic was carried out according to plan.

VIII. Situation East Asia.

Nothing to report.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance.

The well-known British military commentator, Liddle Hart, writes that it has become clear in England recently how gigantic the preparatory work for an invasion must be in view of the strong enemy defense positions. Meanwhile the public is indulging in exaggerated conceptions concerning the size of the total forces which are at the disposal of the Allies for an invasion. He refers to an address by Churchill on 31 Oct. 1942, according to which German forces in France and the Netherlands were even then just as large as their own. The promise to force the enemy to unconditional surrender will be difficult to keep in the near future in view of the strong positions which he occupies in Europe. The best chance for the Allies would be to develop new means and methods to solve this problem. The South African Prime Minister, Smuts, in a speech also gave a warning against underestimating German powers of resistance and emphasized that by far the most difficult part of the war is ahead. However, it seems probable, he said, that the battle in Europe will start this year.

Contrary to critical press remarks, Roosevelt stated that war activities on the home front and production of war materiel are developing satisfactorily. According to an official statement, the production of steel in the U.S.A. increased in the year 1942 to 86 million tons. 91½ million tons are expected in 1943.

According to an Exchange report, the U.S. Government is not inclined to deliver lend-lease material to Argentina until this country has broken off her connections with the Axis.

According to the Daily Herald, the food situation in India has become more acute. The rice ration in Bombay was again cut by one third.

Special Items.

I. In connection with the measures against enemy anti-submarine measures, Armed Forces High Command, Intelligence

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Division, Secret Intelligence Section, Naval Liaison presented during the course of June the following reports:

- a. Report on new anti-submarine weapon "Hedgehog".
- b. Report on attacks on submarines by fishing vessels, type GRIMSBY TRAWLER; particulars about direction-finder sets and depth charges.

Both reports gave valuable data for intelligence on enemy anti-submarine measures.

- c. Report on search gear of planes for detecting submarines, with exact statements of antenna and wave lengths of enemy telemeter sets for submarine reconnaissance.
- d. Report on rotating Gamma sets as directional gear against planes on American vessels.
- e. Photostat copy of Canadian official instructions for the radar set SCR 602 dated 26 Sept. 1942 for the first 25 sets of this kind, which gives almost complete information on this search gear, the particulars of which were not known up to now.

Foreign Armies West transmits a report received from Commanding General, Armed Forces, South which the Italian Naval Attaché in China received from a reliable source. According to this, the British Naval Liaison Office in Washington requested the Admiralty urgently at 1900 Rome time on 23 June to inform Roosevelt before altering orders to the convoys destined for the joint operation in the northern Mediterranean and inquired:

- a. whether operations by commandos or the main operation or both have been postponed,
- b. whether the whole expedition corps is to stay in the ports of North or West Africa longer than two weeks, instead of proceeding direct to the three islands, or whether the steamers are only to stop at the above ports as temporary anchorages, without landing troops and materiel, in order to await the carrying out of air operations.
- c. whether the convoys are to remain in west Moroccan ports or enter the Mediterranean one by one.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

d. whether the convoys, when under way to the targets, will stay close to the African shore or proceed further to the north.

A further telegram of 2200 is said to contain the request of Admiral Leahy that Admiral Cunningham instruct the convoys direct, should the necessity arise, to set course for Casablanca or to divide them between Gibraltar and the North African ports in expectation of further decisions. The telegram is said to contain the information that the American Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force were informed of the possibility of an alteration in the original plans.

The report was transmitted to German Naval Command, Italy, Group South and Group West with reservations. The form and contents of the report indicate its plausibility. In connection with the already reported statement by a British naval officer at Alexandria, according to which the imminent expedition has been postponed, the telegrams of the British Naval Liaison Office at Washington would confirm that some alteration in the enemy plans is either intended or has already been ordered.

The mention of the three islands as well as the distinction between commando operations and main operations is extremely significant.

Situation 30 June.

I. War in Foreign Waters.

1. Enemy Situation:

According to numerous submarine reports, enemy ships are now only sailing with topmasts taken down and sometimes with masts cut off to below the height of the bridge. Anti-aircraft gun positions and look-out stations are erected on the mast stumps and are sometimes armored. Numerous anti-aircraft guns are noticeably mounted on superstructures and particularly high substructures.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

The last submarine supplied reported in the evening of 29 June from KR 49 having refuelled according to plan from the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN. Naval Staff assumes that the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN left point "Lotte" on 27 June and expects her to arrive at Batavia at the earliest on 12 July. The successful refuelling deserves full appreciation as an essential contribution to submarine warfare.

The positions of Japanese submarines reported by the Naval Attaché in Tokio (see War Diary 28 June) do not seem to be without objection in view of the movements of the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN and Ship "28", the exact position of which is not known. Therefore the Naval Attaché in Tokio received instructions by Telegram 1815 to ensure with the Japanese Navy that attacks are prohibited and to request and report approximate plans of Japanese submarines.

The Naval Attaché in Tokio was also informed about the refuelling of submarines carried out by the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN in Telegram 1815, with the additional remark that the driving pinion for the cam shaft of the main port engine of the SCHLIEMANN has to be renewed. Ship "28" was also informed by Radiogram 2201 of the completion of the refuelling and sailing orders for the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN and instructed that an inquiry is being made in Tokio in view of the reported Japanese submarines, the intentions of which are not clear here.

The CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN was informed of the views of Naval Staff on her situation by Radiogram 1/Skl I k 1866/43 Gkdos. Chfs. Appreciation for the successful refuelling carried out was expressed to her. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Volume I.

All vessels in foreign waters were informed of new American plane markings by Radiogram 1743 and were instructed by Radiogram 2219 that enemy ships now only proceed with topmasts taken down. (See Enemy Situation.) The Naval Attaché in Tokio should as far as possible fit all blockade-runners up accordingly. In any case the topmasts should be taken down, as ships with topmasts in the Atlantic are extremely noticeable.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Situation West Area.

1. Enemy Situation:

Twenty five planes were detected on reconnaissance over the Bay of Biscay. An unknown warship was located in BE 3140 shortly after midnight on 30 June.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Two ELM/J mines each were swept off Bayonne and off La Pallice.

Naval Staff agrees with plans of Group West for meeting submarine U "180" (see War Diary 29 June). For the time being the necessary quantity of fuel should be taken from the July quota. Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla left Royan at 1530 with destroyers Z "24" and Z "37" to meet submarine U "180".

On the situation regarding mine-exploding vessels on the Atlantic coast, Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West reports that mine-exploding vessel "122", which was once more on operation from 25 June, was again put out of action, probably for a long time, on 29 June through a heavy mine explosion; at present, therefore, only one large and three small mine-exploding vessels are available. (See Telegram 1630.)

Channel Coast:

Torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" were transferred from Boulogne to the Hook of Holland. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla returned from minelaying operation. Detailed report has not yet been received. An enemy plane unsuccessfully attacked the 3rd battery of Naval Artillery Battalion 823 west of Ostend at 1325 with machine-guns. Six enemy planes approached Cherbourg at 1800 but turned off without dropping bombs after being fired on by Air Force anti-aircraft guns. An unsuccessful bombing attack was made on the convoy of steamer SIRIUS after it left Dunkirk. Ship's anti-aircraft guns shot down two of the four attacking planes. For brief report from Commander, 15th Patrol Boat Flotilla see Telegrams 0820 and 1630.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items.

According to instructions of Chief, Naval Staff, an attempt should be made to bring submarines through the Channel to the west. Naval Staff, Submarine Division plans to provide three submarines for this, of which two will be ready at Kiel at the beginning of July. Groups West and North received instructions accordingly, with copy to Commanding Admirals, Defenses, West and North and Naval Staff, Submarine Division, to make preparations for a single transfer of one to three submarines in a group under the code word "Gute Hoffnung". Copy of order 1/Skl I a 1868/43 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Volume II b.

III. North Sea, Norway, Northern Waters.

1. North Sea:

Altogether 22 ELM/J mines were swept north of the islands of Ameland to Juist. Escort service was carried out according to plan. Torpedo boats T "2", "5" and "18" will transfer from Rotterdam to Wesermuende during the night of 30 June.

Special Items.

In view of the ordered transfer of the 11th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, North Sea Station has requested that a motor minesweeper flotilla from another command area be made available for the time being to Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North at least for the duration of the dockyard period of the 9th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla which is the only one left in his area. Copy of application and the negative decision of Naval Staff as per 1/Skl I op 17082/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume d.

2. Norway, Northern Waters:

Enemy Situation:

Over the North Sea seventeen planes on reconnaissance and one plane of the Iceland squadrons were detected. Photographic reconnaissance established the presence of 15 steamers, 2 tankers and 20 coastal craft in Loch Ewe on 29 June. According to aerial reconnaissance there were about 20 ships in the evening

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

of 30 June 50 miles east of Cromer on northerly course and 7 ships and 2 escorts on the same course 20 miles east of Great Yarmouth.

Own Situation:

Submarine chaser "1206" was attacked with three torpedoes which missed by an enemy submarine near Tanahorn at 1445 on 28 June. Russian batteries fired three rounds on a motor boat in Petsamo Fjord in the afternoon of the same day. Four further Russian anti-submarine inertia-contact mines were cut in Kwaenangen Fjord on 29 June. In the area Vardoe on 29 June 16 enemy planes were forced to turn off during five flights, sometimes when already on the run-in to the target. The attack was not carried out. An enemy plane twice approached one of our tanker convoys at 1950 on 29 June near Stadlandet. The plane was driven off by the convoy's anti-aircraft fire and by an Ar 196. Escort service covered 32 northbound and 30 southbound ships. Nine ships had to remain lying in harbor in the area of Admiral, Arctic Coast owing to shortage of escort forces. Admiral, North Norwegian Coast also reports shortage of escort vessels.

Group North/Fleet reports plans to use the tanker FRANKEN in the Arctic area during the second half of July in order to make the supplying of destroyers and torpedo boats easier (see Telegram 1612). The decision lies with Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea.

1. Enemy Situation:

A Finnish coastal battery fired 209 rounds on an eastbound convoy consisting of 2 tugs, 1 barge and 16 escort vessels during the night of 29 June. Russian batteries returned the fire. The convoy put up a smoke-screen. It is believed that one hit was scored. Otherwise shipping movements in Kronstadt Bay were unchanged.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic.

Reinforcement of barrages "Lashorn" XIa and XIIa was carried out according to plan in the Gulf of Finland. The attack on the oil trace reported in AC 3537 is being continued.

V. Submarine Warfare.

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Group "Trutz" was divided into three groups of three or four submarines which, as Groups "Geier I, II and III" will proceed east behind one another with a day's run between them at about 36° N. and will haul off in a wide circle to the north from CF 90. After that they will take up CG 10 as operational area to make attacks on convoys. A roving convoy operation is not planned.

For the time being submarines U "387", "277", "307" and "713" are at the disposal of Commanding Admiral, Submarines, Norway. Thus seven submarines altogether have been handed over to Commanding Admiral, Submarines, Norway to carry out special tasks in Northern Waters.

Naval Staff, Submarine Division has received instructions on sparing French forces in the West Indies. Copy of order 1/Skl Ic 18495/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume IV. Further data on this question in War Diary, Part C, Volume VIII.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. Aerial Warfare.

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force had 100 planes out on operation in the west area and five in the Mediterranean. During the day the enemy carried out machine-gun attacks on traffic installations in which six locomotives were damaged. Two enemy planes were shot down.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

One hundred and three of our heavy bombers attacked shipping targets and harbor installations at Bone during the night of 29 June. Extensive fires were observed in the harbor and town area. No military damage was caused by the enemy Air Force in attacks during the same night on Reggio and Messina. Light and heavy bomber formations attacked airfields on Sicily during the day. However, only slight damage was caused. Only enemy reconnaissance is reported over Sardinia and central and northern Italy. For particulars see "Daily Situation".

3. Eastern Front:

The 4th Air Force carried out photographic reconnaissance of Batum. No reports were received from the 5th Air Force.

Special Items.

Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff has ordered trials to be carried out on the supplying of flying boats by submarines after arrival of the BV 222's at the 3rd Air Force; this is to be done in close co-operation with Commanding Admiral, Submarines. Reconnaissance missions of the squadron are not to be impaired. After the experiences gained in the Baltic Naval Staff, in agreement with the Naval Inspector, considers fuelling trials in the Bay of Biscay no longer necessary, as no new knowledge is to be expected but, on the other hand, there would be serious danger to the flying boat and the submarine owing to continuous threat from the air. Naval Staff requested Commander in Chief, Air Force, Operations Staff, therefore, to restrict refuelling trials of the BV 222's to the Baltic Sea.

CONFIDENTIAL

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea.1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The NELSON, RODNEY and one aircraft carrier are still at Gibraltar. No sighting reports have been received regarding the remaining four battleships and the second aircraft carrier which entered the western Mediterranean. According to Italian radio intelligence, it is suspected that the two ships of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class will pass through the Sicilian Channel into the eastern Mediterranean during the course of 1 July. However, no further proofs of this assumption have been received.

Photographic reconnaissance of Bizerta and Malta on 29 June showed a considerable increase of landing craft there so that some of the vessels sighted at sea on previous days may be connected with this. It is, however, possible that still more landing craft were withdrawn from the Algerian and Tunisian area to the east. For particulars of photographic evaluation of Bizerta and Malta see "Daily Situation".

Our air reconnaissance sighted at 1505 3 surfaced submarines in the area of Cape de Fer and at 1515 3 PT boats 60 miles north of Bone on northerly course. Presumably the same PT boats were detected at 1820 32 miles west of St. Pietro (Sardinia) proceeding at high speed on course 30°. At 1945 there were 8 merchantmen and 3 destroyers 30 miles north of Bougie on easterly course. According to a report by one of our submarines, there was an eastbound convoy at 2257 72 miles northeast of Benghazi. Four large ships were detected by our air reconnaissance at 1740 southwest of Benghazi on northerly course.

From Italian sources a submarine was reported at 0500 near Capri.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The 7th PT Boat Flotilla had no engagement with the enemy during the night of 29 June. Torpedo boat TA "9" arrived in Maddalena. Compartments I and II are full of water and the rudder is out of action. The boat had been on escort duties for supplies to Sardinia and was hit by a bomb during the night of 29 June.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Submarine U "453" torpedoed three steamers of an eastbound convoy at 2257 72 miles northeast of Benghazi and observed one explosion.

A naval motor transport section was destroyed by three direct hits during an enemy air raid at noon on Palermo. According to an Italian report, one mine Mark XVI was swept near Punta Stilo on 29 June.

German Naval Command, Italy asked on 29 June for urgent allocation of 820 EMC mines, 82 PB mines and 584 explosive floats to Toulon and for provision of 1252 UMB mines in Spezia. German Naval Command, Italy was informed by Naval Staff, Operations Division over the telephone that it is impossible to comply with this request to the full and in time. To this Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reported that the absence of the mine allocation means a serious weakening of the defensive strength of Italy, that the stocks available in Italy are in Sicily except for 648 EMC mines and that available minelayers cannot be used from Sicily owing to the air situation. The Admiral proposes that the 2090 mines ordered be calculated against the 750 EMC mines + 1000 UMB mines already allocated, so that only 340 more mines need to be allocated.

Naval Staff decided as follows:

"1. For the first minelaying operation 410 EMC mines with antenna firing and 200 m. of mooring rope, 41 cutting floats and 292 explosive floats are allocated under designation M 41. It is doubtful if the whole lot can be transferred to Toulon by 6 July as it will be necessary to take the last reserves from various depots at home and effect conversion in some cases. Approval, if necessary, of recourse to the reserves of Group West stored in Toulon from allocation MF 1. Group West has been informed.

2. No more EMC mines are available at home for the second minelaying operation. Naval Command, Italy is again examining the possibility of bringing up mines from stocks there or changing the barrage plans to EMF mines.

3. 1254 UMB mines of allocation M 38/39 will be fitted up accordingly and attempts will be made to effect delivery on time.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In order to speed up the transfer of mines and to avoid alterations, another kind of fitting or longer mooring rope are to be accepted as far as possible with mines of 1) and 3). Particulars should be settled direct with Mining and Barrage Inspectorate."

Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch and Group West received instructions accordingly.

The difficulties at present arising here emphasize urgently the necessity of increasing the material facilities of the mine by all possible means.

German Naval Command, Italy transmits a brief report on the return of Lieutenant Nieger (technical communications) from Tunisia. With six radio operators he evaded the capture of the combat group of the Army to which he was attached with the staff of German Naval Command, Tunisia and arrived after weeks of adventurous experiences in Marsala on 27 June. For copy see Telegram 0445. The report will be submitted to the Fuehrer. Commander in Chief, Navy has ordered a personal report by Lieutenant Nieger.

3. Sea Transport Situation:

Supplies to the island were carried out according to plan.

During an enemy air raid on Messina during the night of 29 June war transport KT "11" was again sunk at the quay by a bomb hit just after being raised.

Chief, Supply and Transport, Italy has submitted extensive statistics on sea transports in Italy from 1 Feb. 1942 to 1 May 1943. Copy as per 1/Skl 17992/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume XI.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The convoy of steamer TANAIIS was attacked at 0620 off Suda Bay by an enemy submarine with a torpedo which missed.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Submarine chase was started. An Italian plane reported an enemy submarine at 0945 30 miles southeast of the southern point of Rhodes. A third enemy submarine was reported by the convoy of steamer SINFRA at 1815 on 29 June 25 miles northwest of Leros.

The BULGARIA left Leros for a minelaying operation in the Dodecanese and the BARLETTA left Piraeus for Salonika. Eleven naval landing craft with tanks for Rhodes left Salonika escorted by submarine chaser UJ "2109". Otherwise transport traffic and escort duties were carried out according to plan.

Strong enemy flights headed north were reported on the east coast of Crete in the evening of 29 June.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Two PT boats fired torpedoes from a distance of about 3,000 m. at 0045 on the mole at Anapa; they exploded on the beach 500 m. west of the target without causing damage. The boats turned off after being fired on and put up a smoke-screen.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla had an engagement with an enemy patrol boat during the night of 29 June southeast of Gelendzhik. Two torpedoes from PT boat S "47" exploded before reaching the target in shallow water or in a net barrage. Our boats were located by searchlights from shore after the detonation, unsuccessfully shelled by coastal batteries of up to 13.5 cm and also fired on with machine-guns by naval reconnaissance planes for a time. The boats returned fire without any effect being observed. The attempt, made on return passage, to intercept the enemy PT boats returning to Anapa from the attack was without success.

No reports have been received yet from the reconnaissance line in Temriuk Bay.

The freight train ferry ship VITEZ burned out and was destroyed in the harbor of Temriuk through a fire in the fuel cargo. The cause is still unknown.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943

CONFIDENTIAL

Supply traffic was carried out according to plan. Ferry traffic across the Strait of Kerch was temporarily restricted as railway supplies broke down.

Special Items.

1. With regard to the development in the situation Group South announced demands for the new construction of the following vessels for the Black Sea:

1. Further construction of armed trawlers.

2. For submarine chase, in addition to the fitting-up of the first six war transports as submarine chasers, as already promised, and instead of the fishing steamers type Uhlenhorst requested up to now:

40 or
or
a. New construction of 8 minesweepers type
b. Fitting up of 8 further war transports
c. New construction of 8 enlarged armed trawlers with a speed of 12 knots, stronger armament and increased sea worthiness.

3. New transfer of 18 PT boats.

4. New transfer of 20 motor minesweepers.

5. New transfer of 18 naval landing craft (artillery) not counting the six already assigned from home production.

Investigation lies first with Quartermaster Division and Naval (Ship) Construction Division.

2. Concerning the air defense of the Danube delta, Group South rightly denies the responsibility of the Navy and advises co-operation between German Air Force authorities and the Rumanian Air Force. Copy of Telegram to Quartermaster Division as per l/Skl 18578/43 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Volume X.

CONFIDENTIAL

GLOSSARY

Aquila

Italian submarines used for transport between Bordeaux and the East.

AT mine

Moored mine.

BMC mine

Bomb mine, type C.

EFA mine

British moored influence mine.

ELM mine

British aerial mine.

ELM/A mine

British aerial mine with acoustic firing mechanism.

ELM/J mine

British aerial mine with induction firing mechanism.

EMC mine

German standard mine, type C. A contact mine against surface vessels.

EMF mine

German moored influence mine.

FZ mine

Non-contact mine.

Gisela

Code name for planned occupation of northern Spanish coast.

LMB mine

German aerial mine, type B. Weight 975 kg.

LMF mine

German aerial mine, type F.

Marco Polo

Code name for transfer of two submarines to Japan.

Route "Anton"

A German shipping route. Its geographical borders were: The French coast at 47° 30' N; 47° 30' N, 29° W; 43° N, 40° W; 37° N.

Seeloewe

Code name for planned invasion of England.

CONFIDENTIAL

TMB mine

German torpedo-tube mine, type B.

TMC mine

German torpedo-tube mine, type C.

UMB mine

German anti-submarine mine, type B.

Wunderland

Code name for operations of the SCHEER against Russian shipping in the White Sea during summer 1942.

Zaunkoenig

Anti-destroyer, acoustic homing torpedo.

(Bremen)

CONFIDENTIAL

